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This edited volume is the result of a special workshop funded by the 
Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada and held 
at the University of Calgary in 2006. The purpose of the workshop was 
to bring together a group of leading scholars in the two fields of what 
has been called “comparative religion” and “comparative philosophy.” The 
mandate was to explore the current state of affairs in these fields and to 
explore whether there can be a rapprochement between them. To further 
this task, it set out to investigate certain problems and/or to suggest al-
ternative approaches. While there may already be numerous specialized 
books in the fields of comparative philosophy and comparative religion, 
there are a limited number of scholars who can address both disciplines. 
Such scholars attended this workshop. It thus marked the beginning of an 
interdisciplinary and intercultural project to bring these scholars together 
to initiate discussion that would continue to take place on a regular basis.1 
The unique aspect of the workshop was that this was the first time to 
my knowledge that a group of scholars had been intentionally assembled 
where there were scholars with expertise in both areas of comparative 
philosophy and comparative religion. As such, it is a ground-breaking 
volume.
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While the division between the two disciplines of Religious Studies 
and Philosophy is commonplace in Western academia, this bifurcation 
does not necessarily apply in non-Western settings, where religion and 
philosophy tend to be integrated. As a result, when the disciplines are 
virtually mutually exclusive, as in the West, a full appreciation of non-
Western approaches to either religion or philosophy is not easily attained, 
and distortions, such as appropriation, often occur. Within the last ten 
years, there has been a concerted effort on the part of a number of schol-
ars to try to address these deficiencies, but it is necessary to distinguish 
this project from others that are occurring. It is not a project in inter-
religious dialogue, which occurs only among believers and practitioners. 
Nor is it an exercise in apologetics where one religion would maintain 
dominance. Instead, it is an academic activity, undertaken with the goal 
of re-examining many ideas that have been misappropriated or otherwise 
excluded in comparative studies. These errors have resulted from a trad-
itional approach where the religions and philosophies of non-Western 
peoples have been interpreted by reducing or manipulating their ideas and 
values to fit solely with Western concepts and categories. As such, this 
project is conducted with full awareness of the post-colonial critique of 
such enterprises. As a result, the overall aim of the project is not to reach 
a final solution or to recommend a definitive procedure – the intricate and 
often impenetrable jargon employed in many undertakings of comparative 
philosophy has been noted by many scholars. It is easy to get lost. This 
book seeks to avoid such interferences with a more modest endeavour of 
initiating constructive discussion.
In undertaking to organize this conference, there was also the in-
tention, in accordance with SSHRCC regulations, to have a significant 
number of Canadian scholars represented, and to have a balance of gender 
as well as of scholars at different stages of their career. The actual im-
petus for this conference resulted from two new joint appointments to 
the departments of Philosophy and Religious Studies at the University of 
Calgary in 2006. These two appointees are: Chris Framarin (Hinduism 
and Analytic Philosophy) and Katrin Froese (Chinese Philosophy/
Religions and Continental Philosophy). This brought about a critical mass 
of scholars in these departments working in the area of comparative re-
ligion and philosophy – adding to the work of Morny Joy (Comparative 
Method and Theory in History of Religions/Continental Philosophy) and 
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Tinu Ruparell (Hinduism and Christianity). The four of us comprised the 
organizing committee of this workshop. I take this opportunity to thank 
my Calgary associates for all their dedicated work, which helped to realize 
the conference. At this stage I would also like to acknowledge and thank 
the generous support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada, without whose grant to Scholarly Conferences and 
Workshops this venture – including publication of this volume – would 
not have been realized. The University of Calgary was also generous in 
granting both a Conference Grant and a Grant for a Visiting Speaker.
One of the central questions that interested us was how compara-
tive philosophy and religion would change if the concepts and categor-
ies of non-Western philosophies and religions were taken as primary in 
their terms of reference. This is the principal reason that we determined 
to frame this project as an exercise in intercultural philosophy and religion 
in a way that attempted to bridge the two various areas of study. While 
some scholars preferred to retain the term “comparative” – their approach 
was not uncritical and their usage was basically compatible with what we 
understand by the term “intercultural.” This workshop is timely and con-
stitutes a major contribution to the burgeoning field of intercultural study 
in philosophy and religion.
We each nominated a number of thinkers that we considered to be 
doing groundbreaking work in this area. Seven scholars accepted our invi-
tations. Of those who accepted, only five could come. Those who could not 
come submitted papers that were discussed at the conference. All papers 
were then revised as a result of the discussions. As a result, the volume 
comprises an excellent selection of essays that touch on vital issues in all 
the major religions and their relation to philosophy, from both substantive 
and methodological perspectives.
All participants were asked to reflect on the problems and difficul-
ties that they had encountered in their attempts to undertake work of 
such an interdisciplinary, intertextual, and intercultural nature. The essays 
that were presented at the workshop reflected the diverse nature of the 
dilemmas and insights that had been perceived already, or arose in the 
course of writing the workshop paper. The workshop examined the over-
lapping terrain between the fields of philosophy and religion. On the one 
hand, one workshop was particularly pertinent because it allowed not only 
for the examination of the religious undercurrents that have informed 
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philosophy, but also for the exploration of whether the division in the 
West has served to narrow the horizons of much contemporary Western 
philosophy in a way that excludes modes of thinking that are not amen-
able to its procedures of classification. On the other hand, the academic 
study of religions has often tended to focus on one aspect in an in-depth 
study of one particular religion, and it has made grandiose claims of simi-
larity with non-Western religions, based on broadly organized typologies 
of a phenomenological nature.2 This often led to vague generalizations or 
inaccurate accommodation in accordance with Western constructs.
In contrast, this workshop on intercultural philosophy and religion 
fostered a philosophical dialogue between diverse traditions that allowed 
for a re-examination within Philosophy and Religious Studies of ideas 
that have often previously been taken for granted. Such an approach also 
threw into question the predominant trend towards specialization in aca-
demia. In this spirit, the conference also encouraged interdisciplinary dis-
cussion between scholars working in a wide variety of cultural, religious, 
and philosophical fields. The book that has resulted from this workshop 
consists of thirteen essays, all of which address an issue or illustrate a 
problem in the interdisciplinary field of intercultural religion and philoso-
phy as it is presently conceived.
At this stage it would seem appropriate to delineate the understand-
ing of the notions of “intercultural philosophy and religion” that are being 
used here, as the concept “culture” is itself a loaded, if not overdetermined, 
word. In this context, we have adopted the term “intercutural” to acknow-
ledge its recent usage in a number of conferences and publications. It has 
come to be employed instead of the term “comparative” so as to distinguish 
its approach as one that neither privileges nor takes as normative Western 
concepts, categories, or methods. Such a usage of “intercultural” is to be 
applauded as it attempts to remedy what are viewed as past distortions 
and impositions.3 Yet any unqualified use of the term “intercultural” is 
unacceptable without further investigation of its implied meaning(s). This 
is because the term “culture” is by no means objective or innocent in the 
way that it is being applied today.4 In an article on human rights, Martin 
Chanock supplies a reason why the contemporary Western usage(s) of the 
word “culture,” are in need of interrogation because of its past compromised 
employment as an agent of imperial enculturation: “All we can say about 
‘culture’ comes from a history of imperialism, and from the current dual 
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framework of ‘orientalising’ and ‘occidentalising’ in a world of globalised 
symbolic exchange. If we are to treat ‘culture’ as a fundamental factor in 
our analyses of rights, and of government and institutions we need a very 
high degree of self-awareness of the history and current circumstances of 
the deployment of the concept.”5
It is somewhat ironic, in contrast to the above colonialist deployment 
of “culture” by western nations, that in non-Western and formerly col-
onized countries a contemporary use of the word “culture” promotes it as a 
conservative defence against any change – especially those that are associ-
ated with “Western values.” In some instances, it is connected with ap-
peals to either an idealized or pristine society that predated colonization, 
or to rejection of the impact of selective Western influences. Uma Narayan 
eloquently discusses fascinating variants of this phenomenon in her book 
Dislocating Cultures.6 Contemporary anthropology also has had something 
of importance to add, particularly given the lively discussions that have 
taken place since James Clifford’s book, The Predicament of Culture.7 As 
I have said elsewhere: “Clifford acknowledges the seemingly paradoxical 
engagement in ethnography as it both negotiates and evaluates the very 
procedures it both introduces and participates in.”8 The resultant self-
reflective stance, which incorporates an examination of one’s own pre-
suppositions, would seem to recommend a stance whereby anthropology 
no longer regards culture as a consistent or timeless and stable entity. As 
Sherry Ortner observes in relating the development of her own under-
standing of the construction of culture: “[There] are larger shifts in the 
conceptualization of ‘culture’ in the field of anthropology as a whole, [that 
go] in the direction of seeing ‘cultures’ as more disjunctive, contradictory, 
and inconsistent than I had been trained to think.”9 “Culture” then, while 
it still needs to be understood as the amalgamation of influences such 
as ideals, forces, institutions, and traditions, including those of religion 
and philosophy, should never be reified as a static entity. It would seem 
that all of the above observations need to be kept in mind when the term 
“intercultural” is invoked. They function as a healthy precaution against 
the attempted enforcing of any one particular viewpoint as holding any 
special prerogative to authority or precedence. A healthy hermeneutics of 
suspicion would seem necessary.10
Questions of method and theory are obviously essential to such an 
undertaking, and another task envisioned by this workshop was to provide 
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as clear an exposition as possible of the respective contributions of both 
Philosophy and Religious Studies to this interdisciplinary venture. The 
late Raimundo Panikkar suggested that the basic business of compara-
tive philosophy and religion was what he called “diatopical hermeneutics.” 
This is the practice of bringing one culture, language, or philosophy into 
another culture, language and religion/philosophy for the purposes of a 
clearer exposition of the relevant questions, contexts, and topoi. It also 
undertakes a constructive search for new and more useful responses to 
these questions and topoi. In such a context, comparative philosophy and 
comparative religion engage in an encounter between fundamentally dif-
ferent traditions and address issues of how to deal with the “foreign.” Not 
only does this necessitate working between languages that may not readily 
lend themselves to translation, but it also demands an exposure to ways 
of thinking that may be either unknown or marginalized within one’s 
accustomed canon. In one respect, however, this project seeks to enlarge 
on this accustomed understanding of the “foreign.” Not only must one 
avoid the pitfalls of simply superimposing familiar categories onto another 
tradition in order to achieve a comfortable synthesis but, by venturing 
into such unfamiliar terrain, one needs also to examine familiar traditions 
from the “outside” and thereby reveal presuppositions that are often taken 
for granted. This may well foster an awareness of incongruities within 
“known” paradigms that might otherwise go unnoticed. Almost all the 
papers contain reflections on the nature of such foreigness or otherness, 
or, as Vincent Shen termed it, adapting a Chinese word waitui (外推), 
“strangification.” At the same time, there is one position that is evident in 
all the papers. This is that each tradition involved in a comparison is ac-
corded equal weight. No tradition is regarded as having a superior stance 
or a more privileged access to truth, however that may be understood.
Over the past fifty years, the journal, Philosophy East and West, has 
published numerous insightful articles of a comparative nature, where 
both philosophy and religion have been featured. But there has not been 
a specific issue where the methodological problems of such interactions 
have been addressed in a systemic or thematized way. There have also 
been, of course, a large number of single-author volumes written from 
either a philosophic or religious studies perspective of a comparative na-
ture that reflect the accepted methods of their respective disciplines. One 
example is Lee Yearley’s highly nuanced comparative study of Aquinas 
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and Mencius on both virtue and courage. His astute readings broach both 
philosophic and religious topics. Distinguishing carefully between areas 
of theory and practice, or reason and ethics, Yearley is particularly sensi-
tive to differences as well as to commonalities in both traditions in the 
way they foster human flourishing.11 Another example of comparative 
work that illustrates how attitudes can be changed is that of Roger Ames. 
He demonstrates that an encounter with Chinese thought sensitizes the 
reader to the truly original nature of a thinker such as Nietzsche who is 
a maverick within his own tradition.12 Other scholars have highlighted 
certain issues of a methodological nature pertaining to comparative phil-
osophy. The work of Gerald J. Larson and Eliot Deutsch13 and that of 
Fred Dallmayr14 have been particularly helpful. Katrin Froese, who is 
a contributor to this volume, has also written an excellent comparative 
philosophical study.15
It needs to be observed that this type of investigation has not been the 
prerogative of Western scholars alone, as recent books by Chinese scholars 
illustrate. For example, Cheng Zhongying (1991)16 has drawn parallels 
between Confucianism and western hermeneutics, and Li Chenyang in 
The Tao Encounters the West,17 describes how democracy and eastern values 
can fruitfully be combined. Another recent edited volume in the same 
vein is that of Shun Kwong-loi and David B. Wong.18
It is also noteworthy, that there have not been many edited collec-
tions comparing and contrasting eastern and western philosophy and re-
ligion. There has been, however, one such volume already published. This 
was entitled, East-West Encounters in Philosophy and Religion, edited by 
Professor B. Srinavasa Murthy and Ninian Smart, published in 1996.19 
It was Professor B. Srinavasa Murthy who first organized a conference 
of this nature in Mysore in 1991, with a second one taking place in Long 
Beach, California, in 1993. The book comprises selected papers from both 
conferences. Examples of papers or sections in the book have titles such as: 
“Person: East and West,” or “Asian and Western Thought.” It is obviously 
wide in scope but contains very little reflection on issues of methodology. 
Nevertheless, it marked a rich and eclectic attempt to take the measure of 
the immense interest stimulated by the two conferences.
I believe that our workshop and the resultant papers can make an 
extremely important contribution to the continuance of such undertak-
ings, both nationally and internationally, to the rapidly expanding field of 
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intercultural studies in both philosophy and religious studies. Thus far, 
there has been no book published that attends to a multi-faceted discussion 
of method and theory from an intercultural philosophical and religious per-
spective. I also believe that it is both a substantial and an original undertak-
ing. One of our principal intentions in inviting scholars in philosophy from 
both analytic and Continental backgrounds as well as scholars in religion, 
all of whom are well versed in method and theory, was to raise the discus-
sion on these issues to a more sophisticated level, particularly in light of 
contemporary debates on the role of pluralism and globalization. The aim 
was not to find solutions, but the hope was to arrive at some clearer insights 
into the various obstacles that can hinder such exchanges.
* * *
Vincent Shen proposes the term “strangification” – a translation of the 
Chinese term Waitui – as a constructive way of appreciating the task that 
is involved in undertaking intercultural study in philosophy and religion. 
His intention in using this term is to describe a process of “going outside 
oneself in order to go to many others”; that is, to strangers and to strange 
worlds that engage with different forms of philosophy and religion. His 
paper contributes to this volume by laying out certain methodological 
foundations for his philosophy of contrast as a strategy of strangification. 
As part of this strategy, dialogue is understood as a process of mutual 
strangification. In his study, Shen illustrates his discussion by contrast-
ing Chinese philosophy with Western philosophy. He does this by first 
clarifying his concept of “many others,” as well as those of contrast and 
strangification, with reference to their origin in Chinese philosophical 
traditions such as Confucianism and Daoism. He then places these terms 
in dialogue with a number of Western Continental philosophers. Shen’s 
own discussion is set against the contemporary context of globalization 
and with particular reference to his own traditions of Chinese philosophy 
and religions.
After defining globalization as a historical process of deterritorializa-
tion or border-crossing, Shen places intercultural studies within a frame-
work of cross-cultural philosophy and religion. From his perspective, 
intercultural study can be appreciated as leading to potential communica-
tion with a view to mutual enrichment, instead of simply doing comparison 
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simply for comparison’s sake. By replacing certain post-modern French 
thinkers’ concept of “the other” with a concept of “many others,” Shen 
also elaborates on the concept of “contrast.” For Shen, comparison, com-
munication, and dialogue always start with a mutual act of going outside 
of one’s self-enclosure to many others, an act initiated by an original act 
of generosity that makes reciprocity possible. In the resulting process of 
mutual strangification, all parties involved endeavour to make their own 
scientific/cultural/religious/life world understandable to each other. From 
a methodological position, Shen’s paper focuses on the strategy of stran-
gification and the idea of dialogue as mutual strangification as ideas and 
processes that can take place on a number of levels – linguistic, pragmatic, 
and ontological.
Michael McGhee wonders about a different sort of strangeness – 
that of the philosopher who, in ancient times, as described in the work of 
Pierre Hadot, was a seeker of wisdom and thus not necessarily motivated 
by the same goals as ordinary citizens of the world. McGhee reflects on 
his own feelings of estrangement from contemporary philosophy – specif-
ically that of analytic philosophy – and suggests ways that could revitalize 
contemporary philosophy from its basically secular preoccupations. He 
considers comparative philosophy as one possibility – but not simply as 
an exercise that would enlarge the canon. McGhee considers the impetus 
that prompted Henri Corbin to undertake his explorations in compara-
tive philosophy, but McGhee seeks to move beyond its idealistic Platonic 
orientation. Nevertheless, he recognizes the need for a skilled application 
of the Platonic tools of dialogue, both agon and elenchus, in any compara-
tive exercise where searching questions need to be asked, though prob-
ably to different ends than Plato and Corbin had in mind. This is because 
McGhee is only too well aware that the present situation, with its global-
ized networking and commodification, needs to be taken into considera-
tion. In such a complex world, a solution can no longer be sought in easy 
appeals to former times, such as Corbin’s approach. McGhee is seeking 
a way that would mediate between the all-too-familiar contemporary ex-
tremes of nihilism and idealism, or other simplistic dualisms that tend to 
occur in contemporary debates of inclusion/exclusion. From a compara-
tive perspective, McGhee finds guidance for a responsive and tolerant 
approach in his own Buddhist practice. He finds it particularly helpful 
in the way it provides insight into how states of consciousness influence 
I N T ROD U C T IONxvi
either the expansiveness or constraint of human experiences and action. 
Such knowledge is a form of wisdom and would be helpful in intercultural 
philosophy as a way of encountering strangeness or otherness. It could 
help foster the innovative connections that can take place when a phil-
osopher, as a stranger, enters into previously alien or unknown ways of 
philosophizing that challenge ideals regarded as normative in his or her 
own time, culture, and philosophical tradition.
Tinu Ruparell is also interested in the question of strangeness and 
the stranger as a component of intercultural philosophy and religion – 
but this time the stranger is cast as the Other. As Ruparell attests, the 
authentic voice of the Other is a subject that has exercised many scholars. 
This includes those who, from a postcolonial perspective, view colonial-
ism, with its mandate of “civilizing” the religious other as involving the 
imposition of foreign values and beliefs. At the same time, there are phil-
osophers, like Emmanuel Levinas, who seek to rectify the failures of the 
Western ethical code that did not prevent the Holocaust from occurring. 
As Ruparell observes, Levinas’s prescription for a new understanding of 
an ethical orientation is to place one’s responsibility for the other person 
before one’s self-related inclinations, be they charitable or egocentric. In 
his own search to find a process that would be suitable for intercultural 
philosophy and religion – one that allows an alienated person or subaltern 
figure to find his or her voice – Ruparell proposes that Levinas’s approach 
might be of help. In this approach, the philosopher goes towards the other, 
in a manner similar to Shen’s “strangification.” In fact, again one becomes 
a stranger to oneself on order to be open to the other. Ruparell, however, 
would see a further qualification to Shen’s proposal to initiate a dialogue 
by means of a kenosis, or emptying of self. This is because for Ruparell, in 
attempting to constitute him- or herself in a different mode of receptiv-
ity, a person must not just become receptive but place oneself entirely at 
the disposal of the other. Only by taking such a radical step, Ruparell 
proposes, can a genuine self-transformation take place.
All the above three variations on the theme of strangeness and the 
stranger by Shen, McGhee, and Ruparell find echoes in other essays in 
this volume, though different terms are employed to describe such a mo-
ment or movement. They are all symptomatic of the difficult situation 
involved when a Western academic tries to come to terms with a legacy 
that has prevented him or her from full appreciating the dimensions of 
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religions and philosophical systems that are substantially at variance with 
their own particular notions of belief or ethical ideals.
The contribution of Arindam Chakrabarti is a study of the Sanskrit 
philosophical concept of “manas”, controversially translatable as “inner 
sense.” Among the many functions assigned to this internal instrument 
by the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (1.5.3), such as desire, resolution, doubt, 
memory, and introspection, one crucial function is that of cross-modal 
comparison and connecting the data from different external senses. The 
paper discusses seven distinct arguments for postulating such an inner 
sense. In the Sāṃkhya, Vedānta, and Nyāya schools of philosophy, it be-
comes a distinct sense organ, responsible for attention, comparison, im-
agination, and reflective awareness of cognitive and hedonic states. Since 
it is an organ of comparison, manas deserves special attention of compara-
tive philosophy. Chakrabarti illustrates this point by actually comparing 
the Indian concept of inner sense with a corresponding conception in 
Aristotle’s De Anima (425a–426b), where such a sixth inner sense is pro-
posed and rejected. But the comparable idea of a sensus communis is taken 
seriously by Aristotle. In Kant’s philosophy, inner sense also has a very 
crucial role to play, but it is distinguished from the common sense, which 
is central to aesthetic reflective judgment. Chakrabarti suggests a richer 
theory of a sixth common sense-organ for imaginatively perceiving possi-
bilities. The essay concludes by discussing Ibn Rushd’s (Averroës’) original 
metaphysics of the inner common sense, in his commentary on De Anima, 
and indicating the possibility of connecting the concept of sense-organs 
with the Vedic Hindu concept of multiple divinities. 
Ahmad Yousif ’s paper is a constructive proposal that would help situ-
ate the notion of comparative religion as an acceptable approach in Islam. 
In this way it features more as a preamble to the further development 
of intercultural philosophy and religion. Yousif understands his contribu-
tion to constitute the beginnings of a move towards a possible dialogue 
of Islam with Western and Eastern religions. He states that, in most in-
stitutions of higher learning in the Muslim world today, scant attention 
is given to the field of comparative religion. This is in distinct contrast 
to similar institutions in Western countries. Yet, to bring the situation 
into perspective, Yousif states that this was not always the case. Between 
the ninth and twelfth centuries, Islamic civilization witnessed the rise 
– and also eclipse – of the discipline of ‘ ilm al milal wa n-nihal (literally, 
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“knowledge of religious groups and sects”). Classical Muslim scholars, 
such as al-Shahrastani, al-Biruni, al-Kalbi, al-Baghdadi, Ibn Ḥazm, and 
others, made numerous investigations and contributions to the field. The 
modern period has also witnessed the emergence of a number of Muslim 
intellectuals, such as al-Faruqi, Shalaby, al-Hashimi, Daraz, and others, 
who have made serious endeavours to investigate the field. Frequently, 
the methodology utilized by Muslim scholars towards the study of major 
world religions, however, differs from their Western counterparts. Yousif ’s 
paper first explores the historical developments of the discipline of com-
parative religion from Islamic and Western perspectives. Second, it com-
pares and contrasts methodological approaches among Muslim and non-
Muslim scholars in the field of comparative religion. Then, it examines 
some of the challenges encountered by scholars studying “other” religions. 
In conclusion, it discusses the importance and significance of studying 
major world religions at the tertiary educational level, in the West and in 
the Muslim world, to help in the mutual understanding and appreciation 
of both philosophy and religion.
Katrin Froese’s exercise in intercultural philosophy and religion is 
achieved by putting seemingly disparate philosophers in dialogue on a 
particular subject. In her paper, she examines the criticisms of ethics 
undertaken by Nietzsche and Kierkegaard as well as in the Daoist phil-
osophies of the Daodejing and Zhuangzi. All of these thinkers expose 
an unethical underbelly to ethics. They reveal an intractable paradox at 
the heart of ethics, which is that the same processes that enable human 
beings to become moral also produce immorality. Such a formulation sug-
gests that morality and immorality may share a common core. By way of 
comparison, Froese first portrays Nietzsche as seeking redemption from 
selfish Christian morality by attempting to infuse life into what he views 
as its moribund precepts. He does this by adopting a universal ethic of em-
bracing life that is based on affirmation of this world rather than self-con-
tempt and a longing for eternity. Then, by describing Kierkegaard’s critical 
philosophy, Froese demonstrates the trouble that western ethics has in 
accommodating the radical other. This is due to the spectre of egoism that 
undermines all such human endeavours. As a remedy, Kierkegaard states 
that faith demands a readiness to relinquish all attachments of the ego so 
as to be able to enter into a direct relationship with God.
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Froese also portrays the way that Daoist thinkers view morality as 
worrisome because it is directly linked to the use of language. For Daoists, 
language, by definition, must parcel the world into fragments. Thus lan-
guage constrains, and, because of this, it is often linked to the desire for 
closure or possession. The resultant addiction to language suggests that 
moral imperatives are very closely wedded to the desire for knowledge, 
which is understood as a way of rendering the world amenable to human 
comprehension. Words thus divide, and so exclude, as well as include. 
As a result, morality, by positing the good, must inevitably depend on 
the notion of evil against which it defines itself. This means that moral 
systems all too often rest on the ostracism of the stranger who symbol-
izes the unknown and cannot so easily be embraced within the linguis-
tic paradigm. In order to counteract this, Daoist philosophy, both in the 
Daodejing and the Zhuangzi, underlines the importance of an attunement 
to nothingness. This is because nothingness represents a kind of radical 
openness that has banished desire. Thus, despite their seemingly obvious 
differences, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Daoist thinkers would concur 
that conventional morality is predicated on a kind of resistance that can 
stamp out the particularity of others, rather than celebrating it. As such, 
Froese’s exercise in comparative philosophy and religion helps to dem-
onstrate commonalities of viewpoint regarding ethical ways of living in 
traditions that are often regarded as completely distinct.
In his paper, Michael Oppenheim begins with a guiding question to 
help him in his explorations: “What might a conversation between com-
parative philosophy of religion and modern Jewish philosophy contribute 
to each participant?” While he appreciates that such a conversation is only 
just beginning to take place, he believes that there are important insights 
that each side can contribute to the other. He begins by reflecting on the 
nature of contemporary philosophy and Jewish philosophy from a com-
parative perspective. This is followed by an examination of some basic 
problems in these two areas. In terms of comparative philosophy, he first 
examines the failure of philosophy generally to respond to contemporary 
feminist philosophy. He then laments its failure to include Jewish phil-
osophy (as well as Islamic philosophy) and to recognize them as having 
historic roles in its own narrative history. Oppenheim then highlights 
what he considers to be the two problem areas in contemporary Jewish 
philosophy: 1. the way the relationship between (Western) “philosophy” 
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and Jewish philosophy is usually depicted, and 2. its own reticence to rec-
ognize and enter into dialogue with feminist Jewish philosophy. In the 
concluding section, Oppenheim explores the potentialities for each side 
to address these problem areas in the mode of the other as proposed by 
Levinas.
Dan Lusthaus’s essay is a wide-ranging rumination on what it has 
meant to do comparative philosophy of religion. In his approach, since 
all thinking is comparative – where, hopefully, comparative philosophy 
stimulates insightful thinking – comparative philosophy and religion 
needs to draw its strength from expanding the range of philosophies and 
religions it compares. In Lusthus’s view, for a Western philosopher to 
think about Indian or Chinese or Arabic or Jewish philosophies is basic-
ally no different from a North American philosopher thinking about 
Plato, Spinoza, Hegel, or Wittgenstein. Each task requires looking at the 
other through similarities and differences of language, culture, context, 
foundational categories, historical developments, and a host of other fac-
tors. Lusthaus posits that the basic differences are not between East and 
West, as is often assumed, but between styles of philosophizing and root 
metaphors from which different traditions take their orientation. In this 
vein, Lusthaus explores the similarities and differences between religion, 
philosophy, and science, especially medicine. Taking the fact that pramāṇa 
theory (the means of acquiring knowledge) first appeared in India in a 
medical text, the Caraka-saṃhitā, as a jumping-off point, he illustrates 
that philosophy, religion, and medicine have always been intertwined, es-
pecially in ancient and medieval philosophy. He concludes with a concise 
examination of the Caraka-saṃhitā’s pramāṇa-theory, with special atten-
tion to a unique pramāṇa found only in one text, yukta-pramāṇa. This is an 
inductive synthetic type of reasoning that seeks to analyze transformation 
in terms of coordination of multiple factors converging into a transforma-
tive trajectory. Lusthaus’s analysis thus proposes a fascinating mode of 
pursuing comparative studies in philosophy and religion. In a sense, such 
an exercise is also in the spirit of intercultural philosophy and religion in 
that it does not privilege a specific religion but attempts to discern their 
similar roots.
In his essay, Francis X. Clooney proposes that religious texts – 
considered seriously, and in depth – constitute a most appropriate and 
fruitful place for reflection on philosophical and theological issues in a 
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comparative context. Such texts provide access to worlds of thought that 
are invariably complex and inhabit diverse terrains – partly accessible and 
partly particular – or present insider discourse that can all branch off in 
various diverse and elusive ways. For Clooney such texts are also often 
especially rich in style as they are in readers’ expectations. Two such texts 
from two traditions, in this instance, Hinduism and Catholicism, if they 
are read together, create an array of comparative possibilities that, in turn, 
can then generate a considerable range of philosophical and theological 
reflection. Clooney regards this kind of reflection on complex texts that 
are both philosophical and theological, both highly rational and richly 
imaginative, as being superior to thematic comparisons. This is because 
the texts resist conclusive generalizations and keep introducing cultural 
and religious specificity back into such generalizing discourses.
Because the emphasis is on thinking-through-reading, half of 
Clooney’s essay is dedicated to giving a passage from each of the two 
classic texts that are to be read together – that need to be read together, 
if their religious and philosophical significance is to be made access-
ible in a comparative context. Each of the texts that are excerpted – the 
Treatise on the Love of God (Traité de l ’Amour de Dieu) of Francis de Sales, 
a major seventeenth-century Catholic theologian, and the Essence of the 
Three Mysteries (Śrīmad Rahasyatrayasāra) of Vedānta Deśika, a major 
medieval Hindu theologian – “works” on multiple levels and makes con-
nections among linguistic, philosophical, theological, mystical, and other 
tradition-based resources. When the texts are read together, their pos-
sibilities are maximized and intensified, and the new text thus generated, 
comprised of traditional, religious, and rational insights, facilitates further 
conversation.
Such a shared reading provides a complex starting point – reference, 
foundation, directions – for intercultural reflection, philosophical or re-
ligious. This is because each text is itself a synthesis compounded by its 
author. Together, the paired texts constitute a still more complex conver-
sation in which the reader who is philosophically or religiously inclined 
reads his or her way back and forth across the spectrum of matters both 
philosophical and religious, or rational and affective.
Chen-kuo Lin explores the Buddhist phenomenology of awaken-
ing as exemplified in the philosophical writings of Zhiyi (538–597 C.E.), 
the founder of the Tiantai School of Buddhism, and then investigates in 
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what way the Western notion of phenomenology, especially as pursued 
by Edmund Husserl, could be enriched by comparison with this Chinese 
philosopher’s work. The phrase “phenomenology of awakening” is deliber-
ately used in contrast to “phenomenology of mundane experience.” In the 
Buddhist context, the former may be referred to as “phenomenology of 
insight,” whereas the latter is classifiable as “phenomenology of conscious-
ness.” In both forms of phenomenology, a distinct method is required for 
the disclosure of truth. Lin’s article is mainly concerned with how the 
truth of awakened experience is disclosed through the meditative method 
in the Buddhist phenomenology of Zhiyi. As an illustration of one of the 
impetuses of this volume, which is an attempt to investigate the ways in 
which Western philosophy and religion can be rethought through non-
Western categories, two questions are raised by Lin. The first asks: in 
what sense can Zhiyi’s Tiantai philosophy be characterized as a form of 
phenomenology? The second asks: in what way can Husserlian phenom-
enology be further developed into a phenomenology of awakening as en-
visioned in the Buddhist tradition? In reply to these questions, Lin divides 
his study into two sections. The first section lays out the Buddhist dis-
tinction between mundane knowledge and trans-mundane insight. In the 
second part, Lin focuses on Zhiyi’s soteriological phenomenology with 
special attention to the problems of truth, meditation, and insight. In con-
clusion, he sums up the religious spirit in Zhiyi’s phenomenology, where 
the experience of awakening should never be regarded as exclusionary. In 
this way, it differs from Husserl’s more explicitly personal approach. For 
Zhiyi, true awakening, which manifests the enlightened world, must be 
experienced along with all other worlds that have yet to be enlightened. 
That is, true liberation must be experienced along with all other worlds 
that are still in suffering. In his study, Lin describes how Husserl’s under-
standing of phenomenology can be enriched by an intercultural study 
with Chinese philosophy, which is indeed a reversal of many earlier ones 
where the terms of reference were usually provided by the Western scholar 
and traditional categories of analysis.
Tamara Albertini’s paper is an appeal to study, discuss, and assess 
philosophy in non-Western traditions by returning to criteria afforded by 
these same traditions. It is an appeal that Islamic philosophy should be 
read and appreciated on its own terms, rather than assessed according to 
Western standards. Rather than being preoccupied with what “counts” as 
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philosophy, or with what constitutes a “good thought” or a “good meth-
odology” according to standards developed to measure the philosophical 
merits of Western texts, the focus of inquiry ought to be placed on the 
devices, concepts, and strategies that are of concern to the tradition to be 
studied. Ideally, for Albertini, the inter-cultural investigation begins once 
the intellectual intricacies of the two (or more) traditions involved in an 
in-depth study or discussion have been appreciated – each one in its own 
right.
Albertini then graphically illustrates what happens when centuries of 
misunderstandings and missed opportunities stand in the way of Western 
scholars’ “appreciation” of another tradition of thought, such as, for ex-
ample, Islamic philosophy. Ironically, the difficulty in this comparative 
setting lies not in Muslim thought being perceived as being too different 
but rather as too similar. This over-emphasizing of the commonalities has 
its roots in an approach that has long looked upon Islamic philosophy and 
sciences as a gold mine for Western intellectual needs. For Albertini there 
is, nevertheless, something to be gained from recognizing this ill-balanced 
perception: Islamic philosophy has been no stranger to the European his-
torical landscape in the past. Yet while the scientific, philosophical, and, 
to a lesser degree, cultural debt toward Islamic civilization has long been 
acknowledged, contemporary research on Muslim thought requires a new 
direction. In Albertini’s view, what needs to be created is an understand-
ing of why it should matter to study Islamic philosophy for its own sake, 
independently of how or whether it speaks at all to the Western world. To 
achieve this, a non-utilitarian approach should be adopted, or, at the very 
least, one in which the primary use of studying Muslim thought is to know 
it on its own terms.
Chris Framarin examines an approach that is utilized in Indian phil-
osophy and explores how lakṣaṇā and its application could be of benefit to 
Western scholars in their own work of interpretation and translation of 
Indian texts. Lakṣaṇā is an Indian exegetical principle that permits an in-
terpreter to revert to a less literal reading of a claim when the literal read-
ing is sufficiently implausible. If the literal reading implies a contradiction 
or absurdity, for example, an interpreter is often permitted – and some-
times required – to understand the claim figuratively. Contemporary in-
terpreters of Indian philosophy employ this strategy extensively, but often 
without acknowledging its limitations. In this paper, Framarin argues that 
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contemporary interpreters of Indian philosophy should adopt and utilize 
the principle of lakṣaṇā, but only in accord with the criteria set forth by 
classical Indian philosophers. 
Morny Joy’s paper introduces the topic of women’s rights as human 
rights as a subject that could benefit from intercultural discussion by both 
philosophy and religion. It may not seem immediately to be a relevant topic 
for such an undertaking, but it is an emerging area of interest and concern 
that needs to be addressed by women. At stake is the shifting boundary 
between public/private as this affects the secular/religious divide. In many 
recent instances, fundamentalism has attempted to interfere in the public 
and political sphere, while keeping women under tight private control. 
At the same time, many feminists have proclaimed “the personal is the 
political.” Such diverse impulses would only seem to confuse the situation. 
Yet what is being contested in both cases concerns the rights of women, 
particularly with reference to the control of their bodies. Joy discusses how 
in the wider parameters of the globalized women’s movement, reactionary 
activities by fundamentalists from a number of religions and countries at 
the United Nations have tried to prevent any further advances by women 
in the area of rights, citing reservations on matters of culture and trad-
ition. These are basically shorthand terms for religion. Such cases involve 
extraordinarily complex and sensitive issues that need extremely careful 
discernment of the religious sensibilities involved. They are not easily 
solved. Yet they are in need of input from scholars in religion because 
of their specific skills in both religious/ethical traditions and fine-tuned 
exegesis or textual interpretation. As yet there has not been much work 
done on a comparative basis that would bring scholars of religion and 
philosophy into dialogue with activists from all regions and religions of 
the world to address this most important issue. This paper is an attempt to 
bring it to notice and further discussion from a comparative perspective.
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FROM COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY/RELIGION TO 
INTERCULTURAL PHILOSOPHY/RELIGION
For me, comparative studies in philosophy and religion today should be 
put in the context of reaching out to meet many others in all cultural 
traditions and political communities, a phenomenon of border-crossing 
or deterritorialization characteristic of today’s world process of globaliza-
tion. Elsewhere I have defined ‘globalization’ as “a historical process of 
deterritorialization or border-crossing, in which human desire, human 
interconnectedness and universalizability are to be realized on the planet 
as a whole, and to be concretized in the present as global free market, 
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trans-national political order and cultural glocalism.”1 All people of the 
world are involved in the process of going beyond themselves to many 
others, to meet them and understand them, either ideally for dialogue in 
view of mutual enrichment or unfortunately for dealing with conflict in 
the case of oppositional confrontation.
It is in this context that comparative studies become pragmatically 
meaningful. I don’t think, at least for myself, that there is any positive 
interest for doing comparison for comparison’s sake. Comparative studies 
in philosophy, religion, social sciences and culture, etc., always presuppose 
and indeed involve, on the one hand, the existence of many others and the 
act of going outside of oneself to many others, and, on the other hand, a 
deeper understanding of one’s true self and potentiality, and the precious 
values accumulated in one’s own tradition.
Now, when the world is entering an era of globalization, two inter-
related questions concerning the future of philosophy/religion emerge for 
our attention: First, how could each philosophical/religious tradition draw 
the best of its cultural resources for the benefit of other philosophical/
religious traditions in the world? Second, how could each philosophical/
religious tradition achieve self-understanding by regarding impartially 
other philosophical/religious traditions and, furthermore, by allowing 
philosophizing and religiosity to become indispensable for the mutual 
understanding of all cultural traditions in the world? Facing the challenge 
of these two questions, we are led to put more and more emphasis on 
intercultural philosophy/religion.
It is an undeniable fact that philosophy/religion was, and still is, cultur-
ally bound. Western philosophy was very much related to the long cultural 
heritage from ancient Greek, through Roman, to medieval and modern 
Europe. In the non-Western world, for example, in China, we find other 
traditions such as Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. As Martin 
Heidegger has well pointed out, Western philosophy has developed from 
a decisive choice made by the Western culture in the time of Parmenides 
and Plato. Even now, many works in the history of Western philosophy 
are still unjustifiably called “The History of Philosophy”; regrettably, this 
exclusiveness and arrogance arbitrarily sets aside many other possibilities.
In this context, to study intercultural philosophy/religion means not 
to enclose one’s own vision of philosophy/religion within the limit of one’s 
own tradition, especially that of Western philosophy/religion. This is 
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particularly necessary today when the type of rationality and religiosity so 
basic to Western civilizations is now much challenged and even collaps-
ing. Now the world is open to other types of rationality and religiosity, or 
it would be better to say a more comprehensive function of human reason 
and human feeling.
It is well recognized that we live now in an age of multiculturalism. 
As I see it, the concept of “multiculturalism” should mean, of course, but 
not only, a request for cultural identity and a respect for cultural differ-
ence, as Charles Taylor has well argued. In the meanwhile, it has been 
limited to a kind of “politics of recognition.”2 For me, “multiculturalism” 
means, at the start, that each and every culture has its own cultural iden-
tity and that each should respect each other’s cultural differences; besides, 
it should mean, above all, mutual enrichment by cultural differences and 
an unceasing search for universalizable elements embodied in various cul-
tural traditions.3 I understand that we can obtain this upgraded meaning 
of multiculturalism only by conducting dialogues among different cultural 
worlds. In this context, different ways of doing philosophy and religion in 
different cultural traditions could enrich our vision of the multi-layered 
and multi-faceted reality. Especially in this time of radical change, any 
philosophy/religion capable of facing this challenge has to include in itself 
an intercultural dimension.
PHILOSOPHY OF CONTRAST AND INTERCULTURAL 
PHILOSOPHY/RELIGION
What is intercultural philosophy/religion? This should not be limited only 
to doing comparative philosophy/religion, as in the cases of comparative 
linguistics, which is quite often limited to the studies of resemblance and 
difference between two different languages. Although doing comparative 
philosophy/religion in this manner could lead to a kind of relativism in 
philosophy/religion, it could not really help the self/mutual understanding 
and the practice of philosophy/religion itself. A maximal vision of com-
parative study should lead to interaction and dialogue among different 
cultural, philosophical, and religious traditions.
For me, the real target of doing intercultural philosophy/religion is to 
put different philosophical/religious traditions into contrast, rather than 
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engaging in a sheer comparison. I understand “contrast” as the rhyth-
mic and dialectical interplay between difference and complementarity, 
continuity and discontinuity, which leads eventually to the real mutual 
enrichment of different agents, individual or collective, such as different 
traditions of religion or philosophy.4
I have proposed a philosophy of contrast as an alternative to both 
structuralism and Hegelian dialectics. Structuralism sees only elements in 
opposition but not in complementarity. It also over-emphasizes synchron-
icity to the negligence of diachronicity, and therefore human historicity 
is reduced to mere structural determinism. It could be said that historical 
movement is essential to Hegelian dialectics, which sees dialectics as both 
methodology and ontology, i.e., as the historical movement of Spirit seen as 
the True Reality. In Hegel, however, Spirit moves by means of Aufhebung, 
which is understood in a negative way that tends finally towards the tri-
umph of negativity and thus overlooks the positivity in dialectical move-
ment. However, my concept of contrast rediscovers the dynamic tension 
of both difference and complementarity, structurality and historicity, and 
it integrates both negative and positive forces in the movement of history 
as the process of Reality’s unfolding and manifestation.
The wisdom of contrast has its origin in Chinese philosophy, such 
as the Book of Changes, the Laozi and other Chinese philosophical texts. 
It suffices to mention that the diagram of the Great Ultimate seems to 
give us a concrete image of a philosophy of contrast, though apparently it 
represents only what I call “structural contrast.” Still, we can put it into 
movement on the axis of time and thereby obtain an image of “dynamic 
contrast.”
By “structural contrast” I mean that in any moment of analysis, the 
multiple objects appearing in our experience are constituted of interacting 
elements, different yet related, opposing yet complementary to each other. 
It is synchronic in the sense that these elements appear simultaneously so 
as to form a well-structured whole. Being different, however, each ele-
ment enjoys a certain degree of autonomy; while being related, they are 
mutually interdependent.
On the other hand, by “dynamic contrast” I mean that, on the axis of 
time, all beings, all individual life-stories, collective histories, and cosmic 
processes are in a process of becoming through the continuous and dis-
continuous interplay of the precedent and the consequent moments. It is 
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diachronic in the sense that one moment follows another moment on the 
axis of time, to form a history, not in a discontinuous or atomic succession, 
but in a contrasting way of development moving continuously and discon-
tinuously. As discontinuous, the novel moment has its proper originality, 
never to be reduced to any preceding moment. As continuous, it always 
keeps something from the preceding moment as residue or sedimentation 
of experience in time. This concept of dynamic contrast could explain all 
the processes of becoming, such as the relationship between tradition and 
modernity.5
In this sense we are different from structuralism for which the struc-
ture is anonymous, as it determines the constitution of meaning without 
being known consciously by the agent.6 For us, on the contrary, a system 
or a structure is always the outcome of the act of structuration by a certain 
agent or group of actors in the process of time.
On the other hand, the process of time can also be analyzed through 
our vision or intellectual gaze in order to uncover its structural intelligibil-
ity. An historical action can be analyzed in terms of systematic properties 
and be integrated into a structural totality. This is true, for example, in 
communication where the system and the agent are mutually dependent 
and promoting one another. The contrasting interaction between struc-
ture and dynamism leads finally to the evolution process of complexifica-
tion. Structural contrast puts interacting elements into a kind of organ-
ized totality, but it is only through dynamic contrast that continuity and 
the emergence of new possibilities can be properly understood.
The wisdom of contrast reminds us always to see the other side of 
the story and the tension between complementary elements essential to 
creativity in time. The wisdom of contrast reminds us of the contrasting 
situation between concepts such as agent and system, difference and com-
plementarity, continuity and discontinuity, reason and rationality, theory 
and praxis, understanding and translatability, process and reality, etc.
Let us consider now the epistemological strategies we can adopt in 
view of a good comparative or intercultural philosophy/religion. Two con-
secutive strategies could be proposed here: First, the strategy of appropria-
tion of language, which means, more concretely, speaking and learning 
the language that makes other cultural/philosophical/religious traditions 
understandable. Ever since our childhood, learning a language takes place 
by interacting with the generous act of those who take the initiative to 
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speak to us and thereby open to us a world of meaningfulness. Later, when 
we are grown up, we learn the languages of different disciplines, cultural 
practices, and linguistic communities, which open us to ever-enlarging 
worlds. As Wittgenstein says, different language games correspond to 
different life-forms; therefore, appropriation of another’s language would 
give us access to the life-form implied in that specific language. By appro-
priating different languages of different cultural/philosophical/religious 
traditions, we could enter into different worlds and thereby enrich the 
construction of our own world.
Second, there is the strategy of strangification (or waitui 外推, in 
Chinese). By this I mean the act of going outside of oneself to go to many 
others, from one’s familiars to one’s strangers, from one’s cultural/reli-
gious world to many others’ cultural/religious worlds. Later, I’ll discuss 
in more detail three types of strangification, that is, linguistic, pragmatic, 
and ontological strangification, and my notion of “dialogue” as mutual 
strangification.
CONTRAST INVITES STRANGIFICATION
Philosophies/religions from different cultural traditions may be seen as 
in a situation of contrast, that is, different yet complementary, which al-
lows them to go beyond one’s own side to multiple others, from one’s own 
familiarity to strangers. We may, for example, put Chinese philosophy 
and Western philosophy into contrast, by saying that, first, Western phil-
osophy uses languages based on alphabetical systems and are therefore 
more abstract, while Chinese philosophy uses pictograms and ideograms, 
which express ideas through images such as 人 (ren, human beings), 天 
(tian, Heaven), 仁 (ren, humanness), 道 (dao, the Way), and 心 (xin, mind/
heart). Second, Chinese philosophy expresses itself by image-idea, differ-
ent from Western philosophy, which aims at pure ideas; Chinese philoso-
phy prefers metaphors and narratives, and thus is different from concepts 
and argumentations used by Western philosophy. We may also put them 
into contrast by saying that Western philosophy can be traced back to its 
origin in the Greek notion of theoria, the disinterested pursuit of truth 
and sheer intellectual curiosity,7 while Chinese philosophy seems to be 
without such a purely theoretical interest and is more pragmatically mo-
tivated. Generally speaking, the episteme in Western philosophy began as 
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a result of the attitude of wonder, which led to the theoretical construction 
of scientific and philosophical knowledge, whereas Chinese philosophy 
began with the attitude of concern, which led finally to a practical wisdom 
for guiding human destiny.
In the case of Western philosophy, Aristotle pointed out in the 
Metaphysics that the way of life in which knowledge began was constituted 
of leisure (rastone) and recreation (diagoge), as in the case of the Egyptian 
priests who invented geometry in such a way of life. Aristotle believed 
that, in leisure and recreation, human beings need not care about the daily 
necessities of life and could thereby wonder about the causes of things and 
go in search of knowledge for knowledge’s sake. The result of wonder was 
theories. Aristotle wrote in the Metaphysics:
For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and 
at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the 
obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated 
difficulties about the greater matters … therefore since they 
philosophized in order to escape from ignorance, evidently 
they were pursuing science in order to know, and not for any 
utilitarian end.8
According to Aristotle, the philosophical meaning of “theoria” was deter-
mined, on the one hand, with respect to praxis, or, as Aristotle put it, “not 
in virtue of being able to act but of having the theory for themselves and 
knowing the cause.”9 On the other hand, it was determined with respect to 
a universal object, which was seen by Aristotle as the first characteristic of 
episteme, thus leading itself to philosophy and ending up with ontology.10
We now know well that the emergence of theoria in Greece also had 
its religious origin. In the beginning, theoroi were the representatives from 
other Greek cities to Athens’s religious ceremonies. It was through look-
ing at and not acting  in the ceremony that they participated in religious 
ritual. Analogically, philosophers, emerging from theoria, began to look 
at the universe in a disinterested way instead of looking only at the altar 
or the stage. Western philosophy was historically grounded in this Greek 
heritage of theoria, which no longer regarded human life as determined 
by diverse practical interests but rather submitted itself henceforth to a 
universalizing and objective norm of truth. Theoria and philosophy, in 
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Aristotle’s Metaphysics, culminated ultimately in the science of ontology, 
which, according to Aristotle, investigated being as being as the most 
general and comprehensible aspect of all beings.
By contrast, Chinese philosophy in general originated with the atti-
tude of concern, which led not to universalizable theories but to universal-
izable praxis. It was because of his concern with the destiny of individual 
and community that a Chinese mind started to philosophize. The Great 
Appendix to the Book of Changes, arguably attributable to Confucius, start-
ed to give an explanation of the beginning of the Book of Changes and saw 
its author to be in a situation of anxiety and calamity with compassionate 
concern. There we read:
Was it not in the last age of Yin 殷 … that the study of the 
Changes began to flourish? On this account the explanations in 
the book express a feeling of anxious apprehension, and teach 
how peril may be turned into security, and easy carelessness is 
sure to meet with overthrow. The way in which these things 
come about is very comprehensive, and must be acknowledged 
in every sphere of things. If in the beginning there be a cau-
tious apprehension as to the end, there will probably be no error 
or cause for blame. This is what is called the Way of Changes.11
This text shows that, in the eyes of its author, Philosophy of Changes, 
as a serious intellectual activity, began with the attitude of concern in 
the situation of anxiety and calamity, not at all in the situation of leisure 
and recreation, as Aristotle would suggest. It emerged with the concern 
for both personal and collective destiny. The proposition that “the way 
in which these things come about is very comprehensive, and must be 
acknowledged in every sphere of things” suggests that Chinese philoso-
phy intends to be a practical wisdom capable of guiding a universalizable 
praxis.
Since whether or not there is universality pure and simple is still a 
question open to debate, we prefer to use the term “universalizability,” – a 
common concern of which may show us a convergence between Western 
philosophy and Chinese philosophy. Even if Western philosophy concerns 
itself more with the universalizability of theories, whereas Chinese phil-
osophy concerns itself more with practical universalizability, nevertheless, 
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both of them try to go beyond particular interest and to transcend the 
limit of particularity in view of a universalizable value. In a certain sense, 
both of them target the ideal of universality in which theoria and praxis 
might be seen as complementary. In a certain sense, theoria and praxis, 
though different, are complementary and constitute thereby a structural 
contrast between Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy.
THOUGHT, EXPERIENCE, AND THEIR UNITY
Another contrast, this time on the level of epistemic principle, puts 
Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy in another situation of dif-
ference and complementarity. The close relation of Western philosophy to 
mathematics is itself a fascinating philosophical problem. Not to mention 
the philosophy of ancient Greece, it suffices to say that geometry, algebra, 
and, more generally, to use Heidegger’s term, ‘mathesis universalis’ have 
founded the rationality of European modern science. This, in its rational 
aspect, is a process of theory-construction using logical-mathematically 
structured language to formulate human knowledge. In modern Western 
philosophy, rationalism since Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz has laid the 
rational foundation of modern European science. Their philosophy and 
many of their works, written according to the order of geometry, offer us 
the most articulated examples of mathesis universalis in modern Western 
philosophy.
Compared with this, Chinese philosophy did not use logico-
mathematic structures for its theory formation. It did not ponder its own 
linguistic structure to the point of having elaborated a logic system for 
the formulation and control of scientific discourse. Mathematics, though 
highly developed in ancient China, was used only for describing or or-
ganizing empirical data, not for formulating theories. Lacking in logical 
mathematical structures, Chinese philosophy and its proto-scientific 
theories were mainly presented through intuition and speculative imagin-
ation. These theories might have the advantage of being able to penetrate 
into the totality of life, nature, and society as a whole, to give them a rea-
sonable interpretation, but they lacked somehow the rigour of structural 
organization and logical formulation.12 Even today, Chinese philosophy 
may still learn from Western philosophy in the more rigorously logical 
C OM PA R AT I V E S T U DI E S I N P H I L O S OP H Y/ R E L IGION10
formulation of its theoretical propositions, but, with its essential concern 
with life-meaningfulness, it would never go so far as to indulge itself in 
mathematic/logical formulations.
On the other hand, empirical data are also very much emphasized in 
both Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy. For the latter, such 
as in the case of classical empiricism, philosophers like Locke, Berkeley, 
and Hume have well justified the empirical side of Western modern sci-
ence, characterized by its unrelenting quest of empirical data and well-
controlled systematic experimentation. We should, however, notice that 
modern science works on information, not passively given as understood by 
classical empiricism, but rather actively constructed by theoretical and tech-
nical devices. Modern science, by elaborating on the sensible data and our 
perception of them, assures itself of keeping in touch with the environ-
ment, the supposed “real world,” but in a very artificially and technically 
controlled way.
As to Chinese philosophers, they made empirical observations too, 
looking up to the heavenly movement and down to various things on earth. 
These could be very detailed but passive observations, with or without the 
aid of instruments, with the intent to penetrate into the true nature of all 
things. But it had seldom tried any systematically organized experimenta-
tion to the extent of effecting any active artificial control over the human 
perception of natural objects.
In fact we should say that, if there is need of empirical data, it is be-
cause there is need to go outside of our thought to reach the Reality over 
there so as to form a reliable knowledge. The search for empirical data 
could therefore be seen as a particular form of strangification, but, if con-
trol of our perception is indispensable, the technical manipulation of the 
object might not be necessary. Chinese philosophers preferred, as Zhong 
Yong (中庸, the Doctrine of the Means) said, to allow all things, including 
oneself and many others, to unfold their own nature.
Furthermore, in Western philosophy of science, there is always a con-
scious checking of the correspondence between theories and empirical 
data so as to combine them into a coherent whole and to serve human 
beings’ purpose of explanation and prediction for the control of world 
events. This idea of correspondence could be found either in the tradition 
from classical empiricism to logical positivism, which assumes that there 
is truth where there is correspondence of theory to empirical data, or in 
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Kant’s critical philosophy, for which the world of experience must enter 
into the a priori framework of our subjectivity in order to become known 
by us. The idea of correspondence is always there behind all tentative 
forms of verification (R. Carnap), falsification (K. Popper), or other forms 
of confirmation.
As to Chinese philosophy, we should say that the unity between em-
pirical knowledge and human thinking was also much emphasized.13 This 
is what Confucius affirmed when he told his disciple Zi Gong (子貢) that 
he was not merely aiming at learning many things and retaining them in 
memory but rather that there was a unity that bound them all together.14 
Confucius seemed to affirm, as Kant did, the complementary interaction 
between empirical data and thinking when he said, “To learn without 
thought leads to confusion. To think without learning leads to danger.”15 
These words of Confucius remind us of Kant’s saying that sensibility with-
out concept is blind, whereas concept without sensibility is void. However, 
it is different in the sense that the mode of unity in Confucianism is 
achieved by ethical praxis, and, in the case of Daoism, by life praxis, both 
in reference to the Dao or Heaven as the Ultimate Reality. Here “praxis” 
or “practical action” was not interpreted as a kind of technical application 
of theories to the control of concrete natural or social phenomena. On 
the contrary, it was understood as an active involvement in the process of 
realizing what is properly human in the life of the individual and of soci-
ety. As to science and technology, they are not to be ignored but must be 
reconsidered, transformed, and upgraded in the context of ethical praxis 
and life praxis.
REASONABLENESS ENCOURAGES STRANGIFICATION
The function of reason in Chinese philosophy is better characterized as 
reasonableness rather than by rationality. “Reason” in the Chinese sense re-
fers always to the totality of existence and to its meaningful interpretation 
by human life as a whole, which in principle would encourage the act of 
going to the other side of reality to see holistically and therefore encourage 
strangification.
On its cognitive side, reasonableness concerns the dimension of 
meaning: meaning of literary or artistic work, life, society, culture, exist-
ence itself, etc. The model of this cognitive activity could be found in the 
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understanding and interpretation of a text or a work of art. This activity of 
understanding and interpretation could be extended to any form of rela-
tionship that human beings entertain with the dimension of the totality of 
existence. In the understanding of meaning, we have to refer, not only to 
its linguistic meanings, but also to the totality of my self and the totality 
of relationships that I entertain with the world. In some sense, it has to 
start from my self as the subject of my experience and my understanding 
in order to reconstruct the meaning of a text, but it refers inevitably to the 
level of ontology where human life is integrated into a profound relation-
ship with the Ultimate Reality.
On its practical side, when we ask the question, what are those ac-
tions that are subject to the function of reasonableness, the answer is that 
all actions are concerned with personal as well as collective involvement 
in meaning constitution. For example, we could think of those actions 
concerned with the creation and appreciation of works of art, with the 
realization and evaluation of moral intention, and even those political ac-
tions concerned with the decision of historical orientation of a certain 
social group. Finally, we could consider the meaning of life and existence 
as an unceasing process of meaning realization in the universe.
We have to notice that the function of reasonableness that refers 
itself to the totality of one’s self and one’s relationship with the world, 
as exemplified by Confucianism, is still quite limited to human-centred 
orientation. There is still another function of reasonableness, of a more 
speculative character, which is concerned more with the totality of Being 
and Reality Itself and is not limited to human subjectivity and human 
meaningfulness. This is more exemplified by Daoism.
In Chinese philosophy, it is necessary to ask the question about the 
relation we have with Reality Itself, or the Ultimate Reality. I would say 
that Chinese culture is characterized by its intimacy with Reality Itself. 
It cherishes always some sort of communicative union with the Reality 
Itself or Ultimate Reality, understood as Heaven, Sincerity, Dao, Nature, 
Emptiness, Mind, or Life.
Confucianism’s function of reason, though focusing on human beings 
as the centre of the cosmos, is nevertheless still open to the dynamism 
of nature in supposing that human beings are interconnected with and 
responsive to many others, such as nature and Heaven. The concept of 
“Heaven,” which had represented a personal God in ancient China and 
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thereby represented an implicit Ultimate Reality, changed its meaning 
after the arrival of Confucianism, so as to represent now the philosoph-
ical ground of human existence and moral praxis. The focus therefore was 
shifted to the concern with human self-awareness and responsiveness to 
many others, nature and Heaven. This self-awareness and responsive-
ness, this interconnectedness, which Confucius expresses by the term ren, 
serves as the ontological foundation of the manifestation of Reality Itself 
and humans’ original communicative competence. By way of sincere re-
sponse, human beings can even attain the Ultimate Reality. That is why 
the Doctrine of the Means posits “sincerity” (誠, cheng) as its core concept, 
which means both metaphysically the true Reality itself and psychologic-
ally the true self. On the transcendental level, it is in union with the true 
Reality before its expressions evolve into empirical psychic states such as 
being happy, angry, sad, or joyful.
Confucianism tends to see human language and knowledge as hu-
man ways of manifesting Reality Itself. This could be achieved through 
the rectification of names and a sincerity of purpose. In today’s situation, 
Confucianism would look upon science and technology as capable of be-
ing integrated into the process of constructing a meaningful world. In 
general, the process of human intervention into the process of nature is 
seen by Confucianism as humankind’s participation in and assistance in 
the creative transformation of Heaven and Earth. It concerns a kind of 
participative construction instead of dominative construction.
For Daoism, the Dao, as the Ultimate Reality, manifests itself in 
Nature, and Nature is seen as a spontaneous process not to be domin-
ated and determined by human beings’ technical intervention. Human 
beings themselves are considered by Daoism as part of nature, and their 
ontological status is much like that of plants, animals and other beings in 
nature, all taken to be sons of the same Mother, the Dao. Daoism teaches 
us how to respect the spontaneous process of nature and that human be-
ings’ knowledge should be constructed in such a way that it unfolds the 
spontaneous dynamism of nature.16 According to Daoism, human beings 
should be aware of the limit of all kinds of human construction and, by 
way of deconstructing the already constructed, keep their minds always 
open to the spontaneous dynamism of nature. Knowledge and Life-world, 
necessary for human existence, should not be constructed according to the 
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structural constraint of human language and thought but according to the 
rhythmic manifestation of nature.
In general, Chinese culture cherishes the Life-world, which is partly 
constructed by human beings and partly unfolds itself spontaneously in 
the rhythm of nature. Confucianism puts its emphasis more on the human 
construction of a meaningful existence, while, in contrast to it, Daoism 
would emphasize the spontaneous unfolding of natural rhythm.
STRANGIFICATION AS WORKABLE STRATEGY OF 
INTERCULTURAL PHILOSOPHY
We are now facing a multicultural situation, together with more and more 
conflicting differences in interests, ideologies, and worldviews. In this 
pluralistic world, the search for self-identity, for respect of difference, and 
for mutual enrichment becomes more urgent than ever. The exception is 
found in the domain of artistic creation, where there will be no space 
for compromise and consensus, and there we can accept Jean-François 
Lyotard’s idea of a radical preference for difference in language games in 
view of originality and creativity. But in the public sphere, in any case, 
we always need more communications and more effort for consensus. In 
the public sphere, life could not go without communication, and policy-
making could not be done well without consensus.
I accept Lyotard’s view that we should respect each language game 
and its differences. But this does not mean that we should not try to 
understand each other’s language and to appropriate it or to translate 
ours into language of or understandable to others. Otherwise, we will 
not really be able to appreciate the difference of the other, and our respect 
for this difference is deprived of a real appreciation of it. In fact, if person 
P can really say that language game A is in such and such aspects differ-
ent from language B, even to the degree of being incommensurable, it 
means that both language games are intelligible and understandable to P 
and P understands them. This fact presupposes P ’s appropriation of both 
languages and his act, at least implicitly, of strangification between them.
That is why Lyotard’s respect for different language games re-
mains abstract and unrealizable. In order to understand the difference 
of other philosophical/religious/cultural traditions, we need language 
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appropriation and strangification, and these do not necessarily presuppose 
any tentative of integration, not to say unification. Strangification presup-
poses language appropriation, but it does not presuppose the target of a 
final unification. Unwillingness to appropriate another’s language and an 
unwillingness to strangify, however, would mean self-contentment with, 
or self-enclosure in one’s own micro-world, cultural world, or religious 
world.
The concept of “strangification” could be seen as a workable strat-
egy of communication between different agents. I have modified and ex-
tended Fritz Wallner’s idea of “strangification” (Verfremdung, in German; 
first proposed to serve as an epistemological strategy for interdisciplinary 
research on the level of science) to levels of intercultural exchange and 
interreligious dialogue. “Strangification,” an act of going outside oneself 
to multiple others, from one’s familiarity to strangeness, is properly hu-
man and universal to all human activities and can therefore be applied to 
all kinds of communication, including cultural interaction and religious 
dialogue. For me, the process of dialogue should be a process of mutual 
strangification.
Presupposing an act of previous appropriation of language, inter-
cultural philosophy can proceed first of all to conduct linguistic strangi-
fication, by which we translate the language of one’s own philosophical/
religious or cultural tradition into the language of (or understandable to) 
another tradition, to see whether it thereby becomes understandable or 
absurd. In the latter case, reflection and self-critique should be made of 
one’s own tradition instead of self-defence or other more radical form of 
apologetics. Although there is always some untranslatable residue or hard 
core of meaningfulness, its commonly shareable intelligibility would be 
enough to prove its own universalizability. If one can only boast of the 
meaningfulness of one’s philosophy/religion within one’s own cultural 
tradition, as some nationalist philosophers and scholars of religion would 
maintain or pretend, this is only a proof of its own limit rather than of its 
merit.
Then comes the pragmatic strangification, by which we draw out one 
philosophical idea or cultural value/expression from its own cultural con-
text to put it into another cultural context to see whether it is still under-
standable/workable there or whether it loses its ability to adapt itself in 
the new context and become ineffective. If it still works, this means it has 
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more pragmatic possibilities and is pragmatically more universalizable. 
Otherwise, it should check its own limit by self-reflection and self-critique.
Finally, there is ontological strangification, by which we attempt to 
travel from one micro/cultural/religious world to other micro/cultural/re-
ligious worlds in order to understand them through the detour of a direct 
contact with or the manifestation of Reality Itself.17 This level of stran-
gification is especially important when there is a religious dimension in 
the philosophical traditions or in religious dialogue. Without a certain 
engagement to an experience of Ultimate Reality, it would be superficial 
in conducting religious dialogue. Our experience of the Ultimate Reality, 
if indeed ultimate, should be universalizable and shareable, otherwise it 
could be only a pretext of religious exclusivism.
In fact there are many cases of successful intercultural or interreli-
gious strangification. One of them is Buddhism’s success in China. We 
know that Buddhism came from India to China and became one of the 
three basic constituents of Chinese philosophy and religion. Buddhism 
accomplished this by taking all the measures of linguistic, pragmatic, and 
ontological strangifications. As to linguistic strangification, Buddhism 
first of all appropriated Daoist and Confucian languages to make itself 
understandable to Chinese intellectuals and then proceeded to the sys-
tematic translation of its scriptures into Chinese. As to pragmatic stran-
gification, Buddhism made an effort to re-contextualize itself in Chinese 
ethics (such as filial piety), politics (such as relation with political leader-
ship), and economics (such as monastery economics). On the ontological 
level, with its experience of Emptiness or One Mind as Ultimate Reality, 
Buddhism made itself understandable to other endogenous traditions such 
as Confucianism and Daoism. The Buddhist experience of Emptiness and 
Mind, the Daoist experience of Dao and wu, and the Confucian experi-
ence of ren (humanness, humanity, and cosmic innerconnectedness) and 
cheng (sincerity and true reality), though quite different in themselves, still 
enjoy some similarity and complementarity in their experiences of the 
Ultimate Reality.18
Unfortunately, not all Buddhist strangification into China communi-
cated the right message to Chinese people, and this was deeply related 
to the linguistic strangification. This is to say that linguistic strangifica-
tion can affect pragmatic strangification and vice versa. This can be found 
in some Chinese translations that missed or even distorted the original 
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message that was potentially good for Chinese culture in the long run. For 
example, the translation of terms expressing ethical relationship such as 
“mother and father” and “wife and husband” in Indian Buddhist scriptures 
became “father and mother” (sometimes even modified as “paying filial 
piety to father and mother”), and “husband and wife.” The phrase “marry 
one’s wife” was quite often translated as “marry one’s wife and concubines.” 
As to political relations, “republican relation” was translated as “imper-
ial relation.” In the volume 2 of the Dīrghāgama, Sākyamuni praised the 
country of Vraja people, who often held meetings to discuss righteous af-
fairs in a republican way. However, when translated into Chinese, it reads 
“the Emperor and his subjects are in harmony and the superior and infer-
ior respect each other” (君臣和順，上下相敬).19 The consequence of this 
was that the messages of more egalitarian ethics and republican politics 
contained in the Indian Buddhist scriptures were turned into hierarchical 
and totalitarian terms in order to adapt to Chinese culture and thereby 
the Chinese people were unable to learn for their own long-term benefit.
The most basic of all these three is linguistic strangification, by which 
one translates an idea/value/expression from one cultural/religious world 
into language of (or understandable to) other cultural/religious world. 
Even if in the process of translation, we lose by necessity some mean-
ingful content, especially in the case of poetic, aesthetic, and religious 
expressions, this should not be an excuse for not making any effort of 
strangification. We should not argue from the fact of losing meaning in 
translation for a radical intranslatability of different language games. We 
could say that there must be a minimum of translatability among dif-
ferent language games, so as to allow the act of strangification. The act 
of strangification presupposes also the will to strangify and the effort of 
strangification. Strangification is thus the minimum requirement in inter-
cultural interaction.
I would say that strangification is a very useful strategy, not only for 
different scientific disciplines, but also for different cultures and religions. 
It is even more fundamental than Habermas’s concept of “communicative 
action.” In fact, Habermas’s communicative action is a process of argu-
mentation in which the proposition-for and the proposition-against, by 
way of Begründung, search for consensus in a higher proposition acceptable 
to both parties. Although Habermas has proposed four claims for an ideal 
situation of communication, including understandability, truth, sincerity, 
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and legitimacy, unfortunately, in the actual world of communication, it 
happens very often that there is either total conflict or compromise, with-
out any real consensus. The Habermasian argumentation tends to fail if in 
the process of Begründung and in the act of searching for consensus there 
is not first of all any effort for strangification. In this case, there will be 
no real mutual understanding and no self-reflection during the process of 
argumentation. Therefore, the strategy of strangification could be seen as 
a prerequisite for any successful communication.
Religious and/or philosophical dialogue should be conceived as based 
on a mutual act of strangification or mutual waitui. In the dialogue be-
tween A and B, on the level of linguistic strangification, A should translate 
his propositions or ideas/values/belief system into the language of B or a 
language understandable to B. In the meanwhile, B should translate his 
propositions or ideas/values/belief system in the language of A or under-
standable to A. On the level of pragmatic strangification, A should draw 
his proposition(s), supposed truth(s)/cultural expression/value/religious 
belief out from his own social, organizational contexts and put it into the 
social, organizational context of B. In the meanwhile, B should draw his 
proposition(s), supposed truth(s)/cultural expression/value/religious belief 
out from his own social, organizational context and put it into the social, 
organizational context of A. On the level of ontological strangification, A 
should make an effort to enter into B ’s micro-world, cultural world, or re-
ligious world through the detour of his experience with Reality Itself, such 
as a person, a social group, Nature, or the Ultimate Reality. Meanwhile, 
B should also make an effort to enter into A ’s micro-world, cultural world, 
or religious world through the detour of his experience with Reality Itself.
This is to say that comparison, communication, and dialogue will 
never be conducted within one’s self-enclosure. On the contrary, it starts 
with a mutual act of going outside of one’s self-enclosure to the other, what 
I call “a process of mutual waitui.” I go outside of myself to you and you go 
outside of yourself to me, so as to form a dialogue leading to mutual en-
richment. When we conduct mutual waitui, we make our own scientific/
cultural/religious/life-world understandable to each other by translating 
our languages into the language of each other or understandable to each 
other, by putting it into another’s pragmatic context or by going through 
the detour of Reality Itself or the other’s life-world. This process of mutual 
waitui is to be conducted not only in everyday life, in scientific research, 
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and in cultural and religious life, but also in economic and political life, 
where different political parties, interest groups, governments, and people 
should always commit themselves to a process of communication leading 
to mutual enrichment rather than to conflict or war.
Strangification and dialogue in the form of mutual waitui are more 
fundamental than the communicative action understood by Habermas as 
argumentation. For me, Habermasian argumentation presupposes a pre-
vious effort of strangification in expressing one’s proposal(s) in another’s 
language or in a language understandable to others, without which there 
will be no real mutual understanding and no self-reflection in the process 
of argumentation. Habermas’s four ideal claims for understandability, 
truth, sincerity, and legitimacy just cannot work in the real world without 
previous mutual waitui. I would think I am sincere, but you would think 
I am a hypocrite; I would think that I am telling the truth, but you may 
consider that just absurd; and, since a commonly acceptable norm does 
not yet exist, or that the law necessary for legitimacy is still an issue under 
debate, there is no accepted legitimacy, so to speak.
THE FOUNDATION OF STRANGIFICATION IN CHINESE 
PHILOSOPHY
Philosophically speaking, the strategy of strangification has its condition 
of possibility in human communicative competence. In Chinese philoso-
phy, Confucianism would propose ren (仁) as the original communicative 
competence, the ontological condition of possibility that renders feasible 
and legitimate the act of strangification as well as communication and self-
reflection. From this original communicative competence, Confucianism 
proposes the concept of shu (恕), which could be seen as an act of empathy 
and strangification, a better strategy for fruitful communication than 
Habermas’s argumentation. Confucianism, in positing the existence of a 
sensitive responsiveness as a condition of the possibility of strangification, 
has elevated strangification to the ontological level.
Based on the sensitive responsiveness of ren, Confucianism affirms the 
existence of an innate knowledge (良知, liangzhi) and the dimension of 
tacit consensus, which could serve as the pre-linguistic foundation for fur-
ther argumentative consensus. If deprived of all these, during the process 
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of argumentation, Habermas’s suggestion of four ideal claims would not 
be able to work in actual political debates, even to the point of leading 
towards total conflict, because of the difference in political languages and 
in interpreting concepts such as truth, sincerity, and legitimacy. There will 
be no real mutual understanding and no self-reflection during the process 
of argumentation, if we do not communicate our position in considering 
the others and in speaking the other’s language or in a language under-
standable to the other.
In Confucianism, the concept of shu represents this ability to go to 
multiple others and to communicate with others through language under-
standable to him/her/them. Especially under the post-modern condition, 
when any difference in race, gender, age, class, or belief system could cre-
ate total conflict, any part in confrontation, difference, or opposition with 
another part should communicate with the other part in a spirit of shu.
On the other hand, from the Daoist point of view, strangification 
does not only presuppose the appropriation of and translation into the lan-
guage of other traditions. It is also necessary to render oneself present to 
the Reality Itself. In Laozi’s word, “Having grasped the Mother (Reality 
Itself), you can thereby know the sons (micro-worlds). Having known the 
sons, you should return again to the Mother.”20 Daoism posits an onto-
logical detour through Reality Itself as the condition sine qua non for the 
act of strangification into other worlds (micro/cultural/religious worlds).
In terms of Laozi, we grasp the Reality Itself by the process of “re-
tracing regard” (觀, guan), an act of intuition into the essence of things 
by letting things be as they are. A holistic knowledge is seen therefore by 
Daoism as a back and forth process between the act of interacting with 
manifested worlds (sons) and the act of returning to Reality Itself (the 
Mother). The act of returning to Reality Itself and communicating with it 
is therefore considered by Daoism as nourishing our strangification with 
other worlds. This act of ontological detour through Reality Itself bestows 
an ontological dimension to strangification. Ontological strangification in 
this sense is especially important for religious dialogue, when the relation 
with the Ultimate Reality is most essential to religious experiences.
For Chinese philosophy, it is always preferable to encourage the act of 
strangification and dialogue to maximize harmony in one’s relation with 
many others. I use the term “many others” (or multiple others) to replace 
the post-modern concept of the “Other” proposed by Lacan, Levinas, 
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Derrida, and Deleuze. For me the “Other” is a mere abstraction. In no 
moment of our life are we facing purely and simplythe “Other.” We are 
all born into the many others and we grow up among many others. The 
Confucian concept of wulun (五倫, five relationships), the Daoist concept 
of wanwu (萬物, myriad things), and the Chinese Buddhist concept of 
zhongsheng (眾生, all sentient beings) all imply an undeniable idea of many 
others. It is better for our life of sanity that we keep in our mind the exist-
ence of many others and our relation with multiple others.
CONCLUSION
As I see it, now that we are in the beginning years of the twenty-first 
century, philosophy is also facing the challenge of globalization. We 
should not limit ourselves to a single type of national philosophy or to a 
philosophical tradition. Although philosophizing is a common interest of 
many cultural traditions in the world, it is still too early to boast of a world 
philosophy, and philosophy still exists in plural forms. In today’s situation, 
philosophers are commonly facing three major interrelated issues:
First, the swift and enormous development of science and technol-
ogy will soon become the leading factors of human historicity and cul-
tural development. In fact, this is the real power leading to a world of 
globalization. How to deepen the development of science and technology 
through philosophical reflection and how to elaborate ethical reflection to 
make science and technology more human will be very important issues 
in the future of human civilization. This will not be achieved by any single 
philosophical tradition whatsoever and, by virtue of the complex nature of 
the problem, invites the effort of intercultural philosophy.
Second, the more and more frequent and intimate interactions be-
tween different cultural traditions is putting us inevitably in a world of 
multiculturalism. How are we to enrich ourselves and promote others by 
means of cultural interactions in which we share the best part of our own, 
while being aware of our own limitations in contrast to others? This task 
will become even more urgent in the future. In this sense I think that 
intercultural philosophy is a key to the future of philosophy.
Third, as we have seen, the philosophy of the twentieth century was 
too much human-centred. Just think of phenomenology, existentialism, 
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structuralism, critical theory, neo-Marxism, hermeneutics, post-modern-
ism, and modern Neo-Confucianism; all of these philosophical tenden-
cies were all human-centred. However, as we observe, the difficulties of 
humankind became unsolvable in the bottleneck jammed with all these 
human-centred ways of thinking. Fortunately, the ecological movement 
and new discoveries in astronomical physics leads us to a greater concern 
with Nature, and the religious renaissance in the end of the last century 
leads us also to a concern with the transcendent or the absolute other and 
also with inter-religious dialogue. In this new era, we will have to redefine 
human experience in the context of nature and inter-religious dialogue.
We hope, and we should say, that the domination of the philosophical 
forum by Western philosophical/religious discourses should from now on 
cede its way, with self-critique and self-understanding, to the wisdom of 
concordant contrast, paying more respect to both difference and comple-
mentarity and leading to the optimal harmony among many philosoph-
ical/religious traditions. In this context, traditional comparative philoso-
phy/religion should move on to intercultural philosophy/religion. In the 
multicultural context, now and in the future, the search for self-identity, 
reciprocal respect, and mutual enrichment could be reached through a 
new vision and practice of intercultural philosophy/religion. For this, 
Chinese philosophy/religion will have a lot to say. I am not saying that 
Chinese philosophy/religion will be another dominant trend in the future 
but rather that Chinese philosophy/religion could contribute to a more 
balanced intercultural philosophy/religion better for all philosophical/re-
ligious traditions and cultural interactions. With the vision and method of 
contrast, mutual strangification, and dialogue, we will be able to deal with 
the problems of the impact of science and technology on all cultures, the 
situation of multiculturalism, and the redefinition of human experience 
in both the cosmic and inter-religious context, which are the major chal-
lenges of twenty-first century intercultural philosophy/religion.
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The Philosopher as Stranger:  




The title and sub-title of this essay seem to name incongruous themes 
arbitrarily bolted together – but their unexpected congruence is the theme 
of the reflections that follow. The idea of the philosopher as “stranger” 
comes from a comment in Pierre Hadot’s book, Philosophy as a Way of 
Life,1 a book now associated with a philosophical movement that seeks 
to re-engage with the ancient, practical conception of the philosopher as 
a seeker after wisdom. This re-engagement, however, is also an expres-
sion of dissatisfaction with the contemporary condition of philosophy. The 
claim I wish to make in this paper is that what we now call “comparative 
philosophy” is not only an expression of this same dissatisfaction but is 
also one of the main strands of its development. Comparative philosophy, 
particularly as it is associated with the work of Henry Corbin, is another 
form of philosophy as a way of life, a particular way of seeking to revitalize 
the ancient conception of philosophy as a search for wisdom.
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PHILOSOPHERS AND THE “WORLD”
Thus philosophers are strangers, a race apart.… By the time of 
the Platonic dialogues Socrates was called atopos, that is, “un-
classifiable.” What makes him atopos is precisely the fact that 
he is a “philo-sopher” in the etymological sense of the word; 
that is, he is in love with wisdom. For wisdom, says Diotima in 
Plato’s Symposium, is not a human state, it is a state of perfec-
tion of being and knowledge that can only be divine. It is the 
love of this wisdom, which is foreign to the world, that makes 
the philosopher a stranger in it.2
It is useful and sobering to be thus reminded by Hadot of this ancient 
image of the philosophers, whose love of wisdom makes them strangers in 
the world. It reminds us, in the first place, of the subtle resonances of the 
expression – “the world” – that Hadot here introduces, which is at once a 
formation of desire and a perspective on reality embodied in a population. 
It reminds us that “the world” in this sense has always moved, as Eliot 
once wrote, “in appetency, on its metalled ways/ Of time before and time 
after,” and it also reminds us that this spirit of appetency is what defines 
“the world.” The origins of philosophical estrangement from the world 
must lie in the exposure to its cynical view of knowledge and opinion as 
instruments of policy and power. Speaking truth to power, parrhesia, is 
one of the virtues of the philosopher, not just because it is dangerous but 
also because it can hardly be heard.
Hadot’s words are sobering because they imply a high vocation for 
philosophy that seems now either dauntingly unattainable or foolishly ir-
relevant, especially in those whose avocation is to teach philosophy in in-
stitutions of higher education. Is it possible for an academic philosopher of 
the early twenty-first century really to be a philosopher under the ancient 
conception, a member of a race apart, one who has become a stranger be-
cause of their love of a “wisdom” defined “as a state of perfection of being 
and knowledge that can only be ‘divine’”? 
The crucial contrast here is with a “human” imperfection of being and 
knowledge. The concept of “the world” might be taken as referring to 
one form of this imperfection, a condition in which a prior state of being 
determines what might be appropriated as knowledge, rather than one in 
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which being progressively alters with the knowledge that is appropriated. 
But all this language is embedded in the Platonic spiritual tradition whose 
downfall Nietzsche had announced along with the death of God. Such a 
sense of “being philosophical,” which we retain in common speech as a 
way of representing a distinctive and admirable demeanour, particularly 
of fortitude in the face of adversity, seems otherwise remote from domin-
ant contemporary conceptions of the vocation of philosopher and seems, 
indeed, closest to religious notions of sainthood.
There are few enough voices now in philosophy that even hint at such a 
vocation for philosophers as “strangers in the world.” Surprisingly, though, 
there is a hint of a leaner but only an apparently more secular version 
of this conception found in a short remark in Wittgenstein’s Zettel.3 He 
observes there that “the philosopher is not a citizen of any community of 
ideas. That’s what makes him a philosopher.”4 This is at least a conception 
in which the philosopher is in some way set apart – from those who are 
the citizens of a “community of ideas.” But now, this comment is juxta-
posed in Zettel to an intriguingly long and quite unexpected quotation 
from Plato’s early dialogue, Charmides, whose topic is how to understand 
the idea of temperance or temperateness, the Greek virtue of sophrosune. 
What is under discussion in the passage copied out by Wittgenstein is the 
proposal that sophrosune should be defined as “knowledge of knowledge 
and ignorance.” This is obscured for Anglophone readers by the transla-
tion of sophrosune as “wisdom,” though the German text has the more 
accurate Besonnenheit, with its sense of the self-possession that belongs 
to temperateness or temperance. The implication of making this connec-
tion between what appears on the surface to be a “purely” practical virtue 
and that of “knowledge of knowledge and ignorance” is that our states of 
mind in some fundamental way govern our access to and experience of 
reality, and do so in a way that is not reducible to the sort of propositional 
or conceptual knowledge that is independent of the states of mind of the 
knower. The idea is not that the relevant state of mind can be identified 
separately from the knowledge to which it gives access. We are speak-
ing, rather, of a single state of being and knowledge, in which conduct 
and demeanour are natural expressions of the state of the knower. This is 
almost the defining Platonic thought that sets the philosopher apart as a 
stranger. Their distinctive knowledge is attained through transformations 
of their inner experience, in the sense that what they come to know and 
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their interior disposition form a unity, a transformation of their whole be-
ing. This makes them a-topos and takes them precisely out of “the world,” 
which is thus defined as the expression of a contrasting mental condition 
that stands in need of transformation. This is perhaps the point of the 
contrast between “human” and “divine” in Hadot’s reference to the speech 
of Diotima in the Symposium. But now, why is sophrosune or temperance 
defined as knowledge of knowledge and ignorance? It is time to consider 
Plato’s greatest metaphor.
One of the most striking aspects of Plato’s image of the cave is that 
the prisoners are not in a position to see that they are prisoners. We could 
put it more strongly and say that, were they to be told that they were 
prisoners, they would have no reason to believe what is nevertheless true. The 
Platonic irony is that we know that the real claim is that our own position 
is that of the prisoners and that we have no reason to believe it either. The 
truth or reality of our situation is beyond the grasp of our concepts; there 
is something that transcends or surpasses them. This does not imply that 
we know nothing – we know a lot about shadows for instance – but only 
that we are ignorant of the real nature of our situation, or, somewhat dif-
ferently, are deluded in our estimate of it. If we have an estimate of it, as 
many people do, it features as a kind of baseless assumption that what lies 
within our fixed horizon exhausts reality. What is striking about the way 
the metaphor unfolds is that at a certain point the liberated prisoner is 
brought to a position where he can now see the mechanisms that determined 
the scope of the limited knowledge previously available to him, which he 
can now see was, by contrast, a restricted knowledge only of shadows. It is 
just these mechanisms that prevent the prisoners from seeing any reason 
to believe that they are prisoners, and the ironic implication is that there 
are analogous mechanisms – of human bondage – that obscure the alleged 
fact that we are in the same position as the prisoners. The liberated pris-
oner sees the flames of the bonfire and the traffic on the road whose shad-
ows are cast onto the walls that confront the chained prisoners. One way 
of understanding this significant moment in the cave, with the liberated 
prisoner looking back at the scene and at the workings of the mechanisms 
that limited perception, is that it is an image precisely of the enlargement 
and liberation that depend upon sophrosune. It is also, therefore, a picture 
of the idea of “knowledge of knowledge and ignorance” since the liberated 
prisoner at least knows this: – he knows both what the chained prisoners 
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know and what they are ignorant of. In other words, it is the moment 
when the prisoner has become a stranger to the world of which he was 
once an inhabitant: he now speaks a foreign language.
These Platonic reflections imply claims about what it is to be a hu-
man being at all and about what it is to be a philosopher. The underlying 
thought is that within us there is a divided and conflicted self, something 
all too human contending against and resisting something “divine,” a self 
that at once belongs to and clings to “the world” and at the same time has 
the possibility of transcending and becoming a stranger in it. The question 
that remains is whether the ancient conception can be disentangled from 
what is crudely known as the “two worlds” doctrine of Platonism. 
COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY, COLONIALISM, 
MULTICULTURALISM
Now so far I have said nothing to indicate that my topic will impinge on 
the theme of comparative philosophy. However, I said at the beginning 
that recent interest in the ancient conception grew out of dissatisfaction 
with a state of the discipline that seemed by contrast sterile and disen-
gaged. I also remarked that the turn to comparative philosophy expressed 
a similar dissatisfaction. But it also has other grounds, which brings us 
at once to our contemporary situation, in which the turbulence of geo-
politics is complicated by tensions between tradition and modernity, reli-
gion and secularism, tensions rendered global by the historical processes 
of colonization, “westernization,” and migration. In our multicultural so-
cieties in the West, we find that the spiritual and intellectual division that 
began to emerge in the eighteenth century exists now as a division within 
and between both relatively indigenous and relatively recent immigrant 
communities.
Non-Western countries were exposed not only to the foreign culture 
of the colonists but also to its tensions and conflicts, and the dismay that 
many felt in the West as secularization took its course was transferred to 
the countries that were being “westernized.” It would be naïve to see this 
dismay as simply moral, since the undermining soft power that accompan-
ies hard economic and military power – a natural expression of “the world” 
as it moves in appetency – is also a major political reality. Many outside 
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the West must find it ironic that the expression “the clash of civilizations” 
was coined in the West. Thus, for example, Roy Mottahedeh5 discusses 
the Iranian writer Al-e Ahmad’s sense of the cultural illness that he felt 
had stricken the towns and cities of Iran. Mottahedeh comments:
For this illness Al-e Ahmad seized on a newly coined word, 
and he made this word a rallying cry for Iranians from the six-
ties to the present. The word translated literally, piece by piece, 
is “West-strickenness,” but even this clumsy translation fails 
to convey the sense of the Persian original, gharbzadegi. “I say 
that gharbzadegi … is like cholera (or) frost-bite. But no. it’s at 
least as bad as saw-flies in the wheat fields. Have you ever seen 
how they infest wheat? From within. There’s a healthy skin in 
places, but it’s only a skin, just like the shell of a cicada on a 
tree.”6
The Indian philosopher J. L. Mehta, who was a well-known commentator 
on the work of Heidegger, once referred to the disruptive forces unleashed 
by the Western “marriage of science and technology.”7 But it’s not so much 
the marriage that is the problem as the perspectives and energies that 
have driven its direction. Mehta asked whether it might not be true that 
“Western thought … enters … like a Trojan horse … into the thinking of 
the non-Western world” or “like a virus … invisibly altering our percep-
tion of reality.”8 And the point here, surely, is the “invisibly.” It may be 
that one’s perception of reality ought to be altered, but only, surely, on the 
basis of what you judge to be compelling reasons. If there is an abrupt 
caesura, then the old way of thinking remains unresolved, becomes un-
conscious and works itself out underground. In 1929 Krishna Chandra 
Bhattacharya9 had written that cultural subjection occurs “when one’s 
traditional cast of ideas and sentiments is superseded without comparison 
or competition by a new cast representing an alien culture which possesses 
one like a ghost” (emphasis added).10 The consequence, as he says, address-
ing his Indian audience, is that “we either accept or repeat the judgments 
passed on us by Western culture, or we impotently resent them but have 
hardly any estimates of our own, wrung from an inward perception of the 
realities of our own position.”11
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The states of mind that find expression in the dispositions of “the 
world” are hardly absent in non-Western countries. As we know, present 
victimhood is hardly a guarantee of present or future virtue. Even the 
distinctively moral anxiety about western sexual excess can also veil a 
harsh patriarchal impulse to control women. It would be difficult to show 
that the alleged moral decline of the West extends to the disappearance 
of exemplars of courage, justice, and compassion. However, the alleged 
moral decline of the West and the perceived degeneracy of the culture 
it has exported are quite closely connected to one of the most influential 
essays into comparative philosophy.
PLATONISTS OF THE WORLD
Perhaps it would be prudent if I confessed the misgivings I had when 
I was invited to contribute to this project on the state of “comparative 
philosophy” – misgivings, I should say, in the first instance, about my own 
competence as a contributor to what appeared to be a serious and well-
developed specialist field of philosophical scholarship, but also the sceptical 
misgivings of an outsider looking in, about the nature and value of the 
enterprise, its interest for philosophers. My misgivings took the form at 
once of a suspicion that what is called “comparative philosophy” might 
represent a dilution of philosophy and, admittedly somewhat in tension with 
that, an anxiety that crucial philosophical work might be ignored because 
its name allows “mainstream” philosophers to shunt it into a specialist 
siding of marginal interest.
However, and especially when one takes into account historical per-
iods of intense intellectual contact between cultures, whether Greeks and 
Romans, Europeans and Arabs, Moguls, Hindus and Buddhists, it seems 
to me that in fact “comparative philosophy” is just philosophy, that philoso-
phy is intrinsically “comparative” if we mean by that term that it critically 
compares and examines the merits of ideas whatever their provenance. 
In other words, philosophy has frequently in its history been refreshed 
by “cross-cultural comparison.” Indeed the failure to engage with other 
traditions probably stands more in need of explanation than the readiness 
to do so.
One fairly obvious explanation extends at least to the mainstream of 
analytic philosophy – it is both deeply implicated in and partly the product 
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of the Western process of secularization. Philosophers of this tendency are 
the least likely to feel any need to look abroad, as it were, apart from for 
the sake of recruitment to its own ranks. And there is no doubt that many 
have been very happy to be recruited, as Bhattacharya and others have 
lamented. Those who are most likely to look abroad for sustenance, both 
to other traditions and to poetry and literature, are those who feel most 
strongly that something profound is missing, that the focus is too narrow, 
and that subjectivity, interiority, spirituality, have all gone from it and 
need to be restored. But this returns us to the agon of philosophy in the 
modern age and the problem of how, if at all, philosophers can resolve the 
tensions between religion and secularism. Are not these latter notions also 
the most contestable, the most implicated in the traditional worldview 
from which western philosophy has rescued us? And if we claim that we 
are in a period in which an arid, over-technicalized and self-referential 
philosophy needs to be refreshed, we should state our grounds, refer to 
some failure in its adequacy to human reality and show that it is of the kind 
imaginatively represented by the case of the released prisoner. This chal-
lenge is not easy to meet, since it invites a conversation between different 
formations of subjectivity. Not to put too fine a point on it, it is invidious 
to make this claim, as there is a problem in principle about communica-
tion between the chained and the released prisoner, and this problem must 
lie at the heart of our present philosophical difficulties. And claiming to 
be a released prisoner is not a comfortable public position. Alternatively, 
and to introduce a Freudian thought, just as we can judge that an individ-
ual is showing resistance in the vicinity of repressed material, we must be 
able to say that there is material, including significant aspects of human 
experience, that is not yet incorporated into the world of the philosophers. 
Their account of experience and reality is unsatisfactory because the way 
they represent how things are is distorting and deluded.
That its practitioners in the West who have felt compelled to coin a 
special term for an ancient and intrinsic practice implies, then, a philosoph-
ical critique of “straight” or mainstream philosophy. “Comparative phil-
osophy” is a coinage that belongs nevertheless to the politics of philosophy, 
and we take it seriously, as more than merely wounded and resentful amour 
propre, only when it can show that there is inadequacy or lack in the trad-
ition. This is that it is blind to significant insights into human nature that 
are available elsewhere, or that its general conception of the possibilities of 
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human action and experience, and the forms of our general understanding 
of the nature of reality, stand in need of significant correction.
But the crucial thing that it also seeks to acknowledge is the polit-
ical reality that we do philosophy now in a global rather than a merely 
regional context, and in multicultural not monocultural societies, and that 
a monocultural philosophy is itself as it were a pale reflection of the ten-
dency towards assimilation rather than integration. Although politicians 
regularly distinguish between these two terms, they also regularly con-
flate them. When we hear it declared that Muslims in the UK, for ex-
ample, must learn to integrate themselves into some host community, it is 
hard to see how this is not simply a demand for assimilation. Assimilation 
is a one-way process, whereas integration is a reciprocal process. Nor is 
integration achieved simply by the presence of different communities liv-
ing side by side in mutual indifference. It only takes place when the whole 
is altered by the participation of the parts in dialogue with one another, 
generating a new intercultural reality. The image of this in a philosophy 
that recognized and benefited from the new political reality is an enlarged 
and integrated canon.
In the opening remarks of his famous lecture, The Concept of 
Comparative Philosophy, Henry Corbin12 expresses regret that
[T]here are today all too few philosophers capable of simul-
taneously grasping several complete cultural unities and suf-
ficiently prepared linguistically to be able to cope with the texts 
at first hand.13
Although this remark may seem to set the standard impossibly high, 
nevertheless Corbin’s rare philosophical bird is surely likely to hatch out 
in reasonable numbers eventually – from within the various diasporas in 
the West. Within those diasporas there will be some who experience, on 
the one hand, the same disappointment with the state of philosophy as 
Corbin does, and to which I shall return. On the other, some experience a 
sense of invisibility and cultural dispossession, all in the form of that most 
painful but creative condition, the crisis of identity, as they live out the 
temptations and the pressures towards assimilation – pressures that reflect 
precisely the arrogance, incuriousness and self-absorption that they find in 
an alien philosophy. This is an unconscious arrogance that is naturally met 
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by resentment, so that what emerges is the triumphalism of resentment 
contending against the triumphalism of arrogance, a state of contention 
which can also divide the individual psyche. Such states of mind are in-
imical to philosophy, which degenerates instead into aggressive polemics 
or defensive apologetics.
Meanwhile, by the criterion Corbin offers here about the ability to 
“cope with the texts at first hand,” most of us in the profession could 
never be “comparative philosophers.” That does suggest that philosophers 
should see it as a very particular scholarly specialism of which they can 
at best be the beneficiaries. Even in the case of the canonical writings of 
their own traditions, most philosophers depend on critical translations 
and commentaries by scholarly experts and are vulnerable to the familiar 
pitfalls of such dependence.
But it is worth recalling that Corbin’s lecture was given at the 
University of Tehran. I mention this because, although he regrets the 
shortage of philosophers who are able to cope with texts at first hand, 
and, although it is important that scholar-philosophers should make such 
texts available, it is nevertheless philosophical dialogue that is fundamental 
to philosophy and, a fortiori, to comparative philosophy. This may seem a 
rather obvious remark, but I have already commented that philosophy can 
descend into aggressive polemic or defensive apologetic, so we need some 
sense of how philosophical dialogue may be distinguished from these ac-
tivities. It is also possible to be unconsciously one-sided in one’s account 
of what might be involved in “comparative philosophy,” so that one thinks 
of it as us over here, as it were, availing ourselves of the resources of another 
tradition. One does this by mediating its texts to our fellow philosophers 
in the West, in the manner of Schopenhauer, say, who found inspiration 
as well as confirmation in Indian Buddhist texts and sought to naturalize 
them into the language of the Kantian philosophy. 
The first person plural is very slippery in this kind of context. For most 
of this paper I have used it to associate myself with a particular position 
within analytic philosophy. But parallel conversations have been going on 
in India, for example, in which “we” reflected on our proper relation to the 
philosophy that was coming out of the West. What we need to attain is 
a first person plural whose scope covers all those engaged in this kind of 
dialogue as they come to their common conclusions and discuss their com-
mon experience. We best understand comparative philosophy as involving 
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participants on different sides of the dialogue. As in general philosophy, 
the essential act is one of dialogue, i.e., the sort of dialogue that becomes 
possible when we become conscious of the presence of different notions of 
reality – and the interests and the possibilities of appropriation belong to 
both sides in the conversation. For obvious historical and political reasons, 
however, the position, if not the interests of the participants, may be dif-
ferent, and this is, again, in familiar ways inimical to the conditions for 
the possibility of genuine philosophical dialogue.
So, in talking about what I take to be fundamental to philosophy I do 
so at a particular cultural moment and what I say has the status, not of a 
pronouncement, but of an overture to someone else who, for current pur-
poses, must be taken to come from a different tradition, and who is now, 
and this is a matter of both our attitudes, free to respond. I say “both our 
attitudes” because the demeanour and position of the different parties to a 
philosophical dialogue can inhibit or promote the freedom to engage in it. 
But it is worth repeating that we are not dealing with a general notion of 
dialogue here, but of specifically philosophical dialogue – and in propos-
ing a Socratic conception of philosophy I invoke a form that involves a 
robust agon between the parties to the elenchus.
But there is a serious question about what constitutes the freedom to 
engage in this kind of dialogue. It is one thing to be capable of conducting 
the elenchus and another to be capable of submitting oneself to it. For 
one thing, there is no assumption of equality between the participants – 
indeed, it involves an unequal relationship, one between a teacher and a 
pupil, in which the teacher by various means seeks to dislodge the pupil 
from a condition that obscures their view of reality or of how things really 
are. But the inequality does not derive from the fact that one person for-
mally holds the role of teacher and the other the role of pupil. Rather it 
is determined precisely by a more adequate awareness of how things are, 
by who has something to teach and who something to learn. The prem-
ise, to return to the beginning, is that one person can see the obscuring 
mechanisms and the other cannot. It is vitally important to realize that 
we are not talking in the elenchus simply of changing someone’s beliefs. As 
I also mentioned at the beginning, we are talking about a transformation 
of the person, of a kind that reflects not greater knowledge but greater 
understanding reflected in a changed demeanour. But the upshot of this 
is a curious one that is extensively discussed in the work of Kierkegaard, 
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viz. that communication between the parties represented by the liberated 
prisoner and those still bound by the mechanisms of bondage has to be 
artistic and indirect. It is not a matter of telling someone something, or 
defeating them in argument, and there is, no doubt, to recall a famous 
Zen story, many a professor whose cup is already full.
Corbin’s Tehran lecture gives eloquent expression to a disappointment 
and alarm about the moral condition of the West, the processes of west-
ernization, and the state of philosophy, which, in his case, is a particular 
secular direction of post-Hegelianism. But as we have seen, Corbin’s sense 
of danger, which no doubt echoes Heidegger’s vigorous warnings, is and 
has been no less felt by thinkers of different cultures who have seen the 
engulfing effects of “westernization” on those cultures. Corbin’s proposal 
for comparative philosophy represents a politico-religious agenda, a call 
as it were to arms to thinkers of affected cultures against the encroach-
ment of an occidental ideology, impelling a conception of philosophy that 
unconsciously conceals what should be the task of philosophy to reveal.
It seems to me that Corbin’s notion of comparative philosophy is 
that of an essential preliminary to the enlargement of a canon. It is the 
idea of bringing into contact recognizable philosophical traditions that 
are relatively unknown to one another, traditions that have diverged at 
some point in the past and lost contact, or traditions that have developed 
independently but are capable of a fruitful and challenging engagement 
with one another. In other words comparative philosophy is always aimed 
towards a new condition of philosophy itself. I say preliminary because it 
stands at the threshold of the enlargement or expansion of a canon. I do 
not mean here our, as opposed to someone else’s, canon, but rather the idea 
of a shared, global canon – so that, for instance, and to use Corbin’s own 
example, both the Cambridge and the Persian Platonists would feature in 
a common history of Platonism. Once there is a fruitful engagement and 
mutual integration, then that particular task of the comparative philoso-
pher is over. There is a mutual incorporation, not a continued comparison, 
of what constitutes a canon in the first place.
I am already of course using some of the language deployed by Corbin, 
in particular the distinction, familiar from the work of Heidegger, between 
concealment and revelation, and a conception of philosophy according to 
which the philosophical task is by no means to conceal from view but to 
bring to light, to show what is hidden in and by the appearances. And if 
37Michael McGhee
we are to take this further with any degree of philosophical seriousness 
we must surely now turn to the interrogation of the perceived inadequacy 
to reality and experience of the dominant and threatening condition of 
philosophy. By putting it in those terms, of course, I am giving less than 
its due weight to Corbin’s sense of the gravity of our predicament. His 
eschatological Christian Platonism comes out fairly clearly in this passage:
An agnostic humanity cannot organize the world by giving it-
self the same goals as does a humanity whose effort goes into 
projecting an arc the far side of which penetrates beyond this 
world of ours, a humanity which escapes the perils of history 
gone mad from losing direction.14
Corbin’s “agnostic humanity” appears here to be in possession only of val-
ues that we would associate with “the world” and his agenda for a com-
parative philosophy is an appeal to fellow Platonists to help stem the tide 
of an encroaching nihilism set to overwhelm the approaches of the divine. 
But as we have seen, the major philosophical task is to re-examine the 
nature and implications of this intellectual fission.
I should want to see whether one can articulate a middle position be-
tween this nihilism and Corbin’s eternalism, to see whether an “agnostic 
humanity” need after all be a humanity entirely lacking gnosis. It may be 
that our philosophical labours are better spent seeking to articulate how 
we can look back at this world and transcend it in the way that the released 
prisoner is forced to do, so that we become strangers, and in that sense 
genuine philosophers, just to the extent that we follow the transforma-
tion of being and knowledge without seeking to discern the lineaments of 
another, higher, world. We can do this, it seems to me, without in any way 
denying that there could be such a world, a world which is unchangeable 
and ultimately real.
This is the moment at which I might be expected to introduce the 
Buddhist philosophical traditions into the discussion, and to do so would 
be an obvious move towards expanding the terms of Corbin’s Comparative 
Philosophy beyond those of the Platonic traditions that developed within 
the monotheistic religions. I refrain, however, not simply because I do 
not have the scholarly or linguistic competence or inclination but because 
when I started to think of myself as a Buddhist in the mid-seventies it 
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seemed important to conduct an experiment which I think now was a 
groping attempt to establish an authentic connection between life and 
philosophy.
My immediate thinking was based on a personal reaction to what 
Western Buddhist artists of my acquaintance were doing, viz. educating 
themselves into the traditional techniques of Buddhist artistic forms, es-
pecially Tibetan. Though it was hardly for me to say, I thought that they 
should simply allow their painting to emerge naturally from their practice, 
to see, in other words, whether there might not be some creative, im-
aginative response to their Buddhist experience in their seeing and their 
painting. Simply to copy the forms of traditional art seemed to be analo-
gous to the complaint of Bhattacharya and others about Indians becoming 
expert in analytic philosophy, say, and allowing this enterprise to overlay 
the creative currents of their own cultural forms. Perhaps the analogy is 
misconceived, but nevertheless, rather than making myself familiar with 
the various Buddhist philosophical texts and the debates between the 
various Buddhist and Brahmanical schools, which, to be honest, I had 
no appetite for, I thought that I ought to see to what extent my Buddhist 
practise impinged upon my thinking, to see whether it made a difference 
to my seeing and thence to my attempts as a philosopher to articulate that 
vision. This also excuses me rather conveniently from having an opinion 
about abstruse disputes between the Buddhist schools. But it was hardly 
an experiment that could be conducted in a vacuum – the cultural and 
philosophical background to it was precisely the loss of that faith so vigor-
ously reasserted by Corbin. To put it rather pointedly, I was not about to 
sit in silence on a meditation mat and become aware of the presence of 
God, though it was also humbling to discover at last a degree of interior 
silence that led me to understand a little of the conditions which might 
have led me to talk just in those terms.
But the underlying premise of Buddhist practice – and the idea im-
plicit in the core Buddhist metaphor of bodhi or “awakening” – is the simple 
human truth that states of consciousness determine the forms and limits 
of knowledge and experience. Of course, it is a very particular application 
of an alleged general truth, that very particular states of consciousness do 
indeed constrain the possibilities of action and experience – possibilities 
that can be glimpsed when the kleśa (defilements) are suspended.
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But all this talk of danger and threat is already the expression of a par-
tially suppressed voice and derives from its perspective, a perspective that 
must, if we are prompted at all by this language of danger, be evanescently 
present to us. The complication here is that sometimes one is tempted to 
write as though there were some possibility of enlargement or expansion, 
which it is difficult to see how we can discern if our vision is so narrow. 
It is rather the other way round, that we see a constant danger of a nar-
rowing vision because we see it being narrowed, again either evanescently 
or overwhelmingly, both in ourselves and in others. We are in that case 
all released prisoners, some of us, though, more reluctant than others to 
acknowledge the truth of our situation.
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Locating Intercultural Philosophy 
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A central problem for comparative or intercultural philosophy1 – one that 
continues to both irritate philosophers interested in the area and elude 
their attempts at an adequate response – is that of maintaining the authen-
tic voice of the Other. I refer not to the now-famous question of whether 
the subaltern can speak, though this is a facet of the issue, but rather to 
the broader problem of the potential incommensurability of “categories in 
the typology of beliefs crucial to the understanding of [the] side[s] of the 
symbolic systems being juxtaposed.”2 When the foundations required to 
understand a philosophical system in one tradition are either absent from 
or irrelevant to the other being compared, whither comparative philoso-
phy? This is a well-known issue in the field and I need hardly rehearse 
the problem in full here. Suffice it to say that the fundamental problem, 
for the business of intercultural philosophy, of the extent and nature of 
conceptual incommensurability still haunts us. I want to suggest that one 
way of shedding light on this issue may lie in considering the intended 
audience for intercultural philosophy, that is for whom is philosophizing 
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“in a comparative mode” done? In what follows, then, I will propose a 
location of intercultural philosophy: its relation to its practitioners and its 
intended audience.
Of course “location” can refer in many and diverse ways: geographic-
ally, socially, professionally, economically, discursively, and so on. One 
might also consider location as a form of tracking: a snapshot of a mov-
ing discourse. I do not here intend to provide a map or history of the 
field in relation to other forms of philosophy; rather, I wish to consider 
the question on more pragmatic grounds, namely through the question of 
who is intercultural philosophy for? If, following Dewey, all rationaliza-
tion is at the same time a “doing for the sake of,” then for whose sake is 
this practice? What good is it and what does it enable for its intended 
beneficiaries? Clarifying the target audience of intercultural philosophy 
will in turn make better sense of its rationalization, its particular form 
and suitability to its purposes, and thus how it might provide grounds for 
a response to charges of conceptual incommensurability. To some extent 
this question leaves aside for the time being the more basic question of 
what intercultural philosophy is and whether the notion is coherent. The 
issue of incommensurability arises from this more basic question and will 
reappear in what follows, but to begin with and for the sake of argument 
let us allow that intercultural philosophy is indeed a possible and coherent 
practice. The question, then, is who is its audience?
At least three possible audiences for intercultural philosophy are typ-
ically identified – to which I shall add a fourth, non-typical alternative 
later: (1) society at large, that is the public whose taxes support the aca-
demic and other institutions in which most if not all intercultural phil-
osophy is now done – at least in the West; (2) some subset of society as in, 
for instance, what we might call the philosophical public – namely those 
who may be both interested in these topics already and have some training 
and/or expertise in philosophy (and this would include most professional 
philosophers); and finally, (3) adherents of or believers in the philosophical 
systems being compared; that is, the members of philosophical schools 
of thought or religious communities. I will dispense with audience (1) 
at the outset since, while it may be a laudable aim to educate and enrich 
the wider society in which one lives with the information and wisdom 
gleaned from years of study as well as frequent intellectual forays into 
foreign thought-worlds, it is highly unlikely that many of our neighbours 
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and friends will have the required background or interest in what can be 
quite abstruse philosophical meanderings for the project of intercultural 
philosophy to be worthwhile for them. Put in a nutshell, most people do 
not care to what extent Mencius and Aquinas agree on the nature of our 
ethical duties or just how Leibniz and Rāmānuja might together supply a 
metaphysic relevant to quantum theory, and so, if intercultural philoso-
phers are to work for them in any direct way, I fear their efforts will go 
even less rewarded than at present.
The second potential audience would make intercultural philoso-
phy merely an academic affair. If intercultural philosophers are writing 
mainly or solely for other philosophers – a distinct possibility given the 
institutional nature of philosophical and theological social projects – then 
comparative philosophy risks being a very small and perhaps not very im-
portant activity in the academy (already a marginalized institution within 
most societies). Doing comparative philosophy for other philosophers or 
theologians is no doubt interesting for its practitioners and, within the 
field, perhaps a necessary task; however, if philosophic professionals are 
the only or main audience for such philosophy, then perhaps it deserves its 
place at the margins of “mainstream” philosophy and theology – compara-
tive philosophy being, after all, a minority practice. This puts intercultural 
philosophers in a bind to some extent since it is other philosophers and 
scholars of religion who are their best audience, having among them the 
requisite understanding, skills, and commitment both to critically judge 
the ideas and proposals arising from their comparative philosophical ex-
periments and to suggest new and more fruitful avenues for their research. 
But this gives rise to various problems of over-specialization endemic to 
the modern academic practice of philosophy. No doubt one of the reasons 
many philosophers and humanists are suspicious of comparative projects, 
and I suggest one of the unsaid reasons why religious studies scholars are 
so as well, is due in part to the culture of training academics that has taken 
hold in Europe and North America. Where once the doctorate was seen to 
be the bleeding edge of development in a field, having taken account of all 
that was done before and thus acquiring a synoptic standpoint from which 
to speak to a broad range of scholars, the sheer growth of literature now 
available to scholars, as well as the quasi-professionalization of academia, 
has meant that such a requirement is now seldom required and much less 
realized. Rather, it is presently sufficient to corner a small segment of 
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the literature, showing adequate mastery over its languages, concepts, and 
contours, in order to contribute an increasingly small increment to the 
conversation. The academy no longer aims to create generalists capable of 
creatively traversing disciplines but rather rewards those who lay claim to 
expertise in an increasing variety of small and tightly defined niches.3 The 
cliché of academics devoting themselves to knowing more and more about 
less and less has never been more true, so it should come as no surprise 
that the broader philosophical and religious community of scholars look 
to projects such as, for example, a comparative evaluation of Indian and 
Greek metaphysical systems, with a good deal of suspicion.
Some might argue that these “professional issues” are beside the point: 
that intercultural philosophy faces substantive questions concerning its 
very cogency and that issues concerning how philosophy happens to be 
done in some Western universities are not really germane. While I do not 
want to dismiss any substantive debate, I would argue, however, that the 
criticism fails to see philosophy and intercultural philosophy in particular 
as social projects, embedded within economic, social, and institutional 
contexts. The biases and rules of propriety implicit within these contexts 
both guides how philosophy is carried on in a given society and partly 
determines what gets studied and funded. Nicholas Rescher makes a per-
suasive case that meta-level assumptions inchoate in social projects are to 
a large extent the cause for philosophical disagreements among scholarly 
communities otherwise unified with respect to the theory and methods 
of their disciplines.4 Such “orientational pluralism,” as he labels it, must 
be accounted for if we are to understand the basis of disagreement on the 
value of intercultural philosophy. Context is often the largest determinant 
of the shape and possibility of discourse and one cannot neglect its effect 
in evaluating the location of intercultural philosophy.
Various “professional issues” problematizing intercultural philoso-
phy are, I suspect, also at the bottom of much (though not all) of the 
discourse in religious studies concerning the post-modern valorization 
of the Other and its concomitant suspicion of any form of constructive 
metaphysics. The dilettante followers of Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze, and 
Barthes (among others) have, in the name of the destruction of any and 
all metanarratives, so demonized metaphysics that even the possibility 
of strategic comparison between philosophies is now greeted with barely 
muffled hisses; yet, one wonders just how much of this is little more than 
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guarding the small bit of turf on which philosophers are trying to build 
an academic career. It is ironic that such a fashion has taken hold to such a 
degree in religious studies, which itself grew from the nineteenth-century 
practice of comparative religions. The oedipal battle with their forebears 
in philology, anthropology, sociology, history, and philosophy in which 
many contemporary scholars of religion are locked, means that to utter 
the words “comparative/intercultural philosophy of religion” in academic 
company is now almost as bad as admitting one’s admiration of Fox News. 
There are, I suspect, a number of mewling infants in the streets along with 
the remnants of their ablutions and perhaps it is high time to forego any 
queasiness about tenure applications and go pick them up. Comparison is 
indeed a fundamental mode of understanding – compare we must5 – and 
there is simply too much at stake in comparative/intercultural philosophy 
of religion to demur for the sake of professional conservation in the guise 
of post-modern angst. This is not to say that intercultural philosophy is 
an easy task, but it is, I submit, a necessary one, and I shall suggest a few 
avenues by which we might move forward later.
But first we still must clarify for whom the practice is done, and we 
come now to the third typically proposed audience, namely those who 
belong to the particular schools of thought or religious traditions under 
comparison. By this category, I do not mean to suggest that philosophers 
or religionists are non-problematically classifiable into such schools. It will 
come as no surprise that a philosopher or religionist who categorises him 
or herself a follower of Wittgenstein, Hume, or Shankara, for instance, or 
indeed a Christian, Buddhist, or Hindu, may well have many disagree-
ments with aspects of their group’s founding beliefs and/or the views of 
their fellow philosophers and religionists. By isolating this potential audi-
ence for intercultural philosophy, I do not wish to impute any necessary 
degree of homogeneity to them. As with most such communities, the 
binds that tie are usually quite fluid – in reality, at least, if not by design 
– and for my purposes here we can safely leave it this way. Such com-
munities are effectively self-policing with respect to their membership so 
that belonging to these groups is won through a once or continuing series 
of negotiations. On this view, continuing as a good Wittgensteinian, for 
instance, is something I would more or less regularly have to demonstrate 
through my words and actions submitted to the ad hoc community of other 
Wittgensteinians with whom I wish to have fellowship. If I start writing 
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or teaching that Wittgenstein did not in fact repudiate his earlier work 
in the Tractatus, then my error will soon be pointed out to me by other 
Wittgensteinians, either in the corridors of my university or, more disas-
trously, in the pages of academic journals. If I subsequently maintain my 
position and cannot convince my fellow Wittgensteinians of the truth of 
my views, again my errors will be corrected; however, this time, the meth-
ods will be through marginalizing my work through refusing to publish it 
and/or perhaps personal marginalization in academic and social situations 
– the invitations to speak at conferences and other venues will dry up.6 My 
membership in the group labelled “Wittgensteinians” is thus the result of 
a continuous series of negotiations between me and relevant others in the 
group and is impacted by numerous factors directly and indirectly related 
to its putative raison d’être.
These negotiations, whether straightforward or subterranean, are im-
portant to consider at this stage since they effectively remove the spectre 
of what has been called the insider/outsider problem for comparative phil-
osophy. If what is meant by “insider,” in the case of such social groups like 
“Wittgensteinians” or “Buddhists,” is never fully settled but always at least 
in principle liable to revision through a process of negotiation between the 
relevant stakeholders, then we need not worry greatly about the issue of 
whether an outsider comparativist can legitimately carry on his/her work 
merely due to him/her being an outsider. While the situation is no doubt 
complicated by particular historic factors, for instance systems of hier-
archical power, it is by these very tokens that we can factor them out of 
our understanding of what makes the group. My point is that we need not 
be waylaid by the insider-outsider question since upon closer scrutiny this 
distinction may be found to be quite permeable. No essence hides here 
and inclusion and exclusion may be due more to extrinsic, non-substantive 
factors. Comparativists simply need not be “in the group” in order for 
them to carry on their research because what counts as being “in” is not 
settled except by rather artificial and quite arbitrary criteria. This leaves 
the nature of inclusion just too slippery to afford any strong grip to those 
who wish to close ranks.
I do not expect many disagreements at this stage. On one level, what I 
have pointed out is quite obvious. Religious as well as philosophical social 
groups are non-natural and thus cannot themselves uphold any significant 
barriers to comparison. Claims that Indian thought, for example, is in its 
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fullness open only to Indians are easily defeated by the question “who is 
an Indian?” But it is important to note here that these kinds of claims are 
indeed made in the literature critiquing the possibility of intercultural 
philosophy. The claim is not so much centred on the membership status 
of the erstwhile philosopher but rather on the requirement that a philoso-
pher be insinuated in the relevant community in order for the meaning of 
philosophical texts and ideas to be fully appreciated:
[…] if we were to suppose that each religion is an organic whole 
and that to that extent a system complete in itself in a way that 
no part of it can be isolated and considered separately from the 
other parts, how is comparison possible? If each part had a par-
ticular function that could not be explicable outside the system 
of which it is a part then any assumptions about a “comparable” 
part in another religion might well be spurious.7
The view here is that religions are whole and well-defined, but what is 
implied, I argue, is that such wholeness and definition are also extended 
to the social religious group such that one must belong in order to under-
stand properly, one must be nurtured in the faith to avoid taking things 
out of context, and policed by the discourse in order not to make fool-
ish comparisons. How are these requirements unlike the demand that 
one be fully contextualized in the language and literature of a tradition 
before being able to make tentative steps outside that tradition? George 
Lindbeck’s contextual-linguistic model of religion8 here stretches to a 
kind of Wittgensteinian fideism where a structural aspect of a religion or 
philosophy is extended to social groupings to exclude outsider compara-
tivists. The pragmatic picture I sketched above concerning membership 
in social groups, however, works in the opposite direction. If that view of 
membership is correct, then one can argue that religions and philosophies 
are equally ragged unities. The organic wholeness of religion quoted above 
turns out to be a misleading model. What one needs instead is a kind of 
structured open-endedness where one can make sense of the connected-
ness and contextuality of cultural-linguistic units without assuming the 
same structure holds for the social groups that define or embody this 
structure.9
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So where does this leave us with respect to the audience for inter-
cultural philosophy? The general public lacks the requisite knowledge 
to enter into discussion and the requisite interest to care; other philoso-
phers and religionists may be the best conversation partners and critics, 
but intercultural philosophy must transcend this group if it is to avoid 
the Scylla of over-specialization with its concomitant irrelevance and the 
Charybdis of professional politics and petty turf wars; and those true be-
lievers in their religious and philosophical traditions turn out to be dif-
ficult to form into coherent groups without either drawing highly arbitrary 
and artificial boundaries around them or reifying misleading models of 
their discourses into too-cosy social groups. While admitting that con-
textual rootedness is essential to intercultural philosophy, the practice still 
needs a proper audience, and this, I suggest, may in fact be the compara-
tivist him/herself. And if this is the case, that intercultural philosophy is 
for the person undertaking the comparison, then the practice becomes a 
vehicle of transformation – a way, to borrow Michael McGee’s phrase, for 
the philosopher to become strange to him or herself.
What I want to argue is that the practice of intercultural philosophy 
is doing philosophy from a particular standpoint – not a real place in the 
sense of an objective Archimedean vantage point outside cultures, histor-
ies, and languages, but a narrative, ironic locus of intersection sustained 
through a dialogical redescription. What Michael Barnes labels the space 
in between traditions.10 which I call the ‘interstitial mode,’ is a discourse 
through which a hybrid or double position is created between traditions 
in comparison. This is a shifting and evanescent area of intersection or 
overlap – but not of identity – wherein religions being compared or phil-
osophies in contact are mutually redescribed in the creation of the self 
as other or stranger. To be the audience for intercultural philosophy is to 
take up this position and become strange to oneself, to become Other, 
yet never lose grasp of one’s self. There are at least two ways in which one 
might make sense of the position I am proposing: through the notions of 
translation and mimesis.
The business of translation will be familiar to many comparative phil-
osophers. Translators insinuate themselves for a time between conversants, 
texts, or thinkers in order to play11 double agents. It is a position very clearly 
between traditions and for this reason has been an obvious model for the 
comparative philosopher. To the extent that a translator excels at his/her 
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job, they become invisible, and this ideal is of course just the problem crit-
ics of intercultural philosophy decry. Ironically, the perfect translators of a 
text or tradition would have mastered the languages, cultures, and histor-
ies of the objects of comparison; yet, by that very mastery , they efface their 
own biases and prejudices. The perfect translator thus tries, and of course 
fails, to inhabit the view from nowhere; however, intercultural philosophy 
as translation is still instructive in its highlighting the piecemeal and sub-
jective nature of its practice. The intercultural philosopher as translator is 
a bricoleur both in respect to the specificity of the elements he or she brings 
together in comparison as well as the “at-hand-ness” of the tools he or she 
brings to the job. Moreover it is often the translator him/herself who is 
best able to judge the quality and elegance of the translations – the mem-
bers of the translated sets being themselves essentially rooted within their 
own contexts. Intercultural philosophy as translation, as I am suggesting 
it, then becomes a practice for the sake of the philosopher as audience. The 
mutual translation involved in intercultural philosophy is then a piecemeal 
construction of the self for the immediate requirements of living, a form 
of temporary philosophical consolation: what Richard Rorty refers to as 
edifying discourse. By locating its audience as the bricoleur him/herself, 
intercultural philosophy may also avoid the charge of obfuscating its own 
position since the goal is precisely its opposite – to highlight the position 
of bricoleur as beneficiary. Moreover, in bricolage/translation, difference is 
conserved since every translation is to some extent merely to construct 
an artifice – one that draws attention to its put-together nature and its 
rendering of parts-at-hand to effect the job of communication.
The second way in which we might make sense of the claim that the 
audience for intercultural philosophy is the philosopher him/herself is 
through the notion of mimesis. If one of the central problems of inter-
cultural philosophy boils down to a question of authenticity, the diffi-
culty of speaking in another voice for the sake of the Other, then locating 
oneself as the proper audience of the practice (inhabiting the “for-the-
sake-of ” position) makes intercultural philosophy an imitation of one 
imitating oneself.12 There is an inherent reflexivity built into intercultural 
philosophy as mimesis: one “plays” at the foreign philosophical position 
for the sake of oneself as the audience. In so doing, one makes the foreign 
position imitative of one’s own position so as to make it commensurable 
and understandable. In order for the foreign position to be known, it has 
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to be interpreted in a hermeneutic of recovery – to do anything else would 
be to avoid the project of intercultural philosophy entirely13 and in do-
ing so the foreign position becomes imitative of the home position. In 
intercultural philosophy, therefore, one is imitating an Other imitating 
oneself. This would seem to efface the other but for the difference upheld 
in intercultural philosophy as translation/bricolage. The dialectic that en-
sues between translation and mimesis is, I would argue, at the heart of the 
transformative power of intercultural philosophy.
Locating intercultural philosophy in this way, with the practitioner as 
audience, avoids both disingenuousness as well as obfuscation. The twin 
movements of translation and mimesis ironize and make possible the 
other. Moreover, translation highlights the specificity and serendipity of 
intercultural philosophy, while mimesis clarifies its transformative power 
as well as its potential to open up new options for living. It is this second 
possibility that I wish to take up briefly here since not only will it help il-
luminate the notion of intercultural philosophy as mimesis but it will also 
elucidate one of the motivations for practising comparative philosophy. 
To illustrate a particular element in the motivation behind comparative 
philosophy, I shall use a problem in interreligious dialogue, namely that 
of the reluctant other, where there is an absent or recalcitrant party in a 
dialogue between religious believers. This example parallels the problem 
of authenticity for intercultural philosophy through the silent refusal of 
the other to engage in dialogue. Just so, the compared tradition resists 
potential amalgamation or integration by erecting a firewall of incom-
mensurability and charges of disingenuousness.
What I propose is that in the face of resistance, when the only options 
seem to be reversion to monologue or self-imposed silence, one option is 
for the intercultural philosopher to consciously hybridize their religious or 
philosophical position with the other’s, and, because of their position as 
audience, hybridize even themselves. Through the use of mimesis – that 
is, imitation of the other imitating for the sake of oneself − one can con-
sciously and carefully seek to hybridize one’s own religious and philosoph-
ical commitments, practices, and beliefs with those of the reluctant Other. 
In so doing, one creates a novel discursive location liminal to oneself and 
the Other. One also redescribes the Other’s and one’s own positions in 
order to contribute new options for living. This is the practice of compara-
tive philosophy as constructive metaphysics.
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This is, I believe, a fairly radical proposal. In the context of inter-
religious dialogue, what I am arguing for is that when the would-be dia-
logue partner refuses to engage in open, honest conversation, due either to 
contrary ideological commitments or mere disinterest, it may be one’s re-
sponsibility to carry on the conversation oneself. This is not simply to play 
the other part in some perverse pantomime, but something much more 
significant – through the reflexive double mimesis where the philosopher 
is the audience, it is nothing less than allowing the Other’s tradition to 
interrogate, supplement, edit, magnify, or significantly change one’s own 
tradition in a hybridizing redescription. It becomes the job of the reflex-
ively mimetic, intercultural philosopher to create an intermediary position 
between themselves and the compared tradition. And this would not be a 
mere intellectual exercise but would need to create new options for living/
thinking. It is, therefore, not a simple, one-time affair, but rather entering 
into a process whereby one risks comfortable certainties for the sake of 
creativity. This brings forth several questions, not least the problem of mo-
tivation: why would anyone seek to do this? Surely to loosen one’s grip on 
one’s own religious or philosophical commitments for the indeterminacies 
of a strange hybrid would negate the very reasons one sought comparison 
in the first place – and for what? – a mutant hybrid of one’s own deeply 
felt religious commitments with those of a silent or reluctant Other? How 
would one know that what one is hybridizing with is even remotely close 
to the tradition of one’s silent partner? Is this not simply a muddled way of 
creating even more confusion?
There are, I suggest, religious and non-religious reasons why one 
would wish to lay oneself open to hybridization. In the context of inter-
religious dialogue with a reluctant other given above, an example of such 
hybridization can be seen in the Christian theological idea of kenotic in-
carnation.14 The self-emptying required in mimetic hybridization such as 
I have described has a close analogue, I would argue, in the theological 
concept of kenosis. I should note here that I do not understand kenosis 
as a form of self-denial in the sense of complete eradication, but rather 
as a conscious opening up to the Other in order to partially become the 
Other. The intercultural philosopher becomes a stranger to herself pre-
cisely through such openness to transformation just as the God-man is 
precisely the kind of interstitial hybrid required when one party is trying 
to communicate a new option for living to an obstinate partner. In kenosis 
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the divine condescension both changes its own nature and creates a new 
option for its partner – God becomes human in order that humans may 
discover their divine likeness. A kenoticly inspired intercultural philoso-
phy can thus create the possibility of a new option for the Other – one that 
may be freely accepted or refused, but one that is required if any progress 
is to be made beyond the stalemate of a reluctant other.
But what about the problem of religious or philosophical syncretism, 
or the possibility that one loses one’s self altogether? If the locus of inter-
cultural philosophy is the philosopher who undergoes the transformation 
of becoming strange to herself, is there not a danger of her being over-
taken by the other? I suggest that the dialectic of mimesis ensures that 
neither syncretism nor assimilation becomes a significant problem. Since 
mimesis, like metaphor, always begins in otherness − indeed requires this 
otherness to be conserved for its redescription to work − the worry that 
one loses oneself in an interstitial hybrid is groundless. What happens to 
the self is that it is redescribed, not annihilated, so there is little worry that 
one becomes something else altogether. Identity is conserved so that the 
self grows rather than being replaced. The problem of syncretism is also a 
non-starter since, apart from legitimate analyses of syncretism as primar-
ily a political rather than an ontological issue,15 mimetic redescription may 
also be understood to stretch the semantic horizon of one’s tradition but 
not to supplant it. Intercultural philosophy in this mode is not a method of 
grafting and absorbing the Other onto oneself but a form of re-organiza-
tion, a re-creation of oneself in a fundamentally artistic or imaginative act. 
This is wholly appropriate and in keeping with contemporary discussions 
of identity as “oneself as another.” Worries about syncretism ignore the ac-
cretions necessary in one’s own development and owe more to eighteenth-
century fear of impurity than anything else.
There is legitimate worry, however, in the question of whether or not 
what one is imitating bears any resemblance to the tradition being com-
pared. As the comparativist is also the audience, one might be liable to 
caricaturing the Other’s tradition. To some extent, this is inevitable, but 
absolute fidelity to the Other’s tradition is not necessarily required, nor, it 
must be said, possible. In any comparison, one may only grasp a similitude 
of the positions represented – even one’s own. Certainly, great care and 
much time is required when one seeks to represent the Other, but this 
is the same kind of care and respect shown to one’s own tradition, not 
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different. Intercultural philosophy’s potential for creating novel, liminal 
positions may, however, make the risks acceptable.
Let us now move to the non-religious motivations for embarking 
on comparative philosophy as reflexive mimesis. My example of kenosis 
above would, obviously, speak most eloquently to Christians, so we need a 
more “generic” motive if my proposal is to have greater usefulness.
For this I turn to the work of Emmanuel Levinas, whose morality 
based on the face of the other gives a clarion call for an ethics that makes 
supererogatory kenosis a first responsibility for all people. While I have 
too little space to fully develop his thought here, we can focus on the fact 
that Levinas seeks to ground subjectivity in the Other. Our very being 
as a subject is construed by Others, and thus we have at the very core of 
who we are an ethical relationship – nay, an ethical duty.16 Indeed, this 
relationship with the “otherness” of the Other – what Levinas calls “the 
face” – brings me as a subject into being and demands my ethical regard. 
Levinas writes:
I am responsible for the Other without waiting for reciprocity.… 
It is precisely insofar as the relationship between the Other and 
me is not reciprocal that I am subjection to the Other; and I am 
subject essentially in this sense.17
Levinas argues that the creation of our subjectivity relies on the Other and 
this constitution entails and demands responsibility to and for the Other 
in a non-reciprocal way. This is particularly apropos for intercultural phi-
losophy as it is precisely in the redescription of our own subjectivity that 
the ethical call of the face beckons. Levinas claims more than that we are 
duty-bound to take on aspects of the Other’s selves. He suggests that in 
authentic ethical behaviour we have already done so. For the intercultural 
philosopher, Levinas’s requirement furnishes not only motivation but also 
the promise of self-transformation wherein we ironically find ourselves 
in and through being made strange. Levinas’s theory of the ethical con-
struction of the self in the face of the Other parallels the kenotic attitude 
towards the other: in each case there is a prior call to both recognize and 
facilitate one’s own essential hybridity with those with whom we wish to 
converse, to understand, and, ultimately, to partially become. This recog-
nition, facilitated through the dialectic of translation and mimesis, is the 
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true telos of intercultural philosophy. It is in this telos that intercultural 
philosophy discovers its location.
In conclusion, I have argued that the locus of intercultural philosophy, the 
“for-whom” it is undertaken may best be understood as the self and that 
locating the discourse in this way sheds light on some of the problems 
and critiques regularly levied against its practice. To be consistent with 
my own pragmatic principles, however, I must admit that my conclusions 
can only be a temporary pause in a wider discussion concerning the nature 
of comparative philosophy and that my views must ultimately furnish the 
materials for other intercultural philosophical bricoleurs.
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Together may your minds know. (saṃvo manāmsi jānatām) 
— Atharva Veda
There is always more pleasure to be gained from combinations 
than from simplicity. 
— St. Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on De Anima, 426b7
Quite a few of us had to read both Plato and the Upaniṣads, both Aquinas 
and Udayana, both Kant and Dharmakīrti, both Wittgenstein and 
Nāgārjuna, Quine and Bhartṛhari, as we were taught how to philoso-
phize. Long before one was aware of the ‘dangerous liasons’ of inter-
national academic politics (where colonialism still rules under the garb of 
the post-colonial), not just one’s thought and talk, but even one’s every-
day sensibilities had become incorrigibly ‘comparative.’ Now, when one 
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painfully finds out that in the insular power-enclaves of philosophy even 
a mention of non-Western theories of mind, knowledge, or truth is pun-
ished by polite exclusion, well-preserved ignorance about other cultures, 
and mono-cultural hubris define the mainstream of professional philoso-
phy in Euro-America, that the discovery of exciting connections, sharp 
oppositions or imaginable dialogues between some ancient or modern 
Eastern and ancient or contemporary Western ideas is going to be greeted 
with condescension or cold neglect, it is already too late. While lamenting 
the misfortune of our purist (and power-blinkered) colleagues who are 
missing out on this fun, one of the best ways to deepen the collective 
celebration of culture-straddling contemplation is to reflect, critically and 
analytically, on the sense-organ or cognitive instrument. It is this organ or 
instrument with which we compare, connect, imagine, re-arrange, choose 
to focus on, desire to ignore or investigate, will to change, like and dis-
like, – or even try to witness without attachment or aversion – disparate 
traditions of thinking. In this essay, we shall engage in such a paradigmat-
ically philosophical reflexive exercise of thinking about the very idea of a 
sense-organ for thinking and cross-sensory comparison, comparatively. In 
a nutshell, that is the agenda of this paper.
In Sanskrit, the cognitive and active instrument or faculty is called 
“manas.” That word is standardly and not wholly without justification 
translated as “mind.” But for all sorts of well-known reasons, having to do 
with a Mind/Self confusion in Western thought, it is safer to translate it 
as “inner sense.” Whatever else it is, the manas is never the ātman (soul).
In the most ancient Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (I. 5. 3), manas is func-
tionally defined in terms of desire, resolution, doubt, memory, and intro-
spection. In Sāṃkhya, Vedānta, and Nyāya, it becomes a distinct sense-
organ responsible for attention, cross-modal comparison, and reflexive 
awareness of cognitive and hedonic states. In Aristotle’s De Anima (425a–
426b), such a sixth inner sense is proposed and rejected, but the idea of 
a “sensus communis” is taken seriously. In Kant, inner sense has a very 
crucial role to play, but it is distinguished from the common sense that 
is central to aesthetic reflective judgment. This paper will go through six 
main arguments for the existence of manas and show how it does both 
the jobs of inner and common sense, suggesting a richer theory of a sixth 
common sense-organ for imaginatively perceiving possibilities. We shall 
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end with the soteriological role of the inner sense, in binding as well as 
liberating the embodied self.
Philosophy, in both East and West, is uniquely characterized by 
this inward reflexivity of noticing its own practice and presuppositions, 
analytically and phenomenologically. So, that is what we shall do in this 
paper: reflect comparatively on the cognitive and motor organ of comparison.
THE AGENT-INSTRUMENT-OBJECT MODEL OF ACTION
An action performed by an embodied being requires an agent, an instru-
ment, and an object. The very grammar of our thinking about an action 




A tailor could be the agent of a particular act of cutting, its direct object 
– a piece of cloth, and the tool – a pair of scissors. The act of seeing or 
hearing, thus, requires, besides the self or embodied person who sees or 
hears and the colours or sounds seen or heard, a visual or auditory organ, 
distinct from both the seer and the seen, from both the hearer and the 
heard. This, in brief, could be the conceptual root of the idea of a sense-
organ (indriya), a central idea of Indian philosophies of mind.
Just like tearing and touching, talking and tasting, even thinking, 
remembering, imagining, desiring, looking within oneself, attending to 
the fact that one is tearing or touching, trusting or doubting something, 
also seem to be cognitive mental acts. They also require an inner instrument 
or faculty, besides the thinker, or the agent of volition, desire, attention, or 
introspection. This job cannot be done by the outer senses. Hence, a sixth 
sense of a different level is postulated.
It is not easy to determine what exactly a sense-organ is, especially if 
we are seeking to map them onto contemporary neuro-science of percep-
tion. Even within the classical Indian metaphysics of the mind, there is 
considerable disagreement as to what the sense-organs are made of. While 
everybody agrees that the eyeball or the retina is not the visual sense-
organ, but rather the subtle function or power to see which is realized by 
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those organs, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika postulates that the sense-organ has to be 
made of the same material element as what it can receive. Thus, the visual 
organ has to be made of fire/light, olfactory organ out of smelly earth, and 
the auditory organ out of “ākāśa” – the vacuum where sounds can emerge. 
The Sāṁkhya-Vedānta camp construes sense-organs as (unconscious but) 
immaterial, having emerged out of the transparency-dominated aspect 
of the ego-maker (sāṃvika ahamkāra). But, about the manas – the inner 
sense that receives qualities and acts of consciousness – both camps agree 
that it has to be immaterial. Surely, even the grossest materialist will not 
insist that we can find out with our eyes that we are pleased, or that we 
can figure out by touching that we are willing or imagining things. So we 
need an internal sense-organ. This is what is called manas, one of the three 
constituents of the group of faculties collectively called antahkaraṇa (inner 
instrument) in Indian psychologies.
Are we conflating the idea of an “organ” (a body part, e.g., a hand) and 
the idea of an “instrument” (a tool, e.g., a hammer or an axe) here? Such 
an objection actually helps us penetrate deeper into the general concept of 
an instrument as something in between the patient of an action. Thus, if 
we think of the disembodied soul as the agent and the external world as 
the patient, the body itself is an instrument (like a chariot) which the soul 
or consciousness ( jña) wields in order to get things done in the world, but 
if we think of the embodied organism as the agent and the knife or the 
brake as the patient, then the hand or the foot is the instrument by means 
of which the organism moves and uses the tool. If, on the other hand, we 
regard the hand as the agent and the tree as the patient, then that which 
mediates the former’s action on the latter – the axe, itself becomes the 
instrument. Thus, an instrument literally is the “means,” that which oper-
ates in the middle.
On the basis of this concept of the “means,” the orthodox (Sāṃkhya) 
Indian philosophers make deeper and deeper use of the agent-instrument-
object model of action. It first generates an external organ (e.g., hands), 
which is more agentive than the tool (spoon), which we wield to catch, 
cut, move, or grab an object, and then generates an inner sense that is 
more agentive than the external organ, which then becomes in a sense an 
object manipulable by the inner sense. Thus, the instrument in the middle 
partakes of both the ends. The most abstract notion of an “instrument” 
(karaṇa) seems to be something that is both an agent and an object used 
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by the agent, as well as functions as a connector between them: Thus, 
between self and external senses, there is the manas, and between manas 
and the material tool, there is the external – motor organs, between the 
external motor senses and the objects, there is, in some cases, a physical 
tool.
Unlike the Vedānta or Vaiśeṣika metaphysic of the mind, the early 
Buddhist meditational psychology has a very different conceptual cartog-
raphy of the sense-organs as well as of the manas. In the list of twelve 
indriya-s the manas occurs side by side with separate organs for pleasure, 
for depression (daurmanasyendriya), for memory, etc. – a list that would 
look horribly guilty of cross-division from the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika perspec-
tive! The distinctions between citta and caitasikā dharma-s, and the re-
flective mano-vijñāna are all fascinating research topics for any serious 
engagement with Indian psychology. Though, as I shall show at the very 
last section, even the Vedic āstika schools study the manas with a view 
to liberation, the Abhidharma psychology is much more closely a phe-
nomenology of meditational practice, and its taxonomies are also openly 
ethically loaded. Thus, one type of ego-erecting mental function is called: 
“The sick (kliṣṭa) mano-vijñāna”! In this chapter, I shall not discuss this 
complicated and obscure Buddhist theory of manas.
From the Sanskrit philosophical texts of the orthodox schools, at least 
six or seven different arguments can be culled for the existence of an inner 
sense-organ. Let me state them briefly in what I consider their order of 
importance.
FIRST: THE ARGUMENT FROM ABSENT-MINDEDNESS
It is empirically well-established that sometimes normal subjects whose 
eyes and ears are wide open cannot see or hear what is right in front of 
them. If the well-functioning external sense-organs and their proximity 
or exposure to their appropriate objects were sufficient conditions for sen-
sory perception, then such non-perception would be inexplicable. Hence, 
there must be an additional faculty or organ, due to the absence or non-
operation of which externally stimulated sense-organs also fail to register 
their given objects. And this additional sense is the manas. If the ma-
nas is disconnected from the appropriate sense-organ where the relevant 
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stimulus strikes, being caught up somewhere else, then even things pre-
sented to open healthy eyes or ears are not registered.
This argument occurs for the first time clearly in Bṛhadāranayakaṣad 
(I. 5. 3; ca. 800 B.C.E.; hereinafter “B.U.”), where it is immediately fol-
lowed by a fascinating empirical detail. When a man is touched on his 
back by another person, the first man is able to tell without looking back 
whether it is a touch of a hand or a touch of a knee. The tactile organ 
itself does not make those distinctions since as sheer touch they might feel 
qualitatively pretty similar. After all, the concept of a knee or the concept 
of a hand are far richer than merely cutaneous concepts; they require the 
articulate recognition of different functionally distinguished body parts 
conceived in a partly first-person fashion. It is the manas which, at an 
imperceptible but now perhaps measurable speed, reflects upon and dis-
criminates between the tactile sensations in terms of remembered and 
conceptualized body-schema of other people. The direct relevance of this 
keen observation to the proof of the existence of manas may be unclear. 
But it surely reminds us of the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and, more 
recently, Mark Johnson,1 which talks about our processing external sen-
sory data through an internalized body schema.
Sāṁkara’s commentary here is very succinct: “If the discriminator in-
ner sense-organ were not there, then how could skin (the tactile sense) 
alone make such discriminations? That which is the cause of knowledge 
of distinctions is the inner sense” (yadi viveka-kṛn mano nāma nāsti, tarhi 
tvan mātreṇa kuto viveka pratipattih syāt? yat tad viveka-pratipatti kāraṇam 
tan manah) (Commentary under B.U. I. 5. 3).
SECOND: THE ARGUMENT FROM NECESSARY  
NON-SIMULTANEITY OF ALL COGNITIONS
Sensory data as well as thoughts and acts of imagination come to us neces-
sarily in a successive manner, one after another. This rule of successive-
ness of all mental representations, shared by Nyāya and Kant, has almost 
the status of an a priori principle, for untrained introspection seems to 
claim feeling and perceiving and thinking many things simultaneously. 
But logically, unless two events are perceived at distinct moments of time, 
how are we ever going to tell them apart as two distinct events, especially 
63Arindam Chakrabarti
when spatial locations are not relevant? Thus perception of succession is 
impossible without succession of perceptions. Now, take our hearing of 
a sentence uttered, even at a great speed. Unless we hear its constitutive 
phonemes one after another, with proper pauses, it would all get jumbled 
up as one noise and we would not know where one word ends and another 
begins. The same is true, as has been shown by Kant, for our visual percep-
tion of an extended thing or a long line. Without a sequential perception of 
different parts of it, we would have no sense of its expanse or length. Now, 
as far as the visual or tactile sense-organ is concerned, they could easily 
function together, and a whole range of objects (with colours, textures, 
sizes, shapes, and perhaps varying temperatures) are simultaneously avail-
able to our skin and our visual range. Why is it that we can go through 
them only one at a time? What breaks up the process to a sequence, so 
to say? The explanation of this is provided by this additional instrument 
of focusing attention, the manas, a tiny pinpointed organ, which cannot 
hook up with more than one sense-organ object at a time.
A counter-example is standardly produced to this basic rule of “non-
simultaneity of awarenesses.” When one eats a long twisty fried pastry 
(dīrgha-saskuli), one may feel that one experiences five sensations at once 
through the five senses: that it smells good, that it is cold to touch, that it 
is elongated in shape, that it tastes sharp, and that it even makes a crisp 
sound as we munch on it! Vyoma Śiva and Jayanta Bhatta takes care of this 
counter-example by the famous example of a needle going through a hun-
dred petals of lotus. It may look as if the needle goes through all the petals 
at once. But of course, that is physically impossible. It has to go through 
them one after another. Thus quick succession of the attention-function of 
the manas switching on and off from one sensory datum to another creates 
the illusion of a manifold perceptual data all presented at a single time.
Kant spent a very crucial part of his “Transcendental Deduction of 
Categories” (in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason) on the three 
steps of this process of synthesis, including “synthesis of reproduction in 
imagination.” For experience to be possible, the manifolds of intuition 
have to be run through and bound together in an ordered sequence. And 
he was also postulating inner sense, parallel to the outer sense, calling time 
the “a priori given form” of inner sense. But Kant thought that all synthe-
sizing action has to be done by “thinking” or the apperceptive ‘I think,’ 
so inner sense could not do the job of binding and ordering. Committed 
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to a sacrosanct distinction between thinking and sensing, Kant would not 
draw the metaphysical conclusions drawn by the Nyāya phenomenologists 
from these undeniable facts of subjective synthesis of external data that 
goes on behind the curtain of our concept-formation and our knowledge 
of “objects” rich with qualities accessible to multiple sense-organs. What 
Nyāya philosophers deduce from the same evidence is that there is a fast-
moving, constitutionally restless, atomic, unconscious, but immaterial 
substance, other than the external sense-organs but equally able to control 
the functioning of all of them. It is non-specific to any particular external 
sense but unique to each individual conscious body.
Not only is the co-operation of that substance needed for the occur-
rence of any cognition in a body, the very life of a conscious animal is 
nothing but this activated contact between the self and the internal or-
gan, thanks to the accumulated karmic residues undergoing the process 
of natural maturation (vipacyamāna karmāśya sahita ātmamanha samyogo 
jīvanam iti vadānti – Nyāyamanjari, Āhṇikas2).
The self in Nyāya is regarded as all-pervasive on systemic ontological 
grounds. Such an all-pervasive self enjoys and suffers experiences only in 
those regions of space where a particular manas, in touch with the tactile 
sense-organ spread nearly all over the inside and outside of a specific kar-
mically earned body, keeps contact with this individual self.
THIRD: THE ARGUMENT FROM THE PERCEPTUAL 
CHARACTER OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF HEDONIC STATES
Our immediate and unerring awareness of our own pleasure and pain is 
direct and perceptual. Every perceptual awareness requires an appropriate 
sense-organ as its proximate causal condition, just as visual perception 
requires the eyes. The inner sense is that special organ through which 
the self perceives its own pleasures, pains, desires, etc. We cannot say 
that pleasure is nothing but a mode or intrinsic feature of other external 
sensations, such as a delightful colour or a pleasant sound or a pleasing 
taste, so that it is received by other external sense-organs and does not 
require a special internal sense-organ. Such a reasoning can also reduce 
external qualities such as colours, textures, and sounds into intrinsic forms 
or modes of cognition; in that case, there would be no perception of blue 
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colour or of a loud sound but only a bluish cognition or a noisy awareness, 
all objects becoming merely adjectival to the cognitions, just as pleasure 
and pain were supposed to be.
Since we cannot tolerate such an adverbial reduction of external per-
ception (e.g., “I see a red patch” to be read as “I am perceiving redly”), 
we cannot also reduce inner perception of pleasure to having some other 
external perceptions just in a pleasurable manner. Pleasure must be in-
dependently perceivable. So, the need for a sense-organ is parallel in the 
two sorts of perceptions, outer and inner. And we cannot introspect with 
our eyes or ears. We need the manas to do that (sukhadi pratītir indriya-jā; 
sāksātkāri-pratītitvat, rupādi-pratiti-vat/ na ca śātādyākaro jñānātmā eva 
iti vācyam, niladi-bodhe ‘pi tathābhava-prasangāt).3
FOURTH: THE ARGUMENT FROM CROSS-MODAL 
COMPARISON BY A “COMMON SENSE”
External sense-organs cannot do the explanatory work done by the in-
ner sense because each of them is limited to a specific kind of quality 
of physical objects. Eyes cannot smell perfumes, the tongue cannot taste 
sounds. But we make cross-modal comparisons through very short-term 
memory such as: “This sound is more interesting than that sight,” “The 
freezing touch of this ice-cream is not as pleasant as its nice flavour,” etc. 
It is on the basis of these quick cross-modal comparison that a subject 
reflexively takes the decision as it were to switch attention, that is, attach 
one’s manas to a particular sensory stimulus to the neglect of another of a 
totally different modality.
Obviously, this comparison cannot be done through either one of the 
mode-specific external senses. The ears do not help us remember the col-
ours; neither does the olfactory organ mediate our recall of the touch. So 
there has to be an over-arching non-specific instrument of such sensory 
comparison. That is the manas: it is aniyata-visayaka. It also helps us feel 
bodily sensations such as thirst and excitement, which are not specific 
objects of any one of the five external sense-organs.
Karl Potter’s description of the function of manas is very accurate:
… it acts as a sort of secretary for the knowing self, passing on 
one sensation at a time so that the self will not be swamped 
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with too many data at once ... the time it takes the self to syn-
thesize its awareness of an object from the data gathered by the 
senses is due to the time it takes for the internal sense-organ 
to get into and out of contact with each of the several organs.4
In his De Anima (Book III, 425a–b), Aristotle argues against a common 
sixth sense. He first admits that there seem to be “common sensibles” such 
as motion, number, unity, etc., which are not specific to any particular 
mode of external sensation. We can count colours as well as sounds, we 
can even detect a smell to be moving. But the non-specific recognition 
of these common qualities can be easily explained by a co-operation of 
several senses, by one external sense, “incidentally” drawing our attention 
towards the quality accessible to another external sense, as in synaesthesia. 
The sight of sandalwood may evoke in us an olfactory perception of its 
fragrance. The sight of a pickle may make our mouth water. Even Nyāya 
has an account of such incidental non-ordinary contact between the sense 
of sight and a smell or taste.
We don’t need to postulate a “common over-arching inner sense” for 
the sake of explaining this. But how can the eyes alone, while making us 
aware that the wall is white, also make us aware that we are seeing that 
white wall? Surely our cognition of white does not cast an image on the 
retina as the white wall does! Here Aristotle gives a pretty smart argu-
ment, first anticipating the hypothesis of an inner sense-organ and then 
rejecting it:
Since it is through sense that we are aware that we are seeing 
[notice that he is talking about awareness of seeing or anuvy-
avasaya here, and not of seeing] ... it must be either by sight 
that we are aware of seeing or by some sense other than sight. 
But the sense that gives us this new sensation must perceive 
both sight and its object, viz. colour: so that, either (1) there 
will be two senses both percipient of the same sensible object 
or, (2) the sense must be percipient of itself. Further, even if the 
sense, which perceives sight, were different from sight, we must 
fall into an infinite regress, or we must somewhere assume a 
sense, which is aware of itself. If so, we ought to do this in the 
first place.5
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Thus, he makes each sense-organ self-perceiving, thereby dispensing 
with the need for a meta-sense-organ like the Indian manas. The Nyāya 
Vaiśeṣika psychologists are very much aware of the difficulty that, if manas 
does the job of a meta-cognition or apperception of the seeing, then it has 
to grasp both the visual awareness as well as the colour that is the object 
of the visual awareness. But if the inner sense can “see” colours in this 
incidental fashion (through a jñānalakshana link), why can’t we say the 
reverse, that the outer senses can also perceive cognitive inner events such 
as seeings and hearings and that the visual sense-organ apperceives itself? 
But there is a subtle difficulty here in Aristotle’s position, which is not 
there in the Nyāya position. Once we have given an account of a direct 
normal perception of a kind of sensible object or quality through its own 
appropriate sense-organ, we can then complicate that story with another 
sense-organ accessing it in an incidental or associative non-ordinary way. 
Thus, once sandalwood is smelt through olfactory sense, later on, even 
visually perhaps, one could perceive its smell. But Aristotle refuses to 
give us any account of the direct, non-incidental perception of one’s own 
cognitions and expects the special senses to pick up their own cognitive 
episodes as they are picking up colours and sounds and smells. He himself 
feels uncomfortable in the very next paragraph about eyes seeing colours 
as well as seeing of colours, but solves it by distinguishing two senses of 
“seeing,” one of which applies even to perception of darkness where we 
have to be aware that we are not seeing anything. (According to Richard 
Sorabji, Aristotle does believe in a “common faculty” residing in the heart 
and asserts this in his short work On Sleep.)6
The reason why Indian psychology can never admit the external 
senses to be self-revealing or introspective goes very deep into its Vedic 
roots: The Upaniṣads announce that the Self-born Creator had cut out 
the sensory holes in such a way that they only open outward but can-
not see the self inside or their own functioning. Hence the doctrine that 
the sense-organs are themselves imperceptible. Only a manas can infer its 
own existence; even the manas is not accessible directly to itself. The only 
self-lit (svayaṃjyotih) or reflexively self-aware entity is pure consciousness 
or Atman. In Nyāya, even the Self is not independently self-luminous; it 
needs the manas to know itself. Aristotle’s infinite regress problem does 
not daunt the Nyāya epistemologist because every act of perception need 
not be necessarily perceived. But there is a need for an explanation of our 
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direct acquaintance with our own mental states, and Aristotle could not 
coherently make eyes or ears or the tongue do the work of informing a 
thinker or a wisher that he is thinking or wishing. So, he too ended up 
admitting a common sense.
FIFTH: THE ARGUMENT FROM DEEP SLEEP
During deep sleep, we breathe through our nostrils and keep our ears 
open, and, of course, our skin touches a whole lot of things, yet we neither 
smell, nor hear nor feel anything. What is missing could not be the self 
or its occupation of the body, for we are not dead. So it must be a discon-
nection between another common cause of all sensation which, during 
such sleep, leaves all the sense-organs and takes rest in a special place. The 
ancient Indian physiology gave it a name “puritat nadi,” and it could be a 
part of the central nervous system where the manas remains in a standby 
off-line position.
SIXTH: THE ARGUMENT FROM MEMORY AND IMAGINATION
Suppose I am pondering how it would be if we could taste colours or 
hear textures. Even if the result is to recognize the impossibility of such a 
perception, we would need a cross-modal over-arching sense-organ to feel 
this impossibility with. Similarly, intuitively grasping the metaphorical 
meaning of a statement such as “Van Gogh could feel the golden yellow 
of the Sunflowers on his tongue like a hot sauce!” would require an organ 
of knowledge that can provide the sensory support for such a cross-modal 
imagination. This must be a sixth sense!
Not only does the man who has now gone deaf remember sounds, he 
is sometimes able to imagine a hitherto unheard combination of notes. 
We must not forget that Beethoven composed music after going deaf. The 
hearing organ or faculty, which is absent in those cases, cannot explain 
such recall and imagination. So we need an inner sense to do the work. 
Even the somewhat strange list of “nine properties” of the manas, found in 
Mahābhārata mentions imagination:
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Holding attention, finding justification or reason, recollection, 
error (reversing the order of things), imagination, forgiveness, 
goodness, badness, and swiftness – these are the nine qualities 
of the manas. 
(dhairyopapatti vyakti ścāvisargah kalpanā kṣamā
sad asad cāśuta caiva manaso nava vai gunāh.) 
(Mahābhārata Xll.255.9).
When we read or listen to poetry, we have to figure out the meaning of 
such sentences as:
At midnight, butchers convene a conference.
To make sure the proceedings are free from all bias,
They invite a cow to chair it. 
[Translated from Bengali: Abalupta caturtha caranạ,  
by Sisir Kumar Das (Calcutta,1986)]
In Navya Nyāya semantics, the resulting understanding of meaning is not 
classified as knowledge by testimony (śābdabodha) or information gathered 
from words, but a make-believe awareness generated by the manas (āhārya-
mānasa bodha), which can creatively put together a cow and chairing, 
otherwise thought to be incongruous. The Dvaita school of Vedānta goes 
to the extent of classifying memory as a kind of inner perception of the 
past by the internal sense-organ!
SEVENTH: THE ARGUMENT FROM RESOLUTION, 
INTENTION, AND DESIRE
Close to imagination is another fundamental job of the manas: resolution 
or intending: “sāṃkalpa.” The verb for imagination “kalp” is present in 
“sāṃkalpa” as well because in order to intend to accomplish a project 
we have to first imagine it. The assignment of intent to the manas is at 
least as old as the Yajurveda. Even today, in the beginning of a Vedic 
ritual one must first resolve: “This is the ritual I am going to perform,” to 
prepare the body-mind of the performer for the entire sequence of actions 
that is to follow. The following mantra from the Yajurveda is called the 
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“sāṃkalpa-sukta” – the hymn of resolution – because it tries to focus the 
internal organ of attention to the task at hand:
That which goes up and far ahead for a person who is   
 awake,
That which returns back to him when he is asleep,
That light of all lights, which travels very far,
May that manas of mine have this good resolve. 
– Śukla Yajurveda, XXXIV, 1–6
When the Upaniṣad gives the above-mentioned argument from absent-
mindedness, in that context, it also mentions the following processes: 
“Desire, resolution, doubt, trust, distrust, forbearance, lack of forbearance, 
shame or modesty, wisdom, fear – all of these are nothing but manas” 
(B.U., 1.5.3). The language of the original is worth noticing here: “etat 
sarvam mana eva,” as if these functions themselves constitute the manas. 
This functional concept of the inner organ seems to me to be more defens-
ible in modern terms than the Nyāya concept of a fast-moving atomic 
substance running around the body hooking up with one sense-organ at 
a time. Actually, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Vedānta concepts of citta or an-
tahkarana are concepts of a fluid substance capable of assuming the form 
of objects and also reversing its flow. As the Yoga-bhasya beautifully com-
ments: “The river of citta flows both ways, it flows towards evil, it flows 
towards the good also.”7
The ancient commentary Yukti-dīpikā (YD) on Sāṃkhya Karika de-
velops the argument for the existence of manas simply on the basis of the 
function of sāṃkalpa or motivating resolution which is after all the mother 
of desire: sāṃkalpa-prabhavān kāmān, the Bhagavad Gītā reminds us. In 
fact YD simply identifies resolve with intention, desire, or thirst, and de-
fines the manas as that which does this job. (This will not be approved by 
the Nyāya where desire is the property of the self, but in Sāṁkhya the 
self is pure consciousness which cannot have desire or even knowledge of 
objects, all of that being done by evolutes of prakṛti.) Neither singly nor 
together can the external senses do the work of wishful resolution, since 
the outer senses can only grasp what is given to them at the present time, 
“whereas the resolve-making organ has to deal with the future and the 
past.” Next month I intend to present the paper that I wrote last year. In 
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making that resolve, the manas has to make both the past and the future 
its object. Because of this capacity to access the data of all the senses and 
also the past and the future, the manas has to be postulated as a special 
organ of intention. Even life-sustaining functions like breathing are gen-
erally attached to all sense-organs, one may say, why can’t they help the 
special senses to make motivating resolves? YD answers this objection 
by remarking that breathing, etc., cannot perform the intentional job of 
resolving because they simply happen in the body but do not take “ob-
jects” like a sense-organ does. So we need the inner sense-organ. Even 
breathing seems to become intentional when you put your manas to it by 
attending to it as in prānāyāma. But then it is actually the intention of 
the manas and the breathing is its object. Since most of our resolutions 
involve both our inner and outer life (these being seamlessly continuous), 
the manas stands in between the so-called self and the body, so much so 
that in Sāṁkhya it is categorized as both a karmendriya and a jñānendriya, 
a motor as well as a sensory organ, an initiator as well as a receiver. The 
manas calls into question a rigidly drawn distinction between the sensory 
and the motor in neuro-psychology, between receptivity and spontaneity 
in Kantian psychology.
Of course, many problems remain unsolved. The idea of self-aware-
ness, with or without the inner sense, raises the toughest philosophical 
problems. How can the self know itself, making itself both the subject 
and object, agent and patient, of the act of knowing? How can the agent 
of introspection get passively and empirically affected by itself? And even 
if that happens, how can it end up only knowing how it appears to itself 
and not the real self?
CONCLUSION: WHAT WE CAN MAKE THE MANAS DO AND 
UNDO
Let me conclude by pointing at an important eighth explanatory func-
tion of the concept of an inner sense. Just as, for fidgety distracted people 
like us, the manas is constitutionally vacillating, restless, and constantly 
getting attached to and desiring to get attached to this or that exter-
nal sense-organ, escaping to a distracting stimulus when we are trying 
to focus on something “asamsayam mahābāho mano durnigraham calam” 
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(Bhagavad Gītā, 6.35), there is no doubt that the manas is hard to control 
and perpetually moving – to try to ‘contain’ it seems as absurd as trying 
to restrain air; for a Yogin, the manas itself is an aid to detachment and 
control. Kaṇāda, the ancient author of Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, defines liberation 
in this fashion:
When the internal organ abides in the self but not in the 
senses, there results the absence of pleasure and pain, which is 
called Yoga. In the absence of aḍṛṣṭa which causes transmigra-
tion, there is the absence of contact between the internal organ 
with the self (which results in life), and also non-appearance of 
another body: this state is liberation.8
This brings us to the fundamental spiritual underpinning of Indian psych-
ology. Again, spirituality must not be taken as a denial of the life of the 
body. Indeed, the manomayakosa, the internal organ, along with the cog-
nitive sense-organs, is, after all, a very important body that we need to 
take care of in order to lead a flourishing spiritual life. The spiritual “use” 
of the theory of inner sense defies the Cartesian division between mind 
and body since even the most elementary yogic postures require focusing 
of the inner sense on parts of the body and on the most spiritually signifi-
cant bodily function of breathing!
Just as much of Western psychology is proudly applied in nature, be-
ing usable in human resource development, management, clinical prac-
tice, education, etc., much of Indian psychology too is for the sake of 
application. But the goal of that application is not utmost exploitation of 
what is called ‘human resources,’ as if human beings are like coalmines or 
oil fields to be harvested for material productivity. The goal is a healthy, 
unsuffering, ecologically and interpersonally harmonious life, ultimately 
ending in freedom from frustrating desires. For that purpose, the manas 
is first diagnosed as the cause of distraction, sick desires, doubt and error, 
and then explored as a possible tool of focused attention that cures those 
pathological states. There must be such an internal tool of involvement 
as well as withdrawal, if ultimate tranquility and freedom of the self is 
possible. And the very restlessness and far-imagining nature of the manas 
shows that the human person seeks such a freedom in the fullness of God 
73Arindam Chakrabarti
or in Omnipresent Self. Since liberation is possible, and concentration is a 
means to it, the first instrument of concentration, manas, must exist.
In this context the words of the Maitrayani Upaniṣad clearly bring 
out the value-orientation of most traditional Indian theories of the inner 
sense:
Manas is of two kinds: pure and impure. The impure manas is 
filled with resolves to get what is desired. The pure manas is 
content, it has no desire. When, being made waveless without 
wants and distractions, the manas is well-fixed, then it ceases to 
be a manas – and that is the ultimate state to be in. The manas 
has to be held fast in the heart only as long as it is still there. 
This knowledge is mokṣa, all the rest is proliferation of theories 
and books. The manas that has washed away all its dirt with 
samadhi enjoys a bliss which cannot be described in words, only 
the inner organ can feel it (just as it is about to disappear). 
Just as water cannot be separated from water, fire cannot be 
seen apart in fire, sky cannot be distinguished from the sky, 
an inwardized citta vanishes from the sight of the self. It is the 
manas which is the cause of bondage as well as of liberation 
for human beings. A manas addicted to worldly objects makes 
for bondage and a manas that is objectless leads to liberation. 
(Maitrayani Upaniṣad, VI.34: 6–11.)
UNSCIENTIFIC POST-SCRIPT
In his long and middle commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, Ibn Rushd 
(Averroës) was deeply concerned with the nature and unity of such a sen-
sus communis, which enables us to see the difference between whiteness 
and sweetness, and therefore could not be identified with the eye or the 
tongue. But in his acute argumentation for the unity of the common sense, 
he brings in a comparison with interpersonal judgments of comparison:
If it were possible for that which judges two different things to 
be itself two, then when I perceived a given object as warm and 
you perceived something else as white, I could determine that 
the object which I perceived is different from yours without 
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having your perception, which is absurd.… Just as it is neces-
sary that one and the same man be the person who says that “a” 
is different from “b,” so it is necessary that the faculty whereby 
this individual judges that sweet differs from white be one and 
the same.9
What is most uncanny is how intra-sensory comparison is understood 
in analogy with inter-personal comparison. For, the most controversial 
original idea that Averroës had about the mind is that there is a single 
Material Intellect, which is the same for every human being, and indi-
vidual human intellects and imaginations are parts or fragments of that. 
Almost no other Hellenistic, Arabic or Christian commentators sup-
ported him in this hypothesis. But the concept comes pretty close to that 
of a common collective inner sense, or cosmic intellect (virāt or mahān), 
found in the Vedic, Puranic, and Sāṃkhya-Vedāntic metaphysic of the 
mind. The following metaphor used by Ibn Rushd resonates deeply with 
many Sāṃkhya-Vedānta pictures of Divine and human intellects:
Our bodies are like dew-drops, varying in size and shape. The 
quantitative differences of the glassy surfaces, observable on 
the dewdrops, may be compared to the passive intellect, that 
is, to our different individual dispositions. When the Sun, 
the active intellect, sends out his rays on the dewdrops, the 
smooth glassiness of these drops becomes luminous, capable 
of mirroring external objects, and this luminosity, a common 
character in every dewdrop, may be compared to the material 
intellect. The material intellect, in our comparison the sunny 
luminosity, is not an emergence from the dewdrops, Water can 
never turn into sunshine. Rather the material intellect is to be 
conceived as identical with the sun which radiates actively and 
is luminous passively, although its luminosity can come into 
existence only in the presence of the dewdrops.10
With the de-individuation of the organ of imagination and emotional 
cognition, sensus communis can then re-emerge in the Kantian sense of that 
common aesthetic sensibility which is the transcendental condition of our 
claims of taste being compelling across private personal judgments. Such 
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a common inner sense, then, not only tastes the first-order pleasures of 
contact with desired objects, but it also feels its own free-play of imagina-
tion, its sheer purposeless delight in re-arranging possible sensory-motor 
representations. In this, the inner sense becomes an inter-personal creator 
and spectator of beauty, and indeed of divinity. And the root “div” from 
which “deva/devi/devatā” (deity, divinity) comes, Abhinavagupta reminds 
us, primarily stands for play or sport (dīvyati = krīḍati). When freed from 
its egoistic individual boundaries and interests, our Manas is not only the 
instrument with which we worship God by sacrificing our breath in sacred 
speech or sacrificing our speech in meditative silence, but it is also the 
Divinity whom we worship. Both Sāṁkara and Abhinavagupta tell us, in 
different contexts, that the deities are just the universalized sense-organs 
in our bodies. The comparing common sense relishes its own playfulness 
in a divine spilling and crossing over of its own personal and regional 
limits.
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INTRODUCTION
In institutions of higher learning in the Muslim world, in contrast to simi-
lar institutions in Western countries, scant attention is paid to the field 
of comparative religion. This, however, was not always the case. Between 
the third/ninth and sixth/twelfth centuries, Islamic civilization witnessed 
the rise – and also eclipse – of the discipline of ‘ ilm al milal wa n-nihal 
(literally, “knowledge of religious groups and sects”). According to Ismail 
Raji al-Faruqi, interest in learning about other faiths and in interreligious 
debate and discussion during this period was so high that these areas be-
came subjects of “salon conversation” and a “public past-time.”2
Among the works written during the heyday of comparative religious 
studies in Islamic history are: Ar-Radd ‘ala n-Nasara (“Refutation of the 
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Christians”) by ‘Umar b. Bahr al-Jahiz (d. 255/869), Al-Farq bayna l-Firaq 
(“Differences among Muslim Groups”) by ‘Abd al-Qahir b. Tahir al-Bagh-
dadi (d. 429/1038), Al-Fasl fi al-Milal wa al-Nihal (“Decisive Treatise on 
Religious Sects and Divisions”) by ‘Ali b. Ahmad b. Hazm (d. 456/1064), 
Al-Radd al-Jamil li Uluhiyyat Isa bi-Sarih al-Injil (“Proper Refutation of 
the Divinity of Jesus with Clear Evidence from the Bible”) by Abu Hamid 
al-Ghazali (d. 505/1112), and Al-Milal wa al-Nihal (“Religious Sects and 
Divisions”) by Abu l-Fath ash-Shahrastani (d. 548/1154). Mention may 
also be made of such writers as Muhammad b. Jarir at-Tabari (d. 313/926), 
who wrote about the religion of the Persians; Abu l-Hasan al-Mas’udi (d. 
346/958), who wrote two books on Judaism, Christianity, and the reli-
gions of India; al-Qadi ‘Abd al-Jabbar (d. 415/1025), who devoted part of 
Al-Mughni to Muslim sects and to religions other than Islam; and Abu 
Rayhan al-Biruni (d. 440/1053), who wrote about religion in India and 
Persia.
After a lapse of about six to seven centuries, there is, today, renewed in-
terest among Muslims in studying other religions and faiths. Notable works 
in this connection are: Faruqi’s Christian Ethics, Trialogue of the Abrahamic 
Faiths, and Islam and Other Faiths; Ahmad Shalabi’s four-volume Muqaranat 
al-Adyan (“Comparative Study of Religions”); Taha al-Hashimi’s Tara’ik 
al-Adyan wa Falsafatuha) (“Religions: Their History and Philosophies”); 
Muhammad Abu Zahrah’s Muhadarat fi n-Nasraniyyah (“Lectures on 
Christianity”); Muhammad ‘Abdallah Daraz’s Ad-Din (“Religion”); and 
Sulayman Muzhir’s Qissat ad-Diyanat (“Story of the Religions”).
As in the early Islamic period, so today Muslims scholars and stu-
dents face several challenges in their study of world religions. Some of 
these challenges are common to Muslim and Western scholarship on 
the subject, while others are peculiar to Muslim scholarship. They range 
from the challenge of defining and delimiting the field to those associ-
ated with methodology. This paper examines some of these challenges, 
drawing upon the classical Islamic heritage, the experience of Western 
comparativists, and the works of modern Muslim scholars in the field. 
First, however, it will deal with the question, “Why do Muslim scholars 
need to make a serious study of other major world religions?” To be sure, 
some Muslims are opposed to such an exercise, arguing that it will do 
more harm than good. It is, therefore, necessary to ask what led Muslim 
scholars, especially in the past, to study other religions.
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MUSLIM STUDY OF WORLD RELIGIONS: MOTIVATING 
FACTORS
Historically, several factors have motivated Muslims to undertake study 
of other religions:
1. Qur’anic Injunctions. For a Muslim, the main impetus for studying other 
peoples and their faiths comes from the Qur’an itself. Numerous Qur’anic 
verses urge human beings to reflect and ponder on the world around them. 
In so doing, Muslims cannot help but notice the diversity of belief pro-
fessed by people. The Qur’an not only affirms such differences but also 
contains a wealth of information about other religions – both revealed 
and man-made – including Judaism, Christianity, paganism, and idolatry. 
Though not a textbook on other religions, the Qur’an encourages Muslims 
to investigate and study religious differences. For example, 49:13 says: “O 
Mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and female, and 
made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that 
ye may despise each other).”
Exposure to different beliefs often contributes to greater mutual 
understanding and to collaboration among people of different faiths, re-
ducing hatred and suspicion born of ignorance and prejudice. According 
to Qur’an 4:48, God has created differences among human beings as a 
means of testing the latter: “To each among you have we prescribed a Law 
and an open way. If Allah had so willed he would have made you a single 
people, but [His plan is] to test you in what He hath given you: so strive 
as in a race in all virtues.”
2. Dialogue and Discussion. The Qur’an stresses the importance of a healthy 
exchange of ideas among different religious communities: “Invite [all] to 
the Way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching and argue with 
them in ways that are best and most gracious, for thy Lord knoweth best, 
who have strayed from His Path and who received guidance” (16:125). The 
Prophet Muhammad, whom Muslims regard as the living embodiment of 
the Qur’an, was on several occasions known to have engaged in religious 
discussion with both Jews and Christians.
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3. Addition to Knowledge. In the very early Islamic period, Muslims were 
sometimes surrounded by, and sometimes had as their neighbours, Jews 
and Christians, Magians, idol-worshipers, as well as star-, sun-, and moon-
worshippers. Inspired by the above-quoted and other Qur’anic verses, 
classical Muslim scholars studied the beliefs of the various groups they 
encountered. Initially, they focused primarily on differences between the 
Muslims and the “People of the Book” – that is, the Jews and Christians. 
With the expansion of the Islamic State, however, they enlarged the scope 
of their inquiry to include the new religions they came into contact with, 
particularly Hinduism. Today, large numbers of Muslims live in multire-
ligious societies. Muslims who live as a minority religious community in 
a land or region – as in North America – interact with non-Muslims on 
a daily basis. On the other hand, sizeable non-Muslim minorities exist in 
many so-called Muslim majority countries. Furthermore, modern systems 
of communication and transportation have increased interaction among 
diverse religious groups. Such interaction inevitably raises a question: 
Why do people hold the beliefs they do or practice their religion the way 
they do? While some people may choose to ignore the fact of diversity of 
belief and to associate with like-minded people only, such an attitude of 
aloofness is becoming more and more difficult to maintain in a world that 
is becoming increasingly cosmopolitan.
4. Truth and Falsehood. Many classical Muslim scholars were motivated to 
study religious differences out of a desire to compare false religions with 
Islam – which they regarded as the religion of truth. Frequently, such 
studies were undertaken with the intention of refuting, either directly or 
indirectly, un-Islamic beliefs or philosophies – especially those that were 
perceived to have had a deleterious effect on the Muslims’ faith. Such 
refutation was supposed to make Islam intellectually stronger, and also 
more attractive to others.3 According to Faruqi, study of other religions 
should aim at bringing out the commonalities rather than the differences 
among the religions. He thinks that it is up to the researcher to determine 
the extent to which the various religious traditions agree with “din-al-
fitrah, the original and first religion.”4 Keith Roberts opines that a scien-
tific study of other religions can be beneficial in that it will force one to be 
rigorous in the search for truth and in that it demands logical coherence 
in the articulation of faith.5
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5. Colonial Powers and Missionary Activities. Muslim interest in studying 
other religions peaked in the sixth/twelfth century, declining thereafter. 
It resurfaced with the arrival of the colonial powers in the Muslim world. 
Muslims, on the one hand, wished to acquire a sounder understanding 
of the religion of those who had defeated them – namely, the Christians 
– and, on the other, hoped to counteract the work of the Christian mis-
sionaries who accompanied the colonial powers. Thus, we notice the ap-
pearance of such works as the Mahomedan Commentary on the Holy Bible, 
written by Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898)6; among the later works were 
those written by Abu Zahrah, Faruqi, and Shalabi. Interestingly, many 
Orientalist works written during this period were prompted by the desire 
to gain a better understanding of the mores and practices of the colonized 
people – with the eventual aim of strengthening administrative and polit-
ical control over those people.
6. Affirmation of One’s Religious Commitment. Study of other religions and 
philosophies may serve to increase one’s own religious belief and com-
mitment. Those who interact with people of different faiths often feel the 
need and pressure to find out more about their own faith. It is not uncom-
mon for Muslim students in recent times to express the view that it was 
only after they had travelled overseas to study in non-Muslim countries 
that they truly came to understand Islam.
DEFINING AND DELIMITING THE FIELD
A variety of terms have been used, particularly in the Western scholarly 
tradition, to designate the field under discussion. They have ranged from 
“comparative religion” to “religious studies” to “history of religion.”7 But 
first we will take a brief look at the relevant Qur’anic terminology.
The Qur’an uses three main terms for “religion”: din, millah, and um-
mah. Although din has a number of meanings, including “obligation, dir-
ection, submission, retribution,”8 it is frequently used to denote religion 
in the generic sense of the word.9 In some cases, it refers to the primor-
dial, monotheistic religion that, being one and the same, has subsisted 
throughout history. In others, it alludes to one of the false or corrupted 
forms (for example, polytheism) of a once true religion – a falsehood or 
corruption that may be regarded as din by those who accept it as a true and 
S T U DY I NG T H E “ O T H E R ”82
uncorrupted religion. This latter meaning is evidenced 109:1–3, 6: “Say: 
O you who deny the truth! I do not worship that which you worship, and 
neither do you worship that which I worship.… Unto you, your moral law 
(dinukum) and unto me mine.” Commenting on these verses, the classical 
scholar Qurtubi says that the religion of the infidels has been referred to 
as a religion (din) because “they believed and adhered to it.”10
Millah denotes a religious tradition, a worldview, or a faith.11 The term 
implies a system of doctrines, creeds, and rituals that is followed by a 
group of people regardless of whether, from a social and political stand-
point, that group does or does not make up an independent polity.
Ummah stands for a religio-moral and socio-political community. 
Aasi maintains that, although ummah sometimes gives “the meaning of 
a nation, a people, a culture or a civilization, basic to all these groups of 
people is the idea of one binding religio-moral system of law and values.”12
Islamic tradition does not assign an official name to the study of re-
ligious communities and sects. Faruqi says that the discipline was called 
‘ ilm al-milal wa n-nihal.13 But there is no scholarly consensus on the term. 
According to Shalabi, the discipline of comparative religion, which he 
calls muqarant al-adyan, can be traced back to al-Hasan b. Musa an-
Nawbakhti’s (d. 202/816) Ara’ wa-d-Diyanat (“Opinions and Religions”). 
On this view, the discipline originated about the same time as a number 
of other Islamic sciences, including those of Fiqh, Tafsir, and Hadith.14 
Shalabi goes on to list a number of reasons for the decline of the disci-
pline in later times. First, since, in Islamic societies, non-Muslims came 
to occupy high positions in the administrative and political fields, and 
since many members of the Muslim ruling elite were married to non-
Muslim women, comparative works that showed Islam to be superior 
to other faiths – and the other faiths to be deficient in comparison with 
Islam – were ill-suited to the political climate of the times. Second, the 
Crusades, which aimed at wiping out Islam and Muslims by means of the 
sword, left little hope for religious dialogue and discussion. Third, most of 
the fuquha’ (“ jurists”) developed a fanatical loyalty to their own madhhabs 
(“schools”) and had little interest in studying other madhhabs, much less 
other religions. Finally, some scholars refused to acknowledge the exist-
ence of other religions and felt that no comparison could be made between 
them and Islam.15
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In the modern period, the most commonly used Arabic term to de-
scribe the discipline of study of other religions is muqaranat al-adyan, 
which is a direct translation of the Western term “comparative religion.” 
The word muqaranah (“comparison”) may mean muwazanah, tashbih, 
qiyas,16 or muqayasah.17 Generally, however, the word “comparative” in this 
context refers to comparison of two or more kinds of phenomenon.18 It 
is also used to describe the method whereby likenesses or dissimilarities 
between two or more items are determined through a simultaneous exam-
ination of those items.19
The classic Western definition of “comparative religion” is that offered 
by Louis H. Jordon in 1905. According to Jordon, comparative religion is:
The science which compares the origin, structure and char-
acteristics of the various religions of the world, with the view 
of determining their genuine agreements and differences, the 
measure of relation in which they stand one to another and their 
relative superiority and inferiority when regarded as types.20
In the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the German-British phil-
ologist F. Max Müller (1823–1900) extended the comparative approach, 
which he had used in his philological studies, to the study of religion.21 
Central to this conception of comparative religion was application of the 
comparative – or scientific – method to the data supplied by the world’s 
religions, past and present, in order to discover the laws that are opera-
tive in the realm of religion. In Germany, however, the newly developed 
school had a narrower scope, limiting its research to the background of 
the Old and New Testaments.22 The term “comparative religion” remained 
in use until the end of World War II, even though, by the end of World 
War I, the discipline had already started to split up into a number of 
interrelated disciplines, such as history of religion, psychology of religion, 
sociology of religion, and philosophy of religion.23 Although, initially, the 
main discipline involved collecting, in a dispassionate manner, a massive 
amount of information about other people’s religions, there has been, since 
World War II, a large-scale direct interaction among persons of diverse 
faiths, both on professional and on personal levels.24 This has, in turn, led 
to a shifting of the focus of study. One result of the shift has been that 
Western scholars have almost entirely ceased to concern themselves with 
S T U DY I NG T H E “ O T H E R ”84
the “relative superiority or inferiority” of religions. A second outcome is 
that Western scholarship has almost abandoned the term “comparative 
religion,”25 replacing it with a wide variety of terms, which reflect both 
diversity of thought and methodological uncertainty. One of the more 
popular of these terms is “religious studies,” which came into existence 
in the 1960s, which was a period of growth of higher education in the 
West.26 According to Sharpe, “religious studies attempts to study religion 
not on the basis of one tradition (or a part of a tradition) only, but ‘in the 
round.’”27 In his view, religious studies can, at best, reveal the principles on 
which all religious belief and behaviour, viewed from the believer’s angle, 
rests – principles which, once grasped, can be applied in other, separate 
areas.28
It seems, however, that the discipline of religious studies began to lose 
its focus in the 1980s. Its curriculum has increasingly become “a crazy quilt 
of courses encompassing many disciplines, areas, regions, languages and 
methods of inquiry.”29 At the end of the millennium, Juschka argues that 
“the discipline of religious studies is seen to be void, empty, [or] whimsical 
at best. Since it lacks an identity it also lacks cultural capital, and lack-
ing cultural capital its survival in the changing world of the university is 
uncertain.”30
In light of this overview of the historical origins and development of 
the terms “comparative religion” and “religious studies,” as well as of the 
status of these disciplines, in the West, the next question to ask is, “Where 
do Muslim scholars in the field stand in relation to such developments?” 
The chasm between modern Western and Muslim scholarship in the field 
is very wide. While in the Western academic tradition the discipline ap-
pears to be on the wane owing to a lack of direction and focus, in academic 
institutions in the contemporary Muslim world the field is still in the early 
stages of revival.
Western historical experience has demonstrated that each new schol-
arly attempt to define the field is based upon a new understanding, not 
only of the goal of the research to be undertaken, but also of the method-
ology to be employed in the research. While the term “comparative reli-
gion” may have gone out of vogue in Western academic circles, compari-
son is still a valid method in Islamic intellectual circles. This method is 
frequently used in the Qur’an, and was also used by early Muslim scholars, 
particularly the fuquha’, who were known for their use of qiyās (“analogical 
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reasoning”). At the same time, some of the assumptions underlying the 
new term “religious studies” seem to be questionable from an Islamic point 
of view. The Western religious studies programs are predicated on the as-
sumption that, epistemic certainty being unattainable, no religion has an 
exclusive claim to truth. On this view, we are left with three possibilities: 
(1) all religions are equally true; (2) all religions contain bits of truth; (3) 
none of the religions contain any truth at all. But while the above-stated 
assumption is in keeping with modern trends in Western philosophical 
thought, in which “no form of knowledge can be absolute” and all truth 
is relative, it would not appeal to a Muslim, since the denial of absolute 
values in favour of relative ones serves to negate God and the hereafter.31
Having said that, we must add that some of the issues that Western 
scholars in the field have grappled with must be addressed by Muslims 
as well. For example: “Should study of world religions focus on the ex-
ternal – namely, doctrinal, legal, and social – aspects and manifestations 
of religion or on the internal – namely, experiential – aspects of religions, 
or on both?” “To what extent is it possible for an individual who is com-
mitted to a given religious belief to make an objective study of another 
religion?” “Should the study of other religions include an evaluative aspect 
or should it defer evaluation in light of the difficulty in reaching epistemic 
uncertainty?” Some of these questions will be dealt with in the following 
sections.
CHALLENGES OF METHODOLOGY
The classical Greeks, who were critical of the popular native religion, were 
curious about other religious traditions – and, therefore, open to study-
ing them. In their quest for information and truth, they recorded and 
described what they saw, read, and experienced; they also compared and 
contrasted the material thus collected with their own tradition and cul-
ture.32 But, according to Sharpe, the Judeo-Christian tradition, in contrast 
to the Greek, has been exclusivist and intolerant in the matter of religion. 
In his view, the New Testament exhibits a total lack of objective interest 
in other religious traditions and virtually rules out even the possibility of 
an objective study of other religions.33
The classical Muslim approach – insofar as one can speak of one – to 
the subject is in stark contrast to the Judeo-Christian. It is true that Muslim 
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scholars viewed other religions from the perspective of the foundational 
sources of Islam, the Qur’an and Sunnah. At the same time, however, they 
felt free to approach the subject from several different angles. In this con-
nection, we will briefly compare the methodologies of three representa-
tives of the classical period – Biruni, Ibn Ḥazm, and Shahrastani.
Biruni made an extensive and profound study of Hindu civilization, 
including Hindu religion, philosophy, manners, customs, and scientific 
achievements. In both Kitab al-Athar (English trans.: The Chronology of 
Ancient Nations) and Kitab al-Hind (translated as Al-Biruni’s India), Biruni 
discusses a total of twelve religions and religious communities and then 
compares their traits with corresponding features in Islamic and other 
known cultures.34 He makes three types of comparisons: interreligious, 
intrareligious, and intersectarian.35 This enables him to make use of his 
knowledge of the Greek and Indian philosophical systems to reach con-
clusions and make observations that would be understood and appreciated 
by his fellow Muslims. It is noteworthy that Biruni wrote about Hindu 
doctrine in a completely detached manner. He quoted Hindu sources ver-
batim at length when he thought they would contribute to elucidating a 
subject. Biruni himself confirms that his book “is not a polemical one,” 
and that it is “nothing but a simple historical record of facts.”36 Biruni was 
highly successful in describing Hinduism in an objective manner, without 
identifying himself with the religion.37
Ibn Ḥazm was the first Muslim comparativist to use a critical ana-
lytical approach to study other religions, particularly the Jewish Torah 
and Christian Gospel.38 Although both the Christians and Jews kept 
rejecting his analysis for three-quarters of a millennium, Faruqi states 
that today some Christians have come to acknowledge the worth of Ibn 
Ḥazm’s study.39 As far as his methodology was concerned, Ibn Ḥazm 
would report all the beliefs of the group in question and then critically 
analyze them with a view to showing their merits and demerits. Using the 
Zahirite methodology, he rejected interpretations of the Old Testament 
offered by clergymen and Christian theologians, who, he thought, might 
have committed errors in interpreting that scripture. Ibn Ḥazm preferred 
to examine the original texts and arrive at new conclusions, taking an ap-
proach similar to that taken by the Protestant Reformers in understanding 
the Bible.40 He would, however, reject the texts if he found contradictions 
in them.
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Shahrastani’s Kitab al-Milal wa al-Nihal is a virtual short encyclo-
pedia on all the religions, sectarian groups, and supernatural and philo-
sophical systems known at his time. According to Sharpe, Shahrastani 
has the honour of having written the first ever history of religion. In his 
view, Shahrastani’s work “far outstrips anything which Christian writers 
were capable of producing at the same period.”41 In contrast to Ibn Ḥazm, 
who bases his analysis strictly on a study of original and primary sources, 
Shahrastani does make use of a number of secondary sources – for which 
he is severely criticized by A. J. Arberry, who remarks that Shahrastani’s 
Milal “is little more than a farrago of quotations from older writers, 
loosely arranged and inconsequently strung together without the slightest 
acknowledgment.”42 A. K. Kazi and J. G. Flynn, who are less critical of 
Shahrastani, argue that, although Shahrastani draws heavily on Asha‘ri’s 
Maqalat al-Islamiyyin, he does make use of other sources as well and often 
differs considerably from Asha‘ri – especially in terms of arrangement of 
material and classification of the subsects – and gives a fuller account of 
some of the sects than Asha‘ri. Kazi and Flynn point out, furthermore, 
that Shahrastani’s section on the Isma’iliyyah seems quite independently 
written.43 Nevertheless, they admit that Shahrastani rarely mentions his 
sources, with the exception of Abdallah b. Mahmud al-Ka’bi (d. 319/931), 
whose name occurs quite frequently.
Unlike Ibn Ḥazm, Shahrastani does not critically analyze the ideas 
of the groups he discusses. Generally, he reports the views of the sects 
without elaboration and without comment, though he offers an occasional 
brief criticism.44 “I have,” he says at the beginning of his book, “stated 
their beliefs as found in their books without favouring them and without 
attacking or criticizing them.”45 This approach, however, has not found 
favour with some Muslim scholars. Mahmoud Ali Himaya, for instance, 
criticizes Shahrastani for not correcting the mistaken ideas he described. 
Himaya thinks that the major problem with such an approach is that 
false ideas may stick in the readers’ minds, without these readers knowing 
whether such ideas are false or wrong. He further says that it is easy to 
learn about the ideas of another group and report them but that it is more 
difficult to respond to the wrong ideas.46
This brief review of the differing methodologies of three Muslim 
scholars has shown that there is no such thing as a single “classical Muslim 
method” for studying other religions. Both Biruni and Shahrastani 
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preferred to take a descriptive approach, but Biruni obtained his informa-
tion from first-hand field research, while Shahrastani relied more heavily 
on secondary sources. Ibn Ḥazm, on the other hand, preferred the critical 
analytical approach and relied exclusively on original religious texts, ig-
noring second-hand commentaries on those texts.
In the modern era, Western scholars have used an increasingly wide 
variety of methods to study the field. The so-called Orientalist meth-
odology reigned supreme in nineteenth-century Western Europe. The 
Orientalists treated the religions of the world as “dead-cold data and static 
external observables in human behaviour or as enemy territory, which 
must be reconnoitered in order to be conquered with the least possible 
effort.”47 In their view, the ideal scholar was a detached academic who 
surveyed material impersonally, almost majestically, and subsequently re-
ported on it objectively. This detachment meant that the scholar studied 
the religion without participating in it.48 In addition, many Orientalists 
were evolutionists in the sense that they tended to classify religions his-
torically, geographically, and culturally, systematizing them into various 
“isms,” each a rough equivalent of a biological species.49
One of the shortcomings of the Orientalist methodology is that it 
failed to recognize that “religion is not a ‘scientific’ fact that can be coldly 
examined in the manner of a geological or biological sample.”50 To be sure, 
several dimensions of religion are amenable to scientific study, but these 
may not be religion as such, the heart of a religion consisting of the mean-
ing a religion holds for those who believe in it.51
A second shortcoming is that the great majority of the Orientalist 
writings were prejudiced by Western – if not strictly Christian – categor-
ies of thought and analysis.52 Sharpe says that comparisons frequently in-
volved “undue and conventional selectivity, which chose not what is most 
important in an exotic tradition, but what is accessible and superficially 
attractive.” In addition, many Western students tended to treat the “other” 
tradition as a mirror for their own concerns.53
As already mentioned, “comparative religion” since World War I was 
broken down into a number of subdisciplines, each with its own meth-
odology or approach. The anthropological approach examines the role of 
religion in early or traditional societies – particularly the ways in which 
religious rites and ceremonies bind a community together – the role of 
a chief or shaman in the life of the people, and the function of myth in 
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revealing a tribe’s self-understanding and identity.54 Anthropologists are 
also interested in finding out how society’s religious beliefs and institu-
tions sanction or elicit acceptance of a certain behaviour and how these 
factors assist in making that society integrated and cohesive.55 A favourite 
method of the anthropologists is that of participant observation, which 
requires an open, serious, and respectful attitude toward alien ways of life 
and thought.56
Many of those who used the anthropological approach to study other 
religions were criticized for being arm-chair scholars, in the sense that 
their methods were skewed by unreliable data obtained at second hand, by 
unsifted sources, and by inauthentic comparisons and haphazard synthesis 
in which bizarre phenomena were focused on, or certain types of examples 
selected, to prove preconceived theories. The latter-day anthropological 
method – that of undertaking intensive fieldwork – has also been criti-
cized as impressionistic, haphazard, or simply meaningless busywork, 
while even the technique of “participant observation” has been dismissed 
as the romantic illusion that one can get an inside view of a foreign culture 
in a few months or years.57
The sociological approach to other religions focuses on group or social 
behaviour and on the way religion interacts with other dimensions of our 
social experience.58 The psychological approach, on the other hand, tends 
to emphasize the study of such experiences as conversion, prayer, and 
mystic ecstasy, using such methods as questionnaires, personal interviews, 
autobiographies, and other empirical data that could be analyzed, clas-
sified, and statistically measured.59 The historical approach is concerned 
with establishing the role that religious experience and ideas play in the 
lives of individuals and communities, and also with determining how re-
ligion influences the development of larger societies, nations, and whole 
cultures. In reconstructing a religion’s past or by attempting to distinguish 
historical fact from myth, legend, saga, and religious tradition, the histor-
ian draws on a vast range of non-textual sources, including archaeology, 
numismatics, and geography.60
The phenomenological method attempts to supply the deficiencies of 
the Orientalist approach and of the reductionism of several of the above-
noted approaches. It is designed “to portray each religion in its own terms 
as a unique expression, as a reality that is not to be reduced.” In order 
to achieve this goal, the phenomenologist must remain detached and 
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impartial. But insightful description and interpretation also requires a 
genuine feel for, and empathy with, religious experience.61 The phenom-
enologist must exercise epoche, or the suspension of judgment, a state that 
allows him or her to see through the eyes of those who believe – or of 
those who are committed.62
CONCLUSION
This chapter has critically examined a number of challenges facing Muslim 
scholars and students of world religions. It commenced with a discussion 
of why Muslim scholars in both the past and present have undertaken 
investigations of people of different faiths.
Upon examining the issue of “defining the field,” it was revealed that 
there has never been any agreed upon term for the discipline of studying 
“other” religions. In the contemporary Muslim scholarship, some such 
as Faruqi refer to the discipline as ‘ ilm al-milal wa al-nihal (knowledge 
of religious groups and sects). The vast majority of present-day Muslim 
scholars, however, employ the term muqaranat al-adyyan, which is essen-
tially a direct translation of the Western term “comparative religion.” It 
was argued that, although the term “comparative religion” is no longer 
in vogue in Western academic circles, it can still be considered valid in 
the Muslim world since the comparative technique is frequently used by 
the classical Muslim scholars in various fields of study, especially juris-
prudence. At the same time, it was also evident that the term “religious 
studies,” which has found a place in Western academic circles since the 
1960s, is considered questionable by Muslims due to its epistemological 
foundations.
The next issue this chapter addressed was the challenge of method-
ology. It was argued that there was no one classical Muslim method of 
studying world religions. While some scholars preferred a descriptive ap-
proach, others preferred to undertake a critical analysis of the religion in 
question. Moreover, while some scholars preferred to undertake the inves-
tigation directly in the field, others preferred to rely on secondary sources. 
The common thread between these divergent approaches, however, is that 
their perception of reality was derived from Islamic epistemology, which 
is based on the Qur’an and/or the prophetic traditions.
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As far as a contemporary methodology for Muslim scholars in the 
field is concerned, it was maintained that there is no one precise “Islamic 
methodology” per se. Instead, Muslim intellectuals are encouraged to 
study and investigate different religious beliefs held by people in a man-
ner that is objective and fair to the people under investigation. In fact, it 
is unacceptable for Muslim scholars to maliciously attack or downgrade 
“other” religions.
Finally, the third issue addressed by the chapter was the extent to 
which a Muslim’s religious commitment affects his or her objectivity when 
studying other religions. It was argued that every scholar is committed – 
either consciously or unconsciously – to certain convictions or presuppos-
itions about what constitutes reality, rationality, or evidence. The key to 
overcoming any inherent bias is to state one’s fundamental presuppositions 
from the beginning, rather than keeping them unclear, under the claim of 
being “objective.”
While the issues discussed are hardly an exhaustive list of challenges 
facing Muslim scholars and students of world religions, they do represent 
some of the greater difficulties in academic institutions of higher learn-
ing. While some insight has been offered into a scientific methodology of 
comparative religion, much more work has to be done to further develop 
and refine such a methodology.
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The Vices of Ethics: The Critique 




The call to transcend or go beyond morality is sometimes associated with 
an amoral relativism or religious exception, with dangerous repercussions 
for the social order. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard are two thinkers who 
issue pleas to loosen the constraints of morality. In Nietzsche’s case, it 
is often presumed to clear the way for an untrammelled creativity, while 
Kierkegaard hopes to provide an avenue for the unmediated relationship 
between the individual and God. In both cases, there appears to be a pro-
found concern that the authenticity of the individual is hampered by strict 
moral edifices. Daoist thinkers are also suspicious of moral strictures, 
and the relentless sarcasm with which Confucian moral pedantry is often 
treated could easily be interpreted in the West as praise for the virtues of 
individual creativity. However, upon careful reading, one begins to recog-
nize that in Daoist philosophy, adherence to moral prescriptions not only 
ushers in the possibility for conflict but is accompanied by a burgeoning 
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egoism as individuals begin to use moral appearances to solicit the admir-
ation of others. Furthermore, it is associated with a rigidity that prevents 
open adaptation to others, which would allow for genuinely harmonious 
relationships. From a Daoist perspective, morality does not prevent ego-
ism but rather cultivates it.
A reading of the writings of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard in conjunc-
tion with Daoist philosophy helps to shed light on the criticism of egoism 
that is at the centre of their philosophies as well. According to Nietzsche, 
morality feeds on egoism while at the same time trying to mask it, and his 
plea to go beyond good and evil is also an exhortation to unhinge us from 
the hubris that mars our being. Kierkegaard insists that faith catapults us 
beyond an engagement with the world in which other human beings be-
come mere extensions of the self. By examining these thinkers’ pleas to go 
“beyond good and evil,” it appears that morality may require something 
other to itself in order to be saved from its own vices.
NIETZSCHE’S “BEYOND”
Nietzsche’s attack on Judeo-Christian mores is perhaps one of the most 
ruthless in the history of philosophy. He insists that it is part of the quest 
to render human beings knowable and thus ensure that a certain degree 
of conformity associated with the herd mentality defines our behaviour.
Our eye finds it more comfortable to respond to a given stimu-
lus by reproducing once more an image that it has produced 
many times before, instead of registering what is different and 
new in an impression. The latter would require more strength, 
more ‘morality.’ Hearing something new is embarrassing and 
difficult for the ear; foreign music we do not hear well.1
Michael Weston points out that the formation of the herd represents a 
dramatic shift in our mentality, promoting the abstract, perfect man or 
the universal individual rather than cultivating a human being embedded 
in a particular cultural context.2 The pressure to conform exerted by moral 
systems of the herd fosters a profound egoism because it is not based on 
genuine community but rather demands a constant evaluation of the self 
according to external standards. The narcissism that morality promotes 
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creates a human being obsessed with itself and this eventually destroys it 
from within. The moral system, in his view, has laid the groundwork for 
its own destruction.
Nietzsche’s account of morality famously begins with the master-slave 
dialectic, which describes the ebullient energy of the masters, who con-
ceive of the good “spontaneously out of themselves.”3 The pathos of distance 
between masters and their underlings marked the genesis of value judg-
ments such as good and bad: “The pathos of nobility and distance, … the 
protracted and domineering fundamental total feeling on the part of a 
higher ruling order in relation to a lower order, to a ‘below’ – that is the 
origin of the antithesis of ‘good’ and ‘bad.’”4 These terms were not yet 
laden with moral value but simply marked a power dynamic that separated 
the strong from the weak. Nietzsche is making the point here that value 
judgments were originally brazen assertions of power and difference, in 
order to remind us of their relative value.
In an ironic twist of history, Nietzsche suggests that the weaker slaves 
triumphed by introducing a conceptual revolution that permitted the mind 
to triumph over the body. The slaves, subjected to the power of the master
… with awe inspiring consistency, dared to invert the aristo-
cratic value equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = 
happy = beloved of God) and to hang on to this inversion with 
their teeth, the teeth of the most abysmal hatred (the hatred of 
impotence), saying ‘the wretched alone are the good; the poor, 
impotent, lowly alone are the good … and you, the powerful 
and noble are on the contrary, the evil, the cruel the lustful, 
the insatiable, the godless to all eternity; and you shall be in all 
eternity the unblessed, the accused, the damned.’5 
The slaves accomplished this by transforming their inaction in relation to 
the masters into a virtue, suggesting that the masters were incapable of 
choosing not to act. Furthermore, the shift from good and bad to good 
and evil denotes a shift from relative values to permanent moral ideals that 
impute to good and evil an essential nature, inherent in the disposition of 
human beings themselves.
Nietzsche does not want to repudiate the birth of such moral decorum 
entirely because he suggests that the self divided in this manner also made 
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possible the birth of the sovereign individual, who could assert conceptual 
control over her/his own activity by making promises and thereby plan-
ning her or his future:
If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous process, 
where the tree at last brings forth fruit, where society and the 
morality of custom at last reveal what they have simply been the 
means to: then we discover that the ripest fruit is the sovereign 
individual, like only to himself liberated again from morality of 
custom, autonomous and supramoral.6
However, this came at a tremendous price, namely the festering ressenti-
ment against an outside world which is then negated: 
… slave morality from the outset says No to what is ‘outside,’ 
what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself ’; and this No is its creative 
deed. This inversion of the value-positing eye – this need to 
direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself – is of the 
essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, slave morality always 
first needs a hostile external world.”7
A schism is established between human beings and their environs, and, 
unlike the self-affirmation of the master, which is spontaneous, this af-
firmation is secondary, and derived from contempt: “he has conceived ‘the 
evil enemy,’ ‘the Evil One,’ and this in fact is his basic concept, from which 
he then evolves, as an afterthought and pendant, a ‘good one’ – himself!”8 
For Nietzsche, the propensity to judge others is an automatic outgrowth 
of morality. Egoism in his view is an obsession with the self that is always 
looking to others for its assessment of itself.
According to Nietzsche, the irony of this development is that the 
sovereign potential of the individual is undermined almost as soon as 
it is born, for the success in asserting control over the masters depends 
upon a remarkable degree of assimilation amongst the slaves. The herd 
mentality that ensues is solidified as measurable external standards are 
used to evaluate the self. It is important to reiterate that the herd is not 
a community but rather each individual is left to conform to abstract 
and external standards of morality and justice. According to Nietzsche, 
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the creditor-debtor relationship contributed to the development of this 
relationship, and he highlights the etymological connection in German 
between guilt (Schuld) and debt (Schulden).9 The monetary relationship be-
tween creditor and debtor made it easier for one person to measure himself 
“against another.”10 Monetary debts are easy to measure, and a strange no-
tion of equivalence developed whereby gruesome punishment was exacted 
based on the debt that was owed.
However, this system was not as effective at obtaining the internal 
repression of the debtor. For this, the invention of God was necessary, 
whose debts could never be repaid. The Christian God “as maximum god 
attained so far, was therefore accompanied by the maximum feeling of 
guilty indebtedness on earth.”11 According to Nietzsche, the moral system 
that we ascribe to has its roots firmly anchored in religion, and, with the 
decline of faith, it too begins to crumble. Christian values in his eyes can-
not survive the death of the Christian God. This god, in relation to whom 
we always fall short, exacerbates individual self-contempt that impels us 
to direct our rage against our own bodies and nature itself. However, in 
Nietzsche’s view, the humility that we experience is false, for it also masks 
the enormous hubris that underlies it. God is a metaphor for what we 
would like to be, namely omnipotent and omniscient, while at the same 
time reminding us of what we are not.12 Eventually our resentment is 
directed against this God himself, symbolized in Nietzsche’s work by the 
ugly man in Thus Spoke Zarathustra who announces that he has murdered 
God: “You could not endure him who saw you unblinking and through 
and through, you ugliest man! You took revenge upon this witness.”13 
Furthermore, the constant self-deprecation that Christian humility de-
mands also fosters a narcissistic obsession with the self and is matched by 
a readiness to quickly cast judgment on others. The love of our neighbour, 
which Christianity extols, in reality manifests our attempt to solicit from 
others not companions but wellsprings of approval:
You invite in a witness when you want to speak well of your-
selves; and when you have misled him into thinking well of 
you, you then think well of yourselves.… One man runs to 
his neighbour because he is looking for himself, and another 
because he wants to lose himself. Your bad love of yourselves 
makes solitude a prison to you.14
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In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra becomes an unwilling witness 
to this perverse form of Christian love, when a tightrope walker who 
manifests his courage is sent plummeting to his death by a buffoon, who, 
knowing only scorn, deliberately destroys his concentration by calling him 
lamefoot.15 The dead tightrope walker is simply abandoned by the com-
munity and nobody makes any effort to provide him with the proper bur-
ial that is owed to him by Christian standards. Only Zarathustra remains 
by his side and buries him with his own hands.
Nietzsche seeks redemption from Christian morality by trying to in-
fuse life into the very sentiments Christianity purports to espouse, namely 
universal love, but a love which is based on affirmation. It is significant 
that Nietzsche chooses the figure of Zarathustra, who represents the 
Zoroastrian religion that demarcated good and evil in the first place, to 
journey beyond it. This indicates that Nietzsche wants us to take his desire 
to overcome resentment seriously by making the perpetrator of morality 
an agent of its renewal. While Zarathustra is often seen as the epitome of 
the sovereign individual, trying to create new worlds in a sea of conform-
ity, what is ignored is that he is on a voyage to become humble to the 
extent that he can recognize that he is only one part of an infinite universe 
that he will never control. This humble attitude, however, is self-affirming 
rather than deprecating because it is without guilt in the face of an om-
nipotent god. Undoubtedly Zarathustra has difficulty with this mission. 
He must descend from his heights on the top of the mountain and go into 
the valley. He struggles with his arrogance but is in search of companions, 
refusing to be “herdsman and dog to the herd.”16 Zarathustra is constantly 
on a quest to find friends who will interrupt the lonely dialogue within 
himself and enable him to reach new heights:
I and Me are always too earnestly in conversation with one 
another: how could it be endured, if there were not a friend. 
For the hermit the friend is always the third person: the third 
person is the cork that prevents the conversation of the other 
two from sinking to the depths.17
Zarathustra hopes that his friends will also be enemies, indicating that 
self-overcoming demands a kind of sparring that catapults one to new 
horizons: “In your friend you should possess your best enemy. You should 
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feel closest to him when you oppose him.”18 Furthermore, no attempt 
should be made to reduce the friend to oneself for the friend should be 
a master of “keeping silence: you must not want to see everything.”19 
Although Zarathustra appears to long to redeem himself from the tread-
mill of his own egoism, the friend is still an intermediary that provides 
new fodder for his conversation with oneself. This demonstrates how wed-
ded Zarathustra is to egoism, even in spite of his genuine desire to escape 
its clutches.
The transformation beyond the ego requires an openness of spirit that 
is represented by the three metamorphoses of the camel, the lion, and the 
child. The camel or weight-bearing spirit simply takes upon itself all the 
loads that are bequeathed upon it but in so doing wanders into the lonely 
desert. The camel takes pride in the burdens it carries and its ability to 
comply with demands. Ironically, this gives birth to the ego, for the camel 
must resist his own impulses in order to do its duty. The split self allows for 
its transformation into the lion who rebels against the commands imposed 
upon it, wanting to be the master of its own desert. Against the “thou 
shalt” that the camel has simply accepted, it roars “I will” and bellows 
“no” to all external imposition. All that is sacred is profaned by the lion 
who “finds illusion and caprice even in the holiest.” Nietzsche ingeniously 
demonstrates the close connection between subjection and domination. 
But Nietzsche’s story does not end with this thunderous rebellion of the 
lion but rather with the child, who is “innocence and forgetfulness, a new 
beginning, a sport, a self-propelling wheel, a first motion, a sacred Yes.”20 
The metaphorical child is able to affirm life without judgment, playing 
with things to transform them into something new, without asserting its 
dominion over the world. Above all, the child is not poisoned by resent-
ment; it loves the world without conditions or presuppositions. In fact, 
throughout his journey, Zarathustra is in search of these children whose 
arrival he still awaits as he exclaims at the end of the book: “My children 
are near my children.”21 Yet, in the end, Zarathustra is unable to make the 
movement beyond egoism: “And once more Zarathustra became absorbed 
in himself and sat himself again on the great stone and meditated.”22 He 
greets the world as his own while he still waits in vain for his children 
to come: “This is my morning, my day begins: rise up now, rise up great 
noontide.”23
T H E V ICE S OF E T H IC S102
Perhaps there is only one moment in the text that provides a glimmer 
of what a movement beyond egoism would look like. The metaphor of 
the eternal recurrence of the same is an illuminating parable that offers 
the possibility of affirmation without ego attachments. As human beings, 
we are suspended between the lane running into the future and the lane 
running into the past.24 All things that will happen have already hap-
pened and we are but an infinitesimal threat on this tremendous wheel of 
recurrence, which binds all things together. Everything lies along these 
paths that eventually meet: the good and the evil, as well as the ugly and 
the beautiful. While Zarathustra is contemplating this phenomenon, a 
dog calls his attention to a peasant with a serpent coiled in his throat. The 
wheel of recurrence that goes on forever also can easily claim our lives. 
Zarathustra sees the peasant choking and tries to help him but fails to 
release the grip of the serpent. Eventually, he tells the peasant to bite and 
the peasant takes his advice and is able to spit out the head of the serpent. 
He is completely transformed as a result: “No longer a shepherd, no longer 
a man – a transformed being, surrounded with light, laughing. Never yet 
on earth had any man laughed as he laughed.”25 The shepherd had both 
taken his life seriously and fought to hold onto it, but in the very same 
breath recognized the fragility of his own existence. This is a laughter of 
affirmation that regales in the paradoxes of existence and is freed from the 
fetters of his own ego and resentment. He affirms eternity, even though 
it has almost cost him his life. This is very different from the mocking 
laughter of the herd watching the tightrope walker. The peasant has ac-
cepted existence in its entirety: the good and the evil, his death and his 
life. He can laugh at the cosmos and can laugh at himself, realizing both 
the significance and insignificance of his existence.26 Zarathustra himself 
fails to achieve this level of awareness.
FAITH ECLIPSES MORALITY: KIERKEGAARD
While Nietzsche’s exhortation to go beyond good and evil demands that 
we jettison the chains of the Christian religion, Kierkegaard maintains 
that faith in God alone can not only eclipse morality but throw it into 
question. Like Nietzsche, he detests the abstract levelling of the crowd, 
lamenting the absence of individual authenticity and the complete lack of 
commitment that typifies it: “Not only in the business world but also in 
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the world of ideas our age stages ein wirklicher Ausverkauf. Everything can 
be had at such a bargain price that it becomes a question of whether there 
is finally anyone who will make a bid.”27 In Kierkegaard’s view, only faith 
can resuscitate a moribund particular and elevate it above the universal 
in such conformist environs. However, it is important to recognize that 
Kierkegaard is not suggesting that we dispense with morality altogether 
to make room for faith but rather suggests that, without faith, morality 
may become too closely wedded to an attachment to one’s own. In other 
words, morality may undermine the community spirit that it is supposed 
to foster.
The paragon of bourgeois morality in Kierkegaard’s philosophy is 
Judge Wilhelm, who is very proud of his propriety and exemplary position 
in society. He does everything a bourgeois citizen is supposed to, working 
hard and extolling the virtues of the married life. As the mouthpiece of 
bourgeois values, he appears to waver between Hegelian and Kantian eth-
ical philosophies. On the one hand, he maintains that the purpose of the 
ethical individual is to transform the “self into a universal individuality,”28 
thereby shielding it from a kind of heteronomous wandering that Kant 
also regards with suspicion. However, his Hegelian voice comes forward 
when he suggests that the concrete individual is not simply supplanted by 
the universal but mediated by it for he must do this without “taking off his 
concretion,” instead “interpenetrating it with the universal.”29 However, 
unlike the Hegelian, the ethical individual cannot subsume all possible 
outcomes into the progressive dialectic of history. The ethical individual 
must show himself capable of making a decision, recognizing that he can-
not waver between “either/or” but rather must choose between them and 
take responsibility for the consequences. According to Judge Wilhelm, he 
“is transparent to himself ” and does not “allow vague thoughts to rustle 
around inside him or let tempting possibilities distract him with their 
juggling.”30
This certainty and self-assurance that characterizes the ethical sphere 
is laden with problems in Kierkegaard’s view. Enjoying the “outside him-
self within himself,”31 the ethical individual feels completely at home in 
the world and is not infected with the insatiable yearning for the infinite 
nor plagued with the sentiment that he does not belong. Judge Wilhelm’s 
God does not impose strain on the individual in the form of value colli-
sions, nor does he contribute to the soul’s torment: “It takes away from 
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him the vain joy of being out-of-the-ordinary in order to give him the 
true joy of being the ordinary. It brings him into harmony with all exist-
ence, teaches him to rejoice in it, because as an exception as an out-of-the-
ordinary person he is in conflict.”32 Even one’s erotic and sensual fantasies 
are ministered to by God, who would select a “young and beautiful wife.”33
While Kierkegaard recognizes the need of having a comfortable abode 
in the ethical sphere, we must also be shaken out of our slumber, if ethics 
is to have meaning. Like Nietzsche, he implies that if values are sim-
ply repeated, they eventually grow hollow. Faith, in Kierkegaard’s view, 
disrupts the bourgeois ordinariness of experience in dramatic fashion. It 
fills the individual with an insatiable yearning for the infinite. However, 
it is important to recognize that faith does not supplant the ethical but 
rather is engaged in its “teleological suspension.” This term in itself is re-
plete with irony, for a veritable teleology does not allow for suspension 
but rather progressively moves towards its ultimate goal. A suspension 
suggests that ethics is put on hold, perhaps temporarily. It is a rupture in 
the ethical fabric but does not replace it.
The most dramatic rendition of such a suspension of the ethical is the 
story of Abraham and Isaac that Kierkegaard retells in Fear and Trembling. 
Abraham, a stalwart member of a community and founder of a people, is 
asked by God to sacrifice Isaac, his progeny. He does so without ques-
tioning God’s word, in spite of being a thoroughly ethical individual: 
“In ethical terms, Abraham’s relation to Isaac is quite simply this: the 
father shall love the son more than himself.”34 Kierkegaard reminds us 
repeatedly that Abraham’s act is not comprehensible and cannot be rea-
soned away in Sunday sermons. The pseudonymous teller of the tale is so 
perplexed by the story that he imagines four alternate beginnings, which 
render Abraham’s behaviour more comprehensible. For example, in one 
story, Abraham begrudgingly complies with Abraham’s request but loses 
his faith in God. In another, Abraham assumes that God cannot really be 
asking this of him and refuses to go through with the dreadful act.
The tale of Abraham is absurd because, in Kierkegaard’s view, 
Abraham becomes himself at the moment where he is prepared to relin-
quish that which he holds most dear, namely his own son. In this he is 
utterly alone, and he cannot make sense of his mission to others in ethical 
terms and therefore is forced to remain silent. The command that he faces 
is issued to him by a God who is radically other, and he must respond as 
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an individual without having recourse to the support of the community. 
According to Kierkegaard, only the complete alterity of a transcendent 
God can break the shackles of self-interest, while at the same time speak-
ing to Abraham most intimately. God, in this story, is both infinitely dis-
tant and intensely close.
Abraham’s situation transcends the rational for another reason. His 
faith impels him to follow through with God’s wishes but also leads him 
to believe that his son will be returned to him. However, this is not meant 
to diminish the impact of sacrifice. Ironically, Abraham believes both that 
he will lose his son and, against all logic, that his son will be returned.35 
To make this clear, Kierkegaard contrasts this story with the account of 
the knight of resignation who has let love infiltrate every fibre of his be-
ing, but then surrenders it. The example he gives is of a young swain who 
is in love with his princess but cannot have her due to the constraints of 
custom. He feels blissful delight in letting love palpitate in every nerve.36 
He gives up his princess but transforms his love into an eternal as op-
posed to a temporal love. She becomes a recollection, and he needs no 
finite occasion “for the growth” of his love.37 In so doing, he becomes 
sufficient unto himself and resides in the eternal sphere, cutting his ties to 
the temporal realm. The princess is metamorphozed into an abstraction: 
“In infinite resignation there is peace and rest; every person who wills it 
can discipline himself to make this movement, which in its pain reconciles 
one to existence.”38 He consoles himself with the thought that what he 
has achieved is on a higher plane than the finite sphere and therefore his 
sacrifice is worth it.
The knight of faith is not like the knight of infinite resignation for he 
does not give up the finite:
He does exactly the same as the other knight did: he infinitely 
renounces the love that is the substance of his life he is recon-
ciled in pain. But then the marvel happens; he makes one more 
movement even more wonderful than all the others, for he says: 
nevertheless I have faith that I will get her – that is by virtue 
of the absurd by virtue of the fact that for God all things are 
possible.39
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The real courage for Kierkegaard lies in making this sacrifice and yet fully 
embracing the finite world: “But it takes a paradoxical and humble cour-
age to grasp the whole temporal realm now by virtue of the absurd and 
this is the courage of faith. By faith Abraham did not renounce Isaac, 
but by faith Abraham received Isaac.”40 The Isaac that he receives is an 
individual in his own right, who is not simply an extension of himself. In 
short, Abraham recognizes that the infinite is in the finite and that the 
infinite is difference, not assimilation.
In the story of Agnes and the merman, also recounted in Fear and 
Trembling, Kierkegaard demonstrates that in some situations, faith may be 
necessary in order to embrace the universal. The merman seduces Agnes 
“and in wild lust seizes and breaks the innocent flower standing on the 
seashore.”41 When he is on the verge of carrying her to the depths of the 
sea, her faith breaks his resolution:
Agnes looks at him once more, not fearfully, not despairingly, 
not proud of her good luck, not intoxicated with desire, but in 
absolute faith and in absolute humility, like the lowly flower 
she thought herself to be, and with this looks she entrusts her 
whole destiny to him in absolute confidence.42
The merman cannot “withstand the power of her innocence,” which 
amounts to a kind of radical openness to another, and ceases his seduction, 
refusing to whisk her away to her certain death in the sea. Because he is a 
merman, who is precluded from belonging to the universal, only faith will 
allow his entry into its port:
When the single individual by his guilt has come outside the 
universal, he can return only by virtue of having come as the 
single individual into an absolute relation to the absolute.… 
The merman, therefore, cannot belong to Agnes, without, after 
having made the infinite movement of repentance, making one 
movement more: the movement by virtue of the absurd.43
If difference is to be accommodated in the universal, it also requires a 
tremendous leap of faith. What Kierkegaard is describing here is a radical 
openness that transcends ethics in order to make ethics possible. The open 
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acceptance of the other who is not reduced to the same is necessary if eth-
ics is to function. Kierkegaard’s tale is about the importance of including 
difference and the leap of faith that is required in order to do so.
NOTHING IS VIRTUOUS: DAOISM
Daoist philosophy, like that of Nietzsche, espouses an ethical philosophy 
that is not dependent on moral values, going so far as to spurn them. 
The word dao (道) signifies process, way, and movement, but it can also 
signify language. The opening line of the text of the Daodejing begins 
with a paradox. The English translation of this line is “the way that can 
be spoken of is not the constant way.”44 The Chinese text reads dao ke 
dao fei chang dao (道可道非常道).45 This could be translated as follows: 
“the dao that can be dao’d is not the constant dao.” To speak of the dao, or 
to “dao the dao” is both a part of the process of the dao’s movement and is, 
at the same time, inadequate to convey what the dao is. Language is part 
of the rhythm of the dao; it does not transcend it. Both the beauty and 
limits of language are conveyed here. The dao is beyond each particular 
thing; yet, it is in each particular thing and thus is always close and far at 
the same time, like Kierkegaard’s God. This is why it must be spoken of, 
even though it cannot be spoken of. The dao does not speak, nor does it 
issue decrees like Kierkegaard’s God. It moves constantly because all liv-
ing things are part of it, coming into being and passing away, but because 
it comprises the movement of everything, it is also motionless.
There is a thing confusedly formed,
Born before heaven and earth
Silent and void
It stands alone and does not change
Goes round and does not weary
It is capable of being the mother of the world.
I know not its name
So I style it ‘the way.’46
Value judgments are rooted firmly in the trappings of language, which 
tries to fix impermanent things into permanent categories. In fact, mor-
ality is necessary when “the great way falls into disuse” and this marks 
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the birth of the Confucian values of “benevolence and rectitude.”47 Moral 
language also fixes dualities, which cannot make sense except in relation 
to each other, and therefore, according to the text, the good and the bad 
as well as the beautiful and the ugly are one: “The whole world recognizes 
the beautiful as the beautiful, yet this is only the ugly; the whole world 
recognizes the good as the good, yet this is only the bad.”48
Daoist thinkers point out that the attempt to fix categories by means 
of language and morality is akin to a kind of desire for possession, and all 
possession is linked to the pursuit of personal advantage or li (利). Even 
the good and the bad are united in the one. Both hold onto the dao and 
the Daodejing uses wordplay to underline their similarity. The good man 
treasures the dao (shan ren zhi bao; 善人之寶), while the bad man tries to 
hold onto it and preserve it (bu shan ren zhi suo bao; 不善人之所保).49 The 
phonetic bao links these phrases. In one case, it means to treasure, and, in 
the other case, it means to hold onto or preserve. Evil is thus a derivative 
of goodness. The bad man does not repudiate the dao but rather tries to 
contain it and in so doing reduce it to a possession:
The Tao [dao] is the innermost recess of all things
It is what the good man cherishes
As well as what the bad man wants to keep.
With the Tao, beautiful words can buy respect;
Beautiful deeds can be highly regarded.
How can the bad man desert the Tao.50
The last line in this passage reads somewhat differently in Chinese, namely 
ren zhi bu shan he qi zhi you (人之不善, 何棄之有),51 which asks “how can 
the bad man abandon having.”
The similarity between the bad and the good man in terms of pos-
session is also illustrated in the Zhuangzi, which is a more iconoclastic 
text than the Daodejing. Robber Zhi is the brother of Liu Xia Ji, a friend 
of Confucius. This link is symbolically indicative of the link between the 
alleged “good” and “bad.” Confucius berates his friend for not raising his 
brother properly in accordance with the laws of ritual propriety. When 
his friend responds that nothing can be done when one’s brother resists 
this education, Confucius sets out to see Robber Zhi and lecture him on 
proper behaviour and the cultivation of virtue. His hopes are soon crushed 
for Robber Zhi flies into a rage and berates Confucius:
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The more you say the more ridiculous it is. You eat yet you do 
not plough, wear without ever weaving. You wag your lips and 
use your tongue like a drumstick. You just decide what you 
think is right and wrong and lead the rulers astray, preventing 
scholars from studying the roots of the whole world. You estab-
lish notions of filial piety and fraternal duty just as you fancy, 
yet you also want to wriggle your way into favour with the 
princes, the wealthy and the nobility.… Get off home now, for 
if you don’t then I will take your liver and add it to this meal.52
Furthermore, Zhi points out that the emperors who are so revered create 
a “great walled city.” This is in marked contrast to the time of Shen Nong, 
when the people lay “down in peace and rose in serene security.”53 The 
Yellow Emperor could not sustain this era of virtue because he established 
kingdoms and ministers. The only difference between a criminal and an 
emperor inheres in the difference of scale. Robber Zhi has maligned all 
the heroes of the Confucian tradition.
The Daoist antidote to morality is the cultivation of nothingness. 
Nothingness does not refer to simple absence but rather is the kind of 
openness that makes presence possible. The opening lines of the Daodejing 
make reference to the centrality of wu (無), which is the beginning of 
heaven and earth:
… ‘non-existence’ I call the beginning of Heaven and Earth. 
‘Existence’ I call the mother of individual beings. Therefore 
does the direction towards non-existence lead to the sight of 
the miraculous essence, the direction towards existence to the 
sight of spatial limitations.54
Some commentators, such as Wang Bi, argue that nothingness is central 
to the text arguing that non-being is a point of origin:
… all being originated from nonbeing. The time before physic-
al forms and names appeared was the beginning of the myriad 
things. After forms and names appear, ‘dao’ develops them, 
nourishes them, provides their formal shape and completes 
their formal substance, that is, becomes their Mother.55
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It is also clear that nothingness and being interact in a complementary 
manner and that one is not independent of the other. We must learn to 
cultivate nothingness because as one of the “ten-thousand things” we are 
not as attuned to the beginning of heaven and earth and tend to venerate 
existence rather than nothingness.
In the Zhuangzi, the value of diversity is much more pronounced 
than in the Daodejing. Nothingness is no longer simply associated with 
the beginning of heaven and earth but is clearly linked to the celebration 
of multiplicity. The habit of issuing moral judgments is very much con-
nected to the desire to “wait for one voice to bring it all together,” which 
Zhuangzi asserts is “as pointless as waiting for no one”56 Morality contains 
and tries to limit the diversity of things. Zhuangzi brings up the relation-
ship between being and nothingness or being and not-being as a response 
to questions of right and wrong:
With regard to what is right and wrong, I say not being is being 
and being is not being. But let us not get caught up in discuss-
ing this. Forget about life, forget about worrying about right 
and wrong. Plunge into the unknown and the endless and find 
your place there.57
Nothingness reminds us that all things are undifferentiated and thus 
interrelated. Yet, at the same time, they are differentiated from each other. 
Nothingness is an openness that allows things to connect, and, yet, it is 
the space between them that allows them to be different. This is why it 
is also being. Furthermore, only things that are different can connect to 
each other and thus become one. Oneness does not make sense with-
out difference and difference does not make sense without oneness. The 
sage is able to navigate amongst this multiplicity of perspectives and thus 
“manages to harmonize right and wrong” rather than ensuring that right 
triumphs. More often than not, right is a matter of upholding one’s own 
interest: “Imagine that you and I have a disagreement, and you get the 
better of me, rather than me getting the better of you, does this mean that 
you are automatically right and I am automatically wrong?”58 Right and 
wrong are defined against one another, and this is why Zhuangzi reminds 
us that being and not-being are connected. Those things that we assume 
are our opposites are in reality closely intertwined. Harmony as a goal is 
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more important than the cultivation of moral virtue. Moral virtues step in 
where harmony has failed.
Nothingness also offers a kind of formlessness that is necessary for the 
flourishing of form. This interaction is personified in a dialogue between 
the outline and the shadow. The outline is frustrated with the undecid-
ability and fidgety nature of the shadow: “first you are on the move, then 
you are standing still; you sit down and then you stand up. Why can’t you 
make up your mind?”59 The last line of this section in Chinese could read: 
“Why don’t you hold on in a distinctive way” (何其無特操).60 The shadow 
responds:
Do I have to look to something else to be what I am? Does this 
something else itself not have to rely upon yet another some-
thing? Do I have to depend upon the scales of a snake or the 
wings of a cicada? How can I tell how things are? How can I 
tell how things are not?61
The shadow recognizes that each being is dependent upon another and 
does not care about maintaining its own form. Rather, it adjusts its shape 
to whatever being it encounters. Nonetheless, it could not do so if other 
things did not have form. While the shadow is formless, it too has an 
outline and therefore has form in the midst of its formlessness.
The sage in Daoist texts is someone who is able to cultivate noth-
ingness within himself and thus has no need for morality: “the perfect 
man has no self. The spiritual has no merit; the holy man has no fame.”62 
The Chinese expression for “the perfect man has no self ” is zhi ren wu 
ji (至人无己).63 Ji is used when a more egotistical conception of the self 
is being referred to, while the other term for self, shen (身), refers to an 
interconnected being. This is why the sage cultivates his shen but not his ji. 
Ironically, the cultivation of shen has little to do with constructing a self-
identity because it refers to the interconnected aspect of one’s being. This 
does not mean that we deny ourselves but rather that we live an embod-
ied existence that is always already connected to other beings. Zhuangzi 
points out that we “go around telling everybody ‘I do this, I do that’ but 
how do we know that this ‘I’ we talk about has any ‘I’ to it?”64 Wang Youru 
points out that Zhuangzi, in arguing for the elimination of the distinc-
tion between subject and object, self and other, also makes the distinction 
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between right and wrong irrelevant.65 If self and other are not perceived of 
as distinct, there is no need for morality.
Cultivating nothingness is also closely connected to the art of wuwei 
(無為) or “actionless action”:
The sages are quiescent, not because of any value in being qui-
escent, they simply are still. Not even the multitude of beings 
can disturb them, so they are calm.… The sage’s heart is stilled! 
Heaven and Earth are reflected in it, the mirror of all. Empty, 
still calm plain, quiet silent, non-active, this is the centredness 
of heaven and Earth and of the Dao and of Virtue.66
Actionless action does not mean that one is indolent but rather implies 
that one acts without prior preconceptions or a will that one brings to 
one’s activities. Openness allows one to remain responsive to other beings. 
This means not only that one allows them to be but one must recognize 
their uniqueness in order to act upon it. The sage must be an astute judge 
of character and situation. The sage is non-active because through his ac-
tion he does away with the subject-object dichotomy. Instead, he provides 
an opening through which the diversity of other beings can thrive, which 
is why his heart is like a mirror. Confucian rituals are assumed to be de-
monstrative and thus cannot be associated with the art of wuwei.
A man of the highest virtue does not keep to virtue and that 
is why he has virtue. A man of the lowest virtue never strays 
from virtue and that is why he is without virtue. The former 
never acts yet leaves nothing undone. The latter acts but there 
are things left undone.67
In Chinese, the opening line of the text reads: “shang de bu de, shi yi you de” 
(上德不德 是以有德),68 which suggests that the virtuous man has virtue 
because he is not virtuous. Once again, the multivalent nature of the lan-
guage is played upon. De (德) can be translated as virtue but is also associ-
ated in Daoist thought with the flourishing of particular characteristics of 
each things. Each thing is assumed to have its own de. Thus, he may cul-
tivate difference, while rejecting moral virtue. Unique characteristics can 
only emerge in interaction with other beings, and thus differentiation and 
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oneness are revealed in the title of the text Daodejing (道德經) through 
the juxtaposition of the terms dao and de. Everyone has a different de that 
must be cultivated: “The Dao begets all creatures, the virtue rears them, 
promotes them, nurtures them.”69 The importance of de in its title is often 
underestimated.
In order to stress that the cultivation of virtue takes on many forms, 
texts like the Zhuangzi offer some very unconventional models of the sage. 
In contrast to the Confucian sage, who plays a very traditional role within 
the social order, the Daoist sage is often a social or even political rebel. This 
contrast comes to the surface in a dialogue between an old fisherman and 
Confucius. The old fisherman remarks about Confucius: “so benevolence 
is benevolence, yet he won’t escape without harm to himself. Exhausting 
the heart and wearing out the body puts his true nature in jeopardy. Sadly, 
I believe he is far removed from the Dao.”70 Although Confucius is ridi-
culed in this interaction, he nevertheless treats the fisherman with a re-
spect that surprises his disciple: “Now this old fisherman stood tall before 
you with his pole, while you bent double like a musical chime bar, and you 
always bowed twice before speaking to him.”71 Confucius is not repre-
sented as a complete fool, only a partial one. He recognizes the sagacity 
of the fisherman but ironically turns this into a lesson on moral virtue and 
cannot dispense with his exaggerated display of deference:
If you meet a person who is older than you and are not respect-
ful, then this is a failure of etiquette. If you meet a worthy 
person and fail to offer respect, this is a lack of benevolence.… 
Now the old fisherman most certainly has the Dao, so how can 
I not offer respect to him.72
Confucius has received the message of the fisherman and recognizes the 
power of the dao but at the same time is deaf to the fisherman’s advice 
to abandon moral virtue. Even a fool like Confucius cannot help being 
receptive to the dao at some level, but at the same time its message falls 
on deaf ears. Confucius is both mocked and respected in this passage. No 
one, not even the most hardened Confucian, can be completely unaware 
of the dao even if he perverts its message. In the spirit of openness, the 
Daoist text embraces even those it mocks.
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CONCLUSION
According to Daoist thinkers, morality operates on the basis of a profound 
dualism that fosters egoistic tendencies that it aspires to keep in check. It 
is based on an attachment to concepts that are often reified and inextric-
ably woven into the social fabric. Because good needs its opposite, namely 
the bad or evil to define itself, morality often becomes a line dividing in-
siders from outsiders, or the noble from the base. This gives rise to rituals 
of performance surrounding morality, which are often less concerned with 
virtue than they are with occupying the proper rung on the social hier-
archy. For Daoist thinkers, hypocrisy is a natural companion to morality 
and not merely an unfortunate side effect. Confucius is often presented 
in Zhuangzi’s parables as a pedant who tries to curry favour with govern-
ment officials, albeit to no avail. Both morality and its opposite are linked 
to the desire to possess or you (有), which means that one tries to bring 
others into the fold of the self or one’s community rather than opening 
oneself up to spontaneous interaction with them. An egoistic mindset sees 
the self as a kind of walled entity that thrives on the approbation of others 
and tries to avoid disapproval or scorn. However, even in so doing, it does 
not let others penetrate its boundaries.
Instead of promoting codes of moral conduct, Daoist thinkers recom-
mend cultivating openness and nothingness that would allow one to con-
nect to others based on their particular virtues or dispositions (namely, de). 
Oneness and difference are not seen as mutually exclusive in the Daoist 
canon but rather as correlated, since oneness is based on the interconnec-
tion of different beings. The Daoist sage is blissfully unconcerned with 
her own identity, which is fluid and changes from moment to moment, 
depending upon who surrounds her.
Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche would concur with Daoist think-
ers that morality often breeds conformity and self-righteous judgment. 
Kierkegaard acknowledges that ethics cannot be dispensed with altogeth-
er since the need for a comfortable abode wherein parameters are clear and 
behaviour is routinized holds much appeal. Nietzsche’s invective against 
morality is somewhat more acerbic, for he insists that it develops out of a 
resentment on the part of the weak against the strong and is intended to 
make the behaviour of others more palatable and predictable. The focus on 
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predictability suggests that Nietzsche, like Daoist thinkers, links morality 
to the desire to know the world.
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard both argue that it is important to try to 
shed the chains of egoism, but this process is very much centred on feats 
of self-overcoming. In Kierkegaard’s case, it demands faith in God, who 
is radically other, to wrench one away from the hold of self-interest. In his 
view, only this will allow one to treat the other as a particular other, who is 
irreducible to the self. This is in marked contrast to the thought of Daoist 
philosophers, who remark that the dao is never completely other. No 
intermediary between self and other is necessary because they are always 
already connected. The dao does not bellow commands from the outside. 
In fact, its presence is hardly noticed. There is no problem of the other in 
Daoist thought because all others are linked to one’s self in the dao.
For Nietzsche, the journey beyond egoism is toilsome, as he illus-
trated by his metaphor of the three metamorphoses, which celebrates the 
child. It is extremely difficult to return to the openness of the child who 
plays with things without prior presuppositions. Furthermore, it is not 
clear that, according to Nietzsche, egoism can ever be overcome com-
pletely. The peasant must assertively defend himself to protect his life and 
yet, at the same time, overcome this defensiveness in peals of laughter. 
Zarathustra himself has more trouble with this since he is constantly ag-
onizing about the opinions of his foes and his enemies.
Perhaps the most marked difference between these approaches is 
that the issue of self-identity and authenticity is very much a concern for 
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, whereas the Daoist sage or genuine person 
is freed from the desire for self-identity. This is most poignantly depicted 
in the famous butterfly dream of Zhuangzi, who cannot decide whether 
he is a man dreaming he is a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming he is a 
man. On one level, this is irrelevant to him. Yet, at the same time, he 
pronounces that there “must be some sort of difference between Zhuangzi 
and a butterfly. This is the transformation of things.”73 Zhuangzi and the 
butterfly are one and the same because they are part of the movement 
of things that constitutes the dao. If they were not different, they could 
not be connected this way. What this passage reveals is the beauty of 
celebrating diversity without clinging to one’s identity. Thus, according to 
Daoist thinkers, one cannot cling to one’s identity and be liberated from 
the fetters of egoism. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, on the other hand, are 
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very much preoccupied with the task of self-making and self-overcoming, 
and they excoriate moral systems that attempt to undermine this process. 
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard’s authentic individuals are never satisfied with 
who they are at a particular moment since they strive to go beyond it while 
the Daoist sage is always satisfied with his current state and for this reason 
undergoes constant transformation almost painlessly. He has no need for 
morality because his contentment with himself ensures that he has no 
reason for doing others harm.
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Comparative Philosophy of 




The guiding question for this exploration is: What might a conversation 
between comparative philosophy of religion and modern Jewish philoso-
phy contribute to each participant? The suggestions that follow intimate 
that, while this conversation is just at its beginning, there are important 
insights that each side can bring to the other. This is just a single episode in 
a series of conversations with particular philosophic traditions that com-
parative philosophy of religion must embark on, but I believe that this step 
provides one type of model for this lengthy and important process. I will 
begin with reflections on the nature of philosophy and Jewish philosophy 
from a comparative perspective, as well as on comparative philosophy of 
religion itself. This will be followed with an examination of some problem 
areas in comparative philosophy of religion and Jewish philosophy, and I 
conclude with discussions about the potentialities for each side to address 
these problem areas in the terrain of the other. I want to add that certainly 
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at this stage in the development of the discipline of the comparative phil-
osophy of religion no effort can possibly be inclusive enough, c’est à dire, we 
are all learning from each other.
An important lesson in the repertoire of feminist philosophers is that 
the ways that a philosopher identifies, defines, and approaches philosophic 
issues reflects a host of conditions. These conditions would include: cul-
ture, language, class, age, religious tradition, ethnicity, academic training, 
conscious and unconscious preferences, and, of course, gender.This under-
standing, termed “feminist standpoint epistemology,” reminds us that 
each philosopher has a particular horizon with its attendant strengths and 
weaknesses. These factors both enable and limit the vision of the thinker.1 
A thinker’s approach is like a road; it both facilitates travel and restricts 
possibilities of movement. Consequently, no person is allowed to offer 
proposals in the name of objectivity or the universal. It is in the context 
of this understanding that this male modern Jewish philosopher proceeds.
REFLECTIONS ON PHILOSOPHY, JEWISH PHILOSOPHY, AND 
COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION2
The vast majority of philosophers trained in Europe and the Americas 
assume that the discipline of philosophy is universal. However, what they 
have in mind is a particular tradition of philosophy rather than an under-
standing of the plurality of its traditions. While this problem also dramat-
ically haunts the early history of comparative philosophy, many contem-
porary comparative philosophers of religion recognize that there is more 
than one tradition of philosophy. Usually scholars identify three major 
philosophic traditions, although such identifications are not uncontested.3 
These are discussed in terms of South Asian philosophies, Chinese phil-
osophies, and Western philosophies. Each of these has particular con-
cerns and emphases, reigning questions and issues, including such foci 
as: logic, mathematics, epistemology, ontology, aesthetics, religion, ethics, 
and political thought. They exhibit a variety of notions of what consti-
tutes reason (and perhaps even logic), the self or non-self, knowledge, the 
world, and the appropriate methods and tele of philosophy. There is also 
a great amount of internal diversity,4 since each philosophic heritage has 
multiple currents, shows changes over time, and waxes and wanes over 
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a period of at least fifteen hundred years. In general, the major currents 
of South Asian or what is often termed Indian philosophy are linked to 
Hinduism and Buddhism, which have come to influence not only India 
but also the other countries of South Asia. Chinese philosophy includes 
Confucian, Taoist, Buddhist, and Neo-Confucian philosophy, and the 
countries of China, Japan, and Korea. Western philosophy encompasses 
the period from the ancient Greeks to the contemporary era and includes 
those traditions that drew upon Greek philosophy, utilizing its nomen-
clature, definitions, and issues. There are Christian, Jewish, and Islamic 
traditions of philosophy, as well as modern Western or what might be 
termed post-Christian philosophy.
Some scholars even contest the use of the term ‘philosophy’ to cover 
such diversity, or suggest alternative designations, such as Ninian Smart’s 
term darsanas or worldviews.5 Still, one can generalize, with much cir-
cumspection, about those phenomena that we usually group under the 
term ‘philosophy.’ In this case, philosophy is a discipline that addresses 
some of the widest and most profound human questions: the nature of the 
human, the universe, the true and the beautiful, as well as what consti-
tutes authentic existence, communal life, and relations with others. What 
is distinctive to each of the three major traditions of philosophy is the 
culture(s) and history(ies) or the experiences out of which these streams of 
philosophy arise, the questions that are most prominent, and the methods 
used to address these questions. In terms of the prominent questions or 
fields, a number of scholars have noted the Indian philosophical concern 
with religion, psychology, and dialectics; Chinese philosophical inter-
ests with ethical, political, and social thought as well as aesthetics; and 
Western philosophical considerations about ontology, epistemology, logic, 
and mathematics.6
In light of the above, it is difficult to suggest a single method or 
pursuit inclusive enough to do justice to the variety of philosophies. A 
tentative suggestion might be that these are approaches characterized by 
reflection that is articulate, sustained, critical, and self-critical. The notion 
of ‘articulate,’ which I am borrowing from the work of Charles Taylor, is 
tied to language itself.7 The word ‘articulate’ is from the Latin articulat-us 
meaning jointed. The Oxford Dictionary includes such additions as: “dis-
tinctly jointed or marked; having the parts distinctly recognizable,” and 
in reference to sound; “Divided into distinct parts (words and syllables) 
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having each a definite meaning; as opposed to such inarticulate sounds 
as a long musical note, a groan, shriek, or the sounds produced by ani-
mals.”8 To speak of ‘articulate’ highlights clarity, meaningful distinctions, 
and connections. Philosophers use language to examine issues and to 
present arguments and counter-arguments. Issues are addressed by break-
ing questions into distinct components, looking into relations, and in-
sisting on providing the maximum appropriate clarity and meaning. The 
term ‘sustained’ just reinforces the tenacity or persistence of the process 
of examination. The word ‘critical’ refers to uncovering presuppositions 
and implications of positions and statements. Ideas are not just explored, 
but, in particular, what both grounds them and leads from them is traced. 
Finally, philosophy is ‘self-critical.’ The philosopher not only presents 
arguments but continually reflects on her or his own position, presup-
positions, and implications.9 Philosophy, and this has special relevance to 
Indian philosophy,10 is sometimes taught and performed through debates, 
where one invites or welcomes the other to critically examine one’s own 
position as part of the process of doing philosophy.11 The Jewish philoso-
pher Emmanuel Levinas has said that, despite all of Western philosophy’s 
lapses, it is the feature of being self-critical that is both outstanding and 
redeeming. In his words, “what I am interested in is precisely this ability 
of philosophy to think, to question itself, and ultimately to unsay itself.”12
The histories of philosophy are filled with self-critical statements 
about the nature of philosophy. One of the most compelling contempor-
ary Western positions, which reflects the importance of the “linguis-
tic turn”13 in many disciplines, is expressed by Richard Rorty. Rorty’s 
much cited essay, “Pragmatism and Philosophy,” describes a shift in how 
Western philosophy itself is seen. He distinguishes between “Philosophy” 
and “philosophy.” Thinkers who believe in “Philosophy” search for ultim-
ate truths that transcend cultures, languages, and particular discourses. 
Adherents of “philosophy” “compare and contrast cultural traditions” and 
find that “in the process of playing vocabularies and cultures off against 
each other, we produce new and better ways of talking and acting.”14 These 
post-Philosophical philosophers study “the comparative advantages and 
disadvantages of the various ways of talking that our race has invented.”15 
The relevance of this definition of philosophy to comparative philosophy 
of religion is obvious.
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There are multiple and divergent understandings of the nature and 
scope of Jewish philosophy. As will be discussed later, some thinkers sug-
gest that Jewish philosophy utilizes the methods of [Western] “philoso-
phy” to explore or interpret specific Jewish issues, while others propose a 
broader understanding of Jewish philosophy. In harmony with the earlier 
discussion, coming out of a comparative perspective, of the foci of the 
discipline of philosophy, Jewish philosophers also explore, again, some 
of the widest and most profound human questions: the nature of the hu-
man, the universe, the true, and the beautiful, as well as what constitutes 
authentic existence, communal life, and relations with others. One of the 
best examples of this understanding of the scope of Jewish philosophy is 
found in Franz Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption. The Star looks at 
nothing less than God, humans or “man,” and the world, through the 
integral categories – and Jewish understandings of these categories – of 
creation, revelation, and redemption. Additionally, in “narrating” a Jewish 
philosophical view of these topics, Rosenzweig also explores such mat-
ters as: mathematics, logic, aesthetics, philosophy, theology, world his-
tory, Western intellectual history, world religions, psychology, sociology, 
political theory, biblical literature, and linguistics.16
In addition, Jewish philosophy has always been seen to include, and 
some even limit it to, the philosophic exploration of specific Jewish topics 
or issues.17 For example, in the modern period, Jewish philosophers have 
addressed such issues as: the essence or character of Judaism, the nature 
of Jewish identity or what it means to be a Jew, what role Judaism has in 
the modern world, how continuity with the Jewish past can be maintained 
or re-established, the importance of Halacha (Jewish law) for individual 
and communal life, the challenges to religious faith by secularism and the 
Holocaust, and the impact of both feminism and religious pluralism on 
Jewish life and thought.
In terms of the broader conception of Jewish philosophy, one of the 
defining characteristics of this discipline is that its resources emerge out 
of Jewish history or Jewish experiences. Jewish religion, literature, culture, 
and history provide the experiences and categories out of which Jewish 
philosophy is done. Some speak of Jewish experience or Jewish memory,18 
but these terms must always be put in the plural, reminding us of the 
multiplicity of experiences of Jewish communities and individuals, includ-
ing the importance of cultural, economic, and social groupings as well 
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as gender. Religion points to Jewish beliefs, practices, and worldviews. 
Literature might include such sacred texts as the Hebrew Bible, Mishna, 
and Talmud, as well as the halachic and aggadic commentaries and re-
flections, and liturgy that arise out of these religious sources. Literature 
would also include other writings, such as poetry, stories, and novels that 
may be religious or “secular.” The term ‘culture’ would include the huge 
variety of cultural productions including such things as folkways, music, 
dance, and art. Diachronically, Jewish experiences range from the biblical 
period to the present, and particularly relevant for contemporary Jewish 
philosophy are the Holocaust, the establishment of the state of Israel, and 
the Jewish communities in North America. Jewish philosophy reflects out 
of these foundations and, following an earlier definition, proceeds in ways 
that are articulate, sustained, critical, and self-critical.
Two fundamental features are deeply embedded within the history of 
Jewish philosophy and continue to be prominent in the modern period. 
These are the themes of community and responsibility. The solitary individ-
ual is never a topic in itself. The view that the individual must always be 
understood in relation to others, in the midst of community is pervasive 
in Jewish philosophy and in Judaism overall.19 A full or authentic human 
life is lived with others. Classically, the relationship to the transcendent 
is treated within the context of covenant, the covenant between the tran-
scendent and the Jewish people. In more secular positions, the individual 
is always seen within the umbrella of the people, Israel. Thus, whether 
the understanding of Judaism reflects a religious, cultural, or national 
viewpoint, the web of relationships between persons is a central matter 
of reflection. As the twentieth century Jewish philosopher Martin Buber 
wrote: “There is no I as such,” but only the I in relation.20
A second theme is that of responsibility. That web of relationships 
that links persons together is constituted by responsibilities or obligations. 
Classically, once again, the covenant is a love relationship delineated 
through obligations. Halacha was the instrument to live out these obliga-
tions, to the transcendent, to the people, and to the neighbour, stranger, 
poor, orphan, and widow. The philosophical rubric for this concern is, of 
course, ethics, and many Jewish philosophers have insisted that the cen-
trality of ethics continually distinguishes Jewish philosophy from others 
streams of Western philosophy.21
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My own work as a Jewish philosopher has focused on a tributary that 
includes those twentieth-century Jewish philosophers of the interhuman: 
Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Emmanuel Levinas. The notion 
of relationship, characterized primarily by responsibility, is the keystone 
of their thought. Born into relationships with others, into a community 
and communities, they speak of how one begins as chosen rather than as 
choosing. They mean by this that to understand the individual one must 
first see her or him in terms of obligations that both precede one’s free-
dom and define one’s uniqueness. This astonishing insight is not only in 
contrast to the usual notions of the person in the modern West in terms of 
autonomy and autarchy but is almost an affront to the reigning stream of 
philosophy of that time and place.
The beginning of the discipline of comparative philosophy of religion 
is often traced to those three pivotal modern European philosophers who 
are credited with founding the philosophy of religion in the West. These 
are the philosophers Hume, Kant, and Hegel, whose contribution to a 
truly comparative endeavour is being reassessed today.22 While this is one 
way to narrate its origin, in my view, comparative philosophy of religion 
should not be seen as the property of, and thus not beginning within, any 
one philosophic tradition. To be comparative it requires the dialogue or 
conversation among philosophers who are looking at religious phenomena 
from a variety of philosophic traditions and perspectives.23 In this sense, 
despite its limits, comparative philosophy of religion properly begins with 
the First East-West Philosophers’ conference of 1939, which took place in 
Honolulu.
There are two main foci, one constructive and one critical, for com-
parative philosophy of religion. First, it seeks to introduce and explore 
comparative definitions, methods, and categories, problems and solutions 
through conversations and studies about the diverse traditions, commun-
ities, and experiences located within the heuristic category of religion. It 
ultimately seeks to provide philosophic understandings of the variety of 
ways that humans express the religious meanings and dimensions of their 
lives. The second focus follows upon the self-critical feature of philosophy 
discussed above. Comparative philosophy of religion seeks to uncover the 
“forces of power, domination, resentment, racism, inferiority, prejudice, 
and a host of other human characteristics [that] are very much a part of our 
world views, ideologies, philosophies, and conceptual frameworks.”24 It is 
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precisely the comparative aspect, that of dialogue or conversation among 
thinkers of diverse traditions, that provides the best means for uncovering 
these distortive and repressive features in all “our world views, ideologies, 
philosophies, and conceptual frameworks.” Additionally, as critics con-
tinually insist, just as the impact of these forces is perennial, the process of 
illumination and correction is interminable. There is a famous admonition 
in the Mishnah’s Pirke Avot or Sayings of the Fathers (11:21): “You are not 
required to complete the work, but neither are you free to desist from it.”
The following sections of this text will provide an example of the 
philosophic dialogue between comparative philosophy of religion and 
particular religious traditions, in this instance modern Jewish philosophy. 
This treatment will highlight the irreplaceable power of conversation to 
illuminate specific aporia within and possible correctives for both com-
parative philosophy and Jewish philosophy.
SOME BASIC PROBLEMS IN COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF 
RELIGION AND JEWISH PHILOSOPHY
As indicated above, prior to the 1939 Philosophers’ Conference, one may 
say that the proto-origins of the discipline of philosophy of religion co-
incides with the beginning of modern Western philosophy. The abjects 
in the latter haunt the history of the former. The list of these rejected 
others is well known. Among them include the primitive, “racial” others, 
women, Jews, and often religion or the religious itself. In various ways, 
these others stood for the backward and irrational, those bereft – often 
constitutionally – of the full endowment of reason that defined both man 
and civilization.25 The ethno- or euro-centrism of these origins enshrined 
through various ideologies of phylogenetic development, colonialism, ra-
cism, sexism, and anti-semitism bequeathed practices, definitions, norms, 
and categories that still mitigate against comparativist tasks.26 For ex-
ample, Western philosophy of religion has, in the main, failed to respond 
to contemporary feminist philosophy, to include Jewish philosophy (as well 
as Islamic philosophy) as having historic and ongoing roles in its own nar-
rative, and often regards “religious belief ” as an unproven presupposition, 
with Western secularism playing the part of the universal and objective.
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Some current efforts in the comparative philosophy of religion re-
tain the same monothetic categories and questions, even if the data has 
been widened.27 Those classical issues concerning God’s existence, evil, 
the afterlife, the soul, and the relationship between philosophy and “reli-
gion” continue to have currency. The task of “ justification,”28 that is, the 
examination of the phenomenon of religion in order to decide whether 
it ought to have a place or value in human life has not been abandoned. 
Religion is still discussed in terms of a variety of myths of origin, seeing 
it as an inauthentic projection or an irrational response to particular crisis 
situations.
Finally, while many of the overt ideologies listed above are rejected, 
and an open, dialogical quest for multi-factor definitions and more in-
clusive categories is being pursued, there is an alarming void in terms of 
the impact of feminist philosophy on comparative philosophy of religion. 
Some of the most critical and inclusive articles seem to see no need for an 
examination of the contributions of feminist philosophy to the compara-
tive effort.29 Ten years ago, Marilyn Thie, in an article that was published 
as part of a group of essays dedicated to feminist philosophy of religion 
in the journal Hypatia, spoke of feminist philosophy of religion as a “field 
that does not yet exist.”30 While this field has been developing in the past 
decade, it has left little or no imprint on comparative philosophic work.
A preliminary discussion of the nature of feminist philosophies will 
illuminate some of the ramifications of this lack. My point of depar-
ture will be Thie’s article. The title, “Prolegomenon to Future Feminist 
Philosophies of Religions,” emphasized the plurality of feminisms, femin-
ist philosophies, and feminist philosophies of religions. She begins with a 
definition of feminism:
Feminist refers to mindsets, consciousness, and so on, which 
are aligned with liberation struggles that a) take into account 
the complex interconnections among the various ways peoples’ 
lives are concretely defined, for example, race, class, age, sexual 
orientation, religion, and ethnicity interacting with gender; b) 
recognize the structural and institutional nature of intercon-
nected oppressions; and c) acknowledge that only by beginning 
with the lived experience of multiply-marginalized women 
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(and those dependent on them) will liberation agendas be suf-
ficiently inclusive, radical, and transforming.31
Thie uses the alliteration of adjectives of “political, practical, pluralistic, 
passionate, and partial,” to characterize feminist philosophies of religion.32 
Drawing on her explanation and the work of other feminist philosophers, 
I would suggest that some of the most distinctive and important features 
of feminist philosophy include a (political) commitment to justice, the 
salience of gender as a category of experience and an analytic category, and 
heightened sensitivities for concrete experiences, especially the experi-
ences and voices of those marginalized. There are also other features that 
are often prominent in feminist philosophy and feminist thought overall. 
These would include an understanding of humans as embodied, relational, 
and part of the natural order of living creatures and the environment.33 
In terms of all of these characteristics, the lives and voices of women are 
central.
While some philosophers may be “gracious” enough to allow the focus 
on gender to prove itself over time as a central philosophic category of 
analysis, it might well be the feature of a prior commitment to justice 
that is the most problematic for those trained (whether men or women) 
in traditional Western philosophy. For them, philosophy is a love for or 
commitment to truth that allows the concern for justice at most and only 
secondarily as ethics. However, many feminist philosophers hold, in Hava 
Tirosh-Samuelson’s words, that “the act of philosophizing and the tell-
ing of the history of philosophy are always political acts,”34 and thus that 
the issue of justice is always at play and cannot be ignored or deferred. 
Similarly, Emmanuel Levinas, who has had great impact on contempor-
ary philosophy, insisted on “ethics as first [the beginning and foundation 
of] philosophy,”35 and defined philosophy as; “the wisdom of love at the 
service of love.”36 Levinas saw this love in terms of responsibility and be-
lieved that it was precisely the heritage of Judaism that could bring this 
imperative, in its full priority and urgency, forward.
In terms of Jewish philosophy, I would like to highlight two prob-
lem areas: the way the relationship between [Western] “philosophy” and 
Jewish philosophy is usually depicted, and the failure, once again, to 
recognize and enter into a dialogue with feminist Jewish philosophy. As 
noted earlier, there is a great diversity of views concerning the nature and 
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scope of Jewish philosophy.37 An influential and diagnostic definition was 
provided in Julius Guttmann’s 1936 classic, Philosophies of Judaism. He 
wrote that: “Since the days of antiquity, Jewish philosophy was essentially 
a philosophy of Judaism.”38 Some decades later, there was a statement of 
goals of the Academy for Jewish Philosophy (AJP) in 1979, which saw the 
task of Jewish philosophy as “enabl[ing] individuals actively involved in 
some form of Jewish religious life who have professional training in phil-
osophy to think about contemporary Jewish faith in new ways.”39 What 
is understood by philosophy in this regard is clarified by one of the lead-
ers of the AJP in his statement that Jewish philosophy “should use the 
tools of analytic philosophy in order to rethink and reformulate all of the 
traditional religious issues of Judaism as well as the new kinds of ques-
tions that arise from Jewish secularism.”40 Philosophy, that is, Western 
philosophy, provides the methodologies and categories to elucidate Jewish 
philosophy. In this guise, the history of Jewish philosophy is narrated in 
terms of series of encounters between the leading systems of Western 
philosophy, whether Platonic, Aristotelian, Cartesian, Kantian, Hegelian, 
Existentialist and Phenomenological, and Jewish experience and thought. 
What is characteristic of this “encounter” is that the direction of inquiry is 
one way. Philosophy provides the categories and Jewish thought the ma-
terial, or, in other words, philosophy is the subject and Judaism the object. 
In this case, Jewish philosophy seeks to understand itself and to explain 
itself to the other through those purported universal categories of reason41 
that philosophy proffers. The model of a mutually transformative dialogue 
between the two sides, where each can learn from the other, is not re-
garded as desirable or even possible.42 The lack of recognition of Jewish 
philosophy by Western philosophy referred to above is here reflected in 
the way Jewish philosophers see themselves, which is a familiar feature in 
the dynamics exposed by postcolonial thought.
In terms of another possible dialogue, between Jewish (male) phil-
osophers and feminist Jewish philosophy, the situation is not dissimilar. 
It has been a little over ten years since the appearance of an important 
article on feminist Jewish philosophy, Hava Tirosh-Samuelson’s “‘Dare 
to Know’: Feminism and the Discipline of Jewish Philosophy.”43 Recently, 
Tirosh-Samuelson supplemented her original appeal with the publica-
tion of Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy, a book that contains both 
historical studies of and constructive essays about Jewish philosophy by 
C OM PA R AT I V E P H I L O S OP H Y OF R E L IGION130
a variety of authors.44 Both works challenge contemporary Jewish phil-
osophers, the first by affirming that Jewish philosophy has been impervi-
ous to the writings of feminist theorists and philosophers and the second 
by providing a forum for feminist Jewish philosophers to “re-read” and 
“re-think” the tradition of Jewish philosophy. While Tirosh-Samuelson’s 
efforts to initiate a “conversation between feminist philosophy, Jewish 
philosophy, and Jewish feminism,”45 and the critical writings of a growing 
group of feminist Jewish philosophers and historians of Jewish philosophy 
require responses, very few to date have been forthcoming.
Feminism and feminist philosophies have deeply influenced feminist 
Jewish philosophy. Feminist Jewish thinkers demonstrate the commit-
ment to justice, and the attention to gender, as well as perspectives that 
highlight humans as embodied, relational, and within the natural order, 
which were discussed earlier. They speak of some of the most important 
issues of human life out of the resources of Jewish experience or memory, 
especially the experiences and memories of Jewish women. Their com-
mitment to justice would include the critical feature of the recognition 
of the historical ways that Jewish women have been oppressed, repressed, 
and marginalized in the Jewish tradition. Feminist Jewish philosophers 
feature a responsibility to transform those elements within the Jewish 
experience that have caused this oppression, repression, and marginaliza-
tion, as well as to bring forgotten and silenced Jewish women’s voices of 
the past forward and to create room for such voices in the present and 
future. There is a growing list of those who define themselves as feminist 
Jewish philosophers, feminist Jewish thinkers, and feminist theologians.46 
Some of those whose work has been especially helpful to me include: Hava 
Tirosh-Samuelson, Susan Shapiro, Susannah Heschel, Judith Plaskow, 
Heidi Ravven, Randi Raskover, Claire Katz, Leora Batnitzky, Laura 
Levitt, and Rachel Adler.
THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF 
RELIGION AND JEWISH PHILOSOPHY
What contributions can comparative philosophy make to Jewish phil-
osophy? In a number of ways, some already foreshadowed, looking at 
Jewish philosophy in the context of comparative philosophy alters its 
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usual portrayal. First, enigmatically, it sets the stage for a true dialogue, 
rather than a dictation, between modern Western philosophy and Jewish 
philosophy. Since the tradition of Western philosophy is only one branch 
or exemplar of the wider phenomenon of philosophy, the encounter be-
tween it and Jewish philosophy is an encounter of particularities. Modern 
Western philosophy is no longer allowed to portray itself, or to be regarded 
by Jewish philosophers, as a universal enterprise, the single paradigm of 
“Philosophy.” Modern philosophy can longer be seen as synonymous with 
reason or the rational. Modern philosophy is the heir of a tradition and 
of an ongoing community of thinkers, with their particular practices, 
presuppositions, definitions, categories, and issues. It is as important for 
Jewish philosophy to dialogue with, learn from, and critique Western 
philosophy as it is for Western philosophy to proceed similarly. Since both 
speak out of histories, experiences, and resources that are at the same time 
specific to each and overlapping, this dialogue should be fascinating and 
productive.
Second, Jewish philosophy is now open to more than one dialogue 
partner in this conversation between philosophic traditions. This will 
deeply influence its self-understanding, as well as multiply its possibilities 
for development. In addition to the renewal of the medieval discussion 
with Islam, encounters with different tributaries of Indian and Chinese 
philosophy should prove rewarding. For example, the centrality of ethics 
for Jewish philosophy, over ontological and epistemological concerns, may 
now be seen, not as a break with “Philosophy,” but as a legitimate option 
taken by others. It might be compared with the role of mokṣa in many 
Indian philosophies. The valence given to community within Jewish phil-
osophy might, once again, no longer be seen as a deviation from the single 
defining norm, but as comparable to the sophisticated treatments of social 
and political thought within Chinese philosophies.
What contributions can Jewish philosophy make to comparative phil-
osophy? First, the encounter of Indian and Chinese philosophies with 
Jewish philosophy will reinforce the lesson about the plurality of trad-
itions even within the three main philosophic heritages. Western phil-
osophy will no longer be taken as a single stream of Greek, Christian, 
and post-Christian philosophy, but one of three traditions coming out 
of Greek roots. Equally, this recognition will further an understanding 
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of the diversity (of experiences, histories, communities, practices, presup-
positions, definitions, categories, and issues) within Indian and Chinese 
philosophy.
Second, the emergence of feminist Jewish philosophy should prove 
to be a very significant development for other traditions of philosophy. 
This might well problematize the notion that feminist philosophy is but 
a single stream with Christian and post-Christian foundations. Feminist 
philosophies can not just be dismissed as another colonial effort, synonym-
ous with a homogeneous and dominant West. The critical and creative 
projects of feminist Jewish thinkers may encourage similar still nascent 
undertakings. Their commitment to justice, unearthing the historical ways 
that Jewish women have been oppressed, repressed, and marginalized in 
the Jewish tradition, should stimulate and contribute to comparable ef-
forts. Their dedication to bringing forward forgotten and silenced Jewish 
women’s voices of the past and to create room for such voices in the present 
and future should further motivate both female and male philosophers in 
other traditions to similar questioning and commitments.
Finally, the possible contribution of Levinas’s insight about ethics 
as the foundation for philosophy is intriguing. How would one discuss 
and what would be the consequences of thinking about “Ethics as First 
Comparative Philosophy”? How is the new discipline changed when re-
sponsibilities and obligations to the other replace the quest for knowing 
the other – the other as object – as the point of departure for the compara-
tive philosophic endeavour? How does one translate this wisdom in the 
service of love into specific theoretical breakthroughs and methodological 
practices?
The conversation between comparative philosophy of religion and 
modern Jewish philosophy promises to be fruitful for both sides. It stands 
as an important effort in itself, as well as a model. It reminds us of the vast 
difficulties in doing justice not only to major philosophic traditions but 
to the plurality of histories and communities that participate in each one: 
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The Caraka-saṃhitā is widely accepted as the earliest extant Indian med-
ical text. Its founding ideas are attributed to an ancient preceptor named 
Ātreya and his disciple Agniveśa, about whom we know very little that 
is not deeply drenched in conflicting hagiographia. The core redaction of 
this text is attributed to someone named Caraka, whose historical identity 
is equally soaked in conflicting hagiographical details.1 In this text, how-
ever, we find, along with a plethora of medical information about sundry 
physical and mental illnesses, symptoms, drugs, herbs, diagnostic theory, 
and principles, methods of prognosis, treatments, anatomical theory, and 
so on, what is usually considered to be the first appearance of the theory 
of pramāṇa, the instruments or means by which knowledge is acquired. 
Medieval Indian philosophy – after the Nyāya-sūtra (which appears to 
have been influenced by the Caraka-saṃhitā [hereafter CS] in its own 
treatment of the pramāṇas), and especially after the innovations in epis-
temology and logic developed by the Buddhist philosophers Dignāga and 
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Dharmakīrti – devoted much of its energy and attention to arguments and 
refinements of pramāṇa theory.
For centuries, pramāṇa theory was the grounding discipline for all 
Indian philosophy, no matter which school or tradition one belonged to. 
Why did it first appear in India in a medical text? Does that make the CS 
a philosophical text or a medical text with some philosophical sections? 
Is this a question for comparative philosophy or for comparative “history” 
of science? I will try in this paper to both complicate and clarify those 
questions.
COMPARED TO WHAT?
This essay will be a departure from my usual approach, which would be to 
focus on a careful reading of a text or limited range of texts. Instead, here, 
I will raise more general issues gathered from some of the thoughts I have 
had over the years as a practitioner of what could be called comparative 
philosophy, ideas raised by working on a variety of materials in a variety 
of religious and philosophical traditions. For the most part, what will be 
offered are, not so much conclusions, but possible research directions or 
considerations for myself and other practitioners of this sort of philosophy, 
though, as I will suggest in a moment, in some very important sense, all 
philosophy is comparative.
All thinking is comparative: X and non-X, X and Y, Q implicating R; 
all thinking presupposes notions of identity and difference. In what ways 
are X and Y the same or different? All relations presuppose at least two 
things must be different from each other, and at the same time united 
in a common relation. When we wish to test whether our students can 
think rather than regurgitate, we ask them to write essays that “compare 
and contrast” one idea, or system, or theory, etc., with another. Rubbing 
things together creates mental friction, which can, under the right condi-
tions, ignite insightful and even innovative thinking – a type of creative 
tapas in the Ṛg Vedic sense.2 A contemporary philosopher tackling Plato, 
or Aquinas, or Descartes, or Hegel, or Frege, or Whitehead, or Derrida 
is, in effect, doing comparative philosophy, comparing the thought of an-
other time and/or place, often in another language, with one’s own. Even 
when philosophizing strictly within one’s own contemporaneous idiom 
with one’s contemporaries, one is thinking comparatively of one idea with 
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another, or one theory with another, though obviously within a much 
more restricted horizon of comparative possibilities. Hence, there is a risk 
of ideational sterility unless new ideas, imported from elsewhere, can re-
vivify the ideational pool. That “other” source can be a foreign philosophy, 
a system from another time, or simply the appearance of someone with 
new ideas that stem from bringing some new factor or permutation into 
the current discourse.3
Someone wrestling with Plato or Aristotle is engaged in something 
very much like what someone wrestling with medieval Indian or ancient 
Chinese philosophy encounters, i.e., an encounter with a foreign language 
that ‘thinks’ and expresses itself differently than we do today. This involves 
systems of thought embedded in alien cultural and conceptual horizons 
whose meanings and orientations must be recovered through whatever 
means available or devisable. At the same time, translating the ideas in 
these alien texts into our thinking patterns often requires negotiation with 
a complicated set of texts, commentaries, divergent interpretations, and 
hermeneutic challenges. These in turn may be riddled with painful lacu-
nae in terms of missing pieces, unknown opponents, and multiple con-
texts, often indistinct (or less distinct than we might imagine them). These 
texts and their contexts all remain moving targets that are re-imagined 
and re-configured by every generation that attempts to think through 
these text-sets afresh. All of this is wrapped in an ever-increasingly dense 
accrual of baggage and assumptions requiring discriminative weeding. 
The encounter can engender a massive oedipal confrontation, or a minor 
re-arrangement of trivial details, or a refashioning to suit current tastes 
and needs. Of these last three alternatives, the first is likely to produce 
philosophy; the second, some form of scholasticism or doxography; and 
the last, revisionism or fundamentalism.4
Yet we tend to think of Greek, or Christian, or German philosophy, 
and so on, as part of our “tradition,” our history, while Caraka-saṃhitā, 
Dignāga’s Pramāṇa-samuccaya,5 Cheng weishilun 成唯識論 (Treatise 
Establishing Vijñapti-mātra),6 and Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 Jinsi lu 近思錄 
(Reflections on Things at Hand7) are not. Some Western philosophers 
still insist that non-Western philosophy is not philosophy at all, but even 
if generously granted the label of “philosophy,” they don’t practice our 
philosophy, i.e., what we consider to be philosophy proper. In a more am-
biguous status are works by Islamic and Jewish philosophers such as Ibn 
PHILOSOPHY, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, AND BOUNDARIES142
Sīnā, Ibn Rushd, Maimonides, Gersonides8 and Crescas.9 Their ambigu-
ity is due to the fact that, while they are rarely part of the curriculum of 
Western philosophy, it is recognized that important figures in Western 
philosophy, such as Aquinas and Spinoza, were aware of and were in-
fluenced by them. Buber and Levinas have impacted the academy, but 
Rosenzweig and Hermann Cohen still remain primarily “tribal” reading. 
One obvious goal of comparative philosophy would be to expand the hor-
izons of our sense of “our” tradition. Laozi and Zhuangzi now are part of 
our tradition. One could even argue, without too much inaccuracy or per-
versity, that making the Upaniṣads a metonymy for Indian thought was an 
invention of our tradition more than a fair appraisal of the actual history of 
Indian philosophy, one with which certain factions in India became com-
plicit. Nonetheless, the status of such divisions between “our” and “their” 
tradition has become increasingly ambiguous over the last century, as texts 
such as the Bhagavad Gītā, the Daodejing, and the Zhuangzi have become 
staples of humanities programs (and even popular reading), while, in Asia, 
Western fare has taken firm root in standard curriculums. The East-West 
divide is more imaginary than real these days – more a question of identity 
politics than a characterization of styles of thinking.
We are situated in a very privileged place. Rarely has such a large seg-
ment of the world had such access to so much of the world’s philosophical 
literature.
It is an historical truism that philosophies are at their innovative best 
when located at the intersection of competing systems. Philosophical xeno-
phobia leads to stagnation, as the results of the largely successful efforts 
by Anglo-American philosophers to expel even the philosophy of their 
European contemporaries from the curriculum of philosophy departments 
sadly illustrates. Rorty sneaking Heidegger in through the backdoor has 
proven insufficient to revitalize the analytic project. He failed partly be-
cause so much of what made the German and French philosophies of the 
twentieth century vital was lost or distorted in reductionistic translation.10
Philosophy is not just any thought on something novel but a disci-
plined form of thought, at once tradition- and rule-bound, and yet seeking 
new discoveries or insights. Different philosophical traditions assume dif-
ferent rules and rhetorical styles. Some prize exhaustively detailed prose 
exposition in formalized univocal syntax – e.g., a syllogism – while others 
prefer evocative, poetic multivocality designed to say more with fewer 
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words. Some seek to express their syllogisms and rigorous method in the 
pithiest of verses. Whatever its style, philosophy seeks to reason, i.e., to 
apply reason methodically to a topic or agenda.
My interest at the moment, however, is not to argue for some sense of 
the universality of comparison. (As soon as universals become sufficiently 
restricted to allow comparison with other universals or particulars, they 
lose some of their presumed universality.) Neither is it to essentialize some 
notion of philosophy, but rather to think about what ‘reasoning’ means 
in different philosophies, and what sorts of typical gestures and charac-
teristics reasoning exhibits in various philosophies. I am not proposing 
a definition of “reason” beforehand in order to remain open to possible 
suggestions offered by the different traditions.
QUESTIONING PARAMETERS
To advance more quickly, let me throw out some questions.
Is there something that makes Chinese philosophy – if there is any 
such unitive discipline as opposed to multiple, divergent philosophical 
and religious traditions that we lump together on the basis of a common 
historical and geographical proximity – distinctively a Chinese philoso-
phy? And so on for Indian, Islamic, Jewish, etc., philosophies. Deciding 
this is important if we wish to know what is being compared to what when 
we propose to do comparative philosophy. As we will see, this also entails 
the question of where our centre of gravity lies: From where do we begin to 
compare? What sets the agenda? Is comparative philosophy done from a 
home base looking out at the “others”? Or do we try to locate ourselves in 
some privileged neutral or lofty position from which we look down at the 
objects being compared, as if implicated by or committed to none of them? 
Is there any viable standpoint upon which a comparative philosopher can 
take his or her stand?
Might it be the case that so-called Western philosophy is also dis-
tinctively “Christian” philosophy, even when practised by non-Christians 
(such as Spinoza, Aristotle, Nietzsche, modern secularists, etc.), such that 
Hegel – despite coining the phrase “death of God” – is after all at bottom 
a Christian thinker? Does his Encyclopedia – consisting of the tripartite 
Logic, Nature, Spirit – bear only a superficial structural and conceptual 
parallel with the Trinity, or is there something more fundamental at play?
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Has Spinoza become a Buddhist when he identifies the three primary 
affects – the affects from which all other affects are derived by permuta-
tional combinations – as pleasure, pain, and desire? In Buddhist jargon 
pleasure-pain is called vedanā while desire in a primary sense is called 
tṛṣṇā. Vedanā and tṛṣṇā are two of the most important nidānas in the 
twelve-fold chain of pratītya-samutpāda (conditioned co-arising), often 
considered Buddhism’s premier doctrine. Pleasure, pain, and desire in 
Spinoza’s system of affects play a similar primary role as do vedanā and 
tṛṣṇā in Buddhist discourse. Or is this model Jewish, since Spinoza partly 
draws on Crescas’ ethical philosophy for these and other components of 
his own?11 What else would Spinoza have to include or exclude before 
we see his philosophy as Buddhistic, in the same way that Pure Land, 
Huayan, or Tantra are seen as, at one and the same time, deeply similar 
yet profoundly dissimilar to the Buddhist teachings of the early Pali can-
on? Might Spinoza be closer to, for instance, Pali Buddhism or Huayan 
Buddhism, than either is to Pure Land or Tantra?
What makes these distinctive types of philosophy distinctive? What, 
aside from their different narrative histories and accidental differences 
(language, socio-political factors, institutional support or suppression, 
changing fashions in styles and rhetoric, etc.), makes them distinctive 
from each other as philosophies? Are there characteristic factors that can 
be enumerated? How do we bracket our expectations of what is properly 
“philosophy” in order to inquire fairly into such a question? Even more 
problematically, how do we circumscribe what counts as “religion”?
It is axiomatic in Indian philosophy that a definition must be suf-
ficiently restricted so as to exclude anything that is not the case, and 
broad enough to include everything that is the case. Western scholars 
will quickly recognize that this is rarely as simple as it seems, especially 
when trying to find a stable referent for a term as famously difficult to 
define adequately as “religion.” Christian or so-called Western presuppos-
itions concerning what counts as a “religion” quickly exclude many of the 
world’s leading religions, such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Mīmāṃsa, 
Sāṃkhya, Jainism, etc. This is because these either reject or give short 
shrift to deities and especially deny a central role to a Divinity with a cap-
ital “D.” These are major religions explicitly devoid of “God.” Responding 
to that by enlarging the definition of religion into something as inclusive 
as Tillich’s “man’s ultimate concern” fails to exclude Marxism, health 
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care, sports, romance, ego-gratification, and a host of other -isms and hu-
man pursuits. Similarly, the Western notion that religion is grounded in 
faith and belief rather than reason and logic would be anathema to many 
Indian traditions (and even some pre-Renaissance Western religions). If 
the essence of religion requires neither God nor belief, such that these 
are contingent properties appropriate only for describing some religions, 
then what essentially marks a religion as a religion? We partially run into 
such problems because we start within the assumptions and “evidence” 
of our Western traditions and then try to explain the “other” traditions 
in terms of how well or adequately they mirror our own. In this way, we 
set the agenda and prioritize the importance of issues based on what our 
religions claim is important. Since other religions revolve around different 
centres of gravity, inconvenient anomalies invariably emerge. If we believe 
that “our” religion is paradigmatic for all religions, then its concerns must 
also constitute the paradigmatic underpinnings of any proper religion. 
Consequently, when faced with the aforementioned anomalies, if “our” 
concerns and definitions render other traditions marginal or insufficient 
relative to what we deem the “ultimate” and most essential concerns, the 
fault lies with them, not us.
What would this look like if, instead of taking Christian assump-
tions as the baseline, we let other traditions formulate their own con-
sensus among themselves as to what counts as central concerns? What if 
Christianity was deemed marginal or insufficient by that exercise? What 
if, for example, one places ethical canons (halakhah, shāri‘a, dharma-śāstra, 
vinaya, Confucian codes, even Daoist ethical treatises) at the core of what 
would constitute a religion? Then Christianity becomes the odd religion 
out. Christianity emits a great deal of moralism (much of it centred on 
“bedroom ethics”), but it lacks a foundational ethical canon that plays a 
comparable role to shāri‘a in Islam, or halakhah in Judaism, or dharma-
śāstra in Hinduism, vinaya in Buddhism. These ethical canons are typ-
ically more important than “belief ” in determining the degree of one’s 
participation in these religions. This is not merely an ethnographic ques-
tion but has immediate philosophical import. For instance, is it, as some 
have conjectured, due to the strong emphasis on the ethical in Judaism 
that Jewish philosophers predominantly embraced Aristotle – rather than 
Plato or explicit forms of Neo-Platonism – during medieval times, and 
Kant in modern times? What is lacking, in the Western study of religion 
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or in Western philosophical method, is a well-formed discipline that deals 
with the canons and reasoning styles of religious jurisprudence. (This is 
in contradistinction to such well-worn and traditionally Christian disci-
plines as ontology, myth, epistemology, and exegesis.) As such, this lack 
is a symptom of an evident myopia, and thus a potentially fatal challenge 
that is presently threatening to render Western scholars irrelevant to the 
growing religious confrontations. Such confrontations are occurring not 
only abroad but within our own shores (despite however relevant we may 
feel ourselves to be from within our own frameworks). For instance, we 
become reduced to mouthing questionable ideological, ahistorical claims 
when we insist that Islamists in Somalia are misusing the term jihad as 
they declare Holy War on their government and suspected Ethiopian 
(which, in their eyes, means Christian) interference. As a result, we fail to 
explain adequately to our students how jurisprudential reasoning works. 
At the same time, while searching for alternatives to military confronta-
tion, we lack a commonly respected language and the recognized disci-
plined reasoning skills to address the holders of such worldviews on their 
own terms. This is very obvious in discussions of the role of women in 
Islam, caste inequities with Hindutvas, or abortion rights with evangel-
ical and fundamentalist Christians. (In contrast, e.g., Palestinians and 
Iranians have demonstrated deft command of our rhetorical polemics of 
rights, self-determination, post-colonial ressentiment, etc.) One might ask 
therefore whether Kant’s Practical Reason (and its spawn) include or oc-
clude jurisprudential thinking? Is his ethical thinking the same or differ-
ent as ethical thinking within religious traditions?
In a lighter but equally serious vein, as one surveys the religions of 
the world one finds in every religion – except Christianity – a sacred hu-
mour tradition. Midrashic and Hasidic tales in Judaism, Zen anecdotes 
and kōan collections in Buddhism, the ironic parodies in Zhuangzi, the 
tales of Mullah Nasruddin in Islam, Śiva’s līlā (play), and so on, are best 
known, but only the tip of a largely unexplored iceberg. For most reli-
gions, sacred humour is an important component of the spiritual path, 
an attunement to the Cosmic Giggle, as some have called it. In contrast, 
Christians, as Umberto Eco’s Name of the Rose highlighted, have often 
condemned comedy, laughter, humour, and even smiling as sacrilegious.12 
This was not merely a medieval predilection but still influences contem-
porary Christianity. When, in the 1950s, inspired by Aldous Huxley’s 
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Doors of Perception,13 the British scholar of Indian and Iranian religion, 
Richard Zaehner, decided to experiment with mescaline under clinical 
supervision, he subsequently declared the experience “profane” rather than 
“sacred.” This was largely because all of his attempts to have a “sacred” 
experience while under the influence of mescaline (visiting his favourite 
cathedral, looking at pictures of the Virgin Mary, etc.) resulted in laugh-
ter, either an urge within himself, or “hallucinations” of the figures in the 
stained glass windows laughing at him, etc. The book he wrote on this is 
in two parts.14 The second part is an abridged but still lengthy transcript 
of his “trip,” in which one needn’t be a clinical psychologist to discern that 
his experiences were concertedly advising him to lighten up and enjoy the 
humour – a message he not only resisted but found shocking and disturb-
ing. The result was the book’s first part in which, clothed in the guise of 
objective scholarly discourse, he laid out a hierarchic typology of religious 
mysticisms, with such labels as “pantheism” and “panentheism.”15 The 
obvious purpose was to reaffirm the superiority of the Roman Catholic 
variety to which he had converted, deeming the mysticisms of other re-
ligions less sacred and even profane. His typology was influential in the 
field for some time, but, as an example of bald apologetics, should stand as 
a cautionary tale for all comparativists.
Such assumptions concerning what counts as a religion or as legit-
imate philosophy lead us to become selective about which literature we 
pay attention to, and even what parts to focus on in the literature we do 
select. What is Buddhist or Hindu ontology? Is there a Daoist theory 
of language? What are Neo-Confucian metaphysics? Such are our typ-
ical questions, but are they typical, much less prominent features of these 
traditions, as our sustained and narrow attention to them would seem to 
imply?
If a Hindu and an observant Jew begin to converse, they would quick-
ly discover that dharma-śāstra and halakhah – which are more constitutive 
of each’s sense of identity and practice within their own traditions – speak 
the same language. They share similar concerns about proper and im-
proper foods, business affairs, daily behaviour, hygiene, familial and social 
obligations, ways to celebrate, etc. However, a Christian observer of that 
discussion might wonder what the bulk of their discussion had to do with 
“religion.” He may be envious of the poignant traditional humour tales 
they trade. And the Christian would likely overlook or resist that for the 
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Jew and the Hindu, what you do is infinitely more important religiously 
than what you personally believe. A Hindu can believe in one, many, or no 
gods, and still be a good Hindu; what he or she cannot do is violate the 
specific dictates and mores of his or her caste and still be deemed a “good” 
Hindu. At the level of dharma-śāstra and halakhah, such matters are no 
longer ad hoc or sociological (or even ethnographic). They are instead 
philosophical, to be attended to with all the rigour of a system of detailed, 
rational jurisprudence, one which has for millennia pervaded every facet 
of social, personal, and spiritual life.
BOUNDARIES
The boundaries between “philosophy” and “religion” (and science, medi-
cine, physics, grammar, linguistics, astronomy, rhetoric, hermeneutics, 
etc.) are unclear, and the separations between such disciplines that we 
take for granted today were less clear even in the West a century or so ago. 
Philosophers and scientists, for instance, were often the same people dur-
ing the Middle Ages in Islamic and Jewish circles. Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), 
Ibn Rushd (Averroës), Maimonides (Rambam),16 Gersonides (Ralbag), 
etc., all made major scientific contributions,17 and, with the exception of 
Gersonides,18 all were practising physicians esteemed for their medical 
skills during their day.19 Kant may have been the last of this breed of 
scientist-philosophers, at least in the Western tradition, since he is cred-
ited with discovering the existence of galaxies. (Similarly, all except Ibn 
Sīnā and Kant were prominent jurisprudents of their day. Maimonides, 
for example, in his Mishneh Torah, was the first to organize the full gamut 
of Jewish law into a systematic code. This, along with his Responsa and 
other halakhic works, continues to be influential and studied today.)
Nor were such scientific endeavours done in isolation. While certain 
Islamic and Jewish religious matters may have been primarily in-group 
matters, scientific knowledge was shared and common. Maimonides 
(1135–1204) and Ibn Rushd (1126–1198) – contemporaries born in 
Cordoba, Spain – drew from the same medical well-springs. (This oc-
curred even though Maimonides’ family had to flee Spain due to the per-
secution of Jews by the Almohades; he completed his secular education 
at the famous University of Al-Karaouine in Fez, Morocco.) And such 
knowledge was far more globally disseminated than is usually recognized. 
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“The greatest tribute paid to the Indian [medical] system came from 
Avicenna [Ibn Sīnā], who categorically acknowledged in Al Qanun (The 
Canon) that he had benefited tremendously from the Indian jogis he used 
as one of his sources.”20
The convergence of philosophy and medicine was not a creation of the 
Middle Ages. In the West, philosophy and medicine have been intim-
ately related at least since Diocles of Carystus (fourth century BCE) and 
Aristotle. As van der Eijk states: “the relationship between Aristotelianism 
and medicine has long been a neglected area in scholarship on ancient 
medicine.”21 One might add that the same neglect is evident in scholarship 
on ancient philosophy. While the present essay cannot substantially rem-
edy that neglect, a few of van der Eijk’s observations about Greek medi-
cine and philosophy – which have striking parallels in the case of India 
– may help bring some attention to what it is we have been neglecting.
… more recently there has been a greater appreciation of the 
fact that Greek medical writers did not just reflect a derivative 
awareness of developments in philosophy – something which 
led to the long-standing qualification of medicine as a ‘sister’ or 
‘daughter’ of philosophy – but also actively contributed to the 
developing concepts and methodologies for the acquisition of 
knowledge and understanding of the natural world. (Philip J. 
van der Eijk, Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity, p. 8)
Moreover, it would be quite misleading to present the relation-
ship between “doctors” and “philosophers” in terms of inter-
action between “science” and “philosophy,” the “empirical” and 
the “theoretical,” the “practical” and the “systematical,” the 
“particular” and the “general,” or “observation” and “specu-
lation.” To do this would be to ignore the “philosophical,” 
“speculative,” “theoretical,” and “systematic” aspects of Greek 
science as well as the extent to which empirical research and 
observation were part of the activities of people who have gone 
down in the textbooks as “philosophers.” Thus Empedocles, 
Democritus, Parmenides, Pythagorus, Philolaus, Plato, Aris-
totle, Theophrastus, Strato, but also later thinkers such as 
Sextus Empiricus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Nemesius of 
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Emesa, and John Philoponus took an active interest in subjects 
we commonly associate with medicine, such as anatomy and 
physiology of the human body, mental illness, embryology and 
reproduction, youth and old age, respiration, pulses, fevers, the 
causes of disease and of the effects of food, drink and drugs on 
the body. (p. 10)
… Galen … wrote a treatise advocating the view that the best 
doctor is, or should be, at the same time a philosopher.… It is no 
coincidence that Aristotle’s comments on the overlap between 
“students of nature” and “doctors” are made in his own Parva 
naturalia, a series of works on a range of psycho-physiological 
topics – sense-perception, memory, sleep, dreams, longevity, 
youth and old age, respiration, life and death, health and dis-
ease – that became the common ground of medical writers and 
philosophers alike. (p. 11)
… interaction… also took place in the field of methodology 
and epistemology. As early as the Hippocratic medical writers, 
one finds conceptualizations and terminological distinctions 
relating to such notions as a “nature” (phusis), “cause” (aitia, 
prophasis), “sign” (sēmeion), “indication” (tekmērion), “proof ” 
(pistis), “faculty” (dunamis), or theoretical reflection on epis-
temological issues such as causal explanation, observation, 
analogy, and experimentation. This is continued in fourth-
century [BCE] medicine, with writers such as Diocles of 
Carystus and Mnesitheus of Athens, in whose works we find 
striking examples of the use of definition, explanation, division 
and classification according to genus and species relations, and 
theoretical reflection on the modalities and the appropriateness 
of these epistemological procedures, on the requirements that 
have to be fulfilled in order to make them work. (p. 12)
Some [philosophers] are known to have put their ideas into 
practice, such as Empedocles, who seems to have been engaged 
in considerable therapeutic activity, or Democritus, who is re-
ported to have carried out anatomical research on a significant 
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scale, or, to take a later example, Sextus Empiricus, who com-
bined his authorship of philosophical writings on Scepticism 
with medical practice. (p. 13)
It is interesting in this connection that one of the first attesta-
tions of the word philosophia in Greek literature occurs in a 
medical context – the Hippocratic work On Ancient Medicine. 
(p. 19)
Comparable observations could be made concerning the early Indian 
medical literature, such as Caraka-saṃhitā and the slightly later Suśruta-
saṃhitā, as a survey of those texts, or even their tables of contents, would 
quickly show. Space limitations preclude documenting that here in detail, 
but one example should suffice. The core of chapter 8 of part 3 (Vimāna-
sthāna) of the CS consists of a rigorous, detailed description of the com-
ponents of “debate” (vāda). This includes a full discussion of the parts 
of a formal inference, the pramāṇas, distinguishing sound from unsound 
arguments, and the value and protocols of argument.22 Passage 68 lists 
ten topics a physician should explore by the three pramāṇas of authorita-
tive tradition, perception, and inference. (Here, unlike in part 1, chap. 
11, where āpta-pramāṇa, ‘authoritative tradition,’ is given great weight, 
several indications place āpta-pramāṇa in a subservient, even expendable 
position in relation to perception and inference.23) The ten topics are: 
kāraṇa (the cause or agent initiating action, i.e., the physician), karaṇa 
(instrument assisting the agent’s action, e.g., pharmaceuticals), kāryayoni 
(the matrix from which the action emerges), kārya (what is being done), 
kāryaphala (the result or purpose of the action), anubandha (what the ac-
tion is bound to entail), deśa (the locus of the action, viz. the place and the 
patient), kāla (time, viz. seasonal factors and the state of progress of the 
disease), pravṛtti (the process), and upāya (procedure or device, i.e., prop-
er preparations and initiation of proper actions). All students of Indian 
philosophy will instantly recognize these ten terms are central, pervasive 
categories of Indian philosophy. Here, where a patient’s life or death (not 
to mention the reputation of the physician, an issue the CS also takes very 
seriously) hang in the balance, these terms acquire not only concreteness 
but a sense of urgency. This list could serve as the program for virtually 
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any Indian religion or philosophy. That the first five items are conceptually 
and etymologically24 linked to the term karma underlines this.
Are we failing to produce philosophers of the stature and acuity of 
Ibn Sīnā and Maimonides because philosophy departments do not require 
their majors or graduate students to attend medical school, much less ser-
iously practice the hard sciences?
What then are the limits or horizons of philosophy proper? Some 
styles of philosophy strive for univocality. Thinking can only be clear, 
goes the claim, when words are drained of all ambiguity or multivocality. 
Today the implications of the desire to reduce all voices to one, to elim-
inate alternatives, or to reduce a word to a single meaning, strike many 
of us as disconcerting. We learn more from exploring different styles of 
philosophy, different ways of accounting for the human condition, than 
we benefit from silencing alternatives.
Are there meaningful lines to be drawn between philosophy and reli-
gion? Let me suggest two:
 (1) Borrowing Neitzschean vocabulary, we might say that 
religion is a will to meaning, while philosophy is a will to 
knowledge. These two types of wills may converge, when 
either meaning is understood as equivalent to knowledge 
or vice versa. Yet there are conceivably meaningful 
endeavours that do not rest on knowledge per se, e.g., 
romance.25
  Religion thus seeks to make life meaningful, to provide 
purpose and meaning to one’s existence and one’s life 
experiences. Philosophy, in contrast, seeks to know, to 
understand, and to make life comprehensible through 
evidence and reason. When meaning and knowledge 
converge, the line between religion and philosophy blurs.
 (2) Religious thinking is ultimately tautological (e.g., 
“I am that I am”; Being is; scripture is true because 
it is scripture). Tautology can be a handmaiden to 
authoritarianism (“It’s so because I say so!”). Philosophy, 
however, considers tautology a logical error, and thus it 
prefers (i) reasoning from premises to conclusions. This 
is Aristotle’s preferred method (derived from the third 
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segment of Plato’s divided line) and is a cornerstone 
of scientific method. Even more importantly and 
radically, however, philosophy prefers (ii) reasoning from 
premises to their presuppositions (as in recovering the 
archē; the fourth segment of Plato’s divided line). Such 
a procedure can be found in Nāgārjuna’s quieting of 
all presuppositions (prapañcopaśama) and perspectival 
attachments (dṛṣṭi). He undertakes this in order to expose 
the absurdities masquerading as reasoned positions 
to which we attach and with which we construct our 
identities (ātma-dṛṣṭi). It is also found in Husserl’s search 
for a presuppositionless philosophy in order to ground 
the sciences, Wissenschaften.
With such considerations in mind, we might ask the following questions: 
 (1) Does Hegel’s teleological view of history, as a rediscovery 
of the self by itself through the other, finally only 
reaffirm a Christian tautological telos? (The result here 
is that history’s destiny is already decided before it has 
begun, the alpha in the omega, so that the eschaton is 
prefigured in the creation. One moves all the way from 
one end of history to the other only to rediscover what 
was already there at the beginning: A = A. History and 
time become nothing more than the working out of the = 
that declares tautological self-coincidence as a discovery 
upon which all history awaits.)
 (2) What significance or insight lurks in the tension between 
his Being vs. Nonbeing sublating into Becoming, i.e., 
his famous Aufhebung offered in the Logic? On the one 
hand, Hegel seems to suggest that a dynamic process 
necessarily arises from, and then supersedes static 
contraries. On the other, he posits Becoming, seen as 
Geist ’s search for itself, as ultimately terminating in 
a static telos of authentic self-realization at the end of 
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history. Does this result in a terminus in which the 
movement of mind, spirit, and history itself comes to 
a stop once reaching its actualized self-recognition? 
Does Becoming emerge from the tension of two static 
contraries only to culminate eventually, with historical 
and ultimate finality, in a new stasis where the contraries 
have been replaced by a tautological self-coincidence? 
(This self-identity will have aufheben-ed all contrastive 
tensions.)
Becoming stops becoming. In what way, then, might this terminal histori-
cism of Hegel be compared with the Kashmiri Shaivite idea of līlā, as a 
game Śiva plays with himself? In this game, Śiva repeatedly, even eternal-
ly, alienates himself from himself, multiplying himself into “others” into 
which he forgets himself in order to find himself again. He thus continu-
ally engenders and wanders through various realms of existence that are 
the forgotten aspects of himself. Eventually, he rediscovers himself as the 
source of the game of forgetfulness, only to forget himself again once he is 
found, in order to keep the game in play. Each of us is nothing more than 
moves in this game of hide-and-seek, mere facets of Śiva’s forgetfulness. 
For Hegel, History becomes a finite search by Spirit for itself consisting of 
a series of logical predictable moves with a guaranteed climax. The notion 
of Becoming with which Hegel reintroduced Western thought to time 
and historicality finally leads to its own static culmination. No such finite 
limits restrict Śiva’s līlā. The divine’s game of hide and seek with himself 
not only plays out perpetually, restarting once completed, but time and 
temporality are byproducts of the game. The game is not only a temporal 
narrative conceived chronologically, but synchronically all levels of the 
game are at play simultaneously, so that remembering and forgetting 
happen simultaneously as well as sequentially. History plays out, but full 
realization is always available and instantaneous. It is a telos that is forever 
culminating because it never really culminates. The joy of realization is 
only one more joyous moment in a joyous game. The game and the joy 
continue nonetheless. The cosmic cards are reshuffled. Śiva forgets once 
again, and the game continues.
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LOGICAL STYLES: ROOT METAPHORS
Let me suggest a quick rubric for differentiating Western philosophy from 
Indian philosophy, and each from Chinese philosophy, though I will not 
expand this here into a full analysis. Each is grounded in certain root 
metaphors, basic models or disciplines which become, from the begin-
ning, fundamental and constitutive of what follows and thereby counts as 
philosophy in each of these traditions.
For the Greeks (and still in the West), the foundational disciplines 
were physics and mathematics. For India, the root models were grammar 
and medicine. For China, it was the family viewed, on the one hand, as 
hierarchical relations (parents over children, elder sibling over younger 
sibling, etc.), and, on the other hand, as dialectical relations between 
family members (the give and take between a couple, parents and chil-
dren, etc.). Family relations, combined hierarchically and dialectically, 
yield a pattern in which individuals both change and keep roles through 
a stable system: The youngest daughter, starting out life at the bottom of 
the family hierarchy, can gradually raise her status until she is matriarch 
of the family, overlording her sons and their wives. Social order, the web 
of correlative thinking into which all natural and artificial entities and 
forces – including medical theories – were plotted, and ascension through 
the stages of the spiritual path followed that model.
For the West, then, we think we are at our most profound when en-
gaged in questions of infinity, ontology, and the translation of time and 
space into mathematical equations. This fosters the illusion that soft sci-
ences become hard once they adopt a mathematical method, etc. The sense 
of profundity that wells up in us when such topics are broached is our 
inheritance from the Greek presuppositional foundation of mathemat-
ics and physics. The word meta-physics resonates. “Infinity,” for instance, 
has had neither the prominence nor the emotional affect in other cultures 
that it has held in ours. Kant, having completed the three critiques, still 
thought his philosophy unfinished, “or else a gap will remain in the critic-
al philosophy.”26 In a letter to Kiesewetter, Kant explains what remains 
to be done: “The transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural 
science to physics must not be left out of the system.… [W]ith that work 
the task of the critical philosophy will be completed and a gap that now 
stands open will be filled.”27 He died before completing this task that the 
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Western tradition tacitly insisted he address. It is like a voice of conscience 
or internalized imperative that had become categorical, unavoidable, an 
urgent need that now defined him and his system. Conversely, Nathan 
Sivin has to argue, in his treatment of Chinese science,28 that Chinese 
scientists did not deal with “Nature” in the sense of phusis. Understanding 
what they have been concerned with thus becomes a conceptual stretch for 
the “Western” mindset.
For Indians, grammar disclosed the structure of reality. Just as 
words are means to apprehend referents (artha), so does perception ap-
prehend objects (artha). The detailed relations and variations denoted by 
Sanskrit grammatical inflections mirror and reveal the relational realities, 
variations, and even the eternal verities of the operations of the cosmos. 
Medicine is about saving beings from sickness, illness, and suffering, re-
storing them to health. Buddha’s famous four Noble Truths29 is taught 
these days, in an expanded form, in medical schools throughout the West 
under the label “Pathological Model,” i.e., symptom, diagnosis, prognosis, 
and treatment. When early Buddhist texts spoke of the Buddha as the 
“Great Physician,” one who turns poison into medicine, etc., they were not 
speaking metaphorically. Buddhism itself, these texts explain, is “medi-
cine,” consisting of specific therapeutic devices designed to cure dis-ease 
(duḥkha). Like all-powerful medicines, it is forged from toxic materials 
specifically designed to treat specific illnesses; when the medicine has 
done its task one should stop taking it, or else it also can make one sick.
Hence, that we should find pramāṇas (means of knowledge) being 
introduced in the medical text, the CS, should not surprise us.
THE CARAKA-SAṂHITĀ, INSANITY, AND THE PRAMĀṆAS
I came to the CS as a result of work on the Mano-bhūmika section of 
Asaṅga’s encyclopedic Yogācārabhūmi. Asaṅga is the nominal founder 
of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism, one of the two Mahāyāna systems 
in India. The Yogācārabhūmi ’s first chapter, on the five bodily conscious-
nesses (pañca-vijñāna-kāya-bhūmi), discusses the sense organs, percep-
tion, karma, and related topics. For the second chapter, the “mental stage” 
(mano-bhūmi), Asaṅga makes the transition from physical, bodily pro-
cesses to more exclusively mental conditions through a medical survey of 
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psycho-somatic topics, specifically physical conditions that affect mental 
states, such as intoxication (mādhyati) and insanity (unmādyati). Insanity 
or mental disorders is a topic to which the CS and Indian medicine gener-
ally devote great attention.30 Asaṅga gives us a list of possible causes, which 
includes such things as physical and mental trauma (uttrāsa-bhayata), 
strikes to vital spots (marmābhighāta), and other external factors such as 
attacks from ghosts (bhūta-samāveśatayā). He explains the causes of sleep 
and the causes for awakening from sleep (e.g., a loud noise, bodily dis-
comfort, etc.). He takes this into a somewhat detailed discussion of med-
ical conditions, employing the three doṣa model and various other clearly 
medical concerns.31 This leads to a discussion of the causes of health and 
longevity, and the causes of the shortening of life span and death (food, 
digestive processes, and moral habits are cited as critical factors). Asaṅga 
even provides a description of how death occurs, how consciousness leaves 
the body.
Interested to discover how typical Asaṅga’s treatment was of Indian 
medical theory at that time, my search for Buddhist medical literature 
of that period revealed that there is precious little available today on the 
Buddhist medical theories and practices of his day. As a result, I turned 
to the next best thing, the text considered to be the oldest of the Hindu 
medical texts, the only extant medical treatise generally considered to 
predate Asaṅga.32 While, unfortunately, it quickly became apparent that 
the Hindu medical theories were a closely related but different system 
(enumerations and models differed), the CS provided charms of its own.
As mentioned above, the CS is usually considered to be the first text 
to introduce the idea of pramāṇa, the means of acquiring knowledge. This 
should not come as a surprise, since medicine requires not only a disci-
plined method of observation to observe symptoms, to take account of 
treatments and experiments that work or do not work, etc., but it also 
requires a method by which what is unobserved and even potentially un-
observable, namely the cause of a disease, can be inferred and known in 
order to be treated. The present symptoms displayed by an ill person may 
have an etiology that lies in the past, and diseases often progress through 
stages. Thus the physician must be able to infer from what presents at the 
moment to what likely has transpired in the past, just as one would infer a 
past fire from ashes and smoke. As the CS itself argues, one also has to be 
able to infer predictability, i.e., from the present to the future, in order to 
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make an accurate prognosis and to have some confidence in the effective-
ness of specific treatments. The current popularity of forensic medicine 
on television shows such as the CSI-style programs illustrates the power 
still inherent in such approaches. To the chagrin of idealists and solip-
sists, physical remainders of past actions can provide definitive evidence of 
what happened – evidence sufficient to convict a perpetrator “beyond the 
shadow of a doubt.”
Various Indian schools proposed different pramāṇas as viable means 
of acquiring certain knowledge. Virtually all agreed that perception and 
logical inference were pramāṇas. For example, I know that the table is 
there because I can see it, feel it, etc. I know it can hold a certain weight, 
because when I place objects of a certain weight on it, it doesn’t collapse, 
and I have this knowledge even when nothing is presently on the table. 
As the CS states, the fact of pregnancy compels one to infer that sexual 
intercourse has occurred (unless one is a certain type of theologian).
To these two pramāṇas, some Indian schools wished to add reliable 
testimony, meaning testimony from a respectable witness, as in a court 
proceeding, or a respectable authority, i.e., an expert. In addition, and more 
importantly, this pramāṇa includes the testimony of scripture. Curiously, 
the first school to challenge śabda-pramāṇa (reliable testimony) as a viable 
source of knowledge was the Vaiśeṣika, a Hindu school that eventually 
merged with Nyāya. Buddhists, rejecting the validity of Hindu scriptures, 
also eventually dismissed the validity of śabda-pramāṇa as a pramāṇa (at 
least after Dignāga, although Asaṅga in his Abhidharmasamuccaya already 
makes it subsidiary to perception and inference). This was because they 
argued that claims made by testimony or scripture must themselves be 
subjected to test by inference and/or perception to be deemed valid. The 
reliability of a witness must be tested, as must the truth-value of claims 
made in scripture. Such tests would examine whether the claims conform 
to what is evident to the senses or to what is reasonable. Thus, Buddhists 
insisted, it is perception and inference that guarantees the validity of 
knowledge, not the testimony itself. Additional pramāṇas proposed by 
others included “comparison,” “analogy,” and even “absence,” but for 
Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists these too are either fallacious or subordinate to 
perception and inference.
Pramāṇa-theory first appears in the eleventh chapter of the first part 
(Sūtra-sthāna) of the CS. Here the CS intriguingly proposes, along with 
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the three pramāṇas one would expect (perception, inference, and authori-
tative testimony), a fourth not found anywhere else: synthetic inductive 
reasoning (yukta-pramāṇa). Discussion of pramāṇa occurs in two other 
parts of the CS: part 3, Vimāna-sthāna, chap. 4 and chap. 8, but the unique 
yukta-pramāṇa is absent from those discussions, a sign of the stratified 
nature of the text.
The discussion in chap. 11 of the Sūtra-sthāna is interesting because it 
offers some explanation for why a discussion of pramāṇas should appear in 
a medical text. It begins by stating that for humans there are three basic 
desires or impulses (eṣaṇa): (1) desire for life itself (prāṇaiṣaṇā), (2) desire 
for material possessions (dhanaiṣaṇā), and (3) desire for (happiness in) the 
next world (paralokaiṣaṇā) (11:3). Of these, the first, the impulse for lon-
gevity, is most basic since “when life departs, all departs” (11:4). Since life 
without adequate means is miserable, the second impulse comes next.
As to the third impulse, the desire for the next life, CS states that 
some have doubts whether such a thing is real. To disabuse its readers 
of such skepticism, CS launches into an attack on all sorts of skepticism 
(those who disbelieve in gods, sages, siddhis, efficient and material causes, 
the necessity for examination and investigation, etc.). He argues, for in-
stance, that non-perception does not entail non-existence. There are num-
erous reasons why something real may be imperceptible. It may be too 
far way, too close, too small, obstructed by something else, a sense-organ 
defect, and so on. CS admits that the scriptures are also in conflict on the 
question of afterlife. Such conflicts, it recommends, should be resolved by 
reason (yukti).
After arguing for the existence of the self (ātman) despite its being 
perceptually unobservable, and for a world created by purposeful causes, 
and denouncing the nihilist (nāstika) as “the worst of the sinful,”33 CS 
states that everything falls into one of two categories: sattva and asat-
tva, i.e., real or unreal, or, perhaps, true and false (11:17). Then the four 
pramāṇas are introduced, starting with āpta, traditional authority. This, 
the CS informs us, is knowledge passed on by the experts (śiṣta). Instead 
of śabda-pramāṇa, CS calls this āptopadeśa, “teachings of the Respected 
ones,” and a list of the types of people this includes is given (passages 18–
19). These people are indubitable because they lack tamas and rajas,34 and 
thus are incapable of lying. Next comes perception (pratyakṣa), which is 
described as contact between the self and what is present. This is followed 
PHILOSOPHY, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, AND BOUNDARIES160
by inference (anumāna), which CS says is based on having previously per-
ceived or learned something. CS explains that there are three types of 
inference, corresponding to inferences about the past, present, and future. 
“Fire is inferred from smoke, and sexual intercourse from pregnancy” 
(present and past, respectively), and a future fruit can be inferred from 
a seed, based on having previously observed, i.e., perceived, that process 
(11:21–22).
The fourth pramāṇa, yukta, is explained with the following examples 
(11:23–24):35
Growth of crops from the combination of irrigation, ploughed 
land, seed and seasons; formation of embryo from the com-
bination of six dhātus (five mahābhūtas and Ātman); Production 
of fire from the combination of the lower-fire-drill, upper-fire-
drill and the act of drilling; cure of diseases by fourfold ef-
ficient therapeutic measures.
Yukta here means something like: the coordination of multiple factors con-
verging into a trajectory in which something is changed or transformed. It 
is taking into account the coordination of multiple causes, a process with 
contributive factors that might affect the outcome, as in crops or medical 
treatments. To plant a crop requires attention to multiple factors, from the 
time of planting, the type of seed, properly working the land, fortuitous 
seasonal conditions, and so on. If all the factors work properly, the seed 
turns into a plant that produces the desired crop. Any of the contribut-
ing factors (e.g., amount of rainfall) can alter the outcome. There is no 
strict one-to-one cause-effect relation between the seed and the fruit. The 
additional factors mediate it. Similarly, an embryo becoming a human 
undergoes a process requiring multiple factors in addition to the sex act 
that initiated it. Any of these factors could terminate the pregnancy or 
inflict permanent damage on the embryo. Producing fire by coordinat-
ing fire sticks similarly illustrates the coordination of multiple factors. 
Treating illness, likewise, requires coordinating conditions across a tra-
jectory in time in order for the person’s condition to change from sickness 
to health. The physician must recognize and coordinate those conditions: 
what to watch for in the disease’s progress; what types of treatments are 
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most effective, and when to administer them; what habits and regimens, 
such as diet and exercise, contribute to health or maladies; etc.
Inference (anumāna) was treated (vs. 21–22) as inferring from a specif-
ic condition or cause to a specific effect, i.e., a fruit from a seed. And CS 
also insists that inference requires previous perception (pratyakṣa-pūrva). 
One recognizes the relation between the fruit and seed on the basis of 
prior observations of this process, and so one can predict a future fruit 
is likely from a present planted seed. Although CS ’s account is terse, the 
claim, I believe, is not simply that a seed will become a plant, but the fact 
that we recognize by looking at a certain type of seed what type of plant 
it will produce. One sees an acorn and knows that it will produce an oak 
tree, not a weeping willow. This type of knowledge would be important in 
medicine, since it is important to know that certain types of treatments, 
medicines, bodily conditions will become or change into something else. 
But this does not necessarily happen automatically. Additional contribu-
tory causal factors must play a role as well. An acorn sitting on a table 
does not become an oak; it must be planted, and it must receive nutrients 
from the soil, heat, water, etc. None of these factors is sufficient alone. 
Each must contribute for the seed to progress along a trajectory in which 
it changes into something else.
Yukta (= yukti), which literally implies to tie together, or connect, and 
later comes to be one of the numerous terms for “reasoning” or “logic,” 
is used in CS specifically to denote combining a group of factors that, 
together, produce a result. A doctor cannot diagnose a disease on the 
basis of a single symptom but must weigh multiple symptoms together, 
many (such as headaches, nausea, etc.) that could be shared by numerous 
diseases. This multitude of factors must be taken into account in order 
to determine correctly the specific disease affecting a particular patient. 
Diagnosis is inductive, not purely deductive, so, to the old debate about 
whether Indian logic is strictly deductive or includes induction, CS at least 
provides a case for inductive reasoning.
Unfortunately, yukta-pramāṇa never underwent further development 
in India, appearing nowhere else than in this text. It is rich in analytic 
possibilities, and one wonders what Indian philosophers, as deeply con-
cerned as most were with causal analyses, might have created had they 
explored further possibilities of this inductive tool.
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Since the CS arrived here by attempting to refute skepticism about 
after-lives, it is not surprising that, having now established a basis for 
knowledge, the CS next turns to arguing for the validity of rebirth, the 
issue that instigated this excursion into epistemology in the first place. 
To do this, it offers arguments from each of the pramāṇas in turn, i.e., 
arguments from authority, perception, inference, and yukta. A modern 
reader would not find the arguments very convincing, and apparently nei-
ther did the ancients, since we do not find them repeated, or improved 
upon, in subsequent literature. In fact, one of the striking things about 
the CS ’s attempt to provide arguments supporting the idea of rebirth and 
reincarnation is the fact that it does so at all, since such arguments are 
surprisingly rare in Indian philosophical texts. Indian philosophers seem 
to have understood that it would be very difficult to mount a reasonable 
argument for the validity of the theory of reincarnation, and thus largely 
chose to avoid embarrassing themselves with such attempts. Thus the CS ’s 
boldness in this regard is refreshing, even if the arguments themselves are 
far from compelling.
This CS chapter has explained that the pramāṇas can help resolve 
doubts about the objectives of one of our basic impulses, the desire for the 
next life. It also demonstrates that, in addition to the pramāṇas employed 
by some other Indian schools, the physician requires a pramāṇa suited to 
the needs of his profession. This is yukta-pramāṇa that deals inductively 
with synthetic judgments about changes and alterations (pariṇāma, etc.) 
affected, in temporal phases, by multiple contributory causes. Illness is 
a transformation of bodily factors from a healthy balance to imbalance; 
restoring health is a transformation back to proper functioning. Birth, life, 
health, sickness, old age, and death are transformations involving multiple 
factors that the physician must learn to recognize and manipulate. The 
physician is a philosopher who lacks the luxury of indulging in specula-
tion. Either his knowledge is true, or the patient dies.
But this matter, along with such other fascinating topics in the CS 
as its use of the idea of “intellectual blasphemy” (prajñā-parādha36) as an 
explanation for some diseases, must await another occasion.
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CONCLUDING SUMMARY
So what does it mean to do comparative philosophy of religion? Since 
all thinking is comparative, comparative philosophy of religion draws its 
strength from expanding the range of philosophies and religions it “com-
pares.” Expanding the horizon of our exploration provides more than 
additional data; it enriches the possibilities of thinking. For a Western 
philosopher to think about Indian or Chinese or Arabic or Jewish philoso-
phies, etc., is basically no different from a North American philosopher 
thinking about Plato, Spinoza, Hegel, or Wittgenstein. Each task requires 
looking at the other through similarities and differences of language, 
culture, context, foundational categories, historical developments, and a 
host of other factors. For a Chinese, Indian, Jewish, etc., philosopher to 
think, philosophically, about Western philosophy is no different. Starting 
from a different standpoint, however, might entail that different priorities 
and categories set the agenda. The basic differences are not between East 
and West, as is often assumed, but between styles of philosophizing and 
the root metaphors from which different traditions take their orientation. 
Similarly, philosophy, religion, and medicine have always been inter-
twined, especially in ancient and medieval philosophy.
As Thomas H. Huxley, the biologist, noted:37 “The only medicine for 
suffering, crime, and all the other woes of mankind, is wisdom.”
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Notes
 1 Some attempt to date Caraka to 
as early as the sixth century BCE, 
though most date the bulk of the 
Caraka-saṃhitā to ca. the first century 
CE, with some obvious later inter-
polations and additions. Our received 
edition is based on an eleventh-cen-
tury CE commentary and redaction 
by Cakrapāṇi.
 2 Tapas eventually came to mean the 
heat of austerities that burn off bad 
karma, thus, like the fire of sacrifice, 
purifying the practitioner; but its ear-
lier meaning in the Ṛg Veda is the heat 
from friction produced in the sex act, 
which is creation par excellence. Cf. 
RV 10.129.3: “tuchyenābhvapihitaṃ 
yadāsīt tapasastanmahinājāyataikam” 
(“that One which had been covered 
by the void, through the heat of 
desire [tapas] was manifested,” trans. 
Antonio de Nicolas).
 3 This is easier to assert once a domin-
ant paradigm or theory has run its 
course, marked by the repetition, 
reiteration, and refinement of previous 
insights rather than the inspirational 
introduction of truly novel ones, as 
some view the situation today for 
both analytic and postmodern styles 
of philosophy. When caught in the 
throes of the creative possibilities 
that are being opened by a new para-
digm, the mere implementation of 
its directives, or putting into motion 
permutations merely implied by the 
new paradigm – analogous to Frege’s 
indication that all of mathematics 
springs from 1 + [i.e., a unit and a 
function] – may give the feeling of 
opening onto limitless horizons with 
boundless future potential. Hence 
the exuberance and heady feeling of 
having brought something new and 
momentous into the world that often 
accompanies “movements” in their 
early phases.
 4 “Living adherents,” i.e., old traditions 
that have modern-day exponents, 
introduce other sorts of problems, 
since modern exponents typically 
are not transplants from another 
time, but instead embody all sorts 
of permutations and sensibilities 
derived from centuries of changing 
interpretations that become embed-
ded in the transmission. And the 
modern exponent’s motivations are, 
consciously or unconsciously, geared 
toward accommodating modern issues 
and modes of expression that a careful 
researcher would have to take into ac-
count and isolate.
 5 Interest has recently been rekindled 
in Dignāga’s foundational Buddhist 
work on pramāṇa-theory. Until a 
few years ago Pramāṇasamuccaya was 
only available in two poor Tibetan 
translations. Jinendrabuddhi’s 
Sanskrit commentary, found in Tibet, 
which contains much of Dignāga’s 
original text, is now coming out. The 
first volume has appeared – Ernst 
Steinkellner, Helmut Krasser, and 
Horst Lasic (eds.), Jinendrabuddhi’s 
Pramāṇasamuccayaṭika, chap 1, part 
1: Critical Edition; part 2: Diplomatic 
Edition (Beijing: Österreichischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaft, 2005)  – 
with more to follow.
 6 This is the only “translation” by 
Xuanzang (600–664) – the famous 
Chinese pilgrim who travelled to 
India and, on his return to China, 
became the most prolific translator 
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of Buddhist texts – that is not a strict 
translation of a single text but instead 
a redacted compendium based on a 
number of Sanskrit commentaries 
on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā (Thirty 
Verses). This “translation” incorpor-
ates a host of other materials as 
well, resulting in an encyclopedic 
work on the Buddhist Yogācāra sys-
tem as it was debated in India in 
the seventh century. Louis de la 
Vallée Poussin’s French translation, 
Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: Le Siddhi 
de Hiuan-tsang (Paris: Geuthner, 
1928, 2 vols.), is overly interpretive, 
transforming the text into a tract on 
idealism, an interpretation that has 
largely stuck. Wei Tat published a 
bilingual edition, Cheng Wei-shih lun: 
The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness 
(Hong Kong, 1973), that contains an 
English rendering of Vallée Poussin’s 
French (minus Vallée Poussin’s ex-
tensive annotations) on facing pages 
with the original Chinese. Swaty 
Ganguly, Treatise In Thirty Verses on 
Mere-Consciousness (Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass, 1992), offers an abridged 
translation. Francis Cook, Three 
Texts on Consciousness Only (Berkeley: 
Numata, 1999), is sometimes an 
improvement over Vallée Poussin 
but too frequently follows his misin-
terpretation. On the philosophy of 
Yogācāra as reflected in Cheng weishi-
lun, see my Buddhist Phenomenology: A 
Philosophical Investigation of Yogācāra 
Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih lun 
(London: Routledge Curzon, 2002).
 7 This has been translated by Wing 
Tsit-Chan, Reflections on Things 
at Hand (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1967). Zhu Xi’s 
name may be more familiar to 
some Western readers by its older 
transcription: Chu-hsi. This is only 
one of the many works of Zhu Xi 
(1130–1200), the most prominent 
Neo-Confucian thinker.
 8 A number of Gersonides’ (i.e., Rabbi 
Levi ben Gershon, whose name in 
acrostic is Ralbag; 1288–1344) works 
have been translated. His major work, 
The Wars of the Lord, is available as: 
(1) Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides), 
The Wars of the Lord: Book One: 
Immortality of the Soul, trans. Seymour 
Feldman (Philadelphia: Jewish 
Publication Society, 1984); (2) Levi 
ben Gershom (Gersonides), The 
Wars of the Lord: Book Two: Dreams, 
Divination, and Prophecy; Book Three: 
Divine Knowledge; Book Four: Divine 
Providence, trans. Seymour Feldman 
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication 
Society, 1987); a third promised 
volume to complete the work has not 
yet appeared. Book Five of the Wars 
includes treatises on trigonometry 
(which sparked the development 
of trigonometry in Europe); a 
description of the meguleh ‘amuqot 
(“revealer of profundities”), a device 
Gersonides invented to measure the 
angular distances of heavenly bodies 
(this also circulated as an independ-
ent text); astronomical tables and 
critiques of astronomical theories. 
An alternate translation, with an-
alysis, of Book Three of the Wars is 
Norbert Samuelson, Gersonides on 
God’s Knowledge (Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1977). 
His style as a Biblical commentator 
is displayed in Menachem Kellner 
(trans.), Commentary on Song of Songs: 
Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides) (New 
Haven, CT: Yale, 1998).
 9 Harry Wolfson’s translation of 
Book One of Crescas’ Or Adonai 
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(Light of Our Lord) – Crescas’ 
Critique of Aristotle: Problems of 
Aristotle’s Physics in Jewish and 
Arabic Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1929) – is 
a classic treatment of a work that 
deeply influenced Spinoza and moved 
Western thought closer to the end 
of the Middle Ages. Crescas’ cri-
tique is comparable to al-Ghazzali’s 
Tahafut al-falsifa (The Incoherence 
of Philosophy) in that its motive is 
to purge Aristotelian contamination 
from religious thought, though it is 
very different in style and conclu-
sion. Crescas (Ḥasdai ben Abraham 
Crescas, ca.1340–1410/11) delves 
deeply into Aristotle’s arguments and 
principles and concludes they are not 
scientific enough, i.e., they are merely 
reified speculations that inadequately 
and incorrectly interpret the physical 
world.
 10 Defenders of analytic philosophy may 
contend that it is still going strong, 
but what is practised under that name 
today would be unrecognizable to 
its practitioners of only a couple of 
decades ago. The label “analytic” 
philosophy was supposed to signal 
above all that only the quality of 
arguments (propositions sequential-
ized into logical entailments) counted, 
not personalities or the authors of the 
arguments. The cult of personality 
was considered a serious error com-
mitted by philosophies of the past. 
A proper essay, they believed, should 
begin with a rational exposition ac-
cessible to all that subsequently would 
be developed into more technical 
implications. The essay’s merit rested 
in the cogency of the argument, not 
the weight of its author. Citing others 
was to be largely avoided, unless the 
essay’s purpose was an analysis of a 
particular philosopher, and reverence 
for a philosopher instead of appre-
ciation for an argument was simply 
bad taste. Today not only must one 
recite and acknowledge a pantheon 
of analytic philosophers to make 
even the most trivial argument, but 
publishers are producing an endless 
stream of books with simple titles 
such as Quine, Ayer, Strawson, etc., 
typically with a photo or drawing of 
that person adorning the cover. The 
cult of personality is now embraced. 
While analytic philosophers of the 
past would find all that shocking, it 
is perhaps a belated recognition that 
philosophy without philosophers is a 
platonic fantasy, as well as a curious 
attempt to breathe new life and sus-
tainability into the analytic project. 
Others would object that even with 
these changes, unlike philosophers 
of the past who wrestled with the 
“big issues” of perennial interest to all 
thinking individuals, the issues that 
analytic philosophy engages and the 
parameters within which it permits 
what it accepts as legitimate analysis 
have become so restricted and nar-
row that few outside the ranks of the 
analytic philosophers themselves find 
their discussions pertinent or even 
interesting.
 11 “Spinoza’s distinction between at-
tributes and properties is identical 
with Crescas’ distinction between 
attributes subjectively ascribed and 
their objective reality in God. The 
connection between Spinoza’s views 
on creation and free will, on love 
of God and of others, and those 
of Crescas has been established by 
[Manuel] Joël in his ‘[Spinoza’s 
Theologisch-Politischer Tractat auf 
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Seine Quellen Geprüft] Zur Genesis 
der Lehre Spinoza’s’ (Breslau, 
1871).” From the article, “Crescas, 
Ḥasdai ben Abraham,” by Kaufmann 
Kohler and Emil G. Hirsch, in 
JewishEncyclopedia.com, http://www.
jewishencyclopedia.com [square 
brackets added]. See also Harry 
Wolfson, Crescas on the Problem of 
Divine Attributes (Philadelphia: 
Dropsie College, 1916); Warren 
Zev Harvey, Physics and Metaphysics 
in Ḥasdai Crescas (Amsterdam: J.C. 
Gieben, 1998).
 12 Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose, 
trans. William Weaver (Boston and 
New York: Harcourt, 1983). While 
Church complicity in suppressing 
Aristotle’s lost work on comedy 
remains speculative, the medieval 
debates between Dominicans, etc., on 
whether laughter is permitted or sin-
ful are grounded in history.
 13 Aldous Huxley, The Doors of Perception 
and Heaven and Hell (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1954, 1956).
 14 R.C. Zaehner, Mysticism: Sacred and 
Profane (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1957. Reprint: London: Oxford 
University Press, 1961).
 15 The term “panentheism” was coined 
by the German philosopher, Karl 
Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–
1832), a student of Fichte, Hegel, and 
Schelling, and one of Schopenhauer’s 
teachers.
 16 Jewish tradition often uses acrostics 
of the names of prominent figures 
as their official nicknames. Hence 
Maimonides, e.g., Rabbi Moshe 
Ben Maimon, becomes RaMBaM; 
Gersonides, Rabbi Levi Ben 
Gershon, becomes RaLBaG, and so 
on. For an overview of Maimonides’ 
works on medicine, including a 
translation of two of his treatises, see 
Ariel Bar-Sela, Hebbel E. Hoff, and 
Elias Faris, “Moses Maimonides’ Two 
Treatises on the Regimen of Health: 
Fi Tadbir al-Sihhah and Maqalah fi 
Bayan Ba’d al-A’rad wa-al-Jawad 
‘anha” (Philadephia: Transactions of 
the American Philosophical Society, 
New Series, v. 54, 4, 1964), 3–50. 
Also cf. Gerrit Bos (trans.), Medical 
Aphorisms: Treatises 1–5 (Provo, 
UT: Brigham Young University, 
2004) (the first of six volumes on 
Maimonides’ summary of Galen); and 
Fred Rosner, Medicine in the Mishneh 
Torah of Maimonides (Northvale: NJ: 
Aronson Press, 1997).
 17 On Ibn Sīnā, see note 19. As Hamed 
Abdel-reheem Ead, Professor of 
Chemistry at the Faculty of Science, 
University of Cairo, Giza, Egypt, 
and director of the Science Heritage 
Center, states on a web page (http://
www.levity.com/alchemy/islam21.
html) devoted to Ibn Rushd’s medical 
contributions (slightly modified):
	 •	 Ibn	Rushd	…	spent	a	great	part	
of his fruitful life as a judge and 
as a physician. Yet he was known 
in the West for being the grand 
commentator on the philosophy 
of Aristotle, whose influence 
penetrated the minds of even the 
most conservative of Christian 
Ecclesiastes in the Middle Ages, 
including men like St. Thomas 
Aquinas. People went to him for 
consultation in medicine just as 
they did for consultation in legal 
matters and jurisprudence.
	 •	 Ibn	Rushd’s	major	work	
in medicine, al-Kulliyyat 
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(“Generalities”), was written 
between 1153 and 1169.
	 •	 Its	subject	matter	leans	heavily	
on Galen, and occasionally 
Hippocrates’ name is mentioned. 
It is subdivided into seven books: 
Tashrih al-a’ lda’ (“Anatomy of 
Organs”), al-Sihha (“Health”), 
al-Marad (“Sickness”), al-’Alamat 
(“Symptoms”), al-Adwiya wa 
‘ l-aghdhiya (“Drugs and Foods”), 
Hifz al-sihha (“Hygiene”), and 
Shifa al-amrad (“Therapy”).
	 •	 Two	Hebrew	versions	of	al-
Kulliyyat are known, one by an 
unidentified translator, another by 
Solomon ben Abraham ben David.
	 •	 The	Latin	translation,	Colliget, was 
made in Padua in 1255 by a Jew, 
Bonacosa, and the first edition was 
printed in Venice in 1482, followed 
by many other editions.
	 •	 Ibn	Rushd	wrote	an	(abstract)	of	
Galen’s works, parts of which are 
preserved in Arabic manuscripts.
	 •	 He	showed	interest	in	Ibn	Sīnā’s	
Urjūzah fī al-ṭibb (“Poem on 
Medicine,” Canticum de medicina), 
on which he wrote a commentary, 
Sharh Urjuzat Ibn Sina.
	 •	 It	was	translated	into	Hebrew	prose	
by Moses ben Tibbon in 1260; a 
translation into Hebrew verse was 
completed at Beziers (France) in 
1261 by Solomon ben Ayyub ben 
Joseph of Granada.
	 •	 Further,	a	Latin	translation	of	
the same work was made by 
Armengaud, son of Blaise, in 1280 
or 1284, and a printed edition was 
published at Venice in 1484.
	 •	 Another	revised	Latin	translation	
was made by Andrea Alpago, who 
translated Ibn Rushd’s Maqala 
‘ l-tiryaq (“Treatise on Remedies,” 
Tractatus de theiaca).
	 •	 Ibn	Rushd’s	unsuccessful	attempts	
to defend philosophers against 
theologians paved the way for a 
decline in Arabic medicine.
	 •	 The	great	image	of	the	Hakim	
(physician-philosopher), which 
culminated in the persons of 
al-Razi and Ibn Sīnā, has been 
superseded by that of faqih 
musharik fi ‘ l-ulum (a jurist who 
participates in sciences), among 
whom were physician-jurists and 
theologian-physicians.
	 •	 The	German	physician	Max	
Meyerhof remarked that: “In 
Spain, the philosophical bias 
predominated among medical men. 
The prototypes of this combination 
are the two Muslims, Ibn Zuhr 
(Avenzoar) and Ibn Rushd 
(Averroës).”
	 •	 According	to	Draper,	Ibn	Rushd	
is credited with the discovery of 
sunspots.
 18 Gersonides’ main scientific con-
tributions were in mathematics, 
astronomy, and logic. For a collec-
tion of essays detailing his scientific 
achievements, especially his innova-
tive astronomy which influenced the 
astronomical revolution we usually as-
sociate with Galileo and Copernicus, 
see Gad Freudenthal, ed., Studies 
on Gersonides: A Fourteenth-Century 
Jewish Philosopher-Scientist (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 1993).
 19 The Wikipedia entry on Avicenna 
(Ibn Sīnā) correctly summar-
izes his contributions thus <http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avicenna>:
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  Ibn Sīnā … was a Persian polymath 
and the foremost physician and phil-
osopher of his time. He was also an 
astronomer, chemist, geologist, logi-
cian, paleontologist, mathematician, 
physicist, poet, psychologist, scientist, 
soldier, statesman, and teacher.
  Ibn Sīnā wrote almost 450 treatises 
on a wide range of subjects, of which 
around 240 have survived. In par-
ticular, 150 of his surviving treatises 
concentrate on philosophy and forty 
of them concentrate on medicine. 
His most famous works are The Book 
of Healing, a vast philosophical and 
scientific encyclopaedia, and The 
Canon of Medicine [in fourteen vol-
umes], which was a standard medical 
text at many medieval universities. 
The Canon of Medicine was used as 
a text-book in the universities of 
Montpellier and Louvain as late as 
1650. Ibn Sīnā developed a medical 
system that combined his own per-
sonal experience with that of Islamic 
medicine, the medical system of the 
Greek physician Galen, Aristotelian 
metaphysics (Avicenna was one of the 
main interpreters of Aristotle, and 
ancient Persian, Mesopotamian and 
Indian medicine. He was also the 
founder of Avicennian logic and the 
philosophical school of Avicennism, 
which were influential among both 
Muslim and Scholastic thinkers.)
  Ibn Sīnā is regarded as a father of 
early modern medicine, and clinical 
pharmacology, particularly for his 
introduction of systematic experi-
mentation and quantification into 
the study of physiology, his discovery 
of the contagious nature of infec-
tious diseases, the introduction of 
quarantine to limit the spread of 
contagious diseases, the introduction 
of experimental medicine, evidence-
based medicine, clinical trials, 
randomized controlled trials, efficacy 
tests, clinical pharmacology, neuro-
psychiatry, risk factor analysis, and 
the idea of a syndrome, and the im-
portance of dietetics and the influence 
of climate and environment on health. 
He is also considered the father of the 
fundamental concept of momentum 
in physics and is regarded as a pioneer 
of aromatherapy for his invention of 
steam distillation and extraction of 
essential oils. He also developed the 
concept of uniformitarianism and law 
of superposition in geology.
  Also, from http://www.isesco.org.ma/
pub/Eng/Architects/P20.htm:
  Ibn Sīnā mastered medicine in par-
ticular. He made new discoveries in 
this field; he was the first to describe 
a worm that he called the “round 
worm,” currently known as “ankles-
toma.” He also studied neurological 
dysfunctions and was able to reach 
certain pathologic and psychological 
facts through psychoanalysis. He 
believed in the existence of an 
interaction between psychology and 
physical health. He also described the 
brain’s apoplexy resulting from excess 
in the blood flow.
  Ibn Sīnā made original contributions 
in medicine, based on his own obser-
vations. He founded his conclusions 
on experiments and was able to reach 
new observations, including the con-
tagious nature of tuberculosis and the 
propagation of diseases through water 
and soil. He also described at length 
dermatological and sexually transmit-
ted diseases. Moreover, he described 
the pharmaceutical preparation of 
some medicines.
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  Ibn Sīnā was also the first to describe 
the irritation of the brain’s envelope, 
distinguishing it from other chronic 
irritations. He elaborated the first 
clear diagnostic of neck’s scleroses 
and of meningitis He also described 
the facial paralysis and its causes. He 
made the distinction between the 
paralysis caused by a dysfunction in 
the brain and that resulting Scientific 
contributions in other fields.
  Ibn Sīnā made important contribu-
tions in physics, through the study of 
several natural phenomena such as 
motion, force, vacuum, infinity, light 
and heat. He made the observation 
that if the perception of light is due to 
the emission of some particles from 
a luminous source, the speed of light 
must be finite.
  Ibn Sīnā made contributions in geol-
ogy with a treatise on the formation 
of mountains, precious stones and 
metals. In this treatise, he discussed 
the effect of earthquakes, water, the 
degree temperature, sediments, fos-
silisation and erosion.
  Ibn Sīnā was also an outstanding 
mathematician and astronomer. He 
studied infinite bodies from religious, 
physical, and mathematical perspec-
tives. His findings helped Newton 
and Leibniz to develop infinite num-
erals in the seventeenth century.
 20 Mansura Haidar, “Medical Works of 
the Medieval Period from India and 
Central Asia,” Diogenes 55, no. 27 
(2008): 28. 
 21 Philip J. van der Eijk, Medicine and 
Philosophy in Classical Antiquity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 15.
 22 This chapter is important, not only 
because of its description of debate 
and its epistemological elements, but 
because it also informs us that debate 
(between different physicians as well 
as between physicians and others) 
was a professional obligation of phys-
icians. It was part of their pedagogy, 
how they learned, how they defended 
their theories and practice, and how 
they practiced medicine.
 23 When we think of “authoritative 
tradition” in a medical context, rather 
than, as is more usual, in a religious 
or philosophical context, the value 
and indeed necessity of a respect for 
tradition becomes obvious, since, if 
every physician had to re-invent the 
full inventory of medical lore and 
acquired knowledge all over again, 
everyone’s health would be at greater 
risk. Medicine learns from the trial 
and error of preceding generations; 
its accumulated knowledge can be 
supplemented and modified by fresh 
observations and discoveries, but 
accumulated traditional knowledge 
can only be ignored at the peril of the 
physician and his patients.
 24 Deriving philosophical categories 
by inflecting a key verb, in this case 
the verbal root of “action,” karma 
(from the root √kṛ), is an inherit-
ance from the other great influence 
on Indian philosophy, the gram-
matical tradition. See below under 
“Logical Styles.” For an example 
in a decidedly philosophical con-
text that draws on the same root, 
compare the following kārikā from 
Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 
(8:4): “If a cause [for an action] does 
not actualize (asat), the enacted 
(kārya) and activator (kāraṇa) are 
not found. | Those not having come 
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to be (abhāva), activity (kṛiya), actor 
(kartā), and acting (karaṇa) are not 
found.” (hetāvasati kāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ 
ca na vidyate | tadabhāve kriyā kartā 
karaṇaṃ ca na vidyate)
 25 The Tevijja sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya 
of the Buddhist Tipiṭaka gives a 
humorous, satirical parody of reli-
gious devotionalism, comparing it to 
someone who proclaims he is in love 
with the most beautiful woman in the 
world, but when asked what does she 
look like, what type of hair, eyes, and 
so on does she possess, what is her 
caste, etc., he replies: “I don’t know.” 
Devotionalism, Buddha concludes, is 
as ineffective as someone who, wish-
ing to get to the other shore of a river, 
builds a fire and sits down, chanting 
to the other shore to “come here,” 
rather than building a raft and mak-
ing his way across.
 26 Kant, in a letter to Christian Garve. 
Quoted in Immanuel Kant, Opus 
postumum, ed. Eckart Förster; trans. 
Eckart Förster and Michael Rosen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), “Introduction,” p. xvi.
 27 Ibid.
 28 Geoffrey Lloyd and Nathan Sivin, 
The Way and the Word: Science and 
Medicine in Early China and Greece 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2003).
 29 (1) Duḥkha (dis-ease, a.k.a. 
“suffering”), (2) samudaya (identify-
ing the causes of duḥkha), (3) nirodha 
(assurance that the causes can be 
eliminated), and (4) mārga (the way to 
eliminate the causes).
 30 For instance, it is the topic of chap. 
7 of part 2 (Nidāna-sthāna) of the 
Caraka-saṃhitā.
 31 The three doṣas – vāta, pitta, and 
śleṣman, based respectively on the 
three elements wind, fire-heat, and 
water – are fundamental categories of 
Indian medicine into which diseases, 
symptoms, pharmaceuticals, foods, 
etc., are classified and analyzed. For 
a general discussion that includes 
Buddhist usages, see Hartmut 
Scharfe, “The Doctrine of the Three 
Humors in Traditional Indian 
Medicine and the Alleged Antiquity 
of Tamil Siddha Medicine,” Journal of 
the American Oriental Society 119, no. 
4 (1999): 609–29.
 32 The next oldest Indian medical text, 
Suśruta-saṃhitā, contains materi-
als roughly contemporaneous with 
Asaṇga (4th century) but is recog-
nized to also contain much later ma-
terial in the redaction that has come 
down to us.
 33 Pātakebhyaḥ paraṃ caitat pātakaṃ 
nāstikagrahaḥ. I have consulted two 
editions of the Caraka-saṃhitā, 
both containing the original text in 
devanagri and an English translation: 
(1) Caraka-saṃhitā: Agniveśa’s treatise 
refined and annotated by Caraka and re-
dacted by Dṛḍhabala: text with English 
translation, Priyavrat Sharma (editor-
translator) (Varanasi: Chaukhambha 
Orientalia, 1981–83), 4 vols.; and 
(2) Agniveśa’s Caraka saṃhita: text 
with English translation & critical 
exposition based on Cakrapāṇi Datta’s 
Āyurveda dīpikā, Ram Karan Sharma 
and Bhagwan Dash (trans. and ed.) 
(Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit 
Series Office, 1976–2002), 7 vols. The 
translation above is from passages 
14–15 of chap. 11, vol. 1, p. 209 of 
Sharma and Dash.
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 34 The CS in its available redaction is 
heavily steeped in Sāṃkhyan theory, 
which holds that the world consists of 
varying proportions of three constitu-
ent factors: sattva (light, pure, etc.), 
rajas (passionate, active), and tamas 
(dark, dull, inert). By implication, CS 
is claiming that someone devoid of 
rajas and tamas (skewering passions 
and stupidity) must be sattvic (pure, 
enlightened), and thus constitution-
ally incapable of lying.
 35 Sharma and Dash, vol. 1, 213.
 36 Prajñā-parādha is translated by 
Sharma and Dash as “intellectual 
blasphemy” and “intellectual error” 
by P.V. Sharma. It literally means 
“an offense to reason,” i.e., acting 
unreasonably. The CS uses the term in 
a number of ways, but what they seem 
to have in common is acting or having 
an attitude that is unreasonable, i.e., 
endangering one’s health in ways that 
one should know better than to en-
gage in. E.g., Sūtra-sthāna, chap. 38: 
39-40 states: “Due to prajñāparādha, 
he indulges in unwholesome sense 
objects, suppression of natural urges 
and taking up risky jobs. The ignorant 
one is attached to temporarily pleas-
ing objects but the learned is not so 
because of his understanding having 
been clear” (P.V. Sharma, vol. 1, 231).
 37 Reflection #90, Aphorisms and 
Reflections, selected by Henrietta A. 
Huxley (London: Macmillan, 1907).
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as a Site for Intercultural 
Philosophical and Theological 
Reflection: The Case of the  
Śrīmad Rahasyatrayasāra and  
the Traité de l’Amour de Dieu




I propose that religious texts – considered seriously, in depth – constitute 
a most appropriate and fruitful place for reflection on philosophical and 
theological issues in an intercultural context. This is because such texts 
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provide access to worlds of thought that are invariably complex and di-
verse terrains, partly accessible and partly particular, insider discourse, 
branching off in various diverse and elusive ways. Such texts are often 
particularly rich in style and in reader expectations. Two such texts from 
two traditions, read together, create an array of intercultural possibilities 
that can generate a considerable range of philosophical and theological re-
flection. This kind of reflection on complex texts that are both philosoph-
ical and theological, highly rational and richly imaginative, is superior to 
thematic comparisons; for the texts resist conclusive generalizations and 
keep introducing cultural and religious specificity back into generalizing 
discourses.1
I thus reaffirm my long-term interest in the close study of texts as 
productive of religious and philosophical insight in part because of what 
I have learned from a more generalist and generalizing project I was part 
of from 1995 to 2000: the Comparative Religious Ideas Project (CRIP) 
directed by Robert Neville at Boston University, a five-year venture that 
involved only fifteen participants and led to three edited volumes, The 
Human Condition, Ultimate Realities, and Religious Truth.2 CRIP was a 
very fine effort to bring together theorists and philosophers of comparative 
work (such as Neville himself) and tradition-specific specialist scholars 
(such as myself, in this instance), for the sake of creating a more integral 
conversation that would be both theoretically satisfying and responsible 
in particular disciplinary detail. Our hope in CRIP was to bridge the gap 
between the theoretical frameworks for comparative work and the highly 
professionalized detailed scholarship of the specialist, rooting the former 
in detail and liberating the latter from the control of narrow groups of 
specialist experts.
My impression, however – shared by others both in the project and ob-
serving it – has been that the volumes arising from CRIP did not achieve 
the integration that was hoped for. Rather, they less successfully placed 
specialist studies between meta- reflections on traditions and themes, and 
even on particularities. Readers have tended to read selectively, without 
having to engage the whole project. From the particularities of the con-
versation, the participants sought a common ground in general thematic 
issues, but this thematic generality failed to keep up with the particular-
ities of what had been learned; we would have been better off, I decided, 
in more particularity and less generalization.
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In the course of CRIP, I had been stressing specific Hindu traditions’ 
claims about truth and the accessibility of truth to those willing to rea-
son coherently, and all of this was related to my own book, Hindu God, 
Christian God.3 But after that I wrote that book and was aware of the 
complexity of my own production, I ended up reaffirming the view that 
learning across traditional boundaries takes a very long time and can-
not be speeded up by swifter theorizing – and is best mediated by long 
reflection on carefully studied texts. So now I am again interested in the 
possibility of gaining help from richly variegated texts that afford multiple 
points of access but also connect one to the other points of access.
The rest of this reflection has to do with an intercultural reading pro-
ject that I finished recently, dealing with a Tamil Hindu text and a French 
Catholic text.4
BY WAY OF EXAMPLE, TWO TEXTS
I wrote about two extraordinarily rich and complex religious texts: first, 
the Śrīmad Rahasyatrayasāra [Essence of the Three Mysteries; henceforth 
Essence] by the fourteenth-century Hindu theologian Vedānta Deśika 
(Veṅkaṭanātha), a work that is an exegesis of the three holy mantras 
[rahasyas] of his tradition and argument for radical surrender to God; 
second, the Traité de l ’Amour de Dieu [Treatise on the Love of God; hence-
forth Treatise] of the seventeenth-century French Catholic theologian 
(and bishop of Geneva) Francis de Sales, a text that argues that the deep 
pleasure and satisfaction of “Nothing but God” is the only true destiny of 
the human person.5 The Essence is a key work for the Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition 
(dedicated to the worship of the deities Nārāyaṇa with his consort Śrī), 
and a kind of summa of spiritual theology; it was written at the end of 
Deśika’s life, intended to provide a full and correct framework in which 
to understand and practice of surrender to God. Francis de Sales’s most 
famous work is the Introduction to the Devout Life, but the Treatise offers 
his full vision of the mystical life of the Christian – toward unity with 
God in love – with its philosophical grounding.
Both the Essence and the Treatise are classic religious texts offering 
philosophical starting points that are, at least in theory, accessible to any 
intelligent and attentive reader. They can be read and understood, and 
they are forceful enough to provoke reactions, and then possible empathy 
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and intentional engagement. Both move from philosophical starting 
points to increasingly tradition-specific assertions that require insider 
belonging and loyalty. Both respect reason but push on to engage more 
mystical claims that can be partly understood, while possibly remaining 
in significant ways inaccessible to those who have not participated in the 
life and practices of its tradition. The Essence and Treatise are complex texts 
including varied kinds of discourse, which Deśika and Sales claim to be 
successfully melded into whole texts.
Because the Essence and Treatise are reasoned treatises that make philo-
sophical claims that then open into theological and mystical claims, they 
can be read in a distanced and speculative fashion, they can be thought 
about, but they can also be appropriated in an increasingly engaged way 
by those who would take them to heart and even pray with them, through 
them.
For the sake of an example to accompany this brief paper, I have 
paired the third chapter of the Essence with Book I, chapters 15–17 of the 
Treatise, and appended both sections in translation. I urge readers to spend 
some time with them since there is really no other satisfactory way to 
understand what I mean. Reading carefully is the substance and the point. 
These sections are early in each work, part of the foundations intended to 
prepare for their later arguments in favour of complete surrender to God; 
for it is necessary, they believe, to make the case that the higher ideals 
and sentiments of divine love are, not merely unexpected or miraculous 
graced events, but also completions to human existence even as ordinarily 
understood. Let us now consider each text in turn.
ESSENCE OF THE THREE MYSTERIES, CHAPTER 3: ON 
THE PRIMARY AND DISTINCTIVE DOCTRINE OF THE 
ŚRĪVAIṢṆAVA TRADITION
Here is an outline of Essence, chapter 3, “On the Distinguishing Doctrine 
of Our Tradition”:
 a. Opening verse
 b. The meaning of “distinctive doctrine”
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 c. The distinguishing feature of our Vedānta: the lord as 
possessor of all as his body, as support of all, and as the 
one on whom all depends
 d. The analogy of beings and their qualities and defining 
characteristics
 e. The Lord supports all by his proper form and his will
 f. The Lord upholds nature by his proper form and by will
 g. The relationship of depending and being depended on
 h. This knowledge of dependence as fruitful and exclusive
 i. The distinctive teaching is revealed in the three holy 
mantras
 j. The traditional teaching of Appuḷḷār on the Tiru Mantra
 k. The Tiru Mantra and the freedom distinctive to humans
 l. Concluding Tamil and Sanskrit verses
In ways that cannot be adequately detailed here, Deśika is setting up the 
entirety of his Essence – all thirty-two chapters – in this chapter. The theme 
of the human’s utter dependence and the divine’s utter intent to protect the 
human appears regularly and variously in the chapters to follow, and, as 
the title of the work suggests, in the regular reference to the truths of self 
and God as inscribed in the three mantras. A basic philosophical point 
about finitude is played out in a variety of theological and devotional ways.
Deśika does not discuss where Rāmānuja might have gotten the idea 
of the body–possessor of the body (śarīra-śarīri) relationship, although we 
know that the dependent–depended upon (śeṣa-śeṣi) relationship of utter de-
pendence is most easily traced to the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini and no-
tions of ritual utility. In Rāmānuja’s usage (in the Vedārtha Saṃgraha, for 
instance)6 both the body–possessor of the body and the dependent–depended 
upon relations are allied with a more elaborate theory of denotation, to-
ward a striking conclusion about how language works and words mean: 
all words refer, not only to bodies and possessors of those bodies in our 
world, but ultimately to the Lord who is the inner support of all dependent 
realities.
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But it is key that, at the start of the process, there is nothing in par-
ticular about this distinctive (pratitantra) idea that requires one to be a 
Śrīvaiṣṇava to understand it. Much of the middle of chapter 3 (sections 
e–h) is about the divine presence and intention that keep the universe 
in working order, and Deśika is very interested in how God supports all 
things by his simple existence and also by the divine will.
It is only in the latter part of the chapter that Deśika turns to the re-
ligious/spiritual meaning of the body–possessor of the body and depend-
ent–depended upon relationship he has explained philosophically, by now 
turning to the liberative fruitfulness of knowing this relationship to God, 
and, for conscious beings, by choosing to affirm what is already ontologic-
ally the case; utter dependence (śeṣatva) counts as a distinctive religious 
position that is nonetheless first presented as a philosophical position that 
does not require faith or a learning of tradition. Later, it becomes a mat-
ter of ethics – service (being a servant, slave: dāsatva) – which then too 
is a matter of a spiritual life lived entirely in accord with dependence on 
God. One cannot end as a philosopher, but certainly one can begin as a 
philosopher.
When we get to the reflections on the Tiru Mantra (and other man-
tras) and the inner truths of the tradition (sections i, j, k), it is obviously 
the case that we have now become involved in insider discourse that re-
quires respect for the mantras and a willingness to listen to and accept the 
traditional oral teaching of Appuḷḷār, Deśika’s own teacher. These points 
are ostensibly inaccessible to non-Śrīvaiṣṇavas, and of little interest, and 
yet – this is the key point – for Deśika there is a natural and inevitable flow 
from the philosophical explication to the scriptural and mantric analyses, 
and to reflections drawn from the oral tradition.
Finally, the opening and closing verses of the chapter seem intended 
by Deśika to reach a wider audience that may find Deśika’s arguments 
hard going, but can still appreciate the loveliness and devotion of such 
verses. Appreciative readers can thereby begin to appropriate, simply on 
the basis of beautiful words that “happen” to be rich in potent meaning, 
the underlying insight into dependence on God as a life-transforming re-
ality. But I suggest that the verses are more accessible to readers when they 
understand the philosophical and linguistic and exegetical arguments in 
the chapter; for here, too, the boundaries are not fixed, and what is true 
easily shifts into what is beautiful.
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TREATISE I.15–17: ON THE NATURAL LOVE FOR GOD AND 
THE FRUSTRATION OF THAT LOVE BY SIN
In the Treatise I.15–17 we do not see so dramatic a shift from philosophy 
to traditional wisdom, but there is still a very imaginative diversity to 
Sales’s discourse, which includes philosophical grounding and a variety of 
spiritual claims. Here is my outline of the three chapters:
Treatise I.15, “Of the affinity there is between God and man”
 a. The testimony of Aristotle; indications from ordinary 
experience
 b. Human Pleasure in God is natural, but also known from 
scripture
 c. The analogy of human and divine natures and ways of 
being and knowing
 d. The reciprocal fulfillment of God and the human
 e. Analogies: mother’s milk; erotic affinity; wine and 
breasts
 f. An appetite satisfied only in God
Treatise I.16, “That we have a natural inclination to love God above 
all things”
 a. The inclination to God is both natural and supernatural
 b. The desire for God persists even in the current state of 
things
 c. The analogy of a partridge seeking its true mother
 d. The instinct for God is never lost
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Treatise I.17, “That we have not naturally the power to love God 
above all things”
 a. The inclination toward God diminished by sin
 b. The testimony of the philosophers
 c. The failure of the philosophers to follow through on their 
knowledge
 d. Imperfect love and the weakness of the will
Sales first (section I.15.a) stakes out a philosophical starting point, when 
he begins chapter 15 with reference to Aristotle’s teaching on the procliv-
ity of humans toward the celestial realm, in their search for happiness.7 
What philosophy declares, scripture confirms (section I.15.b)
Enlisting Aristotle as an ally, Sales echoes the classical Christian 
theological view – of Augustine and Aquinas, for instance – that humans 
are both innately oriented to God, happy only in that relationship, but 
also, in the current condition of original sin, unable ever to complete and 
satisfy that desire for union with God. Strikingly, he then (section I.15.c) 
takes up in a rather matter of fact fashion the analogy between the nature 
of the soul’s self-knowledge and the Trinity’s own knowledge of itself. 
While the latter is of course a specifically Christian doctrine, it is here 
presented in a rather matter of fact fashion, as accessible in reason to audi-
ence members willing to think about this truth that they already know.
Similarly, the reflection (in section I.15.d) on the joys of giving and 
receiving – the wondrous exchange of God and humans, by which both 
are fulfilled – does not at first demand any particular Christian insight 
– until Sales rather definitively determines that giving is better, because 
Jesus so indicated by his words and example. But clearly Sales is hoping to 
achieve more by turning (in section I.15.e) to the Song of Songs, and then 
to the images of breast feeding and erotic affinities; he wants to awaken 
the minds and desires of his readers, to make real his point on the natural 
intimacy of the self and God.
I.16 is at its core another affirmation of Catholic doctrine: sin dam-
ages and diminishes the innate human inclination toward God, but can-
not destroy it. Yet here too, Sales offers a variety of reasons and analogies 
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and does not depend simply on doctrine. Thus, just as a partridge chick 
raised by a partridge other than its mother instinctively seeks out its own 
mother, even a wandering soul inevitably and by instinct seeks for its true 
source, mother, God. The whole of I.16 is at once a careful analysis of the 
natural realm, which Sales wants to preserve, and a meditation on the role 
of grace, which for Sales is everywhere in nature.
I.17 is notable also because of its mention of philosophers. Here Sales 
employs another classic Christian apologetic strategy, both calling the pa-
gan philosophers as witnesses to the truth of the one God and as examples 
of those who know what is true but do not follow up on it. This reading of 
the philosophers – sweeping, undocumented in the Treatise – is all about 
applying the judgment of Romans 1 to them, a move that requires confi-
dence that Greek philosophers can be thus judged according to the New 
Testament. But two further points can be made. First, Sales is serious that 
the testimonies of the philosophers count for something; they do testify 
to the truth, and reading them illumines the truth of the one true God. 
Second, attacking the philosophers is not itself a goal. Sales’s point (like 
that of Deśika later on, in chapter 7 of the Essence),8 is that knowledge by 
itself is of no profit; an honest knower must recognize and live out the 
implications of what one has found to be true and change one’s life. Sales’s 
claim, correct or not, is that many a great philosopher had the right ideas 
but failed in courage and virtue when it came to stating forthrightly and 
living honestly what he (or she) had understood to be the case.
Together, the three chapters, with their inscribed references to 
scripture, the Greek philosophers (and Augustine’s views on them), offer 
an intellectual terrain that is accessible as text and a set of ideas, and yet too 
an entrée to Christian-specific insights, apologetic and mystical. As one 
picks up the Treatise and begins to read it, one also begins to understand 
each of the elements Sales brings together, and all of them as interwoven, 
from the generally accessible to the more specifically Christian insider 
discourse.
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READING DEŚIKA AND SALES TOGETHER, AS THE 
FOUNDATION FOR AN INTERCULTURAL REFLECTION
Against the background of a careful reading of the two excerpts – a read-
ing merely suggested here, not fully practised – we can now engage in an 
additional and also complex operation of intercultural philosophical and 
theological reflection.
Each text affords access to a reasonable and intelligent reader but 
draws that reader into more particular and less comfortable modes of in-
sight peculiar to each tradition itself. Reading the Treatise as a Roman 
Catholic, I am reminded of familiar themes, beliefs, and values, and I 
am taught to see them a little differently and more deeply; reading the 
Essence as a Roman Catholic, I begin to understand the unfamiliar, get-
ting drawn into the ideas and then to beliefs and affective connections of 
the Śrīvaiṣṇava community. Reading them both together, both become 
both more and less familiar as expositions of ideas and beliefs and practi-
ces, and together create new combinations for consideration in a variety of 
ways. We can consider in turn issues of content, method, and the trans-
formation of the reader. Essence 3 and Treatise I.15–17 read together as an 
intensely interesting and provocative, but also unruly and open-ended, 
site for an intercultural philosophy or theology that is philosophical and 
religious and possibly mystical too, if the individual texts and their com-
bination do their work.
CONTENT
Reading the selected Essence and Treatise passages together allows us to 
reflect on the nature of the human in relation to the divine, beginning 
with basic anthropological and theological notions about human and div-
ine beings. Both Deśika and Sales have strong and similar views about the 
orientation of all beings to God, and about how humans are in a position 
to observe this dynamism in nature and in themselves, making a choice 
to affirm the dynamism and live in accord with it. In a way that is not 
reducible to theses or general concepts, but which nonetheless is not over-
ly encumbered with tradition-specific claims, these texts, read together, 
provide for us a site for an intercultural reflection on human nature and 
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related matters; for they are written as if philosophy and faith rest on a 
continuum.
If one chooses, one can use these texts as a basis for arguing that 
there are universal – or at least universalizing – patterns to “the human” 
and its relation to “the divine”; for both Sales and Deśika argue for the 
same general pattern of human dependence on the divine, the finite on the 
transcendent, despite the vast differences in their religious and cultural 
locations and the utter lack of any shared historical context. However in-
teresting such claims may be, they ought not to replace attention to the 
texts, since both authors want to do more than make claims about hu-
man nature, and their texts are always saying more than any set of claims 
drawn from them.
Both write with passion, and both put forward affective and im-
aginative claims and insights about desire and instigative of desire, as a 
physical and spiritual reality, about the natural and unexpected ways in 
which desire is fulfilled, and thus too thereby opening paths into the two 
traditions’ positive religious and even mystical claims. In terms of ethical 
implications, both point to the ideal of a life entirely dedicated to God, 
and lived with a sense of not belonging to oneself, and then specify these 
implications in terms of more articulate communal religious values.
It is still more elusive to think about whether we also find in the 
Essence and the Treatise deeper mystical resonances lending credence to 
the view that mystical experiences are at least similar across religious and 
cultural boundaries. But one could just as easily accentuate differences in 
emotion or affect, noticing for instance that Sales’s appeal to the Song of 
Songs and “the kisses of the mouth,” is quite apart from Deśika’s intense 
but restrained reflections on the graciousness of the divine teacher or the 
steadfastness of Rāma, Sītā, and Lakṣmaṇa in their forest travels.
METHOD
Each text “works” on multiple levels and makes connections among lin-
guistic, philosophical, theological, mystical, and other tradition-based re-
sources. When the texts are read together, the possibilities are maximized 
and intensified. Taken seriously, the continuum of traditional, religious, 
and rational insights written into the Essence 3 and Treatise I.15–17 facili-
tates a new conversation that can be philosophical and about human nature 
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and finitude, or theological and about dependence on God, or pious and 
tradition-specific, or even a matter of rhetoric, related to the deeper and 
more particular ways by which writers touch the hearts of attentive read-
ers who are open both to ideas and to religious sentiment. All of this can 
be thought and written through comparatively, perhaps beginning with 
the rhetoric of such texts.
This shared reading provides a complex starting point – reference, 
foundation, directions – for an intercultural reflection, philosophical 
or theological. Each text is itself a synthesis compounded by its author; 
together, the paired texts constitute a still more complex conversation in 
which the reader who is philosophically or theologically inclined reads his 
or her way back and forth across the spectrum of matters philosophical 
and theological, or rational and affective.
CHOICES BY THE AGENT OF AN INTERCULTURAL 
REFLECTION
If one then reads more widely in the whole of these texts, and then in other 
texts as well, there will be no end to what can be imagined and under-
stood, philosophically or religiously, by a careful and dedicated reader. If 
so, the reader has to make choices about how to read and what to privilege, 
but also can never do so in a way that forecloses other such choices.
All of this then depends on the authors of each text, on the scholar 
who brings the hitherto unconnected texts together, and on subsequent 
readers (including the intercultural scholar) who read the two together 
and manage to shape meanings for them. There is no sure way to prescribe 
how such readers – from one tradition or the other, or from neither – is to 
begin to decipher either the Essence or the Treatise – for example, by prefer-
ring historical or philosophical analysis, or instead by plunging more dir-
ectly into the more “interior” moments of tradition-specific and mystical 
language. So too, it is up to such readers to decide whether to follow the 
texts as far as they go, or to stop with any segment of their analysis. And 
finally, it follows that the various combinations open for an intercultural 
reflection –  stressing the philosophical or the theological or the mystical, 
highlighting differences or similarities, speaking on a distanced and meta-
level or deciding to become autobiographical – are up to the reader.
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In all these moments, no particular choices by any given reader can 
foreclose other such possible choices; and no determinations, however 
forcefully made, can succeed in stipulating the meaning of the reading 
practice or the consequences to be drawn from it. My approach thus re-
quires attention again to the agent – author, intercultural scholar, reader 
– and the capacities of that agent to cross boundaries and to learn with 
agility in the new framework, beginning with what he or she finds more 
accessible but then also moving to what is less so because of genuine or 
seeming demands on the agent to decide how and whether to be also a 
participant. This kind of intercultural theology or philosophy of religion 
is an inherently provisional practice that one cannot ever be quite finished 
with. The reading goes on – to great profit – but nonetheless is never done 
with.
I suggest that this entire process, in which the reader is intensively 
and continually over time faced with two (or more) potent texts which can 
be read in various ways but in no way that successfully ends the reading 
of them, can make the reader into a philosopher or theologian or even 
mystic, with an openness and selectivity that are appropriate to our times, 
and with a hopeful openness to the mysteries of which such texts, still and 
continually available, continue to speak.
ON THE LIMITS OF MY APPROACH
This is an approach that plays to my strengths and interests, but I would 
not seriously expect all intercultural work to proceed in this way. It is an 
approach that has its limits too. It is time-consuming, exhausting, and 
very slow-moving. However interesting this interplay is, it occurs only 
on a very small scale. The intercultural conversation is reduced to two 
cultural and religious traditions, and within that to the writings of specific 
thinkers and, often enough, as here, to specific manageable sections of 
such texts. It cannot seriously be justified as merely starting small; at such 
a pace as I am suggesting and illustrating here, not even a very large sec-
tion of the engaged traditions could ever be covered. There would be no 
question of dealing with four or five or six such traditions, even if under 
ideal circumstances an energetic and learned person might deal with a 
number of texts, and possibly with a third tradition.
RELIGIOUS INTELLECTUAL TEXTS186
But then the more complex problems I have noticed with regard to the 
CRIP project re-emerge, should we try to figure out how to streamline 
things, for the sake of those who want to compare on a grander scale and 
without the patience to read very carefully over a very long period of time.
But, for now, the proof is in the reading: the following, larger part of 
this essay is not merely an appendix. Rather, it is the essential site where 
the work of an intercultural reading takes place, as readers seek to make 
sense philosophically and religiously of the claims and values proposed by 
Francis de Sales, Vedānta Deśika, and myself as a writer who has drawn 
them into my own project.
II. TEXTS
ESSENCE OF THE THREE MYSTERIES, CHAPTER 3, “ON THE 
DISTINGUISHING DOCTRINE OF OUR TRADITION”  
by Vedānta Deśika
a. Opening verse9
“All this world –
what is and endures, its activity and results –
is the first maker’s body,
in accord with rules regarding what it is to be depended   
 upon, and the rest:”
when one sees all this,
the Lord is seen in the mirror of the “pervasive” mantras,   
 and
one plumbs the workings of the minds
of those deep, uncreated peaks [our teachers].
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b. The meaning of “distinctive doctrine”10
“Distinctive doctrine” (“Pratitantra”) indicates some idea that is not com-
monly shared; it distinguishes one’s siddhānta (firm, core position), such as 
is not accepted by proponents of other such siddhāntas.
c. The distinguishing feature of our Vedānta: the lord as possessor 
of all as his body, as support of all, and as the one on whom all 
depends
If you ask what is that primary and non-common meaning belonging to 
our Vedānta system (darśana), it is the relationship of body and self between 
the lord and conscious and non-conscious beings. In this regard, the Lord 
is the possessor of the body (śarīri) – he is he who supports (dhāraka), in 
terms of restriction regarding things that are conscious or non-conscious; 
he is the controller (niyanta) and the one to whom all belongs (śeṣi). 
Conscious and non-conscious beings are the śarīra – things which are 
supported (dhārya) with respect to the lord, and also controlled (niyamya), 
and dependent (śeṣa). He is the support and controller for conscious and 
non-conscious beings, by his proper form and will, as prompting their 
existence, continuation, and activity.
d. The analogy of beings and their qualities and defining 
characteristics
How? Just as the dharmas defining the Lord’s proper form and the guṇas, 
specifying his defined proper form [depend entirely on him but remain 
distinct], similarly, with respect to all those things that are separate from 
him, he is the support, without interruption and by his proper form.
He is also the support, as substance, for the guṇas, etc., that rely on 
other substances. Some say that it is by way of the living selves ( jīvas) that 
the Lord is the support for the bodies carried by those living souls. Other 
teachers (ācāryas) say that he is support by his proper form, though using 
the living selves as the means to that.
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e. The Lord supports all by his proper form and his will
Thus, all things are inseparable specifications with respect to the Lord’s 
proper form, and so their existence, etc., are dependent on the existence 
of that [divine] abode.
Yet the existence of all things depends on his will; that is, things that 
are impermanent arise by impermanent wishes, permanent things by his 
permanent wish. The discerning have distinguished this by the śloka,
By your wish alone is the existence of all things.
[Those which are eternally pleasing to you are eternal,
eternally by their own proper form exclusively dependent   
 on you – 
thus your auspicious guṇas are examples for us.]
(Vaikuṇṭa Stavam 36 of Āḻvāṉ)
And so, their continuation – continuance in existence – dependent on the 
Lord’s will – and so it is said that all depends on the Lord’s will.
f. The Lord upholds nature by his proper form and by will
That heavy things are carried by his will is stated in scripture,
The heavens, moon, sun, stars, sky, directions, earth, great 
oceans – by the manly power of Vāsudeva, the great self, are 
held in order. 
[Mahābhārata, Anuśāsana Parva 254.136]
Thus they are rooted in their specific places, so that they don’t fall.
If you ask what the proper form of the highest self does for such things 
that have being, continuation, and activity dependent on his will, it is the 
will of the highest self that makes it happen that all these various things 
depend on the proper form of the highest self. Thus, all things depend on 
the proper form of the Lord and also depend on the Lord’s will.
In ordinary life, we see that the body depends on the proper form of 
that one that possesses the body, and on that one’s will. After the time 
of that self ’s [living in that body], the body perishes when that living self 
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leaves it. That this is a dependence on the proper form, and not on the will, 
is clear in the states of deep sleep, etc.
In the waking state, it abides by the will lest it fall – and so one can 
say that it is dependent on the will. It is said to be founded on (adheyatva) 
when it is dependent on the proper form; it is said to be controlled by 
(niyamya) when dependent on the will.
g. The relationship of depending and being depended on
The Lord is the one on whom all depends; as it says,
He established the conscious and the non-conscious in their 
existence,
enduring, and restriction, and so forth,
indicating them as his own – thus the word of the Upaniṣads.
Being the means and the goal – such is your Reality, not merely 
your qualities;
and so, Lord of Śrī Raṅgam, I take you as my refuge, without 
pretext. 
– [Śrīraṅgarājastava II.87]
All these things exist for his purpose, and their sole proper way of being 
is to be for the sake of this Other; he has control of them, and by them he 
has his glory.
h. This knowledge of dependence as fruitful and exclusive
What is the fruit for the conscious being of this support–supported rela-
tion? We respond: By this support–supported relation, there is the acqui-
sition of a proper form that definitely is not separable – just as is the case 
with his knowledge, power, etc. By this dependent–depended upon way 
of being, in accord with that settled human goal which is in keeping with 
the self ’s own understanding, there develops a taste for that human goal 
that is in keeping with his proper form. By the dependent–depended upon 
way of being and by the controller–controlled way of being, in accord with 
that human goal which is in keeping with his proper form, there is that 
specific means which has no need [for anything else]. It is this knowledge 
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that is the fruit. By these, that conscious being becomes one who has no 
other foundation, no other purpose, no other refuge.
i. The distinctive teaching is revealed in the three holy mantras
If you ask how this meaning is present in the first mystery [rahasya mantra, 
the Tiru Mantra, aum namo Nārāyaṇāya, Om, reverence to Nārāyaṇa]: In 
the word “Nārāyaṇa,” by the tatpuruṣa and bahuvrīhi forms of compound, 
we have both his being the support and the fact that he pervades all. Thus 
we grasp his proper form as specified by having no other foundation, etc. 
By the latter two words [in the mantra] which are the source for “being for 
the sake of the other” and “depending on the other,” we find “having no 
other purpose” and “having no other refuge.”
As for the jewel of a mantra [the Dvaya Mantra] that illumines the 
practice of taking refuge (prapatti), in its first clause, we find “having no 
other refuge,” and in its latter clause, “having no other purpose.” By both 
parts, [the Dvaya Mantra] illumines having no other foundation. These 
points are made in the Carama Śloka too, explicitly and implicitly.
Thus too, in the Carama Śloka, in order to win over the siddha means 
(the existent means, the Lord), we find the specification of the means 
that is to be accomplished [sādhya means, the means to be accomplished, 
taking-refuge]. By the Dvaya Mantra, we learn what needs to be meditated 
on at the time of performance; the Tiru Mantra illumines succinctly, as a 
small mirror show great forms, all the things that are needed.
j. The traditional teaching of Appuḷḷār on the Tiru Mantra
In the first word [aum], one sees the meanings found in the chariot of 
Arjuna, and in the verse,
Rāma went in front, [Sītā, whose waist is lovely, in the middle;
behind, with bow in hand, follows Lakṣmaṇa.]11 
[Rāmāyaṇa, Arāṇya Kāṇḍa 3.11.1]
In the second word [namo], by the word itself, and by the proper-being 
[svabhāva] underlying that meaning, one knows the meanings that per-
tain to [the other brothers], Śrī Bharata and Śrī Śatrughan.
191Francis X. Clooney, S. J.
The meaning of the word “Nārāyaṇa” is in accord with [what the aḻvār 
says]:
“I am not, without you; but see, Nārāyaṇa, you without me are 
not,” [Nāṉmukaṉ Tiruvantāti 7]
This is seen when one takes as an example the people of the Kośala land 
and the emperor’s son.12
The main thrust is seen in the first two words [aum and namo] – that 
is, respectively, the highest meaning that is reaching the goal, and de-
pendence; that desired service – in which the one on whom all depends 
delights – lies in the meaning of the third word [Nārāyaṇa] in its dative 
form. All this is clear in the activity and cessation of activity that belong 
respectively to Lakṣmana and to his special avatāra that is Tiruvaṭi (the 
serpent Śeṣa13).
All this is Appuḷḷār’s way that occasions meditation on the Tiru 
Mantra’s meaning. In the same way, the meanings of the Dvaya Mantra 
and Carama Śloka are clear.
k. The Tiru Mantra and the freedom distinctive to humans
In all this, the Lord’s being the one on whom all depend is illumined as 
a characteristic common to both the conscious and the non-conscious. 
But this must be reflected on, particularly regarding his being Lord with 
respect to conscious beings. That is, being-dependent is common to both 
[conscious and non-conscious beings], but now [with respect to the con-
scious beings], this is to be meditated on with the conclusive, additional 
specification of being-a-servant. The dependent–depended upon relation-
ship is common to both and is to be illumined by the dative [implied] in 
the first syllable.14
[With respect to the Lord and the self], being a servant and be-
ing a master are both specified here; this is manifest in the meaning 
[of Nārāyaṇa].15 Thus both the general and the specific are found in 
“Nārāyaṇa.” The general state of dependence here further indicates that 
[human] state of being a servant and of doing service that pertain to the 
conscious being. By this specification, the human goal has the form of 
service.
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Similarly, by being the one on whom all depends, the lord is con-
nected to abundance; this specification insures that his goal will come to 
fruition. With respect to the protection of conscious beings, the Lord is 
[self-]established and powerful; aside from their behaviour that depends 
on him, conscious beings have no foundation and remain impotent; such 
is the connection. The Lord’s being the one on whom all depends is non-
adventitious and so too his being the controller is non-adventitious; like-
wise, [individual selves’] total dependence is non-adventitious and so too 
their being-controlled is non-adventitious. The “one who possesses” [that 
is, God] thus protects “what he possesses” [that is, living beings]; the “po-
tent one” protects “those who are not potent.” When he protects, the Lord 
protects selves controlled by karma, making them focus on the means [by 
which they can see the Lord’s protection]. This restriction [to dependence 
on their karma] has to do with his own will.
L. CONCLUDING TAMIL AND SANSKRIT VERSES
“He gave us our foundation,
he supports us,
he is the lord controlling us,
there is nothing that is not his,
he is our father, all is his,
there is no equal to him –
this one who wears tulasi leaves in his hair;
we are at his feet that are of inestimable value”:
those learned in the Veda know this as its true content. (Tamil)
If in this final age someone most wise
knows this unique doctrine taught by the king of ascetics 
[Rāmānuja],
a dawn dispelling the darkness of ignorance,
then right there right then
the tumultuous waves of chattering arguments,
the caprice of those establishing their own various views,
will subside at once. (Sanskrit)
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TREATISE I.15: OF THE AFFINITY THERE IS BETWEEN GOD 
AND MAN by Francis de Sales16
a. The testimony of Aristotle; indications from ordinary experience
As soon as man thinks with even a little attention of the divinity, he feels 
a certain delightful emotion of the heart, which testifies that God is God 
of the human heart; and our understanding is never so filled with pleasure 
as in this thought of the divinity, the smallest knowledge of which, as 
says [Aristotle], the prince of philosophers, is worth more than the great-
est knowledge of other things,17 just as the least beam of the sun is more 
luminous than the greatest of the moon or stars, yea is more luminous 
than the moon and stars together. And if some accident terrifies our heart, 
it immediately has recourse to the Divinity, protesting thereby that when 
all other things fail him, it alone stands his friend, and that when he is in 
peril, It only, as his sovereign good, can save and secure him.
b. Human Pleasure in God is natural, but also known from 
scripture
This pleasure, this confidence that man’s heart naturally has in God, can 
spring from no other root than the affinity there is between this divine 
goodness and man’s soul, a great but secret affinity, an affinity that each 
one knows but few understand, an affinity that cannot be denied nor yet 
be easily sounded. We are created to the image and likeness of God [Genesis 1]: 
what does this mean but that we have an extreme affinity with his divine 
majesty?
c. The analogy of human and divine natures and ways of being and 
knowing
Our soul is spiritual, indivisible, immortal; understands and wills freely, 
is capable of judging, reasoning, knowing, and of having virtues, in which 
it resembles God. It resides whole in the whole body, and whole in every 
part thereof, as the divinity is all in all the world, and all in every part 
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thereof. Man knows and loves himself by produced and expressed acts of 
his understanding and will, which proceeding from the understanding 
and the will, and distinct from one another, yet are and remain insepar-
ably united in the soul, and in the faculties from whence they proceed.
In the same way, the Son proceeds from the Father as his knowledge 
expressed, and the Holy Ghost as love breathed forth and produced from 
the Father and the Son, both the Persons being distinct from one another 
and from the Father, and yet inseparable and united, or rather one same, 
sole, simple, and entirely one indivisible divinity.
d. The reciprocal fulfillment of God and the human
But besides this affinity of likenesses, there is an incomparable corres-
pondence between God and man, for their reciprocal perfection: not that 
God can receive any perfection from man, but because as man cannot be 
perfected but by the divine goodness, so the divine goodness can scarcely 
so well exercise its perfection outside itself, as upon our humanity: the one 
has great want and capacity to receive good, the other great abundance 
and inclination to bestow it. Nothing is so agreeable to poverty as a liberal 
abundance, nor to a liberal abundance as a needy poverty, and by how 
much the good is more abundant, by so much more strong is the inclina-
tion to pour forth and communicate itself. By how much more the poor 
man is in want, so much the more eager is he to receive, as a void is to fill 
itself.
The meeting then of abundance and indigence is most sweet and 
agreeable, and one could scarcely have said whether the abounding good 
has a greater contentment in spreading and communicating itself, or the 
failing and needy good in receiving and in drawing to itself, until Our 
Savior had told us that it is more blessed to give than to receive. [Acts 20. 
35]. Now where there is more blessedness there is more satisfaction, and 
therefore the divine goodness receives greater pleasure in giving than we 
in receiving.
e. Analogies: mother’s milk; erotic affinity; wine and breasts
Mothers’ breasts are sometimes so full that they must offer them to some 
child, and though the child takes the breast with great avidity, the nurse 
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offers it still more eagerly, the child pressed by its necessity, and the moth-
er by her abundance.
The sacred spouse wished for the holy kiss of union: O, said she, let 
him kiss me with the kiss of his mouth. [Song of Songs 1.2]. But is there affin-
ity enough, O well-beloved spouse of the well-beloved, between thee and 
thy loving one to bring to the union which thou desirest? Yes, says she: 
give me it; this kiss of union, O thou dear love of my heart: for thy breasts 
are better than wine, smelling sweet of the best ointment [Song of Songs 1.2–3]. 
New wine works and boils in itself by virtue of its goodness and cannot be 
contained within the casks; but thy breasts are yet better, they press thee 
more strongly, and to draw the children of thy heart to them, they spread 
a perfume attractive beyond all the scent of ointments.
f. An appetite satisfied only in God
Thus, Theotimus, our emptiness has need of the divine abundance by rea-
son of its want and necessity, but God’s abundance has no need of our 
poverty but by reason of the excellence of his perfection and goodness; 
a goodness which is not at all bettered by communication, for it acquires 
nothing in pouring itself out of itself; on the contrary, it gives: but our 
poverty would remain wanting and miserable, if it were not enriched by 
the divine abundance. Our soul then seeing that nothing can perfectly 
content her, and that nothing the world can afford is able to fill her cap-
acity, considering that her understanding has an infinite inclination ever 
to know more, and her will an insatiable appetite to love and find the 
good; – has she not reason to cry out:
Ah! I am not then made for this world, there is a sovereign 
good on which I depend, some infinite workman who has 
placed in me this endless desire of knowing, and this appetite 
which cannot be appeased!
And therefore I must tend and extend towards Him, to unite and join 
myself to the goodness of Him to whom I belong and whose I am! Such is 
the affinity between God and man’s soul.
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TREATISE I.16: THAT WE HAVE A NATURAL INCLINATION TO 
LOVE GOD ABOVE ALL THINGS
a. The inclination to God is both natural and supernatural
If there could be found any men who were in the integrity of original jus-
tice in which Adam was created, though otherwise not helped by another 
assistance from God than that which he affords to each creature, in order 
that it may be able to do the actions befitting its nature, such men would 
not only have an inclination to love God above all things but even natur-
ally would be able to put into execution just such an inclination.
For as this heavenly author and master of nature co-operates with and 
lends his strong hand to fire to spring on high, to water to flow towards the 
sea, to earth to sink down to its centre and stay there – so having himself 
planted in man’s heart a special natural inclination not only to love good 
in general but to love in particular and above all things his divine good-
ness which is better and sweeter than all things – the sweetness of his 
sovereign providence required that he should contribute to these blessed 
men of whom we speak as much help as should be necessary to practice 
and effectuate that inclination.
This help would be on the one hand natural, as being suitable to na-
ture, and tending to the love of God as author and sovereign master of 
nature, and on the other hand it would be supernatural because it would 
correspond not with the simple nature of man but with nature adorned, 
enriched and honoured by original justice, which is a supernatural quality 
proceeding from a most special favour of God. But as to the love above 
all things that such help would enable these men to practice, it would be 
called natural because virtuous actions take their names from their objects 
and motives, and this love of which we speak would only tend to God as 
acknowledged to be author, lord and sovereign of every creature by natural 
light only, and consequently to be amiable and estimable above all things 
by natural inclination and tendency.
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b. The desire for God persists even in the current state of things
And although now our human nature be not endowed with that original 
soundness and righteousness which the first man had in his creation, but 
on the contrary be greatly depraved by sin, yet still the holy inclination to 
love God above all things stays with us, as also the natural light by which 
we see his sovereign goodness to be more worthy of love than all things; 
and it is impossible that one thinking attentively upon God, yea even by 
natural reasoning only, should not feel a certain movement of love which 
the secret inclination of our nature excites in the bottom of our hearts, by 
which at the first apprehension of this chief and sovereign object, the will 
is taken, and perceives itself stirred up to a complacency in it.
c. The analogy of a partridge seeking its true mother
It happens often amongst partridges that one steals away another’s eggs 
with intention to sit on them, whether moved by greediness to become a 
mother, or by a stupidity which makes them mistake their own, and behold 
a strange thing, yet well supported by testimony! – the young one which 
was hatched and nourished under the wings of a stranger partridge, at the 
first call of the true mother, who had laid the egg whence she was hatched, 
quits the thief-partridge, goes back to the first mother, and puts herself in 
her brood, from the correspondence which she has with her first origin. 
Yet this correspondence appeared not, but remained secret, shut up and as 
it were sleeping in the bottom of nature, till it met with its object; when 
suddenly excited, and in a sort awakened, it produces its effect, and turns 
the young partridge’s inclination to its first duty.
d. The instinct for God is never lost
It is the same, Theotimus, with our heart, which though it be formed, 
nourished and bred amongst corporal, base, and transitory things, and in 
a manner under the wings of nature, notwithstanding, at the first look it 
throws on God, at its first knowledge of him, the natural and first inclina-
tion to love God, which was dull and imperceptible, awakes in an instant, 
and suddenly appears as a spark from amongst the ashes, which touching 
our will gives it a movement of the supreme love due to the sovereign and 
first principle of all things.
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TREATISE I.17: THAT WE HAVE NOT NATURALLY THE 
POWER TO LOVE GOD ABOVE ALL THINGS
a. The inclination toward God diminished by sin
Eagles have a great heart, and much strength of flight, yet they have in-
comparably more sight than flight and extend their vision much quicker 
and further than their wings.
So our souls, animated with a holy natural inclination towards the 
divinity, have far more light in the understanding to see how lovable it 
is than force in the will to love it. Sin has much more weakened man’s 
will than darkened his intellect, and the rebellion of the sensual appetite, 
which we call concupiscence, does indeed disturb the understanding, but 
still it is against the will that it principally stirs up sedition and revolt: so 
that the poor will, already quite infirm, being shaken with the contin-
ual assaults that concupiscence directs against it, cannot make so great 
progress in divine love as reason and natural inclination suggest to it that 
it should do.
b. The testimony of the philosophers
Alas! Theotimus, what fine testimonies not only of a great knowledge of 
God, but also of a strong inclination towards him, have been left by those 
great philosophers, Socrates, Plato, Trismegistus, Aristotle, Hippocrates, 
Seneca, Epictetus?
SOCRATES
Socrates, the most highly praised amongst them, came to the clear know-
ledge of the unity of God, and felt in himself such an inclination to love 
him that, as Saint Augustine testifies,18 many were of opinion that he 
never had any other aim in teaching moral philosophy than to purify 
minds that they might better contemplate the sovereign good, which is 
the simple unity of the Divinity.
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PLATO
And as for Plato, he sufficiently declares himself in his definition of phil-
osophy and of a philosopher, saying that to do the part of a philosopher 
is nothing else but to love God and that a philosopher is no other thing 
than a lover of God.19 What shall I say of the great Aristotle, who so ef-
ficaciously proves the unity of God20 and has spoken so honourably of it 
in so many places?
c. The failure of the philosophers to follow through on their 
knowledge
But, O eternal God! those great spirits which had so great an inclination 
to love it were all wanting in force and courage to love it well. By visible 
creatures they have known the invisible things of God, yea even his eternal 
power also and divinity, says the Apostle, so that they are inexcusable. Because 
that, when they knew God, they have not glorified him as God, or given thanks. 
[Romans 1. 20ff.] They glorified him indeed in some sort, attributing to 
him sovereign titles of honour, yet they did not glorify him as they ought; 
that is, they did not glorify him above all things, not having the courage 
to destroy idolatry, but communicating with idolaters, detaining the truth 
which they knew in injustice, prisoner in their hearts, and preferring the 
honour and vain repose of their lives before the honour due unto God, they 
grew vain in their knowledge.
SOCRATES
Is it not a great pity, Theotimus, to see Socrates, as Plato reports, speak 
upon his deathbed concerning the gods as though there had been many, 
he knowing so well that there was but one only?21 Is it not a thing to be 
deplored that Plato who understood so clearly the truth of the divine unity 
should ordain that sacrifice should be offered to many gods?22
HERMES TRISMEGISTUS
And is it not a lamentable thing that Mercury Trismegistus should so 
basely lament and grieve over the abolition of idolatry,23 who on so many 
occasions had spoken so worthily of the divinity?
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EPICTETUS
But above all I wonder at the poor good man Epictetus, whose words 
and sentences are so sweet in our tongue, in the translation which the 
learned and agreeable pen of Jean de Saint-François Goulu, Provincial of 
the Congregation of the Feuillants in the Gauls, has recently put before 
us.24 For what a pity it is, I pray you, to see this excellent philosopher speak 
of God sometimes with such relish, feeling, and zeal that one would have 
taken him for a Christian coming from some holy and profound medita-
tion, and yet again from time to time talking of gods after the Pagan 
manner! Alas! this good man, who knew so well the unity of God and 
had so much delight in his goodness, why had he not the holy jealousy of 
the divine honour, so as not to stumble or dissemble in a matter of so great 
consequence?
d. Imperfect love and the weakness of the will
In a word, Theotimus, our wretched nature spoilt by sin, is like palm-trees 
in this land of ours, which indeed make some imperfect productions and 
as it were experiments of fruits, but to bear entire, ripe, and seasoned dates 
– that is, reserved for hotter climates.
For so our human heart naturally produces certain beginnings of 
God’s love, but to proceed so far as to love him above all things, which is 
the true ripeness of the love due unto this supreme goodness, – this be-
longs only to hearts animated and assisted with heavenly grace, and which 
are in the state of holy charity. This little imperfect love of which nature 
by itself feels the stirrings is but a will without will, a will that would but 
wills not, a sterile will, which does not produce true effects, a will sick 
of the palsy, which sees the healthful pond of holy love, but has not the 
strength to throw itself into it. [John 5.7]25 To conclude, this will is an 
abortion of good will, which has not the life of generous strength neces-
sary to effectually prefer God before all things. Whereupon the Apostle 
speaking in the person of the sinner, cries out: To will good is present with 
me, but to accomplish that which is good I find not. [Romans 7.18]
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Phenomenology of Awakening  
in Zhiyi’s Tiantai Philosophy
CHEN-KUO LIN
National Chengchi University
Buddhism can be paralleled only with the highest formations 
of the philosophical and religious spirit of our European cul-
ture. From now on it will be our destiny to blend that Indian 
way of thinking which is completely new for us, with the one 
which for us is old, but which in this confrontation becomes 
alive and strengthened.1 
— Edmund Husserl
I. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I will explore the Buddhist phenomenology of awakening 
as exemplified in the philosophical writings of Zhiyi (智顗, 538–597), the 
founder of the Tiantai School of Buddhism. The phrase “phenomenology 
of awakening” was deliberately coined in contrast to “phenomenology of 
mundane experience.” In the Buddhist context, the former may be referred 
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to as “phenomenology of insight,” whereas the latter is classifiable as “phe-
nomenology of consciousness.” In both forms of phenomenology, method 
is required for the disclosure of truth. However, there are different articu-
lations of truth through different methods employed in different religious 
and philosophical systems. This chapter will be mainly concerned with 
how the truth of awakened experience is disclosed through the meditative 
method in the Buddhist phenomenology of Zhiyi.
Before delving into the discussion proper, I would first like to high-
light several preliminary methodological notes. In complying with the 
formative ideas of this volume, which attempts to investigate the ways in 
which Western philosophy and religion can be rethought through non-
Western categories, I would like to raise two questions. First, in what 
sense can Zhiyi’s Tiantai philosophy be characterized as a form of phe-
nomenology? Second, in what way can Husserlian phenomenology be fur-
ther developed into a phenomenology of awakening as envisioned in the 
Buddhist tradition? For the first question, I would argue that Buddhist 
philosophy in general can be characterized as phenomenological and that 
Zhiyi’s philosophy is no exception. Viewing Buddhist philosophy in terms 
of phenomenology has been the trend in recent decades, and the compat-
ibility of the Buddhist and Western ways of philosophizing has been bril-
liantly explored by several leading scholars, such as J. Mohanty, Iso Kern, 
Dan Lusthaus, Plamen Gradinarov, and Ni Liangkang. Most of them are 
interested in teasing out from Yogācāra Buddhism its phenomenological 
elements, such as the intentional structure of cognition. They insist that 
the mode of philosophizing with regard to our understanding of Buddhist 
philosophy needs to shift from metaphysics to epistemology, and then 
from epistemology to phenomenology. According to the phenomeno-
logical approach, both the object of cognition and the act of cognition are 
seen as two poles in the same structure of consciousness for the reason 
that consciousness is always conscious of both itself and something else. 
For both Husserl and Yogācāra, the structure of consciousness consists of 
three parts: in addition to the object and act of cognition, there also exists 
the self-awareness of consciousness. It is in the domain of consciousness 
that all experience occurs, including the experience of “things themselves” 
in both the Buddhist and Husserlian senses. Things themselves should 
not be regarded as something separate from our conscious experience. 
Hence, all we need concern ourselves with is how things appear in our 
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experience of consciousness, and what we should not concern ourselves 
with is metaphysical speculation. This is the phenomenological attitude 
shared by Zhiyi and Husserl.
And as we begin to appreciate the similar phenomenological trends in 
non-Western philosophies, including especially Buddhist philosophy, we 
should, however, be cautious not to fall into one-sided readings. To gloss 
over substantive differences in doing comparative philosophy will inevit-
ably result in miscategorizations, such as, for example, picturing Mencius 
as Kant, or Zhuangzi as Heidegger. Taking hermeneutical directives from 
Ricoeur and Gadamer, I prefer to adopt the method of dialogical reading, 
hoping that the “other” can be brought into critical conversation. For this 
essay, therefore, I would like to see in Zhiyi’s philosophy the possibility 
of a contribution to the mainstream of phenomenology. And here arises 
the second question: Is it possible for phenomenologists to learn anything 
new from Zhiyi’s Buddhist philosophy? What exactly can be added to the 
diversity of the phenomenological legacy from the canons of Buddhist 
philosophy?
In order to clearly address these questions, this study has been divided 
into two sections. The first section will attempt to lay out the Buddhist 
distinction between mundane experience and awakened experience. The 
two forms of knowledge, mundane knowledge (識; vijñāna) and trans-
mundane insight (智; prajñā) will be closely examined. For convenience, 
I use “knowledge” to mean “mundane knowledge” and “insight” to mean 
“trans-mundane knowledge.”2 In the second part, I will focus on Zhiyi’s 
soteriological phenomenology with special attention given to the prob-
lems of truth, meditation, and insight.
II. KNOWLEDGE AND INSIGHT
A possible contribution to Husserlian phenomenology might be best found 
by way of exploring the Buddhist distinctions of enlightened experience and 
non-enlightened experience. The former arises from the realization of non-
discriminative knowledge (nirvikalpa-jñāna), whereas the latter, mundane 
experience, results from discriminative knowledge (vijñāna). Through this 
distinction, we see the inseparability of experience and knowledge.
But before fully fleshing out the distinctions in Buddhist theory, let 
us look into Husserl first, who was not completely ignorant of Buddhism 
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as religion and philosophy. In a book review written in 1925 for Karl 
Eugen Neumann’s German translation of the Suttapitaka, Husserl praised 
Buddhism as “a religiosity which looks purely inward in vision and deed 
– which, I should say, is not ‘transcendent’, but ‘transcendental’ – enters 
the horizon of our religious and ethical as well as of our philosophical 
consciousness.”3 Although Husserl’s remark is very brief, it nonetheless 
demonstrates that he did view Buddhist philosophy from the perspec-
tive of transcendental phenomenology. Here the term “transcendental” 
is used by Husserl to mean the attitude that is “directed itself to the life 
of consciousness – in which the ‘world’ is for us precisely that, the world 
which is present to us – we find ourselves in a new cognitive attitude [or 
situation],” whereas in the natural attitude “the world is for us the self-
evidently existing universe of realities which are continuously before us in 
unquestioned givenness.”4 Husserl seemed quite excited to learn that this 
“transcendental” insight has long been seen as the guiding principle of 
Buddhist meditation; that is, the constitution of the world is taken as the 
object of consciousness in meditative contemplation. Unlike the natural 
attitude in which the existence of the external world is uncritically as-
sumed, in Buddhist meditation, a practitioner is trained to withdraw from 
all metaphysical assumptions about the world and reside in solitude for 
sober contemplation. The practitioner believes that, unless metaphysical 
assumptions about the existence of the world have been methodically 
“bracketed,” she will be unable to clearly discern the way that objects ap-
pear in consciousness. This mode of thinking may be properly regarded 
as a shift from the “natural attitude” to the “phenomenological attitude.”5
As mentioned above, the distinction between the enlightened experi-
ence and the non-enlightened experience is central to Buddhist philoso-
phy. This distinction can be understood either in terms of ontology or of 
epistemology. As an ontological distinction, it involves the notion of two 
realms of existence. In view of epistemology, however, the distinction is 
rather seen as two ways of knowing, i.e., enlightenment and ignorance. 
According to the Buddhist theory of two truths, these two aspects are 
inseparable. Methodologically speaking, we should proceed from epis-
temological analysis to ontological exposition, asking: How does our 
knowledge of the world become discriminated and concealed? Conversely, 
what are the conditions for the possibility of unconcealed or non-dis-
criminated knowledge? The Buddhist answer can be found in the various 
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analyses of cognition. Briefly, ignorance (concealment) appears as the re-
sult of discriminated knowledge, whereas enlightenment (non-concealed 
knowledge) is realized by non-discriminated insight. Unless fundamental 
transformation from the cognitive state of discriminated knowledge to 
the cognitive state of non-discriminated insight has been accomplished, 
salvific liberation remains impossible.
Regarding the Buddhist theory of cognition, which is systematically 
elaborated in the Abhidharmaśabhāsya of Vasubandhu, vijñāna and jñāna 
are taken as synonymous with cognition/knowledge. Vijñāna is defined as 
cognition relative to each object (viṣayaṃprativijñapti).6 It is also under-
stood as upalabdhi (apprehension), which is etymologically derived from 
the root labh, meaning “to seize, get possession of, acquire, receive, obtain, 
or find.”7 In the usage of epistemology, vijñāna (consciousness) refers to 
cognition that seizes something as its object (viṣaya) and makes it known 
to the one who cognizes. Accordingly, cognition never exists in itself; it 
must be the cognition of something. For instance, visual-consciousness 
never exists without form as the visual object. By the same token, visual-
consciousness also needs the visual faculty as the condition for its aris-
ing. However, knowledge cannot be explained by the function of sensory 
vijñāna only. It requires prajñā (understanding) in conjunction with sen-
sory perception for the conditions of knowledge to obtain. In this respect, 
prajñā is defined as the discernment/examination of objects.8 In contrast 
to the longstanding misconception of prajñā as “mystical wisdom,” inter-
preting it rather as the “source of true knowledge” better coheres with the 
actual usage of the term in the literature. Instead of alluding to something 
mysterious, most Buddhist philosophers employ the notion of prajñā in 
the epistemological sense. Keeping this in mind, we should resist the ten-
dency to mystify the notion of “insight” in Zhiyi’s philosophy.
Historically, the distinction between “insight/correct knowledge” 
(samyagjñāna) and “discriminated knowledge” (vijñāna) as two forms of 
knowledge seems to make its first appearance in Yogācārin literature. In 
the Yogācārabhūmi, “insight/correct knowledge” is defined as “intuitive 
knowledge of things themselves (tathātā)” in contrast to “discriminated 
knowledge,” which is embedded in conceptualization and verbalization. 
Three kinds of insight are listed: (1) trans-mundane insight, (2) mundane 
insight, and (3) trans-in-mundane insight. The first refers to intuitive 
knowledge of the non-existence of external objects. The second refers to 
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abstract knowledge of things in themselves, which is acquired through 
conceptual thinking (vikalpa). The third one refers to the trans-mundane 
knowledge that is realized within the context of the mundane.9 In the 
Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, we find another account of three forms of 
insight (correct knowledge) similar to those elaborated in Yogācārin lit-
erature. They are (1) insight of all phenomena (一切智 ; sarvajñatā), (2) 
insight of paths (道種智 ; margajñatā) and (3) insight of all modes of phe-
nomena (一切種智 ; sarvākārajñatā).10 As we shall see below, this theory 
of threefold insight plays an important role in Zhiyi’s philosophy.
The distinction between knowledge and insight was also further elab-
orated in the Yogācārin theory of the eightfold consciousness and fourfold 
insight. Briefly speaking, in Yogācāra’s transformative phenomenology, 
the eightfold consciousness (five sensory consciousnesses, apperceptive-
consciousness, ego-consciousness, and storehouse-consciousness) must be 
transformed into fourfold insight (all-accomplishing insight, intellectual 
discerning insight, equality insight, and mirror insight).11 That is, the five 
sensory consciousnesses are transformed into all-accomplishing insight, 
apperceptive-consciousness to intellectual discerning insight, self-con-
sciousness to equality insight, and storehouse-consciousness to mirror in-
sight. A brief outline of the theory of fourfold insight found in Xuanzang’s 
Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi is provided below (T.31.56.a):12
 (1) Mirror Insight (大圓鏡智 ; ādarśajñāna): “The mind 
associated with this insight is dissociated from 
conceptual constructions (vikalpa). Its objects of 
cognition and their characteristics are too subtle 
and difficult to be discerned.… It is pure and free of 
impurity.… Like a great mirror, it reflects the images of 
all physical objects.”
 (2) Equality Insight (平等性智 ; samatājñāna): “The mind 
associated with this insight sees the nondiscrimination of 
all existents, including self and other sentient beings. It is 
always associated with great compassion.… It is also the 
special support for intellectual discerning insight.”
 (3) Intellectual Discerning Insight (妙觀察智 ; 
pratyavekṣāṇājñāna): “The mind associated with this 
insight perfectly sees the particular (svalakṣaṇa) and 
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the universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of existence. It functions 
without any hindrance.”
 (4) All-accomplishing Insight (成所作智 ; 
kṛtyānuṣthānajñāna): “The mind associated with this 
insight is capable of performing actions of body, speech, 
and thought for the benefits of all sentient beings.”
The above theory of insight in Yogācārin philosophy can be summarized 
as follows: Insight is freed from conceptual construction. Following the 
Abhidharma usage, the Yogācārin notion of insight refers to the cogni-
tive function of understanding (prajñā), which is always associated with 
various forms of cognition (vijñāna). The key factor responsible for the 
distinction between insight and knowledge is conceptual construction 
(vikalpa) in association with cognition. Insight is freed from conceptual 
construction, whereas ordinary knowledge is embedded in conceptual 
construction. In most Buddhist texts, vijñāna and vikalpa are often taken 
as synonyms, with the latter being more appropriately understood as the 
“constitution of meaning” in the structure of noesis and noema. In addi-
tion to epistemic meaning, vikalpa also connotes a sense of psychological 
attachment. For Buddhism, knowing something is not merely a cognitive 
act. It is always associated with, or even dominated by, various non-cog-
nitive or ideological factors. This is the reason why the fundamental form 
of insight is referred to as “insight freed from conceptual/ideological con-
struction.” With insight, one is capable of correctly cognizing the aspects 
of the object: the particular and the universal. As Dignāga argues, these 
two aspects of the object are known by perception and inference respect-
ively. Aside from this, there is nothing else one can know. According to 
Abhidharma, however, a yoga-practitioner is capable of directly perceiv-
ing the universal character of the object.13 With insight one also cognizes 
the equality of all existents, i.e., the truth that all existents are equally 
empty of permanent essence.
There is another crucial issue left for further investigation: Is insight, 
which is said to be freed from the act of conceptual construction, inten-
tional? If the answer is affirmative, what then is the intentional structure 
of insight? Can we find the same threefold intentional structure (noesis, 
noema, self-awareness) in insight? If insight has the same intentional 
structure of consciousness, then the difference between the two forms of 
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knowledge requires an explanation. Historically, this issue was debated in 
the Chinese Yogācāra School. Three theories were given in response to 
this issue in Xuanzang’s Siddhi (T.31.49.c-50.a): (1) Insight is void of the 
structure of noesis (the part of seeing) and noema (the part of the seen); (2) 
insight is structured in noesis and noema; and (3) in insight noesis exists 
only, but not noema. The last theory, held by Dharmapāla and Xuanzang, 
was considered the orthodox view.14 In regards to the debate, however, 
it should be noted that fundamental insight is generally characterized as 
being devoid of subject as the grasper (grāhaka) and object as the grasped 
(grāhya). The duality of subject as the grasper and object as the grasped 
is merely a mental construction, which can be eliminated due to its be-
ing void of permanent essence. However, the noesis-noema structure in 
insight remains without change, even if the duality of subject-object is 
eliminated.
In sum, the difference between mundane knowledge and insight 
rather lies in the function of the objectivating act, i.e., cognitive construc-
tion (vikalpa).15 In mundane knowledge, noesis (the seeing) is objectiv-
ated as the subject-as-grasper and noema (the seen) is objectivated as the 
object-as-grasped. In contrast, the act of objectivation ceases to function 
in the enlightened experience while the structure of noesis and noema 
remains intact in regard to insight. This interpretation can be justified 
by the Yogācārin theory of the three natures (trisvabhāva), although it 
differs somewhat from the orthodox position held by Dharmapāla and 
Xuanzang. According to the theory of three natures, the duality of grasper 
and grasped belongs to discursive constructions (parikalpita), whereas the 
structure of consciousness is seen as the ground of phenomena in depend-
ent-arising (paratantra). This theory concludes that it is discursive con-
struction, instead of phenomena themselves, that should be eliminated.
III. ZHIYI’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF AWAKENING
Let us now turn to Zhiyi. What is the enlightened experience disclosed 
in Zhiyi’s philosophy? What is Zhiyi’s conception of mind/consciousness? 
And what is Zhiyi’s response to Yogācāra and Mādhyamika? Before ad-
dressing these questions in detail, I would like to first point out that Zhiyi 
was more eager than his contemporaries to take on a phenomenological 
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approach for disclosing the experience of “things themselves (shixiang; 實
相; real phenomena).” However, he was not content with Yogācāra’s epis-
temological approach and also rejected the metaphysical idealism preva-
lent in certain Chinese Yogācāra sects. As to the Mādhyamika approach, 
Zhiyi was largely sympathetic. Unlike Indian Mādhyamika thinkers, 
however, he was not interested in doing logical and epistemological justi-
fication for the “thesis” of emptiness. For Zhiyi, the most important issue 
was the direct realization of “things themselves” through meditation (ces-
sation and contemplation). Zhiyi maintained that, without the direct real-
ization of “things themselves” in meditation, truth would remain abstract 
and speculative, and thus completely useless for realizing enlightenment. 
As a devoted Buddhist practitioner, Zhiyi held meditation to be the only 
genuine path to awakening.
Mind and Worlds
Let us now examine Zhiyi’s theory of mind/consciousness, which he 
holds to be the first object of meditative contemplation. In contrast to 
Abhidharma and Yogācāra’s dualistic conceptions of mind in two aspects 
(deluded mind and enlightened mind), Zhiyi urges us to return to the ex-
perience of mind before the metaphysical categorizations of mind as either 
deluded or pure. For Zhiyi, the practical implication of the dualistic con-
ception of mind is that a certain period of time is required as metaphysical 
assumption for accomplishing the soteriological task of transformation 
from the deluded state of mind to the pure state of mind. Zhiyi clearly 
rejects metaphysical speculation about time, which, as he believes, will in 
the end take us nowhere. On the contrary, Zhiyi contends that the problem 
of time should be treated within the context of meditative practice. That 
is, time is pragmatically conceivable only in terms of the evolving process 
of consciousness in meditation. For both Zhiyi and Husserl, one should 
methodically bracket metaphysical assumptions about the existence of 
mind and world in order to make the experience of worlds-in-mind fully 
manifested. Just like Husserl, Zhiyi asks us to turn to “contemplation of 
mind” (guanxin; 觀心) in which all worlds are manifested. Let us see how 
Zhiyi presented his phenomenological description of mind in the famous 
passage on “three thousand worlds in one-instant mind”16:
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A single thought exists along with the ten realms. A single 
realm exists along with the [other] ten realms, so there are one 
hundred realms. One realm exists along with thirty types of 
worlds [i.e., each of the ten realms are included in each of the 
three types of worlds: the world of sentient beings, the worlds 
of the five skandhas, and the worlds of lands]; multiplied by 
one hundred realms. This results in the existence with three 
thousand types of worlds. These three thousand [worlds] exist 
along with a single momentary thought. If there is no mind, 
that is the end of the matter. If there is even an ephemeral 
mind, it exists with three thousand [realms]. [emphasis added]
In Paul Swanson’s translation, “one mind” is rendered as a “single thought” 
in order to “avoid the implication of a reified ‘mind’ as separate from men-
tal functioning and ‘objects’ that are experienced.”17 This clarification is 
quite helpful. However, I take issue with his translation of ju (具) as “in-
clude.” Instead, I render it as “exist along with,” indicating the simultan-
eous correlativity of mind (as intentional act) and worlds (as intentional 
objects). That is, whenever a single thought/mind arises, there simultan-
eously arises the realm of objects to which it correlates. This description 
ties in with the classic insight of phenomenology that holds that mind is 
always conscious of something as its intentional object. Hence, if we fol-
low Swanson in translating the first sentence as “A single thought includes 
the ten dharma realms,” the interpretative results will be in opposition to 
Zhiyi’s own phenomenological intent.
How should we then interpret Zhiyi’s famous statement, “Three 
thousand worlds exist with a single momentary thought”? It would be 
pretty easy to understand this statement if Zhiyi had claimed that a single 
thought arises with a single world. However, the theory of one-to-one 
correspondence between mind and world is subject to Zhiyi’s criticism be-
cause it contradicts the Buddhist teaching of emptiness. For there is noth-
ing called “one single thought,” neither is there anything called “one single 
world.” Everything, including mind and world, exist inter-relatively and 
inter-penetratively within the net of existence. Instead of being taken as 
an empirical description, Zhiyi’s fundamental maxim should be read as a 
description of “real phenomena” that have been realized through phenom-
enological reduction. In other words, this statement should be understood 
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in view of insight, instead of in view of empirical knowledge. As a re-
sult of this phenomenological reduction, all phenomena are themselves 
shown as the objects inter-relatively constituted in the non-objectivating 
consciousness.
Zhiyi continues to clarify what is and what is not the proper under-
standing of the relation between mind and worlds. It is important to note 
that for Zhiyi the phenomenon of being-with cannot be explained by any 
form of metaphysics. Among various forms of metaphysics, Zhiyi rejects 
metaphysical idealism in particular, which includes the idealisms of both 
the pure and the deluded mind. In Zhiyi’s own words,
If all phenomena arise from a single moment of mind, this is 
a vertical [relationship]; if a mind in one moment encompasses 
all phenomena, this is a horizontal [relationship]. But these are 
neither [merely] vertical nor [merely] horizontal. It is just that 
mind is all phenomena, and all phenomena are mind. Therefore 
[the relationship of mind and phenomena] is neither vertical 
nor horizontal; they are neither the same nor different. This is 
mysterious and subtle, profound in the extreme; it cannot be 
grasped conceptually, and cannot be verbalized. This is what is 
called [contemplating] “realms of experience as inconceivable.” 
[emphasis added]
Zhiyi concludes that the only alternative way for disclosing the meaning 
of being-with is the method of meditation, but not through any meta-
physical speculation. For Zhiyi clearly rejects two forms of metaphysics, 
namely transcendental idealism (of pure mind) and empirical idealism (of 
deluded mind). The former is characterized by Zhiyi as the “vertical” way 
of thinking by which phenomena is explained as being transcendentally 
grounded in the absolute (pure) mind, and the latter as the “horizontal” 
way of thinking, which explains phenomena through epistemological an-
alysis. Zhiyi argues that since both forms of metaphysics are rooted in rep-
resentational thinking, which is also called “conceivable thinking,” they 
are incapable of making real phenomena (things themselves) fully mani-
fest. In this respect, we find that Zhiyi, Husserl, and Heidegger exploit 
similar lines of reasoning in formulating their rejection of metaphysics. 
For Zhiyi in particular, the truth of “real phenomena” is concealed within 
the conceivability of metaphysics.
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Truth and Method
The motif of Zhiyi’s philosophy is the disclosure of the truth of real phe-
nomena through meditation. Ontologically speaking, truth exists prior to 
method. Practically, truth needs to be disclosed through method. Thus, in 
the Buddhist tradition, truth can be realized only through the method of 
meditation. Though quite complicated, Zhiyi’s system of meditation can 
be divided into two paths: the gradual and the sudden. The sudden path 
of meditation is often considered the key to producing the experience of 
perfect and sudden awakening, while the gradual path is regarded as the 
preparatory step to the final goal of meditation, i.e., the aforementioned 
perfect and sudden awakening. Some contend that the difference between 
the two paths is merely pedagogical. Regarding this issue, I rather see in 
Zhiyi’s system of meditation the gradual path as the necessary training for 
the superior practice of perfect and sudden awakening.
In Zhiyi’s system, a practitioner aims to disclose the experience of 
awakening by taking threefold truth as the object of threefold contempla-
tion. The fruit of practice is called “threefold insight.” Therefore, in regard 
to the architectonics of meditation, Zhiyi’s system consists of the structure 
of threefold truth, threefold contemplation, and threefold insight:18
(1) Threefold Truth (san-di; 三諦) 
Truth can be viewed from three aspects, consisting of: (i) the truth of 
emptiness, stated as “all phenomena are empty,” (ii) conventional truth, 
i.e., truth of phenomena, and (iii) truth as the middle way, i.e., truth as 
the full disclosure through double negation of the two truths. In con-
trast to the Mādhyamikan theory of truth, Zhiyi develops a dialectical 
hermeneutic to make reality fully disclosed in each aspect. That is, the 
enlightened experience will not disclose itself in the truth of emptiness 
and the conventional truth respectively; it must also be disclosed in the 
truth of the middle way. No aspect of truth should be separated from the 
other two aspects because truth can never be exhausted from a single per-
spective. Truth shows itself only through the holistic and dialectical con-
templation. According to this pattern of threefold truth, part and whole 
are dialectically interrelated and holistically integrated, wherein the whole 
can be manifested only through the dynamic dialectic of the parts.19
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(2) Threefold Meditation (san-guan; 三觀)
For Zhiyi, the meditation of cessation and contemplation is instrumental 
for the realization of truth. This is witnessed in Zhiyi’s magnum opus, 
Mohezhiguan (Great Calming and Contemplation). The method of medita-
tion is further divided into threefold cessation and threefold contemplation 
with correspondence to threefold truth and threefold insight. However, it 
must be noted that this system of meditation does not function mechan-
ically. That is, the first contemplation does not merely take the truth of 
emptiness as the object of meditation. By the same token, the second con-
templation does not merely take the conventional truth as the object and 
the third contemplation does not take the middle way as the object. For 
Zhiyi, one should practice contemplation dialectically and dynamically. 
The first step of meditation is to enter into emptiness from the conven-
tional, which will lead to an insight that reveals the conventionality of all 
phenomena, i.e., the emptiness. This methodic move is similar to Husserl’s 
shifting from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude. The 
second move is then a return to the conventional from emptiness through 
a reverse dialectic. Driven by salvific compassion, a practitioner takes this 
move to return to the mundane world (conventional world) from the state 
of emptiness, which results in skillful command of the knowledge of the 
mundane world. In comparison, the second move in Tiantai dialectical 
meditation is rather similar to the call for returning to the life-world in 
Husserl’s later writings. The third move is thus to realize that the previ-
ous two moves are merely provisional for the final realization of things 
themselves. When one arrives at this final stage, there will be attachment 
to neither the first truth nor the second. The practitioner will rather be 
illuminated by the three truths simultaneously. This final move is called 
the “contemplation of the middle way,” which manifests the highest form 
of insight, namely, the insight of all modes of phenomena.20
(3) Threefold Insight (san-zhi; 三智)
According to the Prajñāpāramitāśāstra, the text from which Zhiyi’s theory 
of threefold insight is borrowed, (i) “insight of paths” (margajñatā) refers 
to all kinds of mundane knowledge which are required for the fulfill-
ment of religious goals, and (ii) “insight of all phenomena” (sarvajñatā), or 
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“omniscience,” refers to the abstract truth of all phenomena gained by the 
elimination of ignorance, and (iii) “insight of all modes of phenomena” 
(sarvākārajñatā) refers to the concrete truth that is realized in all aspects 
of phenomena.21 The sequence of practice is stated as follows: Insofar as 
one has obtained the knowledge of the paths beforehand, one can be said 
to know the abstract truth of all phenomena. Next, one progresses to the 
concrete knowledge of all aspects of phenomena and then proceeds to cut 
off all habitual defilements in the final enlightenment.22
Thus, in view of the gradual path, the three forms of insight are taken as 
independent of one another. On the other hand, threefold insight can be 
attained within a single instant of mind via the sudden path. It is in a sin-
gle instant mind that threefold truth arises simultaneously with threefold 
insight and threefold contemplation. Now, how could all of these occur 
simultaneously? The answer to this conundrum is found in Zhiyi’s concep-
tion of mind. In addition to the intentionality of mind as being-with, a 
notion that we have already explained above, everyday mind is also char-
acterized as both deluded and pure. In Buddhist parlance, everyday mind 
has been in ignorance (avidyā) from the very beginning, which is equiva-
lent to saying that mind is the function of mental construction (vikalpa). 
According to the Buddhist theory of emptiness, however, everything, even 
including ignorance, is empty in itself. Since ignorance is empty of itself, 
it follows that mind as ignorance is also empty of itself. Hence, mind 
should be conceived as both ignorance and emptiness. As a consequence, 
if mind as ignorance is taken as the phenomenological ground of phenom-
ena, mind as emptiness, i.e., prajñā, must also be taken as the groundless 
ground of phenomena. Thus, in view of ignorance, mind functions in the 
act of objectivation, whereas in view of emptiness, mind is able to function 
as non-objectivating insight. Finally, in view of the middle way, mind is 
characterized neither as ignorance nor as emptiness. It is characterized as 
“inconceivable” in the sense that any form of metaphysics will fail to ac-
count for the dialectical paradox of mind. As the correlates of mind, all 
phenomena (the three thousand worlds) also manifest themselves as the 
inconceivable infinity of mutual penetration. This is the reason why Zhiyi 
always summarizes his system as “threefold truth within an instant mind,” 
“threefold contemplation within an instant mind,” and “threefold insight 
within an instant mind.”23
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Summing up the above exegetical analysis in response to the questions 
raised at the beginning: (i) In what sense can Zhiyi’s Tiantai philoso-
phy be characterized as a phenomenology of awakening? (ii) What can 
be added to the diversity of the phenomenological legacy when we bring 
Zhiyi into philosophical dialogue with Husserl? To begin with, Zhiyi and 
Husserl belong to different traditions. Zhiyi is religion-oriented, and all 
of his philosophizing is directed toward a soteriological goal. Husserl’s 
philosophical enterprise, on the other hand, is science-oriented, a fact 
attested by his dream of establishing phenomenology as the most rigor-
ous science. Although in his later years Husserl became more devoted to 
ethics and religion, he rarely considered his philosophical task as a path 
to spiritual liberation. In spite of the historical differences, however, we 
do see similarities in the two philosophical systems. On the one hand, 
Husserl contends that truth consists in two aspects: truth as proposition 
and truth as evidence. The truth as proposition is based upon truth as 
evidence “where objects and states of affairs are given intuitively as they 
themselves are or as given in person.”24 On the other side, Zhiyi placed 
the theory of threefold truth within the methodical context of medita-
tion. Truth manifests itself only in the mental experience of contempla-
tion. Hence, Zhiyi’s famous dictum, “threefold truth in an instant mind,” 
might now be better understood in light of Husserl’s theory of “evidence 
as the experience of truth, i.e., as an intentional act in which the intended 
object is presented intuitively, though in different degrees of fulfillment.”25
In view of Zhiyi’s “classification of teachings,” on the other hand, 
Husserl’s phenomenology belongs to the gradual path, whereas Zhiyi 
considered his own system as the perfect and sudden path that leads to 
a final realization of the truth of inter-relativity and inter-penetration of 
phenomena, i.e., the three thousand worlds in one single thought. At the 
final moment of awakening, one realizes that the world of the rich, the 
world of the poor, the world of humanity, the world of animals, the world 
of plants, the world of gods, and the world of ghosts are all interrelated. 
And as far as any one world is manifested in the mind, all other worlds are 
also simultaneously manifested. As a result, the experience of awakening 
is never exclusionary. True awakening, which manifests the enlightened 
world, must be experienced along with all other worlds that have yet to 
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be enlightened. True liberation must be experienced along with all other 
worlds that are still in suffering. This is the core spirit of Zhiyi’s phenom-
enology of awakening.
Notes
 1 Cited in Karl Schuhmann, “Husserl 
and Indian Thought,” in D. P. 
Chattopadhyaya, Lester Embree, 
and Jitendranath Mohanty, eds., 
Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy 
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992), 26.
 2 Since the term vijñāna has different 
usages depending upon context, I 
have translated it in various ways in 
this chapter. To avoid confusion, I 
have inserted the Sanskrit term after 
the translation. 
 3 Schuhmann, “Husserl and Indian 
Thought,” 25. 
 4 Edmund Husserl, “Phenomenology,” 
in Peter McCormick and Frederick 
Elliston, eds., Husserl: Shorter 
Works (Notre Dame, IN: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 27. 
Regarding the term “transcendental” 
in Husserl’s usage, scholars have 
varying interpretations. Dan Zahavi 
insists that “the specific and unique 
transcendental-phenomenological 
question is: What are the condi-
tions of possibility for appearance 
as such?” See Dan Zahavi, Husserl ’s 
Phenomenology (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2003), 
54. According to D. W. Smith’s 
interpretation, the term applies to 
“pure consciousness in abstraction 
from its connection with natural or 
cultural objects or activities.” See D. 
W. Smith, Husserl (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2007), 447.
 5 In spite of the above “insight,” 
Husserl’s “oversight” can be seen in 
his characterization of Buddhism as 
“transcendental [subjectivity],” a no-
tion which would seem to contradict 
the Buddhist doctrinal position of 
no-self. Historically, the Husserlian 
notion of “transcendental subjectivity” 
has been more or less compatible with 
the Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine of 
mind-only (citta-mātra) or conscious-
ness-only (vijñapti-mātra), though 
not of course with Early Buddhism.
 6 Abhidharmakośabhāsya of Vasubandhu, 
chap. 1: Dhātunirdeśa, ed., Yasunori 
Ejima (Tokyo: Sankibo Press, 1989), 
17; Bhikkhu K L Dhammajoti, 
Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma (Hong 
Kong: Center of Buddhist Studies, 
University of Hong Kong, 2007), 293.
 7 Monier Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-
English Dictionary, 205.
 8 Cf. Bhikkhu Dhammajoti, 
Abhidharma Doctrine and Controversy 
on Perception (Colombo: Sri Lanka: 
219Chen-kuo Lin
Center for Buddhist Studies, 2004), 
18–19.
 9 Yogācārabhūmi, T.30.696.a.
 10 In contrast to Abhidharma epistemol-
ogy, prajñā and vijñāna are rather 
placed in opposition to each other in 
the Prajñāpāramitā literature. True 
knowledge (prajñā) is attainable only 
when one comes to realize that no 
knowledge is attainable. According 
to Prajñāpāramitā thought, just like 
magic, emptiness can be known 
through non-apprehension (anupal-
abdhi). In this regard, prajñā obtained 
through anupalabdhi (= nirvikalpa) is 
opposed to vijñāna, which is obtained 
through upalabdhi (= vikalpa). In 
other words, Prajñāpāramitā thinkers 
stand for “negative epistemology” 
instead of “positive epistemology.” 
The problem of “non-apprehension” 
or “negative cognition” was taken up 
again via the positive understanding 
by the later Buddhist philosophers 
such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. 
The historical development of nega-
tive epistemology does not concern 
us at this stage. For anupalabdhi in 
the Prajñāpāramitā literature, see 
Edward Conze, “The Development 
of Prajñāpramitā Thought,” in Thirty 
Years of Buddhist Studies (New Delhi: 
Munshiram Manoharlal, 2000), 127.
 11 Louis de La Vallee Poussin, translated 
and annotated, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: 
La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang (Paris: 
Librarie Orientaliste Paul 
Geuthner, 1928), 685f; also cf., 
Maitreyanatha/Aryāsaṇga, The 
Universal Vehicle Discourse Literature 
(Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra) (New 
York: American Institute of 
Buddhist Studies, 2004), 98–101. 
For analysis of nirvikalpajñāna, see 
Leslie S. Kawamura, “Nirvikalpa-
jñāna: Awareness Freed from 
Discrimination,” in Koichi Shinohara 
and Gregory Schopen, eds., From 
Benares to Beijing: Essays on Buddhism 
and Chinese Religion (Oakville, ON: 
Mosaic Press, 1991), 41–67.
 12 For Xuanzang’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, 
also see Wei Tat’s English translation: 
Hsuan Tsang, Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun: 
The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness, 
trans. Wei Tat (Hong Kong: The 
Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun Publication 
Committee, 1973), 766–81.
 13 See Bhikkhu K L Dhammajoti, 
Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma (Hong 
Kong: Center of Buddhist Studies, 
University of Hong Kong, 2007), 
358–60.
 14 Shunkyo Katsumata, Bukkyo in okeru 
Shinshiki-setsu no Kenkyū (Tokyo: 
Sankibo, 1961), 172–84, 278–80.
 15 Iso Kern renders “dharsanabhāga” 
(the act of seeing) as “objectivating 
act” and “nimittabhāga” as “objective 
phenomenon.” For Yogācāra, there 
are two levels of objectivation, one 
on the mental (paratantra) level, 
the other on the discursive (parikal-
pita) level. The latter is grounded in 
the former. Husserl himself takes 
“objectivation,” which is defined as 
“outward experience form” as the 
condition of objectivity of science. 
See Eugen Fink, Sixth Cartesian 
Meditation (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1995), 104. For 
Kern’s interpretation, see Iso Kern, 
“The Structure of Consciousness ac-
cording to Xuanzang,” Journal of the 
British Society for Phenomenology 19, 
no. 3 (1988): 282–95.
PHENOMENOLOGY OF AWAKENING220
 16 Zhiyi, Mohezhiguan, T.46.54.a. 
I adapt Paul Swanson’s English 
translation with some modifications. 
Swanson’s translation is available at 
http://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/welcome.
htm
. 17 See Paul Swanson, 64n94.
 18 “Threefold truth refers to the object 
which is illuminated by the one in-
stant mind. Threefold contemplation 
refers to the act which is initiated 
by the one instant mind. Threefold 
insight refers to that which is accom-
plished by [threefold] contemplation.” 
See Mohezhiguan, T.46.55.c.
 19 Zhiyi, Fahua Xuanyi, T.33.705.c; 
also cf., Paul Swanson, Foundations 
of T’ien-t’ai Philosophy: The Flowering 
of the Two Truths Theory in Chinese 
Buddhism (Berkeley, CA: Asian 
Humanities Press, 1989), 252–53; 
Mou Zongsan, Foxing yu Boruo 
(Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1977) 
2:647–71.
 20 Zhiyi, Mohezhiguan, T.46.24.b.
 21 Cf., Fa Qing, The Development of 
Prajñā in Buddhism: From Early 
Buddhism to the Prajñāpāramiāā 
System, PhD diss., University of 
Calgary, 2001, 92–95.
 22 T. 25.258.c–260.b.
 23 Zhiyi, Weimojing Xuanshu, 
T.38.524.c–529.b.
 24 Dieter Lohmar, “Truth,” in Lester 
Embree et al., Encyclopedia of 




Ibn Rushd or Averroës? Of  
Double Names and Double 
Truths: A Different Approach  
to Islamic Philosophy
TAMARA ALBERTINI
University of Hawai’i at Manoa
Unlike other non-Western traditions explored in contemporary com-
parative philosophy, Islamic thought stands out as a “hybrid” with both 
an “Eastern” and a “Western” face. It is partly a continuation of Greek 
and Hellenistic philosophy, partly an intellectual tradition defined by 
its own very distinct questions and concerns, whether they are of a re-
ligious, legalistic, cosmological, epistemological, or ethical nature. This 
unique property is not always rightly appreciated by Western scholars, 
in particular specialists of the Middle Ages, who may focus excessively 
on the “reflection” of the Western face in medieval sources. As a result, 
the medievalist’s approach often fails to recognize questions, intentions, 
and methodologies specifically developed in and for a Muslim context. In 
particular, it does not see that the so-called Western face is “Easternized.” 
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To be sure, some Muslim philosophers may have more Greek traits than 
others. However, as with the Hellenistic Buddha-figures, the blend is har-
monious – there is but one face.
To enhance the appreciation of “nativeness” of philosophy in Islam, 
the present paper will regularly point out features that are characteristic of 
Muslim forms of inquiry, or, sometimes, merely to Arabic Islamic culture 
such as the actual significance of the personal name, which helps with the 
assessment of Muslim authors in their own historic context. More import-
antly, attention will be given to titles of works carefully crafted to guide the 
interpretive efforts of the reader, elements of debate typical of the Kalām 
tradition (dialectical theology) that – although originally developed for 
oral exchange – are reflected in writing as well, and, finally, the import of 
jurisprudential terminology and the use of reasoning techniques developed 
by Islamic Schools of Law that are in no way derived from Greek sources.
Basically, the purpose is to help readers interested in the field to 
understand that just in the same way as Muslim philosophers did not wear 
cloaks or togas but robes, their ideas too are “clothed” in a different fash-
ion. The fact that their ideas bear cultural, or even ethnic, features does not 
make these ideas less relevant to other philosophical traditions. There is no 
need of a new tailoring for a more “Western” look. Quite to the contrary, 
these features wrap ideas and concepts in ways that can, if appreciated, 
enrich the dialogue between the traditions.
It is with this possibility in mind that the following examines a text 
generally referred to as The Decisive Treatise (Faṣl al-Maqāl), written by the 
Andalusian Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd (520–595 A.H./AD 1126–
1198), the famed Averroës of the Latin tradition. This text, the legalistic 
reflections of which clearly marked it as a work written for an Islamic 
audience, was deemed of no consequence to a Christian philosophical and 
theological world view. As a result – and unlike Ibn Rushd’s commentar-
ies on Aristotelian works – it was never translated into Latin during the 
Middle Ages. In Europe, the history of the reception of this text begins 
with the printing of the original Arabic text in 1859 (a revised version 
came out in 1942). A German translation appeared in 1875, a French one 
in 1905, and a Spanish one in 1947. The first English version was published 
by Muhammad al-Jamil al-Rahman in 1921. The two currently most 
widely used English translations are by George F. Hourani and Charles E. 
Butterworth. The first appeared in 1961; the latter in 2001.
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To help discover the “native” design of this text, this paper will ex-
plore four questions:
 
 1. what’s in a name?
 2. what’s in a title?
 3. what’s in a question?
  and
 4. what’s in an answer?
As the following will show, major lessons may be drawn from addressing 
precisely these questions, no matter how unrelated they may at first appear 
to a Western sense of philosophical relevance. Indeed, all four questions 
will contribute to the uncovering of the strong influence of Islamic juris-
prudential tradition, language, and methodology on Ibn Rushd’s thought. 
The last two, will, furthermore, open up an interpretive path entirely de-
fined by legal directives.
WHAT’S IN A NAME?
From a Western perspective, Ibn Rushd’s life-long career as a magistrate, 
crowned with a position as Chief Justice in his native Andalusia, is usu-
ally considered to be unconnected with his philosophical and scientific 
research. Quite in contrast to assessments made in Muslim biographical 
sources, the underlying assumption is that what is essential about Ibn 
Rushd’s work are his additions to and further elaborations on Greek-based 
sciences and thought. Accordingly, most medievalists discuss him to this 
day under his latinized name “Averroës,” strengthening thereby his status 
as the extraordinary philosopher who contributed to the advancement of 
Christian-European culture. What is missing in their otherwise highly 
appreciative profile is Ibn Rushd the theologian and expert of Islamic Law 
(sharī‘a), and, more generally, Ibn Rushd the philosopher-scientist whose 
primary intention it was to contribute to his own culture. Little did Ibn 
Rushd know that his latinized name would eventually be both glorified 
and vilified in the Christian West. Unfortunately, the same fate – albeit 
for different reasons – was to befall his name in the Islamic world as well.
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But what was his full name? In his own world the Andalusian philoso-
pher was known as Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad 
ibn Rushd. This is, for instance, how he signed his manuscripts. How to 
explain this name, or rather this sequence of names? In Arabian culture 
individuals are perceived as links between past and future generations. 
Their very names identify them as links in family chains. The first part 
of a name thus signals whether an individual has fathered or mothered 
offspring, i.e., whether he or she is already acting as a link between the 
generations. This part of the name is called the “kunya.” Ibn Rushd’s kunya 
informs us that his oldest son was al-Walīd (abū = father of), while his own 
ism, i.e., first name, was Muḥammad. We are further given the first names 
of his father and grandfather, Aḥmad and Muḥammad, respectively (ibn 
= son of). This part of an individual’s name is the “nasab” (lit. “lineage”). 
‘Ibn Rushd,’ the name by which our Andalusian philosopher is mostly 
referred to in Islamic sources, is actually the name of his family clan, i.e., 
the Banū Rushd. This part of the name is called the “nisba.” The fact that 
Ibn Rushd was referred to by his nisba, is no minor piece of information. It 
helps us understand that in his own culture Ibn Rushd’s fame (or “infamy” 
depending on who judged him) did not belong to him alone but to all of 
the Banū Rushd, a family mostly remembered for having produced a great 
number of prominent lawyers. There is no indication that our Ibn Rushd 
ever had the intention to break with that family tradition and stand out as 
the radical and lonely rationalist often portrayed in Western scholarship. 
In the same way as his ancestors, in particular his father and grandfather, 
had traced his life path by preceding him as Andalusian magistrates, he 
himself placed the burden of an intellectual life dedicated to the well-
being of the city on the shoulders of his own sons who continued being 
judges – and physicians. And yet, there was room for “individuality” of a 
Western type in that many Arabs also enjoy a nickname, called “laqab.” 
Ibn Rushd’s laqab was al-Ḥafīd, i.e., the grandson, to distinguish him 
from his grandfather who had also been a Chief Justice. Clearly, the nick-
name he was given identifies him as the heir of a jurisprudential family 
tradition.
Considering the ethnic and cultural connotations present in Ibn 
Rushd’s name, it should be clear by now that the only acceptable refer-
ence to our Andalusian philosopher is by the name that correctly ren-
ders his nisba. This is not just a matter of proper scholarly transliteration, 
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or, more generally, of linguistic “correctness.” It entails an entire change 
of perspective, since it signals to Western readers that, despite all com-
mon traits (such as Aristotelian rationalism) and sources (mainly from 
the ancient Greek and Hellenistic period), the philosopher they are about 
to be informed about emerged from a culture that is not only religiously 
but also intellectually distinct from their own. Does this mean that the 
name “Averroës” is to join the debris of a discontinued (or, more likely, 
never truly engaged) dialogue between Muslim and Christian philoso-
phers? No, there does remain a legitimate space for the use of ‘Averroës,’ 
provided that one is aware that this name bears the marks of a specific 
historic context, i.e., Western medieval culture, in which, to put it mildly, 
some intellectual positions of Ibn Rushd have been interpreted in most 
peculiar ways. Positively connoted, ‘Averroës’ refers to “the commentator” 
(of Aristotle). This is the language one encounters, for instance, in the 
works of Thomas Aquinas, the champion of Christian philosophy and 
theology. Unfortunately, in the same works one also finds a negatively 
coloured use of Ibn Rushd’s latinized name. It then connects to a long 
controversy known as the “Averroistic heresy,” which played a critical role 
in challenging both ecclesiastical and political authorities in medieval 
(and Renaissance) Europe and, as a result, was dealt with most harshly by 
those same authorities. However, as will be pointed out towards the end 
of this paper, Averroistic theses are of Western origin and sprung mostly 
from a misreading of Ibn Rushd’s philosophy, which in turn was due to 
medieval Christians’ being entirely unaware of there being a theological 
basis for many of Ibn Rushd’s ideas – albeit an Islamic theological basis.
WHAT’S IN A TITLE?
What better way then to acquaint oneself with Ibn Rushd the Arab, the 
Muslim, and the Chief Justice than to explore the work commonly known 
as The Decisive Treatise, a text in which the Andalusian philosopher focuses 
on the relation between Philosophy and Law, not the Greek nomos (which 
he, of course, knew from both Plato’s and Aristotle’s works) but sharī‘a, 
Islamic sacred law? This relation could never have been a central issue 
to a Christian philosopher-theologian in the Middle Ages. The big con-
troversy in that culture and period was whether reason and faith clashed 
– not philosophy and law. The founder of Christianity left no instructions 
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as to what Christian Law might be. Besides, as Christian religion moved 
away from its Jewish roots and spread within the Roman Empire, it found 
a highly sophisticated legal system in place that it ultimately incorporated. 
It comes, therefore, as no surprise that the work called The Decisive Treatise 
found no audience in Christian medieval Europe.
But what exactly is the wording in the original title? The full Arabic 
title says Kitāb faṣl al-maqāl wa taqrīr mā bayn al-sharī‘a wa al-ḥikma 
min al-ittiṣāl. George F. Hourani renders the title as On the Harmony of 
Religion and Philosophy, while Charles E. Butterworth remains prima facie 
more faithful to the original by calling it The Book of the Decisive Treatise 
Determining the Connection between the Law and Wisdom. In fairness, one 
must add that Hourani does offer a correct and complete rendering in 
the introduction to his translation where he calls Ibn Rushd’s work: “The 
book of the decision (or distinction) of the discourse, and a determination of 
what there is of connection between religion and philosophy.” The passage 
clarifies three important points:
 
 1. The original title does not presume to give the ultimate 
answer in respect to the subjects to be explored. It is not 
a “decisive treatise” but a book dealing with “the decision 
(or distinction) of the discourse”;
 2. The work in question is not a treatise but a discourse 
(maqāl) indicating that it is designed as a piece of Kalām; 
and
 3. Ibn Rushd was not investigating whether there is a 
connection between “religion” and “philosophy” but 
rather what the nature of the connection is.
Butterworth’s translation, however, is not without merit. Its appeal lies 
in that it names with greater precision the subjects the relation of which 
is to be investigated in the text: Law and Wisdom. By comparison, while 
Hourani’s ‘religion’ covers Islamic law and ‘philosophy’ and is a valid 
equivalent for the original ḥikma, the English title gives no indication of 
there being a jurisprudential context. The term ‘ḥikma’ also signals that 
Ibn Rushd has given precedence to the native Arabic term for wisdom. 
It is as if Ibn Rushd had wanted to remind his fellow Andalusians that 
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the pursuit of wisdom is not solely the domain of the ancient Greeks. 
Isn’t one of Allah’s names al-Ḥakīm (= The Wise)? The term ‘ḥikma’ has, 
in addition, the advantage of being etymologically related to a number of 
words that belong semantically to the legal field such as aḥkām (= legal 
categories of human acts; plural of ḥukm), which will be discussed in the 
following section, ḥakam (= judge), and, of course, ḥukm (= judgment). 
One may now realize how ingenious it was of Ibn Rushd to opt for ḥikma 
over falsafa, the Arabized word for ‘philosophy:’ The notion of ḥikma car-
ries through its root ‘ḥ-k-m’ an unmistakable legal connotation. Its very 
semantic texture suggests its vicinity to Law, which is precisely what Ibn 
Rushd wished to further demonstrate in his discourse. A careful discus-
sion of the discourse’s title suggests that for Ibn Rushd Philosophy and 
Law are united in a common pursuit. Not surprisingly, he ends up calling 
them “milk-sisters” for having drank from the same source of knowledge 
and “companions by nature and lovers by essence and instinct” (p. 70).
It is to be hoped that the analysis of the exact wording of the title 
was no futile exercise in the reader’s mind. As the contemporary Tunisian 
scholar El Ghannouchi comments, referring to Ibn Rushd’s Faṣl al-Maqāl 
as The Decisive Treatise makes the Andalusian philosopher appear to be 
“pedantic and pretentious,” as if he had wanted to present “in a peremp-
tory fashion the definitive and decisive solution to the secular question of 
the accord between religion and philosophy” (my translation). What is 
one to do after over a century in which this erroneous title has been cir-
culating? Rather than trying to impose a new standardized title, it seems 
best to use the Arabic original: Faṣl al-Maqāl.
WHAT’S IN A QUESTION?
According to most historians Faṣl al-Maqāl was composed around 575 
A.H./1179 CE, i.e., some seventeen years before Ibn Rushd and his 
younger son ‘Abdallah were denied access to the great mosque of Cordova, 
Ibn Rushd’s works burned and he himself eventually sent into exile. And 
yet, Faṣl al-Maqāl already shows the marks of a text written by an author 
under siege.
Faṣl al-Maqāl begins by addressing the subject under investigation: 
“The purpose of this treatise [sic] is to examine, from the standpoint of the 
study of the law, whether the study of philosophy and logic is [1] allowed 
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by the Law, or [2] prohibited, or [3] commanded – either by the way of 
recommendation or as obligatory” (p. 44). In other words, the question is 
whether it can be made legally binding to allow, study, or reject (Greek 
derived) philosophy and logic. In order to fully appreciate the strategy at 
work in the question Ibn Rushd designed, one needs to know the aḥkām 
mentioned previously, i.e., human acts as defined by Islamic jurisprudence.
There are five aḥkām, traditionally discussed in the following order: 
1) obligatory (farḍ); 2) not obligatory but recommended (mustaḥabb or 
mandūb); 3) neutral or permitted (mubāḥ); 4) not forbidden but discour-
aged (makrūh); and 5) forbidden (ḥarām). By comparison, in his listing of 
the legal options open to investigation Ibn Rushd begins with the middle 
– neutral – category that he also calls “mubāḥ.” After, he moves on to 
the last two categories that he addresses together as “maḥẓūr.” Finally, he 
also conflates the first two categories as commanded (ma’mūr). This new 
category he then divides into “mandūb” and “wājib.” One wonders about 
the reasoning behind the reshuffling of the aḥkām. The juxtaposition of 
the two lists is revealing:
Categories of human acts  
(by divine decree)
Ibn Rushd’s categories  
(by legal decree)
1 obligatory (farḍ) obligatory (wājib)
2 not obligatory but recommended (mustaḥabb or mandūb) commanded (ma’mūr)
3 neutral or permitted (mubāḥ) recommended (mandūb)
4 not forbidden but discouraged (makrūh) allowed (mubāh)
5 forbidden (ḥarām) prohibited (maḥẓūr)
It becomes clear now that the language of the strong categories “obliga-
tory” (farḍ) and “forbidden”(ḥarām) has been softened. No matter how 
high the status of a magistrate, he does not have the authority to declare 
an act either obligatory or forbidden in the scriptural sense. The legal obli-
gation the jurisconsult extrapolates is mandatory but to a lesser degree 
than the divinely decreed obligation. It can never be farḍ, only wājib. In 
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other words, if it turns out that the study of philosophy is to be declared 
mandatory, the obligation may never become comparable to the necessity 
of fulfilling one’s ritual prayers, incumbent upon all believers regardless 
of their predisposition and intellectual abilities. However, if the finding 
is negative and the study of philosophy is doomed, it shall not end up 
becoming forbidden in the way adultery or the consumption of pork is 
(these are unnegotiable prohibitions), but will instead be “maḥẓūr,” which, 
according to Ibn Rushd’s own legal manual, corresponds to the fourth 
ḥukm: “makrūh,” meaning “not forbidden but discouraged.”
The precise phrasing of the opening question in Faṣl al-Maqāl un-
ravels the investigative strategy pursued by Ibn Rushd, which is aiming at 
preventing the full loss of philosophy. The Andalusian is, in fact, telling 
his opponents that, while every jurisconsult has, of course, the power to 
issue a fatwā (a legal ruling) forbidding “the reflection on beings,” as Ibn 
Rushd defines philosophy (see following section), there is no scriptural 
basis to do so, which is the only means by which philosophy could be de-
finitively banned from Muslim lands. Ibn Rushd’s own ruling is that the 
available legal basis could only lead to preventing some groups of fellow 
Muslims from “reflecting on beings.” Thus individuals lacking appropriate 
intellectual disposition and/or preparation are not to take upon themselves 
the burden of true ḥikma, since the level of reasoning required for this task 
may put their faith at risk (cf. p. 61).
WHAT’S IN AN ANSWER?
Ibn Rushd’s answer closely follows the discourse’s introductory question. 
To the reader somewhat familiar with Islamic theological training, the 
answer is ingeniously clear and simple: “We say: if the activity of philoso-
phy is nothing more than study of existing beings and reflection on them as 
indications of the Artisan ... and if the Law has recommended and urged 
reflection on beings, then it is clear that what this name signifies is either 
obligatory or recommended by the Law” (ibid., my emphasis).
The middle term of what appears to be a syllogism is reflection. Prima 
facie, this is the structure that presents itself:
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Philosophy is reflection on existing beings, and
The Law recommends and urges reflection on beings (= God’s 
creatures),
Therefore, philosophy is either obligatory or recommended.
This first glance reading led some commentators to think of this being a 
case of flawed reasoning. Butterworth, for instance, notes “the first prem-
ise is not evident; and the second stretches the Qur’ānic verses cited as 
evidence.” I beg to differ: First, the initial premise as it emerges in Ibn 
Rushd’s answer is carefully preceded by an ‘if.’ The Andalusian philoso-
pher was obviously aware of many more ways to define philosophy. The 
‘if ’ is an invitation to accept a somewhat narrow notion of philosophy, 
narrow enough to be compatible with scriptural injunctions, which, as a 
note in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics suggests, may actually 
reflect Ibn Rushd’s genuine understanding of philosophy. Second, as for 
the “stretching” of the Qur’ānic verses, Ibn Rushd is following a tradition 
that began in Andalusia with the philosopher-mystic Ibn Masarra (d. 310 
A.H./AD 931) and can actually be found throughout Islamic philoso-
phy. In his Treatise on Inference (Risāla al-I’tibār), the older Andalusian 
philosopher invokes dozens of verses enjoining the rational and scientific 
investigation of the universe. We are dealing here with a matter of the 
“inner-cultural evidence” of a statement. Passages such as “Have they not 
studied the kingdom of heavens and the earth, and whatever things God has 
created?” (VII, 185) – coincidentally quoted both in Faṣl al-Maqāl (p. 45) 
and in Ibn Masarra’s Treatise on Inference (p. 6) – have been taken by the 
earliest Muslim commentators to mean that the Qur’ān urges believers to 
make sense of God’s creation by rational means. By invoking the verse, 
Ibn Rushd is simply reminding his conservative opponents that Islamic 
theology has long accommodated the need for rationality and sciences. 
Third, and more importantly, Ibn Rushd has a different conclusion from 
the one read by Butterworth. Here is the content of the actual conclusive 
statement in context:
If philosophy is reflection on existing beings, and
If the Law recommends and urges reflection,
Then what this name signifies is either obligatory or recom-
mended by the Law (my emphasis).
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Drawing conclusions by focusing on the meaning of a central term is a 
characteristic trait of Ibn Rushd’s Mālikī training (Malikites belong to 
one of four Sunni Schools of Law). To give a practical example: in his 
courtroom Ibn Rushd once used this procedure to determine that a stu-
dent who had done great damage to the reputation of a teacher in Cordova 
by insinuating that the teacher was infatuated with one of his pupils was 
to be punished in the same way as the slanderer who accuses a woman of 
adultery. Qur’ānic Law provides flogging as the appropriate punishment 
for the unjustified attack brought against a woman’s honour (qadhf ). Ibn 
Rushd decided that the student who had defamed the teacher in question 
should be subjected to the same corporeal punishment. There was no for-
mal syllogism involved in Ibn Rushd’s ruling. All he did is reason by using 
a procedure his school of jurisprudence called “qiyās al-ma‘nā,” analogy by 
meaning. This is not a case of flawed reasoning, it is just a different type of 
reasoning. It may not be Aristotelian, but it is all the same logical, accord-
ing to the criteria afforded by Mālikī methodology.
This type of “semantic reasoning,” as I call it, is also at work in Ibn 
Rushd’s philosophical work. For instance, in Faṣl al-Maqāl, Ibn Rushd 
refers briefly to how he countered al-Ghazālī’s attack on the Aristotelian 
theory of the eternity of the world in his Incoherence of the Incoherence:
Concerning the question whether the world is pre-eternal 
[qadīm] or came into existence [muḥdath], the disagreement be-
tween the Ash‘arite dialectical theologians [such as al-Ghazālī] 
and the ancient philosophers is in my view almost resolvable 
into a disagreement about naming.... For they agree that there 
are three classes of beings: two extremes and one intermediary 
between the extremes. They agree also about naming the extremes, 
but they disagree about the intermediate class. (p. 55)
The first class refers to “originated” beings, the opposite of which are “pre-
eternal” beings. Applied to the world, the world, inasmuch as it comes into 
existence, i.e., has a beginning in time, is an originated being. Translated 
into theological terms, the world was created by God (who is, of course, 
the only pre-eternal Being). Ibn Rushd resolves the contradiction between 
Aristotle and Islamic scripture (and generally biblical tradition) by claim-
ing that the notion (but not necessarily the term) “pre-eternal” may be 
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safely applied to God’s creation, provided one takes the term in its inter-
mediary meaning. It then signifies “the world as a whole”(al-‘ālim bī asrihi), 
neither fully eternal (since it has needs of an agent cause) nor perishable 
the way the single beings in it are. Leaning on Plato and his school, Ibn 
Rushd ends up calling the world “originated ab aeterno” (muḥdath azalī; 
my translation).
What is most striking about this finding is that Ibn Rushd reveals 
himself to be much more a Muslim lawyer than the strict Aristotelian 
logician that Western scholars like to project situated in a context deal-
ing precisely with a Greek-derived problem. This does not mean that Ibn 
Rushd abandoned his beloved master Aristotle altogether, only that he felt 
at liberty to choose when to apply what form of reasoning. As it turned 
out, “semantic reasoning” was the better strategy to pursue both, in har-
monizing Aristotle’s theory of the eternity of the world with scripture and 
declaring reflection on beings a legal obligation.
Aristotle’s logic remains, however, integrated in the remaining obliga-
tions Ibn Rushd extrapolates in his discourse. Thus, another obligation 
says “The Law, then, has urged us to have demonstrative knowledge of 
God” (p. 45). And to clarify that by “demonstration” he, indeed, means 
Aristotelian demonstration. Ibn Rushd asserts in the preparation to a fur-
ther conclusion that “it is difficult or impossible for one man to find out by 
himself and from the beginning all that he needs” (p. 46). Therefore, there 
is a legal obligation to follow a more knowledgeable authority “regard-
less of whether this other one shares our religion or not” (p. 46ff.). The 
Andalusian philosopher then specifies: “By ‘those who do not share our 
religion’ I refer to those ancients who studied these matters before Islam” 
(p. 47). Without any question, the non-Islamic authority on demonstra-
tion to include in one’s endeavour to reflect upon beings is Aristotle.
Among the possible objections Ibn Rushd addresses in Faṣl al-Maqāl 
is one of particular interest. It will allow us to close the circle that began 
by distancing ourselves from the Averroës of the Latin medieval tradition. 
To the opponent who may resentfully declare that not everyone can follow 
the intricacies of intellectual reasoning and that, therefore, demonstration 
cannot be made incumbent upon all believers, Ibn Rushd gladly concedes:
The natures of men are on different levels with [their paths] 
to assent [taṣdīq; my addition]. One of them comes to assent 
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through demonstration; another comes through dialectical argu-
ments just as firmly as the demonstrative man through demon-
stration, since his nature does not contain any greater capacity; 
while another comes through rhetorical arguments. (p. 49)
This is precisely the kind of assertion that gave rise in medieval Europe 
to the “theory of double truth.” While Averroism propagated this theory 
to maintain that one and the same position could contain different truth 
values, i.e., one for philosophy and another for theology, Ibn Rushd himself 
never did propose two (or, as the quotation above would rather suggest, 
three) “Truths.” Quite to the contrary, he actually emphasized that “truth 
does not oppose truth but accords with it and bears witness to it” (p. 50). 
To understand his position, one need take into account the theological 
frame within which he developed his ideas. Thus when Ibn Rushd 
affirmed that one and the same truth may be expressed in multiple ways, 
he was concerned with how that truth could be accessible to members of a 
religious community who are naturally different from each other in terms 
of their reasoning abilities. In this, the Andalusian philosopher thought 
as a Muslim theologian and applied an important requirement of Islamic 
faith that ensures that both prospective believers and adherents already in 
the faith be able to give their consent (taṣdīq) to their religion on the basis 
of personal persuasion. The reasoning is as follows: since certainty in one’s 
religious beliefs is an essential tenet of Islam, it would be unfair to expect 
an intellectually diverse pool of believers to agree with doctrinal issues in 
uniform terms. As a result, Ibn Rushd envisaged society divided into what 
one might call “epistemic classes.” Like many of his Muslim predecessors 
who were inspired by Plato’s tripartition in The Republic, Ibn Rushd ended 
up defining three classes: the masses who reason through the use of images 
(rhetorical arguments), the rational theologians who elaborate on their 
religious knowledge within a pre-defined frame (dialectical arguments), 
and the philosophers who expand on religious knowledge (demonstrative 
arguments). Thus, while all groups have access to the same scriptural truth, 
they differ in the means that permits them to make sense of scripture. The 
assignment of different types of arguments to different epistemic classes is 
to be read as an entitlement given to each of these classes. The masses, for 
example, are like the theologians and philosophers under the obligation 
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to reason, except that Ibn Rushd the magistrate grants them the privilege 
of reasoning according to their very capabilities.
How ironic it was to call Ibn Rushd’s theologically motivated epi-
stemic tripartition a heresy becomes particularly evident when one real-
izes that the entire Christian tradition of biblical exegesis rests on the 
same understanding of scripture holding different levels of meaning. St. 
Augustine’s distinction between “historical, etiological, analogical, and 
allegorical” has thus been discussed and refined for more than a millen-
nium of Christian theology. And Thomas Aquinas (whom the Middle 
Ages credited for having crushed “Averroistic heresies”) seems to be echo-
ing precisely Ibn Rushd when he writes in his Summa Theologica: “It is … 
befitting Holy Scripture … that spiritual truths be expounded by means of 
figures taken from corporeal things, in order that thereby even the simple 
who are unable by themselves to grasp intellectual things may be able to 
understand it” (Part One, q. I, art. 9)! Thomas Aquinas never suspected 
that, rather than being an offender, Ibn Rushd was actually an ally in 
promoting as he did the belief in the existence of one Truth.
In conclusion, there has never been a Rushdian theory of multiple 
truths. All there was was an understanding that individuals with different 
intellectual capabilities should be permitted to reason according to the 
means naturally available to them. And there never has been a “decisive 
treatise,” rather a “discourse” in the best tradition of Kalām examining 
the intrinsic relation between Wisdom (ḥikma) and Law (sharī‘a). More 
importantly, wisdom and law were understood to be rational disciplines 
dealing both with beings, which to the strongly Almohad-influenced Ibn 
Rushd meant that they had to be compatible. That wisdom and law were 
“milk-sisters” was his genuine conviction. In his mind, wisdom guided law 
and law protected wisdom. It would, therefore, be a gross error to assume 
that Ibn Rushd had advanced this view only to give Greek-derived philo-
sophical pursuit (falsafa) a simile of legitimacy in an Islamic context. He 
did not mean to safeguard the place of falsafa in Islamic culture but ḥikma, 
a pursuit more broadly defined to accommodate Muslim intellectual needs 
that may or may not include Greek expertise and methodologies. No mat-
ter how great Ibn Rushd’s admiration for Aristotle was, ultimately the 
object of his intellectual pursuit was wisdom itself. Depending on circum-
stances and the nature of a problem to be solved, reasoning techniques 
and/or concepts could be borrowed from the Greeks or from an Islamic 
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school of thought. While demonstration was understood to be a classical 
Greek tool, reasoning itself was not perceived as the monopoly of ancient 
Greece.
Without any question, the historic Ibn Rushd was a radically dif-
ferent thinker from the Averroës created by the medievals and perpetu-
ated by the later Western tradition. Before the West knew of Ibn Rushd 
the “Commentator,” there existed in Islamic Andalusia Ibn Rushd the 
“Magistrate,” which is how the Islamic world remembers him to this day. 
While one should like to tell contemporary Muslim theologians that 
Ibn Rushd the qāḍī should not be separated from the disciple of Arisṭū 
(Aristotle), the West ought to realize that it is the Commentator who 
must not be separated from the Magistrate.
APPENDIX
Visually speaking, my move away from the Western medieval setting 
can be conveyed by contrasting Filippino Lippi’s “The Triumph of Saint 
Thomas Aquinas over the Heretics” (1488–92) with Raphael’s “School 
of Athens” (1510/11). Lippi’s “The Triumph” is located at the Carafa 
Chapel in Santa Maria sopra Minerva, Rome. It is one of many works 
commissioned by the Dominican order to celebrate Thomas Aquinas’s 
victory over Averroës and other heretics. Not only does it feature a crushed 
Averroës at the feet of the Christian philosopher-theologian but also it 
shows him holding a Latin inscription saying “sapientia vincit malitiam” 
(“wisdom defeats malice”). Considering what a lover of wisdom – or ḥikma 
– the Andalusian philosopher himself was, the inscription is rather ironic, 
not to say malicious.
By comparison, one can tell that Raphael had no intention to perpetu-
ate the image of an Averroës solely to be remembered for his commentar-
ies on Aristotelian works and the controversy these sparked in the West. 
If that had been the intention, surely the Andalusian would have been 
placed in the vicinity of Aristotle. Instead, one finds him lovingly depicted 
as the Muslim he was, clothed with a turban and a green kaftan, leaning 
over the shoulders of the writing Archimedes (3rd century B.C.), in a pos-
ture expressing deep humility, but not humiliation, before a respected and 
admired predecessor. To fully appreciate the inclusion of Ibn Rushd in 
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“The School of Athens,” one need realize that he is the only non-ancient 
author in this august assembly of Greek, Roman (and Persian) philoso-
pher-scientists. No one else from a later period was considered worthy 
enough to be included in Raphael’s “School of Athens.” Ibn Rushd with 
his great love for the Greeks would not have minded being associated 
with them. Nevertheless, to use an Aristotelian term, it is doubtful that 
he would have thought of the “School of Athens” as his natural place. In 
his mind, he most certainly would have felt that – notwithstanding the 
many differences in opinion – he belonged to the philosopher-scientist-
theologians of the Islamic tradition of thought such as al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā 
(Avicenna), and al-Ghazālī.
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Lakṣaṇā is an Indian exegetical principle that permits an interpreter to 
revert to a less literal reading of a textual claim when the literal reading 
is sufficiently implausible. If the literal reading implies a contradiction or 
absurdity, for example, an interpreter is often permitted – and sometimes 
required – to understand the claim figuratively. Contemporary interpret-
ers of Indian philosophy employ this strategy extensively, but often with-
out acknowledging its limitations.
In this paper I argue that the application of the principle of lakṣaṇā 
by contemporary interpreters of Indian philosophy is appropriate only if at 
least two criteria are met. First, the premises of the argument that dem-
onstrates that a contradiction or absurdity follows from a literal reading 
of the claim must be plausibly attributed to the text, author, or tradition 
of which the text is a part. Second, the inference from the premises to 
the conclusion of the argument must be plausibly attributed to the text, 
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author, or tradition. In short, contemporary interpreters of Indian phil-
osophy should adopt and utilize the principle of lakṣaṇā, but only in accord 
with the criteria set forth by classical Indian philosophers.
THE PRINCIPLE OF LAKṢAṆĀ
One of the most common exegetical strategies among contemporary 
scholars of Indian philosophy is to argue that their own interpretations 
avoid absurd or inconsistent consequences that competing interpretations 
do not. This kind of strategy assumes from the outset that an interpreter 
should attempt to avoid contradictions of at least three kinds: (1) contra-
dictions within the text, (2) contradictions with the broader tradition of 
which the text is a part, and (3) contradictions with so-called common 
sense.
On the one hand, there are certainly circumstances under which this 
strategy is justified. The alternative of simply letting apparent contradic-
tions lie seems to amount to a denial of the original author’s ability to 
recognize these contradictions. That is, the alternative seems to be the 
Orientalist interpretation par excellence.
In the introduction to her English translation of the Manusmṛti, 
Wendy Doniger makes this point.1
Many scholars believe that the text of Manu is a hotchpotch 
of inconsistency.… This attitude has been characterized by fol-
lowers of Edward Said as ‘Orientalist’; it is based upon an ar-
rogant Western assumption that ‘Orientals’ are radically alien 
even in their basic cognitive processes, that, unlike us, they do 
not recognize or understand contradictions when they encoun-
ter or generate them.2
Edward Said, quoting Cromer, further illustrates this assumption: “logic 
is something ‘the existence of which the Oriental is disposed altogether 
to ignore’.”3
Even if these texts are the result of numerous authors and redactions, 
or attempts to reconcile competing, inconsistent worldviews, and so on, 
to take apparent contradictions at face value seems to amount to a denial 
of the tradition’s ability to recognize contradictions. The readers of these 
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texts, both within and without the intellectual milieu, “regard the product 
as a single text”4 and hence as a roughly unified document.
Arindam Chakrabarti makes this point in the context of the 
Manusmṛti and Mahābhārata. One might attempt to explain the apparent 
inconsistencies in these texts by mentioning the historical convergence of 
violent Vedic culture and non-violent post-Vedic culture during the period 
of their compositions.
But such an ‘explanation’ does not solve the moral puzzle that 
the Dharmaśāstras [a broader class of texts that includes the 
Manusmṛti] and Mahābhārata present. How could a Dharma-
obsessed self-critical hermeneutically meticulous society inter-
nalize both of these attitudes within the same moral frame-
work at the same time?5
It is difficult to see how the tradition’s interpretive and analytic compe-
tence can be acknowledged without at least attempting to explain how 
it reconciles the tensions that characterize its historical background and 
which might manifest in its texts.
Consider, for example, Rajendra Prasad’s interpretation of 
niṣkāmakarma (desireless action) in the Bhagavadgītā (Gītā). Prasad argues 
as follows:
Kṛṣṇa [an incarnation of God in the Gītā] also speaks of giv-
ing up all desires.… As per common experience, [however,] an 
intentional action X is possible without any desire for doing X, 
if there is another desire for doing something else.… To do an 
intentional action, therefore, I must have at least some desire 
for something, or for doing something. But if I have no desire 
at all, if I am completely desireless, I cannot do any intentional 
action. Therefore … all of Kṛṣṇa’s exhortations to [Arjuna] for 
doing actions without any desire … [are] infructuous [that is, 
useless].6
Prasad argues that desireless action, taken literally, is an obvious contra-
diction. Since Kṛṣṇa endorses desireless action, Kṛṣṇa’s advice is simply 
nonsense.
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If we assume that Prasad is correct that desireless action is an obvious 
contradiction (although see below), then we should at least consider the 
possibility that Kṛṣṇa’s endorsement of desireless action is qualified in 
some way. The alternative is to say that the author of the Gītā was incap-
able of recognizing this fact of “common experience.”
Perhaps the advice could be taken as an endorsement of action per-
formed without certain desires, rather than without any desire at all. 
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, among others, draws the same initial conclu-
sion as Prasad – that the advice, taken literally, is a contradiction – but 
then infers that “[w]e are not asked to uproot all desires; for that would 
imply the cessation of all activity.”7 That is, in Radhakrishnan’s view, since 
the literal reading of Kṛṣṇa’s advice entails an obvious contradiction, the 
literal reading must be abandoned in favour of a less literal one.8
Additionally, the Indian traditions themselves see this strategy of 
adopting a figurative interpretation under certain circumstances as abso-
lutely indispensable. Many of the earliest texts in the Indian philosoph-
ical tradition (the Yogasūtra, Nyāyasūtra, Sāṃkhyakārika, and so on) were 
written with the expectation that a student would hear the text from a 
teacher, who would explain the extremely concise, ambiguous sūtras oral-
ly. Commentaries on these texts reflect this oral tradition and often read 
like the words of one’s guru, explicating each term or claim with syno-
nyms, examples, and analogies, considering alternative interpretations 
and objections, and dismissing them. Without employing some form of 
the contemporary strategy outlined above, however, it is difficult to see 
how one interpretation is more plausible than another. Put simply: the 
commentarial tradition in India has always admitted consistency as a fun-
damental interpretive constraint. The commentators themselves presum-
ably thought that their own work would be interpreted in accord with this 
constraint as well, and wrote accordingly.
Indeed, Indian philosophers and literary critics explicitly defend this 
interpretive principle and outline – albeit sometimes in disagreement with 
one another – guidelines for its use. In these traditions, the principle of 
lakṣaṇā states that when there is an obstruction (bādha) of the primary 
meaning (mukhya, abhidhā) of a word or sentence, a secondary meaning 
(lakṣaṇā, also upacāra, gauṇi, vṛtti, bhakti) must be adopted.9 The principle 
also states that when there is no obstruction to the primary meaning of a 
word or sentence, it is impermissible to revert to a secondary meaning.10
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The primary and secondary meanings of a word are generally ex-
plained in terms of ordinary established usage. The referent that most im-
mediately comes to mind when the word is heard is that to which the word 
refers directly and primarily. The referent that comes to mind, although 
not immediately – usually in part as a result of an obstruction (bādha) 
of the primary meaning – is that to which the word refers indirectly or 
secondarily.
The term bādha can refer to either an immediate breakdown in com-
prehension or a contradiction of some sort. An immediate breakdown in 
comprehension might occur when a person hears, for example, that “food 
is life” or “he is the family.”11 In these cases, it is not clear how one might 
so much as form a consistent image from these utterances, since food and 
life are clearly different – someone might die with a full stomach! – and 
an individual and his family are numerically distinct. Hence the first sen-
tence means food is essential to life, and the second means that he is the 
head or most prominent member of his family.
In contrast, a contradiction might occur when a person hears that 
“the village is on the Ganges.” In this case, it is not as if it is impossible 
to construct an image of a village floating atop the Ganges – there is no 
immediate breakdown in comprehension. It’s just that villages cannot in 
fact be constructed upon rivers.12 That is, the utterance, taken literally, 
contradicts common sense. Hence the sentence states that the village sits 
on the bank of the Ganges.
The examples that are most widely discussed in the literature on 
lakṣaṇā are of the relatively straightforward sort just outlined. They are 
usually isolated utterances of a single speaker and face a bādha in virtue of 
their own content. In the context of textual exegesis, however, the strategy 
is extended, so that a secondary meaning can be adopted even if the claim 
being interpreted is perfectly sensible on its own.
The prevalence of this strategy among classical Indian philosophers 
cannot be overstated. Consider, for example, the opening passages of the 
most well-known and influential commentaries on the Bhagavadgītā – 
those of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Śaṅkara begins his commentary with 
verse 2.12, which reads:
Certainly I never did not exist, nor you, nor these lords of men /
And never will we not all exist henceforth //13
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He explains that the word ‘we’ (vayam) should not be taken literally to 
refer to an actual multiplicity of selves because this is inconsistent with the 
non-dualism of both the Gītā and the Upaniṣads. Instead, ‘we’ refers to the 
merely apparent multiplicity of selves. Śaṅkara argues that the primary 
meaning of the claim should therefore be abandoned for a less literal one.14
Rāmānuja begins his commentary with the same verse, only to dispute 
Śaṅkara’s argument for the non-literal reading. He insists that the word 
‘we’ must be taken literally, since Kṛṣṇa uses the word ‘we’ “at the time of 
teaching the eternal, ultimate truth, as a means to eliminating the error 
due to ignorance.”15 If Kṛṣṇa’s goal is the elimination of ignorance, then 
why would he speak in a way that, taken literally, reinforces what Śaṅkara 
takes to be the fundamental error that results from ignorance – namely the 
error of believing that there are a multiplicity of selves? Instead, according 
to Rāmānuja, in order to avoid further confusion, Kṛṣṇa surely speaks 
literally and means to imply an actual multiplicity of selves.16
So this fundamental metaphysical disagreement between Śaṅkara 
and Rāmānuja amounts, in large part, to a disagreement over which 
authoritative claims should be taken literally. Rāmānuja in turn must 
interpret less literally claims that, taken literally, seem to endorse 
non-dualism.
Elsewhere, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja agree to dismiss more literal 
readings of passages that imply that determinism is true. Gītā 3.33, for 
example, reads:
Even the wise acts according to his material nature /
Beings follow [their] material nature. What will resistance do? //17
Both authors point out the contradiction between the literal reading and 
scriptural injunctions. Scriptural injunctions imply free will. If it is true 
that I ought to act in a spirit of devotion towards God, for example, then 
presumably I am free to do so if I choose. Free will and determinism 
are inconsistent. Hence Gītā 3.33 does not state that determinism is true. 
Instead, Gītā 3.33 should be taken to say that agents are determined by 
desire and aversion (rāga and dveṣa), unless they resist their force.18
In some cases, the defence of one interpretation over another amounts 
to a circuitous argument. The Naiyāyikas, for example, take the Upaniṣadic 
claim that mokṣa (liberation) is eternal sukha – literally: happiness – in its 
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secondary sense, to mean that mokṣa is eternally (and entirely) devoid of 
pain. They argue against the Vedāntin, who takes the claim literally, to 
mean that in mokṣa the eternal bliss of the true self is manifested. This 
means that, when a person attains mokṣa, he or she becomes aware of the 
bliss of mokṣa. If this is right, then some explanation must be given for what 
causes the awareness of bliss to arise. One option is to say that there is no 
cause of the awareness of the eternal bliss of mokṣa. It is simply eternal. If 
the awareness were eternal, however, then everyone would always experi-
ence it, and there would be no difference between the liberated person and 
the unliberated person. This, the Naiyāyikas claim, is absurd, however. If, 
on the other hand, the awareness of the bliss of mokṣa is caused, then it 
cannot be eternal because whatever is caused is non-eternal.19 Anything 
that comes into existence inevitably ceases to exist.20 Instead, then, the 
claim that mokṣa is eternal sukha means mokṣa is perfectly devoid of duḥkha 
(pain).21
The point of this kind of example is to show that the standards for con-
sistency can be extremely high. Prasad charges the author of the Gītā with 
saying something that directly contradicts a supposedly obvious truth. If 
he is right, then, at least according to the classical Indian traditions, an 
interpreter is not only justified in reverting to a less literal reading but is 
required to do so. Commentators on the Nyāyasūtra, in contrast, charge 
the Vedāntins with saying something the falsehood of which is discerned 
only through careful, extensive, and perhaps obscure reasoning (if it is at 
all). Nonetheless, in this case too, the classical Indian traditions say that 
the interpreter is justified in reverting to a less literal reading.
While all of this suggests that the contemporary strategy of avoiding 
contradiction is justified, and even unavoidable, there are also reasons for 
hesitation. It might be objected, for example, that the use of the exegetical 
principle of lakṣaṇā by contemporary scholars amounts to a different form 
of Orientalism, since it licenses the interpreter to impose her own con-
cepts, values, and truths on Indian texts.22 As Doniger and Smith warn, 
“there is always the danger that the coherence is in the eye of the beholder, 
that we project upon the text a pattern that is not of its making.”23
It seems that, if contemporary scholars apply the principle of lakṣaṇā 
as rigorously and extensively as classical commentators do, they will mis-
takenly conclude that the Indian Law Books are consistent with liberal-
ism, that Indian ethics is a species of utilitarianism (or deontology, or 
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virtue ethics), that Indian metaphysics is realist, and perhaps physicalist, 
and so on, just because they take some of these positions as obviously 
correct. Indeed, the analyses of niṣkāmakarma that I mention above (and 
almost every other contemporary analysis of the doctrine) assume that 
Indian moral psychology is fundamentally Humean in that it accepts the 
so-called ‘desire-belief ’ account of motivation – an account that has only 
recently become the preferred view in the West. (Hume himself begins 
the famous passage in which he defends this view by characterizing the 
opposing view – according to which reason can motivate action without 
the help of desire – as a philosophical dogma of his day.24)
THE APPLICATION OF LAKṢAṆĀ
So the question is: How do we reconcile these demands and dangers? 
Not surprisingly, I want to argue that the Indian exegetical principle of 
lakṣaṇā should be used but that it should be used very carefully. To begin 
with, it’s worth drawing a distinction between what might be called the 
‘unrestrained’ application of the principle of lakṣaṇā – the kind exhibited 
by the Nyāya argument against a literal reading of the claim that mokṣa is 
sukha – and what might be called the ‘restrained’ application.
The unrestrained application of the principle seeks to make a text con-
sistent at any cost. Fundamental to this strategy is the assumption that the 
text is both perfectly consistent and entirely true. The strategy does not 
allow the option of simply ascribing an inconsistency or falsehood to the 
text under analysis. Neither Śaṅkara nor Rāmānuja dismisses a claim of 
the Upaniṣads, Brahmasūtra, or Bhagavadgītā as simply false. They apply 
the principle of lakṣaṇā without restraint.
The restrained application, in contrast, does not accept the assump-
tion that the text is perfectly consistent and entirely true. It admits both 
that the author or authors that composed the text might have overlooked 
inconsistencies, and that the tradition that accepts the text as authoritative 
might have overlooked inconsistencies as well. It admits that the author 
or authors that composed the text might have asserted things that were 
untrue, and that the tradition that accepts the text as authoritative might 
have overlooked these falsehoods.
We see the distinction between these two applications of the principle 
in the Indian traditions themselves. When an author comments on a text 
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that he takes to be authoritative, he applies lakṣaṇā in an unrestrained way 
because he assumes that the author of the text is infallible, and hence that 
every word of the text is true, and every claim of the text consistent with 
every other. Indeed, under the assumption that the author of the text is 
infallible, this kind of strategy is justified.
In other cases, however, commentators are willing to attribute mis-
takes to those texts on which they comment simply because they do not 
take the authors of the texts to be infallible. In these cases, they apply 
the principle of lakṣaṇā, but not in an unrestrained way. They utilize the 
restrained application of the principle.25
This is most obvious in cases in which an author considers an oppon-
ent’s position. If the author utilizes the unrestrained application of lakṣaṇā 
in these circumstances, there would be no disagreements left to resolve. 
The Vedāntin, for example, would simply state the Nyāya view in a way 
that reflects innovative interpretation on the part of the Vedāntin. Instead, 
however, the Vedāntin notes the differences between the Vedāntin and 
Nyāya view and argues for the falsity of the latter.
This brings us back to the matter of how contemporary scholars should 
apply the principle of lakṣaṇā. The first point I want to make is that, since 
the unrestrained application of the principle is appropriate only under the 
assumption that the original author was or is infallible, contemporary 
scholars will rarely apply the principle in this way just because contem-
porary scholars tend not to operate under this assumption. So only the 
restrained application of the principle of lakṣaṇā need be addressed here.
In order to utilize the restrained application of lakṣaṇā, at least two 
criteria must be met. (These criteria are not meant to be exhaustive.)
 (1) The premises of the argument that demonstrates the 
contradiction or absurdity that follows from the literal 
reading of the claim must be plausibly attributed to the 
text, author, or tradition of which the text is a part.
 (2) The inference from the premises to the conclusion of 
the argument that demonstrates the contradiction or 
absurdity that follows from the literal reading of the 
claim must be plausibly attributed to the text, author, or 
tradition.
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In order to justify reverting to a non-literal reading of a claim, an inter-
preter must argue that the literal reading of the claim entails a contradic-
tion or absurdity. The first criterion states that the claims that constitute 
the premises of the argument that demonstrates the contradiction or ab-
surdity must be plausibly attributed to the text, author, or tradition of 
which the text is a part.26
Consider an example. Radhakrishnan, whom I mentioned above, 
argues for a non-literal interpretation of Kṛṣṇa’s advice to act without de-
sire in the following way:
Premise One: Kṛṣṇa advises Arjuna to act without desire.
Premise Two: Desire is a necessary condition of action.
Premise Three/Conclusion One: Hence taken literally, 
Kṛṣṇa’s advice is a contradiction – he advises Arjuna to both act 
and not act, or to both act without desire and act with desire.
Premise Four: If Kṛṣṇa’s advice, taken literally, entails a con-
tradiction, then the advice should be taken non-literally.
Conclusion Two: Hence Kṛṣṇa advises Arjuna to act without 
certain desires. Other desires are permissible.
The argument is convincing, however, only if premise two is plausibly at-
tributed to the Gītā. If premise two is true but cannot be plausibly at-
tributed to the text, then, all other things being equal, the most plaus-
ible interpretation of Kṛṣṇa’s advice is the literal – and inconsistent – one. 
Kṛṣṇa advises Arjuna to act without desire even if he is mistaken in some 
way in doing so. Hence Radhakrishnan’s argument is not convincing as it 
stands. Some further argument is needed for the claim that premise two 
is plausibly attributed to the Gītā.
Some of the authors who offer a similar argument argue that, since 
a number of other seminal Indian texts and traditions accept the claim 
that desire is a necessary condition of action, the Gītā does as well.27 
Radhakrishnan and others,28 however, seem to want to say that, since this 
claim is obviously true, the Gītā must accept it. So there are at least two 
different strategies for justifying the attribution of a claim to a text. The 
first is to find the claim in the text or tradition of which it is a part.29 The 
second is to say that the claim is self-evident and hence that the original 
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author must have accepted it, even if there is insufficient textual evidence 
to support the claim that the original author accepted it.
I want to leave the first strategy aside and focus on the second, since 
relatively little has been said about the second. Obviously, the fact that a 
claim is now widely accepted does not entail that it was obviously true or 
self-evident to the author of an ancient text.30 It seems forbidding, how-
ever, to try to codify all of the additional conditions that would have to be 
met in order for an interpreter to be justified in attributing a claim to a text 
on this basis. Instead, I want to point out a single additional condition, the 
violation of which is the basis for many mistakes in Indian exegesis: the 
claim that is attributed to a text on the basis that it is self-evident must at 
least be true.31
Consider another example. Ian Whicher argues that verse 1.2 of the 
Yogasūtra (yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ) should not be taken literally to read: 
“Yoga – yogaḥ – is the cessation – nirodhaḥ – of the modifications (that is, 
states and activities) – vṛtti – of the mind – citta.” Instead, it should be 
taken non-literally to mean: “Yoga is the cessation of [the misidentifica-
tion with] the modifications (vṛtti) of the mind.”32
One of the arguments that Whicher offers for this conclusion goes as 
follows:
Premise One: Assume nirodha (cessation) is the ontological 
elimination of mental modifications. (This is what Yogasūtra 
1.2 says, if taken literally.)
Premise Two: If nirodha is the ontological elimination of men-
tal modifications, then it is the willful suppression of mental 
modifications.
Premise Three: If nirodha is the willful suppression of mental 
modifications, then nirodha is a rajasic and tamasic state (a state 
characterized by aggression, laziness, and delusion).
Premise Four/Conclusion One: Hence if Yogasūtra 1.2 is 
taken literally, nirodha is a rajasic and tamasic state, which is 
absurd.
Premise Five: If Yogasūtra 1.2, taken literally, entails an ab-
surdity, then Yogasūtra 1.2 should be taken non-literally.
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Conclusion Two: Hence the advice in Yogasūtra 1.2 to eliminate 
the modifications of the mind is just the advice to eliminate the 
identification with the modifications of the mind.33
Whicher seems to want to say that premises two and three are self-evident. 
He doesn’t cite the Yogasūtra or any of its commentaries in their support. 
Whicher assumes, in premise two, that in order to eliminate a mental 
state or activity, one must suppress it straightaway. This would seem to be 
false, however, in light of the following example.
In a related context, Paul Williams points out that the Buddhist 
Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras repeatedly describe the bodhisattva as without dis-
cursive thought. Williams points out that to take this to mean that the 
text advises “simply cutting discursive thought, making the mind a blank” 
straightaway, however, amounts to the fallacy of “confusing the result 
with the cause.” Instead, a practitioner should first extend her analysis of 
reality as a means of deepening her understanding of śūnyatā (emptiness). 
As an eventual but not immediate result, discursive thought ceases.34
Likewise in the context of yoga, the practitioner should eliminate the 
kleśas (defilements) by means of morality, dispassion, and concentration 
(rather than simply trying to suppress the mind directly). As an even-
tual but not immediate result, mental activity ceases – that is, there is 
an ontological elimination of the mental modifications. If this is right, 
then premise two of Whicher’s argument is false. If the premise is false, 
then it cannot be plausibly attributed to the text (author and so on) on the 
grounds that it is self-evident.35
Thus, in summary, the first criterion states that the claims that consti-
tute the premises of the argument that demonstrates that a contradiction 
or absurdity results from a literal reading of a textual claim must be plaus-
ibly attributed to the text. In order for a claim to be plausibly attributed to 
a text, at least one of two conditions must be satisfied. Either (a) there must 
be sufficient evidence from the text or tradition, or (b) the claim must be 
self-evident. If an interpreter attributes a claim to a text on the basis that 
it is self-evident, then minimally the claim must be true. Sufficient textual 
evidence is a sufficient condition for attributing a claim to a text. The truth 
of a claim, however, is merely a necessary condition. Indeed, it is a rather 
meagre condition. Nonetheless, failure to meet this condition accounts for 
many mistakes in the interpretation of Indian philosophical texts.
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The second criterion for the application of the principle of lakṣaṇā 
states that any inference within the argument that an interpreter offers 
to justify reverting to a non-literal reading of a claim must be plausibly 
attributed to the text, author, or tradition.36 Suppose an interpreter offers 
an argument for a non-literal reading of a claim, and each premise of the 
argument is plausibly attributed to the text. It still might not be the case 
that the argument as a whole is plausibly attributed to the text. In addition 
to whatever evidence makes the attribution of the claims plausible, further 
evidence is typically needed for the plausibility of attributing to the text 
the combination of claims in the form of an argument. Many of Socrates’ 
dialogues demonstrate that his interlocutor accepts inconsistent claims 
without realizing it, and of course each of us has been and is guilty of the 
same kind of oversight. We should leave open the possibility that a text or 
author is capable of this kind of oversight as well. So, rather than simply 
assume that the author draws every justified inference, a case should be 
made for each inference that is attributed.
There are at least two different strategies for justifying the attribution 
of an inference to a text, and the two strategies parallel those for justifying 
the attribution of a claim to a text. (For the sake of simplicity, in what fol-
lows, I assume that the first criterion is met.) The first is to find sufficient 
evidence for the inference within the text or tradition of which it is a part. 
This might mean establishing that the very argument that is being attrib-
uted to the text is explicit within the text or tradition itself. Otherwise, 
it might mean establishing that a sufficiently similar line of argument is 
advanced, perhaps repeatedly, in the text or tradition.
The second strategy is to say that the inference is self-evident, and 
hence that the original author must have accepted it, even if there is in-
sufficient textual evidence to support the claim that the original author 
accepted it. If the inference is attributed to the text on these grounds, 
then it must meet the very meagre condition of being justified, just as the 
attribution of a claim to a text on the grounds that it is self-evident must 
meet the minimum (and only necessary) condition of being true.37
So in summary, the second criterion states that the inferences within 
the argument that demonstrates that a contradiction or absurdity results 
from a literal reading of a textual claim must be plausibly attributed to 
the text. In order for an inference to be plausibly attributed to a text, at 
least one of two conditions must be satisfied. Either (a) there must be 
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sufficient evidence from the text or tradition, or (b) the inference must 
be self-evident. If an interpreter attributes an inference to a text on the 
basis that it is self-evident, then minimally the inference must be justified. 
Sufficient evidence from the text or tradition is a sufficient condition for 
attributing an inference to a text. That an inference is justified, however, is 
merely a necessary condition.
LAKṢAṆĀ AND CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETERS OF 
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
The two criteria that I have defended here might be combined to read:
The argument that demonstrates the contradiction or absurd-
ity that follows from the literal reading of the claim must be 
plausibly attributed to the text, author, or tradition of which 
the text is a part.
If the argument is plausibly attributed to a text, then presumably each 
premise of the argument is plausibly attributed to the text and any infer-
ence between premise(s) and conclusion(s) is plausibly attributed to the 
text. Still, it is helpful to keep the two criteria distinct, since each amounts 
to a distinct task that comes with its own obstacles. In closing, I want to say 
something about the skills that are required to deal with these obstacles.
First, an interpreter should know the text and traditions that he or she 
interprets as well as possible and attempt to align the text under analysis 
with its cultural, philosophical, and historical milieu. Facility with the 
original language in which the text was composed is an important com-
ponent in this range of skills. This skill will generally be of most use in 
establishing the plausibility of a claim or inference on the basis of evidence 
from the text or tradition of which it is a part. This point can be reduced 
to the advice to simply employ a certain kind of hermeneutic and historical 
rigour that many scholars already employ.
Hermeneutic and historical rigour is not enough, however. Thorough 
knowledge of the traditions under interpretation does not ensure that the 
interpreter will correctly identify possible contradictions and accurately 
discriminate between more and less plausible interpretations. In order to 
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do this, the interpreter must also employ a certain kind of philosophical 
rigour – a careful analysis of concepts and their implications, the broad 
consideration of alternatives, and an ability to evaluate his or her own 
arguments honestly – much like that employed by classical Indian authors.
This is not to say that the careful historian and philosopher never 
imposes his or her own convictions, intuitions, conceptual schemes, and 
so on, onto a text. My point is that some of the grossest instances of this 
can be avoided by means of the strategies I have outlined. Without these 
strategies, there are literally no limitations on what an interpreter might 
claim a text implies.
There are both altruistic and egoistic reasons to produce research of 
this sort. To the extent that we do, we contribute toward building a com-
munity of scholars with a common set of standards. With a common set of 
standards, we produce work that is useful and interesting to a larger audi-
ence. We also work towards avoiding obvious mistakes and the relatively 
effortless refutations of those who have mastered skills that we have not. 
In short, we improve our work by making it more convincing.
CONCLUSION
Contemporary interpreters of Indian philosophy employ something like 
the classical Indian exegetical principle of lakṣaṇā. While this principle 
is indispensable to current scholarship, contemporary scholars will bene-
fit from appreciating the rigour with which it was applied in the clas-
sical Indian commentarial traditions themselves, and by following their 
examples.
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Women’s Rights as Human Rights: 




The subject of women’s rights as human rights has been a topic of much 
discussion in a number of disciplines recently. It seems to me that many of 
the issues raised in connection with women’s rights have a particular res-
onance with religious matters. Unfortunately, however, these matters have 
not been treated in a sustained manner within the discipline of Religious 
Studies.2 This is because religion is often viewed as one of the principal 
obstacles to women’s rights. It is basically from this problematic perspec-
tive that women’s rights have been approached in Religious Studies, with 
an emphasis on fundamentalist forms of religion.3 One of the reasons for 
this is that a number of countries have refused to be full signatories at the 
United Nations to declarations where women’s rights are concerned. They 
have claimed reservations because of tradition and/or culture – which are 
basically shorthand terms for religion.4 While there have been various 
eloquent indictments of this situation by feminist philosophers, political 
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and legal theorists, and activists of many stripes,5 there have been few 
voices from feminists in Religious Studies, especially from a comparative 
outlook.6 In this essay then, I would like to undertake some preliminary 
observations as to specific areas of interest that hold promise for a com-
parative study of women’s rights and religion. In the present climate of 
fundamentalist claims, this would seem to be a matter of some urgency. 
Until there is a form of co-operative dialogue between women scholars 
of various religious backgrounds, who also support women’s rights, it ap-
pears that the present unproductive exclusive divide between the secular 
and religious domains, as mirroring exactly the liberal separation of the 
public and the private worlds, will remain entrenched. This is not to say 
that I oppose the separation of church and state as a general principle, but 
I think that, in particular circumstances, religion can no longer claim to 
be a private haven, shielded from the law when the law has been violated. 
The finer legal details of this needed modification are beyond the scope 
of this paper,7 but what I plan to describe in this essay are some of the 
problematic areas concerning the interaction of religion and the rights of 
women where I believe that women scholars in religion could contribute 
both pertinent and valuable insights.
WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND RELIGION
In 1997 Martha Nussbaum published an article entitled: “Religion and 
Women’s Human Rights.”8 In it she made a statement to the effect that 
no systems of religious law should be allowed to interfere with the basic 
rights of citizens. Her particular concern was the situation of women 
throughout the world where religions have not always respected women’s 
rights, in accordance with the equal dignity and the inviolability of their 
persons, as promulgated by the United Nations in Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1949) and the Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women or CEDAW (1979). For 
Nussbaum, this manifests itself in the need to control women, specifically 
in matters involving sexuality, marriage and divorce, reproduction and 
guardianship or custody of children. Since this publication, much discus-
sion has occurred on the merits of Nussbaum’s liberal political position, 
and of certain inherent tendencies that have been labelled by postcolonial 
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thinkers or conservative religious figures as “western” or “Northern” im-
positions on women in cultures where secular values, such as equal rights 
are inapplicable.
In the same year, another article in a similar vein appeared, “Is 
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?”9 Here political scientist Susan Moller 
Okin worried that cultures “that endorse and facilitate the control of men 
over women in various ways – even informally – limit their capacity to 
live with human dignity equal to that of men and boys, and to live as 
freely chosen lives as possible.”10 Moller Okin was especially concerned 
about the way in which this played itself out when people from these cul-
tures migrate to countries such as the United States. Okin’s short essay 
provoked an extremely animated discussion. A number of responses were 
published in a volume with the same name as her essay, edited by Joshua 
Cohen, Michael Howard, and Martha Nussbaum.11
There were telling observations among these responses. One response 
from Nussbaum herself called on Okin to account for a seeming dismissive 
attitude towards religion as not having anything constructive to contribute 
to human beings and society.12 Another reply from Homi Bhabha alleged 
that Okin depicted a stark dualism posited between religion and secular-
ism that tended to reinforce existing stereotypes regarding the religious 
practices and orientations of minority migrant communities.13 She was also 
criticized by Bhabha for her determinate view of culture as static14 because 
it did not take into account the dynamic, if sometimes controversial, en-
counters that can often bring about positive change in attitudes and behav-
iour for both parties. Finally, she was also charged with ignoring the fact 
that women in minority cultures are not necessarily passive recipients and 
many resist existing conditions by protesting against imposed standards 
that do not acknowledge their integrity.15
In her response, Nussbaum also placed particular emphasis on the no-
tion of freedom of religious expression, specifically as it is expressed in the 
American Constitution. Nussbaum acknowledged the complex and dif-
ficult nature of the competing claims of the right to equality of treatment 
with the right to freedom of religious practice, involving the constant 
testing of the limits of toleration in a politically liberal state.16 She also 
admits that she is in favour of the position that such a state – specifically 
the United States – “would give religion specific deference, on the grounds 
that minority religions have been especially vulnerable in all societies and 
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are consequently in need of special protection.”17 Yet how congruent is this 
observation with her earlier remark that religious law should never impede 
the rights of citizens? For it would seem to me that deference to certain 
religious practices, which claim the authority of law and tradition, par-
ticularly in regard to women, could be extremely problematic. Are these 
practices then to be given deference or to be contested?
It is this contested area where I believe that there are no easy or im-
mediate answers, especially in countries such as Canada, where multicul-
turalism has been official policy, in contrast to the United States where the 
metaphor of “melting pot” is preferred. These crucial decisions need to be 
painstakingly worked out through the courts, and through Parliament – at 
both federal and provincial levels – and in public debate. As an illustration 
of the way that the introduction of religion to these debates can complicate 
the question of women’s rights in specific societies, I will present the basic 
outlines of two recent case studies in Canada. These are: 1. The situation 
of the Aboriginal women of Canada, particularly those on reservations 
governed by the Indian Act.18 The rights of these women to housing, food, 
or shelter can still be lost if they marry a non-Aboriginal man – they 
become legally non-Indian. 2. The recommendation made in early 2005 
in the province of Ontario in favour of permitting Islamic tribunals to use 
Sharī‘a law to settle family disputes.
THE SITUATION OF ABORIGINAL WOMEN IN CANADA
The narratives of the Aboriginal women of Canada testify to injustices en-
acted, not only because of prejudices resulting from perceived differences 
of pigmentation or genetic inheritance, but specifically because of gender 
difference. This is evident in the ongoing failure to recognize Aboriginal 
women’s rights to community or band membership and to respect their 
position as trusted guardians of the tradition. It is also manifested in the 
disproportionate rates of Aboriginal women subjected to judicial proced-
ures and subsequent incarceration. But most especially and tragically it is 
all too obvious in acts of violence and murder that are inflicted upon them. 
These are forms of discrimination that contemporary justice has failed to 
rectify, and their continuation indicates a pattern of enduring injustice. 
As if to emphasize the seriousness of this situation, in 2004, Amnesty 
International issued a report entitled: “‘Stolen Sisters’: A Human Rights 
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Response to Discrimination and Violence against Indigenous Women 
in Canada.”19 The then president of the Native Women’s Association of 
Canada20 (hereafter NWAC), Beverly Jacobs, a Mohawk member of the 
Six Nations of the Grand Rivers, wrote one of the reports presented to 
Amnesty. In documenting the untold instances of violence against the 
Indigenous women of Canada, Amnesty states: “The social and economic 
marginalization of Indigenous women, along with a history of govern-
ment policies that have torn apart Indigenous families and communities, 
have pushed a disproportionate number of Indigenous women into dan-
gerous situations that include extreme poverty, homelessness and prostitu-
tion.” The report also states: “Despite assurances to the contrary, police in 
Canada have often failed to provide Indigenous women with an adequate 
standard of protection.”21
Previous to the settlement of European immigrants, the status was 
very different for Aboriginal women. They were not regarded as inferior 
to men. Though Bea Medicine, an Indian Lakota anthropologist,22 warns 
against any compensatory notion of an inclusive or universalized indigen-
ous women’s spirituality, given the many tribal differences and regional 
distinctions,23 she does acknowledge that “in most pre-contact societies, 
Native women shared equally with men in social, economic and ritual 
roles.”24 Women were full participants in certain religious ceremonies 
where, though their roles differed from those of the men, they were equally 
regarded as ritual specialists. This, unfortunately, is not the representation 
of women that is found in early colonial studies. These works mirror the 
colonialist attitudes, which cast Aboriginal peoples in stereotypical dual-
ist comparisons where they represented evil.
Today Aboriginal women are taking up their cause for recognition. 
Yet Emma LaRocque, a Métis scholar, is only too well aware that the 
attitudes of the Aboriginal peoples themselves have become influenced 
by the same colonialist imaginary, specifically in its contemporary views 
of women. She states: “Sadly, there are insidious notions within our own 
communities that we as Native women should be ‘unobtrusive, soft-spoken 
and quiet,’ and that we should not assume elected leadership, which is 
taken to mean ‘acting like men.’ That ‘traditional Indian woman’ is still 
often expected to act and dress like an ornamental Pocahontas/‘Indian 
Princess.’”25
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Other contemporary Aboriginal women, such as Teressa Nahanee, a 
lawyer and member of the Squamish Nation, affirm that the status and 
rights of women now need to be protected under the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms26 rather the Indian Act. Nahanee cites with ap-
proval the words of Mary Eberts, counsel for a successful appeal launched 
by NWAC in 1992 for protection of women’s rights under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms: “Aboriginal women are at a watershed: 
taking action under the Charter provides them with perhaps their only 
opportunity to secure a future in which they will have available at least 
some tools with which to fight the massive, persisting systemic discrimin-
ation, on grounds of gender and race, which they face at every turn.”27
Yet this strategy has not been welcomed in some communities. Joyce 
Green, a Métis scholar, has described the negative attitude that has arisen 
towards Aboriginal women who adopt this position: “Women advocat-
ing the explicit protection of women’s equality rights were attacked for 
undermining the greater cause of Aboriginal rights.”28 Nahanee herself 
understands the situation as particularly fraught, but she refuses to let 
the situation be framed in terms of rights versus the community, which 
she views as counterproductive.29 “As long as the dominant forces within 
the Canadian and Aboriginal patriarchy continue to use the prison of 
collective rights to denigrate the Aboriginal women’s struggle for sexual 
equality rights as a dichotomy of individual/collective, women will be un-
able to capture popular support inside and outside the community.”30 Both 
Nahanee and Green consider the individual rights/community issue as a 
false dichotomy. Nahanee asserts: “Each and every individual comprises 
the collective; there is no collective without them.”31 She believes that an 
individual inextricably interconnected with their community in extremely 
complicated ways that are not always in accord with the dominant view.
Canadian Native women’s struggle to regain their rights can also be 
viewed from the perspective of religion, where religion is cast by them 
in a positive light. For the Aboriginal women to regain the rights that 
are being denied them, their former religious status is of utmost priority. 
Its restoration represents both the personal and communal integrity that 
many of them believe they are now being denied. It is a rather unique 
set of circumstances where human rights and religious rights are not at 
variance but, in fact, coincide. The dynamics of this appeal and the dif-
fering responses of the Aboriginal peoples themselves remain part of an 
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ongoing internal debate that is part of the claim of the Aboriginal peoples 
to a form of self-government. Such a debate is also continuing at federal 
and provincial government levels, where certain treaties are still being re-
negotiated as the different peoples that comprise Canada’s First Nations 
seek just restitution and just solutions to long-standing neglect of their 
rights.
THE CASE OF SHARI’A IN ONTARIO, CANADA
On 17 January 2005, former Ontario Attorney General Marion Boyd, 
who had been appointed by the provincial government to evaluate the 
situation, caused something of a stir in the Canadian community by rec-
ommending that Islamic tribunals be allowed to use Sharī‘a law to settle 
family disputes in that province. Was this an example of multicultural-
ism, within in a liberal democracy, going too far in its deference? For 
many women in Canada, including moderate Muslims, this seemed to 
be the situation. The decision, however, was not without precedent. Since 
Ontario’s Arbitration Act was passed in 1991, Orthodox Jews, among 
others, have used such tribunals to arbitrate family problems and mar-
riage disputes. This arrangement was viewed as a way of alleviating heavy 
case-loads in the civil courts. Boyd’s recommendation was not binding, 
however, and both it and the act itself were then submitted to review.
The main supporter of the proposal to introduce Sharī‘a tribunals 
into the province of Ontario was Syed Mumtaz Ali, a member of the 
Islamic Institute for Civil Justice, a retired lawyer, who was born in India. 
Mr. Ali has affirmed that he believed his proposal was in keeping with 
the multicultural policies of his friend, the late Pierre Elliott Trudeau – 
Prime Minister of Canada when the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was 
instituted in 1982. Islamic proponents of the tribunals stated that this 
was an acceptable method of arbitration, as no decision could be made in 
such courts that would violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(1982). There was the added proviso that, if a person was dissatisfied with 
a decision, he/she could appeal to the civil court system.
In opposition were a number of women’s groups, including those of 
Muslim women, who did not appreciate Sharī‘a as conforming with the 
rights of women to equality under the Canadian Charter. Other principal 
concerns of Muslim women who disagreed with the implementation of 
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Sharī‘a were about gender bias, and especially of the intimidation that 
could be exerted on recent immigrant women who may not be informed 
of their rights. There was concern that such women could also be pres-
sured by family into such arbitration under threat of rejection. Another 
basic worry was that, though the arbitration itself was not compulsory, 
many women would be led to believe that they were bound by the rul-
ing and would not be told that they could appeal to civil courts if they 
were unhappy with the judgment. A further major concern was that there 
would not be enough trained personnel to review the implementation on 
the tribunals, which was also one of Boyd’s recommendations.
After more consultations, however, in a decision, dated 11 December 
2005, Dalton McGuinty, the premier of Ontario, rescinded the act that 
had allowed family court proceedings to be judged by any religiously af-
filiated tribunal. This was then an instance of a case where freedom of 
expression trumped freedom of religion. What is more intriguing than 
the decision itself, however, are the reflections of certain feminist thinkers 
on the issue. A Canadian professor of law, Natasha Bakht, commented on 
the situation. She was worried that the move to traditional legal arbitra-
tion reflects an attitude on the part of the government to wash its hands of 
dealing adequately with the status of women in religions – particularly in 
a time when fundamentalism is increasing. The state seems to be reluctant 
to take responsibility for matters that are considered private, especially 
decisions on matters of religion. Bakht fears that such non-regulation by 
government amounts to maintenance of the status quo, i.e., “support of 
pre-existing power relations and distributions of goods within the ‘pri-
vate’ sphere.”32 She arrives at this conclusion because, in Canadian law, 
the burden of proof for a breach of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is on 
the person who is making a charge of such a breach. Such an onus places 
women in a difficult and demanding position.
Bakht also makes an intervention, however, on behalf of Muslim 
women who may want to accept arbitration by Sharī‘a. She states that 
one cannot automatically presume that such women are either ignorant 
or oppressed in making such a choice. To do so would be to “infantilize” 
Muslim women in discriminatory ways. She further declares: “In fact, 
making an overly generalized argument regarding women’s capacities or 
experiences homogenizes women and potentially eliminates important 
differences based on intersecting grounds of oppression.”33 In support of 
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her stance, she quotes Fareeda Shaheed of the network Women Living 
Under Muslim Law (WLUML), who were opposed to the implementa-
tion of Sharī‘a law: “WLUML recognizes that living in different circum-
stances and situations women will have different strategies and priorities. 
We believe that each woman knowing her own situation is best placed to 
decide what is the right strategy and choice for her.”34
Another feminist scholar, Sherene Razack, who is a Professor of 
Sociology and Equity Studies in Education at the Ontario Institute for 
Studies in Education of the University of Toronto, and whose principal 
areas of scholarship concern race and gender issues in the law, warns 
against a strategy that she believes was all too prominent in the debate. 
Though she concedes that something positive may have resulted from this 
exercise, in that the “plans of a small conservative religious faction may 
have been upset,” she believes that there has certainly been a narrowing of 
focus and attitudes that she understands as damaging for all concerned. 
This is because the harmful dualisms have been reinforced. These dual-
isms are: “Women’s rights versus multiculturalism; West versus Muslims; 
enlightened Western feminists versus imperilled Islamic women.”35 From 
her perspective, such divisions have rather pernicious consequences, espe-
cially as they concern feminism. “I argue that in their concern to curtail 
the conservative and patriarchal forces within the Muslim community, 
Canadian feminists (both Muslim and non-Muslim) utilized frameworks 
that installed a secular/religious divide that functions as a colour line, 
marking the difference between the white, modern, enlightened West, 
and people of colour, and in particular, Muslims.”36 In a post 9/11 climate, 
such a facile distinction serves to both “keep in line Muslim communities 
at the same time that it defuses more radical feminist and anti-racist cri-
tique of conservative religious forces.”37
Both of these reactions by Bakht and Razack express the disquiet 
that much current debate on rights and religion, particularly in relation 
to women, is presented in ways that simply reinforce a situation where a 
secular society is positioned in opposition to religion. On the one hand, 
this leaves no space available for public dialogue between concerned mod-
erates of different religions. At the same time, however, this debate, with 
its seeming extremist depiction of all Muslims, forecloses any productive 
debate of the problems posed by all forms of fundamentalism for women.38 
In this way, it only serves to reinforce the division between public and 
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private, which has been responsible for the fact that religious practices 
that are harmful to women have largely remained impervious to pros-
ecution. A number of radical feminists, as well as contemporary atheist 
commentators, e.g., Richard Dawkins, seem to be of the opinion that no 
one in their right mind would have anything to do with religion, and they 
recoil at any attempt at accommodation within a secular society. This, I 
believe, excludes any constructive attempt at a public discussion that could 
be informed by a comparative study of the topic that takes into account 
the various positions of different religions and does not only focus on fun-
damentalism. It is in this connection that I believe scholars in Religious 
Studies do have something to offer by way of mediation in the face of this 
fundamentalist reading of all religion.
THE FUNDAMENTALIST CHALLENGE
Before embarking on an investigation of certain problems posed by fun-
damentalisms and their dictates,39 I would quickly like to survey one ap-
proach that has had some success in breaking down the binaries involved 
in the opposition of the secular and religion. This approach can be ex-
pressed, though not in a glib way, by the feminist catchphrase: “The per-
sonal is the political.” In an early article in 1983, Carole Pateman neatly 
summarized the issues involved as feminism strove to avoid either a denial 
of all things private in favour of integration with the public sphere, or any 
false idealization of the private. She observes: “Feminism looks toward a 
differentiated social order within which the various dimensions are dis-
tinct but not separate or opposed, and which rests on a social conception 
of individuality, which includes both women and men as biologically dif-
ferentiated but not unequal creatures.”40 She is nonetheless realistic in ad-
mitting that, at that time, “A full analysis of the various expressions of the 
dichotomy between the public and private has yet to be provided.”41 Some 
progress has since been made, especially in attempting to move beyond 
Pateman’s emphasis on individuality.
One of the areas where the separation of public and private has been 
addressed with a degree of success is that of violence against women. 
While she bemoans the fact that insufficient progress is being made, and 
that non-prosecution is still prevalent in many parts of the world in cases 
of violence against women, Hilary Charlesworth describes the strategy 
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that needs to be adopted on this matter. Recognizing that “the traditional 
construction of civil and political rights … obscures the most consist-
ent harms done to women,”42 i.e., that they mostly occur in the private 
sphere, Charlesworth advocates the adoption of another stance: “[I]f vio-
lence against women is understood not just as aberrant ‘private’ behaviour, 
but as part of the structure of the universal subordination of women, it 
can never be considered a purely ‘private’ issue: the distinction between 
‘public’ and ‘private’ action in the context of violence against women is not 
a useful or meaningful one.”43 This issue has been addressed by the UN 
in 1994 in its Declaration of the Elimination of Violence against Women 
(DEVW). In the same year, it appointed a special rapporteur on violence 
against women. Then, in 1995, the Platform for Action from the Beijing 
Fourth World Conference on Women declared: “Violence against women 
throughout the life cycle derives essentially from cultural patterns, in par-
ticular the harmful effects of certain traditional or customary practices 
and all acts of extremism linked to race, sex, language or religion that per-
petuate the lower status accorded to women in the family, the workplace, 
the community and Society.”44
As Sally Engle Merry notes, both the Vatican and certain Islamic 
countries were opposed to the final statements in the conference Platform.45 
Unfortunately, as Engle Merry also reports, “Many states have opposed 
this conception of human rights on cultural or religious grounds and have 
refused to ratify women’s rights treaties such as DEVW, or have done 
so only with reservations.”46 Courtney Howland views these actions as 
actually in contravention of the UN.47 Such activity by religious groups 
is extremely worrisome. It would seem that they are making a concerted 
effort to counteract all the gains that women had been making in connec-
tion with rights, particularly at the UN, during past half-century.
There have recently been a number of books and articles that chart 
this emergence of women into the public realm at the UN during the 
past century.48 Radhika Coomaraswamy, who was the first rapporteur to 
be appointed by the United Nations specifically on the issue of Violence 
Against Women in 1994, spoke in 1996 on this development in relation to 
human rights: “A revolution has taken place in the last decade. Women’s 
rights have been catapulted onto the human rights agenda with a speed and 
determination that has rarely been matched in international law. There are 
two aspects to this process: first, the attempt to make mainstream human 
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rights responsive to women’s concerns; and second, the conceptualization 
of certain gender-specific violations as human rights violations.”49
At the same time, however, Amrita Basu adds a sobering qualifica-
tion: “Parallel to the evolution of transnational women’s movements, and 
equally important, has been the phenomenal growth of transnational net-
works of the religious right. We saw this in the 1994 Cairo conference on 
population and development, and again in the Beijing [women’s] confer-
ence of 1995. In both these contexts one found a thoroughly transnational 
alliance of groups on the religious right, not only official organizations but 
also members of non-state organizations, including religious bodies like 
the Catholic Church.”50
Judith Butler describes her own reaction to one of their offensives. She 
was alarmed when she learned of the manoeuvrings of the Vatican in the 
lead-up to the Beijing conference on the status of women in 1995: “The 
Vatican not only denounced the term ‘gender’ as a code for homosexual-
ity, but insisted that the platform language [of the conference] return to 
the notion of sex, in an apparent effort to secure a link between fem-
ininity and maternity as a naturally and divinely ordained necessity.”51 
Joan Wallach Scott, an American critical theorist, describes another such 
interference that occurred in the United States around the same time, 
when a sub-committee of the U.S. House of Representatives reviewed 
submissions that cautioned morality and family values were under attack 
from so-called “gender feminists.”52 As Scott describes it, it appeared 
that the opponents of “gender” insisted that “gender feminists” regarded 
manhood and womanhood, motherhood and fatherhood, heterosexual-
ity, marriage and family as “culturally created, and originated by men to 
oppress women.”53 No doubt they had been informed of Butler’s varia-
tions on the theme of gender, which she had explored in her book Gender 
Trouble.54 The authorities were troubled that women were beginning to 
take decision-making into their own hands, specifically concerning basic 
reproductive issues, and saw “gender” as a sufficiently dubious term with 
which to attack this development.55
Since this initial intervention by the Vatican on the subject of “gender 
feminism,” it has attempted to influence members of the Catholic com-
munities from a number of countries (especially in Central and South 
America56), as well as organize coalitions with Islamic countries, to sup-
port its own position.57 Part of its tactic is to argue that human rights for 
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women, especially in the context of gender, is a “western,” i.e., coloni-
alist, imposition. This alignment by the Vatican with the colonized and 
underprivileged of this world, as well as with non-exploitative interests, 
is patently disingenuous. It is simply another example of the manner in 
which it has orchestrated, often with the help of ruling regional elites, 
the appropriation and deployment of idealized “feminine” norms. These 
traditional formulas are designed to keep women in their proper maternal 
place, as the unsullied guardians of a nation’s morality.
From this perspective, women’s increasing demands for self-deter-
mination are decried as nothing less than selfish self-fulfillment. As men-
tioned previously, the struggles against expanding women’s rights since the 
Beijing conference in various UN committees, ostensibly on the grounds 
of protecting religious traditions, are evidence of this reactionary agenda. 
In this way, as is blatantly obvious in the contemporary United States, but 
also in other religions and countries of the world, the battle lines are being 
drawn by fundamentalists and neo-conservatives. By means of these ac-
tivities, they are perpetuating traditional dichotomies. Some scholars are 
wondering if it is even worth continuing the struggle for women’s rights at 
the UN, so effectively organized has the opposition become.58
Judith Butler’s own response to this outcome is intriguing. While she 
is reluctant to approve of the notion of human rights in the abstract, as 
it involves the implementation of a universal category without due con-
sideration of particular circumstances, she has become perturbed by the 
advances that fundamentalism and neo-conservative interests have made. 
As a result, she is willing to concede that: “Although many feminists have 
come to the conclusion that the universal is always a cover for a certain 
epistemological imperialism, insensitive to cultural texture and difference, 
the rhetorical power of claiming universality for say, rights of sexual au-
tonomy and related rights of sexual orientation within the international 
human right domain appears indisputable.”59 This concession demon-
strates that there is a willingness, even amongst those who are opposed to 
universals as they often tend towards prescription, to allow strategic use of 
a universal statement as a tactic of resistance.
It is by analyzing these developments from within the purview of 
Religious Studies, with the help of insights garnered from feminist schol-
ars in other fields, such as philosophy and anthropology, that women 
scholars in religion could provide assistance to further discussions of this 
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fraught topic. This is because they could help to break down the false, and 
even extreme dichotomy posed by the clash of values that both fundamen-
talists and militant secularists seem to want to maintain between religion 
and rights.
THE QUESTION OF CULTURAL ESSENTIALISM
One of the grounds that certain nations have claimed as a basis for their 
reservations against declarations at the UN is that of “culture,” which is 
often associated with another term, “tradition.” Both of these terms are re-
garded as alternative words for religion. A number of women scholars have 
been extremely vocal in their criticisms of the reified notion of culture that 
is appealed to in these situations. Firstly, the anthropologist Sally Engle 
Merry cautions that: “There is a critical need for conceptual clarification 
of culture in human rights practice. Insofar as human rights rely on an 
essentialized model of culture, it does not take advantage of the potential 
of local cultural practices for change.… A more dynamic understanding 
of culture foregrounds the importance of translators to the human rights 
process and the possibilities for change in local cultural practices.”60
In Engle Merry’s view, instead of being regarded as a stable or static 
concept, and as a non-negotiable item, culture needs to be appreciated in 
a more dynamic way. She describes the manner in which culture is under-
stood in contemporary anthropology as “a far more fluid and changing set 
of values.”61 As a result, culture is now conceived of: “as unbounded, con-
tested, and connected to relations of power, as the product of historical in-
fluences rather than evolutionary change.”62 In addition, for Engle Merry, 
cultural practices always need to be appreciated within their specific con-
texts and with an awareness that the meaning of culture and its effects will 
change with any alteration in a context.63
Another scholar who is similarly suspicious of essentialized definitions 
of culture, be they Eastern or Western, is Uma Narayan. In her book, 
Dislocating Cultures, she issues a warning: “We need to be wary about all 
ideals of ‘cultural authenticity’ that portray ‘authenticity’ as constituted 
by lack of criticism and lack of change. We need to insist that there are 
many ways to inhabit nations and cultures critically and creatively.”64 
From this perspective, Narayan takes issue both with Western colonial 
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impositions of “feminine” ideals, particularly in India, where she was born 
and also with India’s own attempts to invoke essentialist categories, es-
pecially as they have done with Hindu fundamentalism (or Hindutva).65 
While Narayan adroitly exposes the idealized projections of a “national 
and cultural identity” and their false association with Hinduism, she is 
particularly articulate about their exploitation of exalted depictions of 
women as central components of “cultural identity.” She describes how, in 
consequence, women who stray from such models are labelled as “stooges 
of western imperialism” or worse. Narayan expands on this: “The social 
status and roles of women are often represented as of central import to the 
task of ‘resisting westernization’ and ‘preserving national culture’ [thus] 
reducing Third World feminist contestations of local norms and practices 
pertaining to women as ‘betrayal of nations and culture.’”66 Narayan also 
remarks on the rather selective process involved here. This involves apolo-
getic attempts to allow for certain “borrowings” that are characterized as 
“modernist,” e.g., those of an electronic nature and other contemporary 
conveniences, in contrast to those designated “Western” ones. In all such 
categorizations, human rights are inevitably Western. The reality behind 
all such rhetorical flourishes is that it is the women who bare the brunt 
of the responsibility for keeping faithful to religiously prescribed cultural 
roles.
What is especially striking is the false nostalgia involved in these 
claims, with their obvious religious associations. These have been criti-
cized by other Indian women scholars, notably by Uma Chakravarti in 
“Whatever Happened to the Vedic Dasi,”67 and by Kumkum Roy, in her 
ironically titled essay: “Where Women Are Worshipped, There the Gods 
Rejoice.”68 These essays have influenced and support Narayan’s argument 
against any form of cultural essentialism. Such a manipulation of history, 
in order to promote a glorious past from which contemporary society has 
sadly fallen and which needs to be re-established, is a hallmark of many 
fundamentalist religious movements. It is both sad and extremely telling 
that, in many of these religions, the cause of a nation’s fall from grace is 
blamed on women’s waywardness, especially their purported sexual devi-
ance. As a result, women thus need to be rescued from their fallen ways 
and returned to supervision and subservience. Gender, insofar as it enters 
into these calculations, features as a divinely ordained decree. Both men 
and women are directed, under pain of sin or a bad rebirth, to follow the 
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gendered scripts that provide the rigid backbone of a stable, god-fearing 
society.
Narayan will have none of this. In drawing her own conclusions about 
these directives, she states that, just as there can be no one essential de-
scription of the female gender, so there is no authentic cultural identity. 
In expanding this position, Narayan finally rejects not only “the idea that 
there is anything that can solidly and uncontroversially be defined as 
‘Indian culture,’ but also the idea of an ‘African culture’ or [for that mat-
ter] ‘Western culture’”69 Yet Narayan is not completely dismissive of reli-
gion, allowing that: “Many religious traditions are in fact more capacious 
than fundamentalist adherents allow. Insisting on humane and inclusive 
interpretations of religious traditions might, in many contexts, be cru-
cial components in countering the deployment of religious discourses to 
problematic nationalist ends.”70 Narayan’s critiques of both “gender” and 
“culture” and their faulty appropriation by religion can help to counteract 
the effects of their being invoked in idealized and inflexible formulas that 
prevent constructive exchange on any level.
Another contemporary educator and activist for women’s rights is 
Mahnaz Afhkami, who was formerly a minister of state in pre-revolu-
tionary Iran. She is the founding president of the Women’s Learning 
Partnership and has written extensively on women, religion, and rights. 
Her sentiments on the inroads made by fundamentalism and its distor-
tions are similar to those of Narayan. “The Islamist discourse seeks to 
establish a particular rendition of Muslim religion as the true image of 
Muslim societies as they ‘actually’ exist. This presumed image is then 
presented as the actual ‘culture’ of the Muslim people. All ‘rights’ then, 
including Muslim women’s, naturally flow from this culture.”71
In a later essay, again concurring with Narayan, she observes: “In 
Muslim societies, women are particularly targeted because there is no 
better proof of return to a golden past than pushing them back into their 
‘natural’ place. Thus women’s position becomes the yardstick, the measure 
for the success of the fundamentalist agenda.”72 She is also cognizant of 
the machinations of the Islamists who have worked in concert with the 
Vatican, and others opposed to women’s rights, to impede the growth of 
rights by implying that it is solely a Western construct. “By suggesting 
that the West has invented the idea of universality of rights in order to 
impose its way of life on others, the Islamists attempt to disparage the 
273Morny Joy
validity of the argument for rights in the eyes of their peoples, including 
women.”73
Afhkami is particularly committed to breaking down many of the 
binaries that continue to restrict women’s access to religious and political 
freedom. In addition to the public/private and secular/religious divisions, 
she would like to encourage a change so that the notion of human rights 
does not focus solely on the individual but understands the individual as 
always situated within a particular community: “We must move beyond 
the theory of women’s human rights as a theory of equality before the 
law, of women’s individual space, or a ‘room of one’s own,’ to the theory 
of the architecture of the future society where the universality of rights 
and relativity of means merge to operationalize an optimally successful 
coexistence of community and individuality.”74
It is worth noting that Afkhami’s program does contain certain pro-
visos deemed necessary for its success, and one of these is directed square-
ly at the enforced directives inflicted on women: “We must insist that no 
one, man or woman, may claim a right to a monopoly of interpretation 
of God to human beings or a right to force others to accept a particular 
ruling about any religion. The upshot of this position is that women ought 
not to be forced to choose between freedom and God. The same applies 
on the part of tradition.”75
CONCLUSION
In these various analyses and testimonies by women from very different 
areas of interest, regions of the world, and religious backgrounds, there 
is a strong affirmation of the need to support human rights as women’s 
rights. There is also a clear insight into the fact that religious and cultural 
claims can insist on false divisions that interfere with women’s access to 
such rights. Fundamentalist religion is one of the worst culprits. As a re-
sult, one of the counter-strategies is that many women scholars and activ-
ists support forms of mediatory intervention in an attempt to moderate 
the stark binary oppositions that all too often characterize the conflict 
between religion and rights. Universal claims by both sides need to be 
put into a perspective that allows for types of global and local, commun-
ity and individual interactions where very careful attention is paid to the 
specific context. None of these recommendations will be uncomplicated to 
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implement – and they do not necessarily all sit easily together – but they 
are suggestive of a start that holds promise.
As fellow participants in undertaking such an approach, I believe that 
women scholars in religion could provide both relevant information and 
appropriate methodological assistance. From both philosophical and her-
meneutical standpoints they are familiar with both textual interpretation 
and historical particularity, and they can call attention to spurious claims. 
Their training also supplies them with the relevant tools to detect readings 
that are either distinctly literalist in their translations or highly selective in 
determining their applications. My hope is that this paper will stimulate 
interest for women scholars in religion to begin to undertake collaborative 
study and discussion of a comparative nature on this most important topic.
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After Appropriation is the first book to undertake a comprehensive study of 
questions in comparative philosophy and religion.
While the division between the two disciplines of Religious Studies and 
Philosophy is commonplace in western academia, this bifurcation does not 
necessarily apply in non-western settings, where religion and philosophy 
tend to be integrated. As a result, when the disciplines are virtually mu-
tually exclusive, as in the West, a full appreciation of non-Western ap-
proaches to either religion or philosophy is not easily attained, and distor-
tions, such as appropriation, often occur. Within the last ten years, there 
has been a concerted effort on the part of a number of Western scholars to 
try to address these deficiencies and re-examine many ideas that have been 
misappropriated or otherwise excluded. These errors have resulted from a 
traditional approach where the religions and philosophies of non-Western 
peoples have been interpreted by reducing or manipulating their ideas and 
values to fit within Western concepts and categories. This project is con-
ducted with full awareness of the post-colonial critique of such enterprises. 
One of the central questions addressed is how comparative philosophy and 
religion would change if the concepts and categories of non-Western phil-
osophies and religions were taken as of equal importance. 
“I would recommend this book as one that will make a substantial contribution 
to research and be read by a wide variety of students from second year of univer-
sity study onwards to scholars in the field.”
Professor Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad
Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster University
“This book will become of immense historical interest in a short time, and possibly 
as popular as Eric Sharp’s ground-breaking work Comparative Religion.”
Professor Purushottama Bilimoria
Department of Philosophy, University of Melbourne
